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A b s t r a c t
Private health insurance plays an important role in Australian health care 
finance, complementing the universal health insurance system, Medicare, 
established in 1984. The road to the current health insurance system was long and 
winding, filled with political passions and debates. This study covers the major 
historical steps leading to the introduction of Medicare, and analyses specific 
features of the Australian private health insurance sector.
After the recent policy change, regulations of the private health insurance 
industry were somewhat eased, and a new range of benefits permitted to be 
provided. This thesis seeks to analyse the likely effects of the policies, and develops 
a theoretical model which adds to the existing literature on the demand for health.
Studies of demand for medical care and health insurance constitute an 
important part of the health economics literature. Grossman’s theory of demand for 
health has become a major framework for the analysis. Generalisations of the 
Grossman model to incorporate uncertainty about health status and insurance 
against medical expenditure are major challenges for theoretical economists 
working in this area. This thesis proposes a new dynamic continuous time 
stochastic optimisation model of demand for medical care, in which uncertainty 
about health and wealth is modelled by correlated Wiener processes. Consumption 
and leisure decisions are included in the model. A health insurance contract with 
coinsurance rate is introduced in this model, and a two-stage procedure of choosing 
an optimal ex-ante coinsurance rate, and optimal ex-post amount of medical care, 
consumption and leisure is discussed.
The theoretical model is then applied to the 1993-94 Household Expenditure 
Survey, Australia. Even though the full structure of the model cannot be tested on 
this dataset, some empirical evidence is found in support of the new theoretical 
model. A two-part bivariate probit model and quantile regression analysis allowed 
the estimation of the income elasticity of demand for medical care and health 
insurance, which was shown to vary with income. To study the quantitative effect 
of the recent policy change based on the new theoretical model, a finer level of data 
is needed.
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1C h a p t e r  l .  I n t r o d u c t i o n
l . i  H e a l t h  a n d  E c o n o m ic s
Health is an indispensable part of every persons’ well-being. By the 
definition given in the Constitution of the World Health Organization (WHO), 
health is a “state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely 
the absence of disease or infirmity”. Clearly, this definition stretches well beyond 
the generally accepted everyday notion of being healthy as being disease-free. 
According to the WHO, the social aspects of well-being ought to be included in the 
notion of health. This approach sets the broader goals for member countries in 
shaping their population health policies.
Humankind has always been concerned with health issues. The mere 
survival of the human race depended on building up the arsenal to fight numerous 
diseases, to develop better and wiser practices of preserving the health of the 
members of human society, and to protect the ecological health of the environment. 
Medical science was among the first sciences to develop in ancient times, and its 
development and achievements have been more remarkable than anything else 
produced by the human mind. Modern medical science, equipped by genetic 
engineering techniques and advanced diagnostic and pharmaceutical technology, is 
pushing the frontiers of the thinkable in its constant search for new cures and new 
means of extending and enhancing human life and well-being. As a result, health 
outcomes have improved significantly, especially in the developed countries. In 
Australia, average life expectancy at birth has increased over the last century by 
38% for males (from 55.2 to 75.9 years) and by 39% for females (from 58.8 to 81.5 
years). Australian life expectancy at birth is among the highest in the world, and is 
similar to that of Canada, Norway, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the 
United States1.
1AIHW (2000), pg. 11-2.
2Supply and demand sides of the medical care market, and its allocative 
efficiency, have become a subject of economic research within the scope of health 
economics. The field of health economics also incorporates studies aimed at 
measuring health and health-related quality of life, economic evaluation of health 
practices, their cost-effectiveness, studies of optimal resource allocation, incentives, 
supplier-induced demand, the theory of demand for medical care, the impact of 
health insurance on demand, and the welfare effects of health finance. This list is 
not by any means exhaustive, and the scope of subjects is constantly expanding in 
this rapidly growing area of economic thought. Understanding the economic 
mechanisms of the health care market is of primary importance, given the 
undoubted value of health for individuals, an apparent increase in aggregate 
health spending, and a foreseeable increase in demand for medical care due to 
population ageing in the industrialised countries. Good economic theory empowers 
policy-makers with the proper tools to address the often sensitive issues of health 
care and finance.
1.2. G o v e r n m e n t  In t e r v e n t io n s  i n  a  H e a l t h  Ca r e  M a r k e t
Medical services, supplied by medical practitioners, are aimed at improving 
patients’ health status. Outcomes of the same medical procedures are often 
uncertain, depending on the individual characteristics of the patient. The costs of 
procedures with similar outcomes can vary significantly. There is an asymmetry of 
information about the efficiency and the cost of treatment available to a doctor and 
a patient. The market for medical services has long been thought of as being far 
from efficient, due to the informational asymmetries intrinsically present in 
purchasing medical services. This market imperfection was used as a major reason 
for government intervention in the provision or finance of medical services. As a 
result, by 1985, 16 out of 24 OECD countries introduced universal health insurance 
systems with varying depths of coverage. In 1984, a national universal health 
insurance, Medicare, was established in Australia.
The state approach to health issues is part of the state ideology. An 
historical battle between libertarianism and egalitarianism shaped the official 
attitude to the matters of equity in health and access to health in the developed 
countries. Countries like the United Kingdom and Canada embraced a large degree 
of government involvement in health care finance and provision. These countries
3established universal public health insurance systems. Following a different route, 
the United States allowed a health care market to develop freely. Health 
expenditure in the US is financed predominantly from private sources, with public 
assistance limited to the most vulnerable groups (aged, disabled and unemployed). 
Employer-provided health insurance is a major type of private health insurance in 
the United States.
Health care is an important industry in the developed countries, and has 
been growing continuously, both in real terms and as a proportion of GDP. The 
growth of health expenditure was particularly rapid in the United States. Some 
researchers attributed the above-average growth to the predominantly private 
method of financing health expenditure, based on private health insurance. It has 
been established in a number of studies that the availability of health insurance 
effectively subsidises medical care and induces excess demand for it. This 
phenomenon, labelled as moral hazard, became a subject of research for many 
economists. Another possible explanation involves the improvement in medical 
technology, which occurs more rapidly in more generously financed systems and 
contributes the most to the rising costs of treatment. Systems that rely on public 
health insurance often use some degree of rationing in controlling the demand for 
medical services. One example is waiting lists for elective surgery, known to exist 
in many countries with universal public health insurance coverage, including 
Australia.
The Australian health care system incorporates a universal tax-funded 
health insurance, Medicare, complemented with the private health insurance 
system, which is an important source of Australian health care finance. Most 
hospital beds in Australia are publicly funded. At the same time, most of the 
medical practitioners are private providers operating on a fee-for-service basis. 
Medicare guarantees free hospital care in public hospitals for all Australians, and 
provides subsidies for a wide range of outpatient services and prescribed 
pharmaceuticals. Private health insurance covers accommodation for private 
patients in both public and private hospitals, provides the patient with a choice of 
doctor, and reimburses some additional in-hospital and outpatient charges. 
Privately insured patients are eligible for all publicly insured benefits, including 
free treatment in public hospitals. Private and public health insurance systems are 
interconnected: part of the medical expenditure of the privately insured is claimed
4through Medicare, with additional benefits payable by the private health fund. The 
universal insurance, Medicare, relies on the viable and efficient private insurance 
that diverts demand for inpatient services from public to private hospitals. The 
current hybrid system of health care finance in Australia is playing an important 
role in easing the budgetary pressure of national health care expenditure.
The Australian health care sector, and private health insurance in 
particular, are highly regulated industries. One of the major regulatory principles 
that has been in place is community rating which forbids premium discrimination 
based on the insured’s medical history, age and other risk factors. Since the 
introduction of the public scheme, Medicare, in 1984, private health insurance 
coverage steadily declined, plummeting from over 80% in the late-sixties to as low 
as 30% by the end of 1998. The insured population became increasingly old due to 
adverse selection. Changes in regulations had to be made, and several important 
legislative moves have been undertaken by the government as part of the private 
health insurance reform. The new policies include provision for “no gap” and 
“known gap” health insurance contracts, which either allow for the elimination of, 
or at least impose a cap on, the out-of-pocket medical expenditure of privately 
insured patients. Another important regulatory change is the move to a lifetime 
community rating, resulting from the introduction of Lifetime Health Cover. What 
is the likely effect of the recent policy changes on total medical expenditure? To 
study this question, it is necessary to have an adequate theoretical model of 
demand for medical care which explicitly addresses health insurance choice.
1.3. A n a l y t ic a l  F r a m e w o r k
It has been recognised in modern economics that for an individual, good 
health is what ultimately matters, and medical services are just the inputs into 
some health production process, the output of which is an improvement in personal 
health and well-being. This idea is in the core of Michael Grossman’s model of 
demand for health, which became the major theoretical framework in this area. 
The model was first formulated in a deterministic setting, and consequently 
expanded by other researchers to incorporate uncertainty. Health insurance 
protects an individual against uncertain financial losses resulting from medical 
expenditure in case of disease or accident. Medical care is needed to alleviate pain, 
reduce individual suffering and improve the patient’s health, and medical
5expenditure is what can be covered by health insurance. There are also large 
uninsurable utility losses due to illness in terms of physical and moral suffering 
and limitations.
A large number of models of health insurance were proposed in the 
literature. The fundamental difference between health insurance and other types of 
non-life insurance is that it is difficult to put an “insured value” or a ceiling on the 
value of health. Health is basically an uninsurable commodity; any amount of 
medical care may fail to restore health to its pre-accident or pre-illness level. 
Building a realistic, yet analytically tractable, model of health capital with 
insurance against uncertain medical expenditure is a challenging task, which has 
attracted significant intellectual resources and has become an area of growing 
attention for theoretical health economists.
The theoretical contribution made in this thesis will be largely within the 
general scope of the Grossman framework. A dynamic model of the demand for 
medical care is proposed which incorporates uncertainty about realised health and 
income, has a labour supply decision, and is capable of incorporating an insurance 
contract specified by a proportional copayment (coinsurance rate). It is a new model 
which to the best of my knowledge does not have an analogue in the literature.
Full empirical testing of the theoretical model was not possible due to the 
lack of readily available sufficiently disaggregated and complete data. Even so, an 
attempt was made to find some empirical evidence in support of the model 
assumptions in the Australian data from the latest available 1993-94 Household 
Expenditure Survey. These data were also used to study the private health 
insurance decision prior to the recent reform and determine factors influencing 
private health insurance choice. Theoretical findings of the thesis were used to 
justify applicability of the empirical models. Further empirical research based on a 
much richer dataset is needed to test the full structure of the new theoretical model 
developed in this thesis.
The thesis seeks to address the following questions:
• What determined the current shape of health insurance in Australia?
What were the main historical steps in its development, who were the
6major players in decision-making process, and where does the 
Australian system stand compared to other developed countries?
• What is the role of the private health insurance industry in Australian 
health finance? Why was private health insurance coverage falling 
following the inception of Medicare? How have recent government 
policies changed this trend?
• Is it plausible that extending the payable benefits through “no gap” and 
“known gap” policies will not lead to an increase in demand for the 
newly covered services? What does economic theory say about the effect 
of health insurance on the demand for medical care?
• How can the theory of demand for medical care be extended? Is it 
possible to model medical expenditure, understood in broad terms, as an 
activity which increases the survival chances of a consumer?
• Is it possible to have a model of demand for medical care which will fully 
incorporate uncertainty about health status and income, include 
consumption and labour supply decision, and allow for an inclusion of 
health insurance, i.e. insurance against uncertain medical expenditure? 
How does the presence of insurance change the evaluation of health, and 
the optimal level of medical care?
• Is there empirical evidence justifying the theoretical assumptions of 
these models? How is the theory applicable to the data?
• What are the major determinants of the private health insurance choice 
in the Australian context? Are they easy to target in setting government 
policy in the private health insurance area?
1.4. O u t l in e  o f  t h e  Th e s is
Chapter 2 contains a concise overview of the history of health insurance in 
Australia. It describes the political battle between the Labor and Liberal parties on 
the issues of the principles of universal health coverage, which brought about the 
Voluntarism versus Compulsion debate that eventually led to the introduction of
7Medicare. Data on a finance mix of health care, the structure of hospital finance, 
and on the role and financial performance of the private health insurance sector 
are discussed in this chapter. The problems caused by the gradual deterioration of 
membership base and worsening of the insured pool, which plagued the private 
health insurance industry in the mid-nineties, triggered a set of government 
initiatives aimed at revitalising and strengthening the sector, including some 
important changes in regulations. This chapter contains details of the new 
legislation adopted as part of the reform process, and discusses the first effects of 
the policy implementation.
Chapter 3 contains an overview of the health economics literature on the 
demand for health and health insurance. It depicts the convergence of two strands 
of literature, dynamic deterministic studies of the demand for health pioneered by 
Grossman, and largely static studies of health insurance, into the recent attempts 
to create a hybrid Grossman-type model with insurance.
Chapter 4 proposes a theoretical model of demand for medical care with 
endogenous survival probabilities. In this model, medical care offsets the 
exogenous increase in the instantaneous mortality rate of the representative agent. 
The agent’s efficiency depends on his or her health (approximated by a mortality 
rate). The intertemporal expected utility maximisation problem is solved for an 
optimal consumption, leisure and medical care. Expected life is an endogenous 
outcome of the model. The properties of the model are discussed and compared to 
those known in the literature.
Chapter 5 develops a continuous time stochastic model of demand for 
medical care and health insurance. Health capital is measured by a continuous 
index assumed to be a Wiener process. Similar specification is used for the wealth 
disturbances, which are correlated with instantaneous shocks to health. A 
stochastic optimisation technique is used to solve the expected utility maximisation 
problem, and the optimality conditions for the choice of consumption, leisure and 
medical care are obtained under the assumptions of constant relative risk aversion 
with respect to health and wealth, constant elasticities of the health adjustment 
and production functions, and a set of several other technical assumptions. The 
model is then extended to incorporate health insurance covering some proportion of 
total medical expenditure, and two possible insurance contracts are discussed. A
8new relationship concerning the coinsurance elasticity of the demand for medical 
care is obtained, with the result dependent on the degree of relative risk aversion 
with respect to health.
Chapter 6 contains an empirical analysis of private health insurance choice 
and medical expenditure based on the 1993-94 Household Expenditure Survey, 
Australia. It focuses on establishing the determinants of private health insurance 
choice. A detailed description of data on demographic characteristics of the 
subsample chosen for the analysis (age, gender, family composition), socioeconomic 
factors (employment, income), and health status is reported in this chapter. Links 
between the presence of private health insurance and health-related activities 
(including medical care and fitness expenditure) are studied. Of particular interest 
is the empirical distribution of medical and fitness expenditure, and income. 
Evidence is found for the assumption of their lognormality.
Chapter 7 extends the analysis begun in Chapter 6. It contains estimates 
from the several empirical models based on the theory developed in Chapter 5. 
Logit and probit models of private health insurance choice are estimated, along 
with the income elasticity of demand for insurance. A quantile regression 
technique is used to investigate properties of the conditional distribution of the 
logarithm of medical expenditure. Heteroscedasticity is confirmed for the 
households level data. A probit model corrected for heteroscedasticity is 
implemented in this chapter. Finally, a two-part model of joint choice of private 
health insurance and positive medical expenditure decisions, followed by a 
regression analysis of the logarithm of total medical expenditure, is implemented. 
Results of the model suggest that income is an important determinant of both the 
decision to insure and to consume medical care. Income elasticity of the demand for 
medical care is found to increase with income. The relative income elasticity of 
demand for insured and uninsured households is also studied.
Chapter 8 offers a summary of results reported in the earlier chapters of the 
thesis, and summarises findings in response to the questions raised in this 
introductory chapter.
C h a p t e r  2 . H e a l t h  I n s u r a n c e  i n  A u s t r a l i a : 
H i s t o r i c a l  a n d  P o l i t i c a l  P e r s p e c t i v e s
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2.1. Th e  A u s t r a l ia n  H e a l t h  Ca r e  S y s t e m  i n  In t e r n a t io n a l  
p e r s p e c t iv e
There exists a wide spectrum of health care systems in the developed world, 
with different degrees of government involvement in health care finance. The 
United Kingdom, for example, has a tax-financed National Health Service system 
providing most health services to the entire population. By contrast, the United 
States system has minimum government involvement and relies heavily on the 
private sector. The US government finances medical services only to the most 
socially disadvantaged (the aged and the lowest income groups), while the rest of 
the population use private health insurance to meet the costs of their health care. 
The Australian health care system is somewhere in the middle of the spectrum, 
having evolved into “an amalgam of the British and American arrangements”.2
The Australian health sector as a proportion of GDP has grown from 5 per 
cent in the early 1960s to 8.5 per cent in 1998-99. The share of total health 
expenditure financed from public sources over the period 1960-94 was quite low 
compared with other OECD countries, at about 68 per cent in 1990-94.3 The high 
share of government funds in health finance in the developed countries is 
attributed to the fact that, by 1985, 16 out of 24 OECD countries introduced 
universal health insurance systems with varying depth of coverage. In 1984, a 
national universal health insurance, Medicare, was established in Australia. 
Medicare provides free treatment at public hospitals and subsidies for a range of 
medical services and is supplemented by the government Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Scheme and nursing home care subsidies.
2 Deeble (1983), pg. 429.
3 Butler (1999), pg. 47.
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Private health insurance in Australia co-exists with Medicare, providing for 
a range of benefits, including coverage for a private hospital treatment and cash 
benefits for outpatient medical services not insurable under Medicare. The private 
health insurance industry has been subject to a number of regulations, and its role 
in the health care system has declined over the past several decades. Until 
recently, various regulations did not allow health insurance funds to offer contracts 
which would completely eliminate the financial uncertainties of individual medical 
costs when ill. Thus, it was not a full insurance, if the term is to be taken literally.
Health care finance, including the principles of medical practitioners’ 
remuneration, is often a sensitive issue. If the finance policies are perceived as re­
distributive, the group that is being hurt by the policy lobbies to protect its 
interests. Very often it is the medical profession who opposes the particular finance 
policy, and, indeed, the Australian Medical Association has played a very 
important role in shaping the Australian health care and finance system into its 
present state.
Among the developed nations, two countries have a long history of political 
battles over their health care arrangements, namely the United States and 
Australia. In the United States, all attempts to introduce a national health 
insurance system have failed, with the result that private insurance plays the most 
important role in financing medical care. The US health expenditure has risen at 
an alarming rate, now comprising more than 14% of GDP.
In Australia, health care and finance have attracted significant political 
attention for many decades. The essence of the policy-making process in health 
care arrangements was that every Labor party government attempted to modify 
the existing system to increase the universal accessibility of health care, sometimes 
ignoring economic costs. This reflected the party’s norms and goals towards 
equalisation and egalitarianism. The Liberal party defended the principle of 
freedom of individual choice and individual responsibility, thus believing that 
government should facilitate development of individuals and not strip them of their 
personal choice. Historically, it has been a battle of collectivism and individualism 
that shaped the political platforms of the two parties. Understanding the principal 
differences between the Labor and Liberal parties’ positions, as well as the 
strategic motives of the Australian Medical Association and of the private health
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insurance industry is essential in reconstructing the historic path along which the 
current hybrid Australian health insurance system developed.
2.2. Th e  H is t o r y  o f  t h e  H e a l t h  I n s u r a n c e  D e b a t e  i n  A u s t r a l ia
“Medical insurance, in particular, may have become too 
highly politicised in Australia in respect of conflicts between 
the major political groupings and with the medical 
profession..”4
Historic information presented in this section draws heavily on the excellent 
reviews by Sax (1984) , Dewdney (1972) , Hunter (1969) and other researchers, 
and is not by any means complete.
2.2.1. The Origin of Health Insurance in pre-Commonwealth Australia
Health insurance in Australia can be traced back to 1831, when a “friendly 
society” was formed by a group of Sydney boat-builders. The Melbourne Union 
Benefit Society was founded soon after, in 1839. It provided members with weekly 
sickness or unemployment benefits for a maximum of eight months, with free 
medical services from the society’s surgeon, and with a funeral benefit. The 
premiums were based on a risk assessment, with members in more dangerous 
occupations paying higher contributions. By the beginning of the 20th century, 
about 250,000 persons contributed to the friendly societies plans. Including family 
members of policy holders, that amounted to more than a million Australians 
covered by friendly societies insurance contracts. This would represent about a 
quarter of the Australian population of 4 million at that time5.
4 Palmer and Short (1994), pg. 327.
5 Dewdney (1972) , pg. 20.
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At the same time, individual private hospitals established contributory 
schemes, or “hospital funds” with weekly contributions. The first funds were 
founded in 1929, at Perth Hospital, and at Bellingen Hospital, NSW. Both health 
funds and friendly societies later became registered health organizations under the 
National Health Act.
The Australian Medical Society, or an Australian branch of the British 
Medical Association, was founded in 1859 and has been a major player in the 
health care field ever since, lobbying for the interests of medical practitioners.
2.2.2. Early Commonwealth Actions in Social and Health Areas: Failure of 
the Earle Page Plan /, 1928
The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act of 1900 left responsibility 
for community health with the States. The only health-related matter under the 
jurisdiction of the Commonwealth was quarantine. The Commonwealth was given 
authority to provide grants of financial assistance to the States. Among the early 
Commonwealth Government initiatives were the National Old-Age-Pension 
Scheme introduced in 1909, the Invalid Pension scheme of 1910, and the “baby- 
bonus” scheme of 1912.
The Minister for Health and the Commonwealth Department of Health was 
created in 1921 by the Hughes (Labor) government. This signified a development of 
the concept of health from the matters of quarantine and contagious disease 
prevention and sanitation to the broader matters of public health. On its inception, 
the Department of Health served mainly advisory and investigatory purposes, and 
did not play any important political role until the 40s. “The critical formative 
period did not arrive until the forties when, stimulated by Labor’s reformist 
enthusiasm, Parliament, the administration and the medical profession began to 
debate health problems and were thus led to formulate their respective provisions 
and plans”.6
6 Hunter (1969), pg. 19.
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The health care system first truly came into the political limelight in 1923, 
under the Bruce-Page Nationalist-CP Coalition government. The Royal 
Commission on National Insurance that was in function over 1923-27 first raised 
the question of the creation of a tax-funded national social insurance scheme that 
would provide sickness, invalidity, maternity and superannuation benefits. At that 
time, there were some voluntary sickness insurance plans available through 
Friendly Societies which contracted medical doctors to provide services to their 
members, as well as providing a number of other cash benefits. The 
Commonwealth Royal Commission on Health set up in 1925, to look into more 
coordinated health policies, at Commonwealth and States levels, led to the 
establishment of the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC).
The Royal Commission on National Insurance submitted its final report in 
1927, and, in 1928, Dr. Earle Page, Treasurer in the Bruce-Page Ministry, 
introduced his National Insurance Bill to the Commonwealth Parliament. No 
specific provisions were made in this Bill for the development of the National 
Health Scheme. The proposed compulsory insurance scheme, which included flat 
rate contributions based on gender from both employers and employees, received 
sharp criticism from the friendly societies. They claimed that the new scheme 
would destroy the whole spirit of freedom in consumers’ choice, and was 
unjustifiable. The employers were concerned with the effect the scheduled 
contributions would have on wage rates, and with increased disadvantage against 
foreign competition. Up until 1929, when the Bruce-Page government was defeated 
in the elections, no practical steps were made to pursue the recommendations of 
the National Insurance Bill 1928.
2.2.3. Steps towards a National Insurance Scheme: the Kinnear Report and 
the National Health and Pensions Act 1938
Under the subsequent Scullin (Labor) government in 1929-31, the problem 
of health care was overshadowed by other government concerns, including the 
Great Depression, and it did not emerge again until the mid-thirties. In 1934, the 
Lyons Ministry (United Australia Party) considered the resurrection of the Earle 
Page Plan, but no immediate policy steps were undertaken. Instead, the following 
year, in 1935, the Federal Government turned to the British Government for a
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word of advice on designing National Insurance and Health Schemes for Australia. 
The advice was given by Sir Walter Kinnear, head of the insurance department in 
the British Ministry of Health, who developed a contributory scheme of health and 
pensions insurance for Australia, which closely resembled the British National 
Insurance system. The essential recommendations of the Kinnear Report, 
submitted in 1937, included the provision of health insurance for lower income 
earners based on tax finance. The British scheme was thought to be suitable for 
implementation in Australia, subject to certain adjustments to accommodate for 
the existing system of voluntary health insurance funds (friendly societies and 
hospital funds). One of the major recommendations of the scheme was establishing 
the capitation method of doctors’ reimbursement. This was something the 
Australian Medical Association could not help but rebel against. As part of the 
recommended arrangements, major operations and confinements would not be 
covered, and the cover would not extend to dependants of an insured working-age 
person. Cover for those contingencies would still be provided through voluntary 
contributions to the Friendly Societies. The social insurance scheme included 
sickness, disability, old age and widowhood cash benefits, and was designed to be 
financed through compulsory contributions by employers and employees, and 
government assistance.
Following the Kinnear Report, the National Health and Pensions Insurance 
Bill was introduced into the Federal Parliament by R. G. Casey, Treasurer in the 
Lyons Ministry, in May 1938. It differed from the 1928 Earle Page National 
Insurance Bill in the provision for free medical attendance and treatment for 
insured people, including medicines and certain appliances. The scheme would be 
tax-financed by imposing a 2% levy on the wage income. The National Health and 
Pensions Act was passed in July 1938, and, as Sir Walter Kinnear himself 
characterised it,
“for the first time, with this scheme Australia has stepped into the front
rank of the nations in the provision of social services for its people”7.
7 National Insurance Commission (1938) , pg. 26.
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But, like the previous scheme of 1928, the new scheme of 1938 was never 
implemented. It came under sharp criticism from the Labor Party, which claimed 
the law was not national, that significant groups, namely farmers and the self- 
employed, were excluded, and that the scope of benefits was limited. The AMA and 
the Friendly Societies were, quite understandably, also opposing the Act. They felt 
threatened by legislation which could substantially undermine their positions .
The AMA most heatedly opposed the capitation principle of doctors' 
reimbursement. Even though agreement was reached in March 1938, before the 
Bill was proposed, between the Executive Committee of the British Medical 
Association in Australia (Australian Medical Association, AMA) and the Federal 
Government, on doctors’ remuneration under the national health scheme, after the 
Bill was introduced in the Parliament this agreement was repudiated.
Another opposition group was comprised of the Friendly Societies. Their 
main concern was imminent erosion of their voluntary membership base, due to 
loss to the new funds which were planned to be established as part of the new 
program. Friendly Societies were also unhappy with not having a decisive role in 
the administration of the health insurance scheme. All of this led to strong 
opposition to the new legislative proposal from Friendly Societies, the medical 
profession, and some representatives of employers and employees. In response to 
the doctor’s critique, the National Insurance Commission was established in 1938, 
and a Royal Commission was appointed to investigate the doctors remuneration 
scheme. This did not lead to any practical developments, due to the changes in 
political circumstances and new commitments of the Government on the onset of 
World War II. As a result, the National Health and Pensions Insurance Act was 
effectively demised.
2.2.4. In Search of Reconciliation: Parliamentary Joint Committee, the 
NHMRC and the AMA Joint Effort, 1939-41
Under the Menzies United Australia Party (UAP) and UAP - 
Country Party (CP) coalition governments, further work went into developing a 
comprehensive system of health insurance in 1939 - 1941. The responsibility for 
developing the new plan rested with three major bodies: the Parliamentary Joint
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Committee on Social Security, the NHMRC, and the Federal Council of the AMA. 
The Medical Planning Committee was set up by the Joint Committee (JC) to work 
on the official government recommendations on the issues of health care and 
finance. Implementation of the proposed changes would be left until after the War. 
At the same time, the AMA was working on an alternative plan for national health 
insurance that would satisfy the medical profession. The plans contradicted each 
other on the methods of reform implementation and the role of the medical 
profession in the new system. The AMA could not accept a system where medical 
doctors became salaried government employees. Neither was it content with the 
capitation as opposed to a fee-for-service reimbursement system.
All parties agreed on the flaws within the National Health and Pensions 
Insurance Act 1938, but their proposed remedies were widely different. The 
government bodies (JC and NHMRC) insisted upon universal free health coverage, 
financed through the taxation system, with doctors employed by the government. 
The proposed system would cover not only hospital and out-patient services, but 
dentistry and ophthalmology as well. Administratively, implementation of this 
plan would run into the problem of hospital finance. At the time, about forty 
percent of Australian hospitals were private, and the public ones were in poor 
financial shape8. The Commonwealth government was considering giving subsidies 
to the States for providing hospital services free for patients in public hospitals. 
The policy was to be preceded by the uniform standardisation of hospitals to 
comply with the major requirements. The AMA plan envisaged expanding the role 
of the voluntary health insurance to cover a larger scope of benefits and preserving 
the historically high role of Friendly Societies. Additional measures were proposed 
in the plan to ensure accessibility of the services by the poor and unemployed. The 
concept of the “safety net”, as perceived by the AMA, evolved from compulsory 
insurance for low-income groups to retaining voluntary insurance and 
supplementing it with government subsidies for the poor and unemployed. The 
ultimate goal of the AMA proposal would be to minimise changes to contemporary 
medical practice. The idea of abandoning private practice and replacing it with 
government-contracted salaried services that was supported in the JC and
8 Hunter (1969), pg. 97.
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NHMRC proposal was despicable to the medical profession. The final results of the 
joint efforts of the JC, NHMRC and the AMA were unsatisfactory. A way to 
reconcile government objectives and the interests of the medical profession was not 
found (for a summary of the main recommendations on National Health by the 
three major bodies involved in the decision-making, see Hunter (1969) 9).
2.2.5. Gaining Legal Power: Labor Years 1941-49 and Amendment to the
Constitution 1946
The Labor party came to power in 1941 and remained in office until 
1949 (Curtin Government 41-45, Forde ministry 1945, and Chifley ministry 1945- 
49). Given the history of the ALP fight for a universal national health care system, 
along with general problems of social security, the return of the health issue to the 
political agenda was to be expected. During the World War II years, health reform 
was under consideration, previous recommendations of the NHMRC and JC were 
carefully studied, and further government reports were produced. Proposed 
measures were quite radical: at the ALP’s General Federal Conference in 1943, 
Senator Fraser urged the government to undertake active steps to introduce a 
comprehensive social security act which would include the nationalisation of 
medical care and other social safety nets. This proposal was rejected, but certain 
steps aimed at strengthening the Commonwealth’s position in health policies and 
its constitutional powers in general were undertaken, which led to the foundation 
of the future ALP social program.
The corner-stones of the new program included full employment and an 
equitable (re-distributive) social security system as main policy objectives over the 
post-war reconstruction period. As the instruments to finance the program the 
Federal Treasurer J. B. Chifley proposed compulsory progressive personal and 
corporate income taxes. Following this proposal, the National Welfare Fund was 
created in 1943 to accumulate a quarter of the tax revenue which would be 
channelled into the social security system. Chifley did not advocate that the 
government take direct control over medical care provision, but argued the state
9 Hunter (1969), pg. 107-8.
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had to intervene in sectors where private markets failed to deliver services 
efficiently and equitably. As private practices did not seem threatened, the policy 
was likely to coerce increasing number of doctors to cooperate with the government 
in the new program. Nevertheless, the opposition parties perceived the policy as 
trying to “socialise” everything, and that backfired. Thus the ALP’s attempt to pass 
this new health legislation failed.
There were also constitutional obstacles as to the powers delegated to the 
Commonwealth in health management, which traditionally belonged to the States. 
Labor’s proposal to give the Commonwealth powers over national health programs 
failed in the 1944 referendum, and a second referendum in 1946 provided for 
limited powers only. The Pharmaceutical Benefits Bill of 1944, according to which 
the costs of prescribed medicines were to be covered from the National Welfare 
Fund if the prescriptions were written on the special Government-approved forms, 
faced strong opposition from the AMA. A tacit policy of non-cooperation, as well as 
legal action, was commenced. The medical profession refused to accept the rules 
imposed on them by the new legislation. In October 1945, the High Court of 
Australia held the Act to be invalid, judging that it inappropriately controlled 
doctors and chemists. The Hospital Benefits Act introduced in 1945 was the 
Federal Government’s next step towards the financing of institutional health care 
nationwide. It provided for per diem hospital benefits in both private and public 
hospitals, and hospital treatment was made free for public beds in public wards.
As a result of the 1946 referendum, Paragraph (xxiiiA) was added to Section 
51 of the Constitution. The Federal Government gained legal power over “the 
provision of maternity allowances, widows’ pensions, child endowment, 
unemployment, pharmaceutical, sickness and hospital benefits, medical and dental 
services (but not so as to authorize any form of civil conscription), benefits to 
students and family allowances”. The wording in brackets was added following the 
suggestion of the President of the Federal Council of the AMA, Sir Henry Newland, 
supported by then Leader of the Opposition, R. G. Menzies. Section 51(xxiiiA) 
became a powerful addition to the existing Section 51(ix), which entitled the 
Commonwealth to provide for quarantine, and Section 96, which enabled the 
Commonwealth to “grant financial assistance to any State on such terms and 
conditions as the Parliament thinks fit.” These were the only constitutional
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channels through which the government could convey its health care finance and 
policy.
Another unsuccessful legal initiative of that time was the Labor National 
Health Service Act, which was accepted in 1948, amended in 1949, and then 
repealed in 1953. The implementation of the Act was administered by the 
Commonwealth Director General of Health. The Act empowered the 
Commonwealth to provide or arrange for general medical or dental services, 
specialist services and diagnostics, medical services in universities and schools, to 
run health facilities, and to manufacture medical supplies. It is worth noting that 
the AMA perceived the new government initiatives as an attack against doctors’ 
freedom and the freedom of their patients. A new Pharmaceutical Benefits Act of 
1947 was boycotted by medical practitioners, and the government retaliated by 
adding Section 7A to the Act which made it an offence if a medical practitioner 
failed to use the Government-authorized form for the prescription of the approved 
medicine. In 1949, the High Court invalidated the amendment, and the medical 
profession continued their tactics of non-cooperation.
There were also several successful legal moves in social welfare and health 
areas, including the Maternity Allowance Act 1943, the Invalid and Old Age 
Pensions and Funeral Benefits Act 1943, the Unemployment Benefit and Sickness 
Act 1944, the Hospital Benefits Act 1945-47-48, the Tuberculosis Act 1945-46-48, 
and the Mental Institutions Benefits Act 1948 (see Hunter (1969) for details10).
2.2.6. Establishing Australian National Voluntary Health Insurance: the 
Earle Page Scheme II and the National Health Act 1953
The Menzies Liberal-Country party government came to power in 1949 and 
started to develop their own health program. The Minister for Health, Earle Page, 
who had previously supported the compulsory insurance scheme (see Section 2.2.2), 
put together separate legal initiatives in the health care system into the National 
Health Act adopted in 1953. The National Health Act 1953 consolidated previous 
legislation on general and pensioner pharmaceutical benefits, on medical benefits
10 Hunter (1969) , pg. 123-27.
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and on a pensioner medical service. The Earle Page scheme led to the introduction 
of the first government-sponsored national insurance system in Australia, whilst 
preserving the role of voluntary insurance, which was proclaimed to be a well- 
established principle in Australia. It was attempting to unite the efforts of both the 
government and the individual, to form a voluntary partnership for mutual benefit, 
which recognised the right of choice for the consumer of medical care, and for the 
care provider -  the medical practitioner.
Defending the voluntary principle, Sir Earle Page warned that the “great 
danger in any government-aided health scheme is the tendency to develop a 
psychology of dependence and diminished personal and community responsibility. 
The fundamental aim of any social security scheme should be to raise the 
individual to a level at which he can help himself. Any such scheme should contain 
elements that encourage self-reliance and a sense of personal responsibility. Also, 
it should stress the obligation of the individual to make at least part of his 
contribution directly to the functioning and cost of the scheme. The Government is 
doing this by a unique device of stimulating voluntary insurance by government 
aid, which tremendously increases the value of the premium in medical security”11. 
The essence of the scheme was that the Commonwealth government provided 
rebates for part of the medical bills, thus subsidising private insurance. Special 
private non-profit funds were established to administer the scheme. It was a 
voluntary scheme that encouraged participation in private insurance. The most 
disadvantaged groups were provided with a safety net through the Page plan.
Several legal moves were implemented before introduction of the new Act. 
These include the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme in 1950, Hospital Benefits and 
Pensioner Medical Service in 1951, and the Medical Benefits Scheme in 1953, all of 
which were consolidated in the 1953 National Health Act. Other changes in the 
national health scheme over the period 1950-63 included the introduction of a 
means test for pensioner medical services in 1955, an increase in the 
commonwealth hospital benefit in 1957, and 1958 amendments to the National 
Health Act, which established a minimum eight month waiting period for new 
contributors to access commonwealth benefits. This was followed by another
11 Speaking o f Health (1972), pg. 1.
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increase in commonwealth benefits and an extension of the general list of 
pharmaceutical benefits, along with the introduction of charges for medicines for 
non-pensioners in 1959. The commonwealth benefit for use of public hospitals by 
pensioners was increased in 1962 and in 1967, and, by 1968, patients with chronic 
health conditions became eligible to receive insured hospital benefit in full, with 
the Commonwealth funding the costs of their prolonged care.12
2.2.7. The Voluntarism versus Compulsion Debate, Late 60s -  Early 70s: 
Scotton -  Deeble (ALP) Universal Health Insurance Program and 
Nimmo Committee
“Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or 
mental and spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering 
each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling 
each to live as seems good to the rest.”13
Over the first decade of its operation the Earl Page scheme came under 
sharp criticism both because of the complexity and costliness of its administration, 
and the economic benefits to the consumers of medical care. For many of them, the 
out-of-pocket expenses remained too high. By the late sixties, about 15 to 17 per 
cent of Australians lacked any insurance arrangements to cover their possible 
medical expenditure14. Problems and deficiencies in the voluntary scheme as 
perceived by its supporters rested also with “unnecessary and disproportionate 
increase in the role of the Government, and registered benefit organisations and 
their contributors ... losing more and more of the advantages of free enterprise and 
competition on which the Scheme was founded.”15 Private health insurance funds 
were constrained by “the inequities and anomalities resulting from the unqualified 
use of community rating as ... applied, and the invalidity of the financial 
justification ... accepted as validation for the existing tables and rates of
12Sax (1984) , pg. 245-47.
13 Mill (1948), pg. 11.
14 Scotton (1969), pg. 115
15 Turner (1969b), pg. 1.
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contribution”16, despite actuarial assessments. Interestingly enough, proponents of 
compulsory health insurance also blamed the community rating principle, but for a 
different reason. They saw that the community rating led to anti-selection of 
private health plans by good risk individuals, particularly by young single males. 
“While it may be rational, at least in a collective sense, for good risk individuals to 
carry their own insurance, they often do not manage their financial affairs so as to 
have liquid assets available to meet the costs which they do incur. In practice, 
therefore, their non-insurance has consequences for the rest of society.”17
It seemed both parties admitted there were problems inherent in the 
community rating principle, yet their conclusions were different, ranging from 
moving towards experience rating with government subsidies for the most 
disadvantaged, to a hybrid between compulsion and increased subsidisation of 
voluntary insurance.18 It was argued that “the Australian voluntary health 
insurance scheme embodies the very quintessence of a democratic society, because 
of the manner in which it combines individual freedom of choice of health services 
with government assistance in meeting the costs of such services”,19 therefore 
preservation of the private insurance sector was essential. Attempts were made to 
rectify the voluntary insurance scheme, which was perceived by its many 
supporters to be the most appropriate for Australia, for a number of reasons:
“There are many communities...where a voluntary scheme, operating 
with a government subsidy, would be ideally suited -  communities 
operating on a balance of the economic and humanitarian principles which 
determine social service policy. The spirit behind it is one of free enterprise, 
but not of a “cut-throat” nature. It embodies the principles of self-help, but 
with external aid for those who are not in a position to help themselves. It 
provides medical care for all at a reasonable cost, whilst creating 
satisfactory working conditions for the medical profession. And it can do this 
without sacrificing the principles of responsible, free enterprise. As such, it 
is the type of health care system most admirably and specifically suited to 
Australia.” 20
16 Turner (1969b), pg. 20.
17 Scotton (1969), pg. 124.
18 Scotton (1969), pg.124.
19 Wilson (1970), pg.6.
20 Wilson (1970), pg. 33.
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In this atmosphere of discontent with the status-quo, and understanding 
that the voluntary health insurance was at the crossroads, the alternative ALP 
health insurance program was developed by Richard Scotton and John Deeble at 
Melbourne University’s Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research (see 
Scotton and Deeble (1968)). Scotton and Deeble claimed that the costs of private 
health insurance bore “unduly heavily on low income families”, and that non­
insurance and underinsurance was “most widespread in the lower income group”. 
In 1968, the government set up a special Commonwealth Committee of Inquiry into 
Health Insurance to review the performance of the voluntary health insurance 
scheme. The Chair of the Committee was Justice J. A. Nimmo. The Nimmo 
Committee concluded that the costs of private health insurance were unbearable 
for about one million Australians, that out-of-pocket expenditure on medical care 
was often very high, and that the chronically ill and people with pre-existing 
conditions were particularly disadvantaged when seeking private health insurance 
coverage. At the time, there was a split in politics on the basis of the health care 
scheme. The left of the ALP, supported by some Unions, was in favour of the 
nationalisation of health services, with the British National Health Scheme serving 
as an example to follow. The mainstream ALP, then in opposition, advocated the 
introduction of a universal social insurance. And the Liberal and Country Parties, 
supported by the Australian Medical Association, were vehemently supporting the 
Page scheme, acknowledging the fact that it should be rectified to address the 
issues of public concern (Swerissen and Duckett (1997)).
The program developed by Scotton and Deeble proposed a universal 
national health scheme, completely financed by the government through the 
introduction of a health tax, and administered by a government body. The major 
perceived benefit of the new scheme would be its equitability and efficiency. For a 
detailed discussion of the Nimmo Committee recommendations and other political 
issues of that period see Sax (1984), Butler and Doessel (1989). The Scotton and 
Deeble program attracted sharp criticism from the supporters of a voluntary 
insurance scheme, and the validity of their major claims was questioned. For 
example, Turner (1969a) stated that a “voluntary plan, reconstructed by the 
application of community rating to more homogeneous populations, and the 
redirection of Government subsidies to provide more effective use of available
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resources, would provide a more effective “pooling” system than could be provided 
by a compulsory tax-financed system”21. He also noted that “the Scotton-Deeble 
compulsory plan is highlighted by its very dependence on the preservation of 
voluntary health insurance” which was required “to cover all services beyond basic 
care”. The alternative program of reconstructing a voluntary health insurance 
scheme was proposed in Turner (1969a) and discussed in Turner (1969b) , and the 
importance of preserving the spirit of individual responsibility as opposed to 
patronising government intervention in provision and financing of health care was 
compared to “the difference between a dole and a wage, between negative and 
positive thinking”.22
The Gorton Liberal-Country party government aimed at reform and 
improvement of the voluntary health insurance. The Health Benefits Plan adopted 
in 1970 included many recommendations from the Committee of Inquiry’s Report. 
Yet, according to the supporters of the compulsory insurance scheme, the aims of 
equity in access to health care were yet to be achieved. The scheme included 
subsidised or free health insurance for people on low incomes and other vulnerable 
groups, yet the commitment to voluntary health insurance was not abandoned. The 
concept of a “most common fee” was introduced to facilitate adequate adjustment to 
the government benefits payable for certain medical services. Those common fees 
were to be revised on a regular basis, but no definite procedures for such a review 
were agreed upon. Doctors were reluctant to embrace the scheme, up to a threat of 
an explicit boycott of the Health Benefits Plan, but a firm government position and 
generous federal funding helped overcome their resistance.
A program of compulsory health insurance became a significant part of the 
political platform of the ALP, then in opposition. Its pre-election program included 
the establishment of a universal health insurance fund providing for both hospital 
and medical benefits to all of the population, with the benefit equal to 85 per cent 
of the schedule fee, and a $5 gap between fees and benefits. Bulk billing was to be 
introduced, and free hospital treatment in public hospitals without a means test to 
be negotiated with the States, and a levy of 1.35 per cent on taxable income and
21 Turner (1969a) , pg. 15.
22 Turner (1969a), pg. 37.
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equivalent contributions from the Commonwealth23. These principles became 
major features of the future Medibank program.
2.2.8. The Birth of Medibank, 1975
The next step of the health insurance policies development occurred 
in 1972, when the Labor party won the Federal elections. The Whitlam government 
committed itself to the implementation of the Scotton and Deeble universal 
compulsory health insurance scheme, despite strong opposition from the Australian 
Medical Association (AMA), private health funds and other political opponents. The 
AMA’s view on compulsory insurance was clearly expressed by Dr. Wilson 24: “Any 
scheme for financing the costs of medical services must interfere as little as 
possible with the training and the attitudes of individual practitioners and the high 
standards of care with which they provide their patients. The advocates of 
nationalised or quasi-nationalised schemes who ignore this proviso cannot expect 
to obtain the support or co-operation of the medical profession. The practice of 
medicine is at its best where the doctor and patient are free of any outside 
influence. When government assumes a dominant role in financing health care, 
either by purchasing medical services and providing them “free” to consumers (as 
in nationalised schemes), or by setting up a single monopolistic National Health 
Insurance Commission (as in quasi-nationalised schemes), it significantly affects 
the desirable doctor-patient relationship”. Turner (1969a) put it even harsher: 
“The Scotton-Deeble compulsory plan ... is anathema to the medical profession 
responsible for providing essential care, and is inadequate for the great numbers of 
their patients who desire and need more than basic care”25. Indeed, it was hard for 
Labor politicians to convince doctors otherwise.
As part of the proposed Labor universal health insurance scheme, a single 
health insurance fund (Medibank) was to be established to finance medical and 
hospital benefits available without means test to all Australians, and the Health
23 Deeble (1983), pg. 433.
24 Wilson (1970), pg. 23.
25 Turner (1969a), pg. 42.
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Insurance Commission was to administer the fund’s operations. In the original 
proposal, Medibank was to be financed through a mixture of sources, namely, a 
1.35 per cent levy on taxable income, an equivalent government contribution, and 
contributions from the workers’ compensation and motor vehicle third-party 
liability insurers. Low income earners were exempted from the Medibank levy. The 
amount of levy contributions was capped for high-income tax-payers, and tax 
concessions on contributions to the private health insurance plans were proposed to 
be retained.
Following heated discussion of the Green paper (the scheme implementation 
plan released in April 1973 by the Health Insurance Planning Committee), and the 
White paper on the Australian Health Insurance Program of June 1973, the 
medical profession engaged in the political battle over medical fees. Private health 
insurance companies joined doctors in opposition to Medibank. The opposition was 
strong enough to reject the Medibank proposal which included the Health 
Insurance Commission Bill 1973 and the Health Insurance Bill 1973 twice in the 
Senate, after it was passed by the lower house. The first rejection of those Bills by 
the Opposition-controlled Senate occurred in December 1973, after which both 
bills were re-submitted to the House of Representatives and passed in April 1974, 
with a second rejection by the Senate to follow.
Facing a legislative system caught in political deadlock, Whitlam announced 
the dissolution of both houses of Parliament and called for new elections, which 
took place in May 1974. After the new houses of Parliament were formed, in July 
1974 the Health Insurance Commission Bill 1973 and the Health Insurance Bill 
1973 were passed by the House of Representatives, along with a Health Insurance 
Levy Bill and a Health Insurance Levy Assessment Bill, but were again rejected in 
the Senate. Only the joint sitting of both houses, which was called for in accordance 
with Constitutional requirements, passed the National Health Insurance 
legislation in August 1974 and created the legal ground for Medibank to be 
implemented. Both bills relating to the introduction of a health levy were rejected 
by the Senate, which made the federal government solely responsible for the 
financing of the national health scheme.
On 1 July 1975, Medibank, a national public health insurance 
scheme, was finally introduced, and administration of the program was delegated
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to the newly established government authority -  the Health Insurance Commission 
(HIC). Medibank comprised medical insurance, hospital insurance and hospital 
funding. According to the new scheme, the doctors had a choice of either charging 
their patients, or billing the HIC. In the latter case, the service was free for the 
patient at the point of service, and the doctor received 85% of the recommended fee 
for the services. In the former, the patient received reimbursement from the HIC 
for the 85% of scheduled fee. The gap between the fee and the refund to the 
consumer was not to exceed $5, and was allowed to be insured by the private funds. 
The program expanded to hospital services which became available to the public for 
free. The patient was given a choice of being treated as a private patient in a public 
hospital or in a private hospital, in which case private hospital insurance was 
needed. As for hospital funding, the Federal Government committed to meet half of 
the net operating costs of public hospitals, substantially reducing the financial 
burden on the States. A new policy-making body, the Hospitals and Health 
Services Commission, was established. The major principle for outpatient medical 
care provision remained the fee-for-service principle.
2.2.9. Medibank Policy Reversal, Liberal Years 1975-83
In November 1975, the political system once again found itself in a 
stalemate, and the Whitlam government was dismissed by the Governor-General, 
followed by new federal elections. By the end of 1975, the office was won by the 
Fraser Liberal-National coalition government. Retaining Medibank was part of 
Malcolm Fraser’s pre-election promise. Even so, following the historic tradition of 
political battle with the Labor party and its expansionary fiscal policies, the Fraser 
government eventually brought the Medibank scheme under attack. Health care 
expenditure rose from 5 per cent of GDP in 1963-63 to 7.7 per cent in 1975-76 26, 
and the government share in health care finance was rising at an alarming rate.
A Medibank Review Committee was set up to study alternative means of 
health finance, with a goal of reducing the budgetary pressures of health care. The 
findings of the Committee were submitted in a report which was never made
26 Sax (1984), pg. 127.
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public. After implementation of the recommended policies, Medibank was 
converted from a universal system into a government-operated health fund. Among 
the policy changes was an option for the individual to quit the government program 
by enrolling into a private registered health insurance plan which provided at least 
a basic level of both hospital and medical coverage. For those remaining in 
Medibank, a levy of 2.5% of taxable income was introduced, with an effective 
ceiling on the amount of levy. This reduced considerably the cost of the health care 
program to the government and consequently reduced the budget deficit. These 
changes to the scheme were referred to as Medibank II.27 Government outlays 
resulting from the changes indeed diminished, but a number of economists claimed 
that should Medibank be retained in its original state, with the lower level of levy, 
the extra reduction in the budget deficit would be achieved. According to Sax 
(1984)28, “the loss of revenue from persons who “opted out” exceeded the Medibank 
benefits which would have been paid to them".
The first policy steps of the Fraser government were followed by a revival of 
the voluntary health insurance scheme that came into effect in September 1981. 
The federal government also subsidised private health insurance plans by 
contributing to a compulsory reinsurance pool, the Health Benefits Reinsurance 
Trust, established in October 1976. Free treatment in public hospitals was 
provided to Medibank levy-payers, and to persons on low incomes, but in order to 
have a choice of a doctor, private “hospital only” coverage had to be purchased. 
Private health insurance contributions were no longer tax deductible. As Sax 
(1984) argues, full hospital and medical private health insurance with opting out 
of Medibank became a cheaper option than purchasing a basic hospital-only plan in 
addition to paying a levy for many households. “This unintended effect may well 
have been responsible for the unexpectedly high proportion of people who bought 
private insurance even though the levy provided the cheapest form of cover".29 This 
all led to the private health insurance coverage rates of almost 59% early in 1977,
27 Deeble (1983), pg. 436; Sax (1984), pg. 128.
2® Sax (1984) pg. 132.
29 Sax (1984), pg. 131.
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with an additional 10 per cent of holders of hospital-only coverage still with 
Medibank.
In 1976, Medibank began to compete with private health insurance funds by 
providing the additional hospital-only cover for shared room and private ward 
hospital charges. The private health insurance market was not intimidated by this 
move, because they provided extra benefits, including private hospital 
accommodation, dental coverage and the gap between the scheduled fee and the 
Medibank benefit. It is worth noting that private health funds were subsidised by 
the government by setting below-costs fees for public hospital charges, by providing 
a direct per diem benefit for private hospital accommodation, and by the 
contributions to the reinsurance pool.
In 1978, a new policy reversal took place. Taking into account adverse 
effects of the new health care arrangements on the Consumer Price Index, and in 
fear of a further rise in inflation and deeper recession due to wage indexation 
according to the rise in CPI, the health insurance levy, opting out of Medibank, and 
the Medibank benefits schedule were abolished. A new universal benefit of 40 per 
cent of the recommended fee was introduced, with a maximum consumer’s 
contribution of $20 when the scheduled fee was charged. Bulk-billing was retained 
for uninsured pensioners, their dependants, and other disadvantaged persons. 
Annual health expenditure over $1590 was subject to a tax rebate at the rate of 
33.5 per cent. Government revenue fell, and under the continued pressure of a 
growing government budget deficit, the universal 40 per cent rebate was abolished 
and a $20 deductible was introduced.
Following the recommendations of the newly established Commission of 
Inquiry into the Efficiency and Administration of Hospitals (Jamison Inquiry), 
hospital cost sharing was abolished, and a series of measures undertaken to 
increase the role of the private sector in the provision of medical care, with the goal 
of increasing the proportion of privately insured from about 50% to around 80%. A 
means test was introduced for free treatment in public hospitals, and about one 
fifth of the population ended up without any health insurance coverage30. Another
30 Butler and Doessel (1989), pg. 83.
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government incentive to encourage a switch to voluntary private health insurance 
included a 32% tax rebate on premiums. As a result, by 1983, after Medibank 
underwent five major restructuring stages, the Australian health finance and 
health care system looked similar to the pre-Labor status-quo of 1972. The logic of 
the Fraser era reforms to Medibank can be better understood by noting that “while 
the erratic course of the health insurance system under the Fraser government has 
been partly due to its subordination to other financial and economic objectives, 
major changes have been due to conflict between the objectives themselves.”31
2.2.10. Creation of Medicare, 1984, and Its Impact on Private Health 
Insurance
The next cycle of the health insurance policies roller-coaster arrived 
with the change of government in 1983, when the ALP took over and the Hawke 
government was formed. The tax-funded universal health insurance scheme, 
Medicare, came into effect on 1 February 1984, and the HIC continued its previous 
role as the administrator of the program. The health levy introduced in 1976 was 
maintained at the lower level of 1% of taxable income, thus reducing the costs to 
the government of running the scheme. The gap between the schedule fee and the 
refund to the consumer was set at a maximum of 15% of the schedule fee and $10, 
and was banned from being insurable by private funds. This constituted an 
important change from the Medibank policy. There was a return to free hospital 
care with the option of being treated as a private patient in both public and private 
hospitals. The Commonwealth provided the States with grants to compensate for 
the provision of free hospital care to patients. Private health funds were required to 
charge premiums based on a community rating principle, with family policy 
premiums set at twice the level of single policy premiums. A review of the Medicare 
performance over the first six years of its operation can be found in Deeble (1991, 
February) . For a detailed discussion of the Australian health care system since the 
introduction of Medicare, and for a review of health finance and policies see e.g. 
Sax (1990), Palmer and Short (1994) , and Mooney and Scotton (1999).
31 Scotton and Ferber (1980), pg. 176.
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In 1986, the health levy was increased to 1.25% of taxable income (Medicare 
Levy Amendment Act 1987 No. 110 of 1987). The upper limit of $700 was 
eliminated. In 1987, the refund for inpatient services was reduced to 75% of the 
recommended fee, and the maximum gap condition removed. For other medical 
services, the gap was capped at $20 (an increase of $10 from the previous level). 
Under the Hawke (Labor) government a number of subsidies to private health 
insurance were eliminated, including removal of the bed-day subsidy for private 
hospitals and the reinsurance subsidy. The Medicare levy was further increased to 
1.4 % of taxable income from July 1993 (Medicare Levy Amendment Act (No. 2) 
1992 No. 157 of 1992), and to 1.5% in 1995 (Medicare Levy Amendment Act 1995 
No. 56 of 1995).
According to Deeble (1987) , the introduction of Medicare in 1984 brought 
about 16 per cent of the Australian population -  about 2.3 million people -  
insurance for private medical fees32. The new insureds contributed the most to the 
increase in use of medical services after the introduction of Medicare. The 
introduction of universal health insurance had an immediate impact on private 
health insurance coverage rates. Figure 2.1 shows the changes in proportion of 
population with private hospital coverage, starting from the fiscal year 1970-71. By 
the end of the sixties, more than 80% of the Australian population was covered by 
private health insurance. The first significant drop in coverage rates happened in 
1975, after Medibank came into effect. This drop was almost twenty percentage 
points. The Fraser years reforms to Medibank, with the option of opting-out, led to 
a reverse in falling membership trends. Private hospital coverage rates had 
bounced back by 1982, but did not quite reach the pre-Medibank levels. Labor 
reforms and the introduction of Medicare caused a further significant drop in 
private health insurance rates, and, during the financial year 1983-84, the 
proportion of the population covered by private health insurance shrank to just a 
half. Ever since, more Australians have chosen not to insure privately for medical 
expenditure, and to rely on Medicare instead. Membership rates decreased at such 
an alarming rate that, by 1996, when the Labor party left office and the new 
Coalition (Liberal - NPA) government was elected, it became apparent that, in
32 Deeble (1987), pg. 192.
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order to maintain a fiscally manageable Medicare system, private finance of health 
spending had to be encouraged.
Figure 2. 1. Per cent of Australian population with private hospital 
coverage, 1971-2000
Source: Industry Commission (1997), PHIAC (1999)
2.3. Cu r r en t  He a l t h  F in a n ce  S ystem : a  M ix  o f  P u blic  a n d  Pr ivate  
F in a n c e
The Commonwealth Government represents a major source of total health 
expenditure finance, contributing 47% of a total of $50.3 billion in 1998-99. The 
total Medicare levy collected in 1998-99 was $4.1 billion, 8.2% of total health 
expenditure, or 17.3% of Commonwealth outlays on health33 (19.6% of 
Commonwealth spending on health care in 1994-95)34. The rest of the 
Commonwealth expenditure was drawn from general taxation. State and local 
funding contributed an additional 23%, making up to 70% the public share in
33 AIHW (2000), httt://www.aihw.gov.au/pubHcations/health/ahOO/index.html.
34 Swerissen and Duckett (1997) , pg. 14.
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Australian health care finance in 1999. The private sector, including individuals, 
registered health benefits organisations and other non-government sources, 
contributed another 30% to total health finance in 1998-99.
Nominal annual health expenditure in current prices was growing at an 
average annual rate of 6.4% between 1990 and 1999 (see Table 2.1), exceeding the 
nominal GDP growth of 5% p.a. on average over this period.
Table 2.1. Total health expenditure and annual growth rates, 1990-99
Year Health Expenditure, $m Annual Growth Rate, %
Current
Prices
Constant
Prices<*>
Current
prices
Constant
Prices<»>
1989-90 28,800 34,609 ... ...
1990-91 31,270 35,313 8.58 2.03
1991-92 33,087 36,377 5.81 3.01
1992-93 34,993 38,304 5.76 5.30
1993-94 36,787 39,798 5.13 3.90
1994-95 38,967 41,324 5.93 3.83
1995-96 41,783 43,392 7.23 5.00
1996-97 44,482 45,330 6.46 4.47
1997-98 47,030 47,030 5.73 3.75
1998-99® 50,346 49,503 7.05 5.26
(a) Constant prices referenced to 1997-998 (see (2000) p9' 2for de,ails)
(b) Preliminary AJHW and ABS estimates.
Source: AIHW Health Expenditure Database, AIHW (2000) •
Health expenditure also became a larger share of GDP over this period, 
increasing from 7.5% of GDP in 1989-90 to 8.2% in 1996-97 and, consequently, to 
8.5% in 1998-9935. Part of the real increase in Commonwealth outlays on health in
35 AIHW (2000), pg. 3.
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1998-99 can be attributed to the introduction of the Australian Health Care 
Agreements which phased out the Commonwealth-State health agreements 
previously in place, with most of the increased funding channelled to public 
hospitals (AIHW (2000)). With the proportion of total expenditure financed by the 
private sector shrinking and the government share increasing, the question of 
whether these trends were sustainable for the “public purse” was a reasonable 
question to ask.
The current Medicare system provides Australians with free treatment as 
public patients in public hospitals. Privately insured citizens may choose to be 
treated as a private patient in either a public or private hospital, or to use public 
hospitals as a public patient, with no charge for hospital accommodation and 
treatment. The treatment is performed by medical practitioners employed 
(contracted) by the hospital, so there is no freedom of choice of doctor on the public 
patient’s side. For in-hospital services rendered to a private patient in either a 
private or public hospital, the Medicare rebate equals 75% of the scheduled fee. 
After obtaining medical out-patient services, Australians receive a rebate from 
Medicare which equals 85% of the schedule fee. Schedule fees are determined by 
the government body and listed in the Medicare Benefits Schedule Book 
(Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care, 1999). Medical 
practitioners can choose to direct bill the Health Insurance Commission (so called 
bulk-billing), accepting the Medicare rebates payment in full. Private health 
benefits funds are prohibited by law from insuring medical expenses refundable 
under Medicare. Ancillary services like dentistry, ophthalmology and such are 
insurable under separate ancillary tables. When a privately insured patient under 
the hospital table received treatment in hospital, until recently the health fund 
was allowed to cover the costs of hospital accommodation and the remaining 25% 
gap between the Medicare rebate for in-hospital medical fees and the scheduled 
(MBS) fee. In 1996, medical fees over and above the MBS fee were not allowed to be 
insured and were to be covered by the patients themselves. This contributed to 
sometimes high and unexpected out-of pocket expenses for people with the highest 
available level of hospital coverage.
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2.4. P u blic  a n d  Pr iv a t e  H o spitals  in  A u stralia
According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS (2000)) and the 
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare36, in 1997-98, 62% of all hospital 
facilities (70% of total hospital beds, 73% of total patient days) was provided by the 
public sector. The public hospital system comprised 734 acute care and 30 public 
psychiatric hospitals. The number of public beds fell from 4.1 beds per 1,000 
population in 1985-86 to 2.8 beds per 1,000 population available for acute care, and 
0.2 beds available in public psychiatric hospitals, in 1997-98. The average length of 
stay in public acute hospitals fell from 5.2 to 4 days over the period 1991-92 to
1997-98. Rates of separation (patients’ releases) from public acute hospitals have 
been steadily rising over recent years, from 168 per 1,000 population in 1991-92 to 
201 in 1997-98. A prolonged waiting time, especially for elective (category 3) 
surgeries became a common phenomenon in the public hospital system. A survey of 
public hospital staff and visiting medical specialists conducted in New South Wales 
revealed that medical practitioners themselves felt that the waiting time for non­
urgent patients in 1995 had extended significantly compared with 1990. Public 
beds became relatively less available, and medical equipment became more difficult 
to replace (Perkins, Petrie et al. (1997)). The official response about the true 
situation with surgical waiting lists is that “..in general, patients in greatest need 
are being treated within reasonable time frames”, and “that the emotive element of 
waiting lists is overplayed. However, those with less urgent needs may now wait 
longer for their surgery” (Collopy (1998)).
Private hospitals operating in Australia during 1997-98 
comprised 317 acute and psychiatric hospitals and 175 free-standing day hospital 
facilities. The number of private beds increased by 11% to 23,091 between 1991-92 
and 1997-98, amounting to 1.3 private hospital beds available per 1,000 population 
by 1997-98.
36 AIHW, Australian Hospital Statistics 1997-98, 
http://www.aihw.gov.au/inet/publications/health/index.html.
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Table 2.2. Summary of separation, patient day and average length of stay 
statistics, by hospital type, Australia, 1994-95 to 1998-99
1994-95*) 1995-96(b) 1996-97 1997-98*) 1998-99
Separations COOO)
Public acute hospitals*) 3,420 3,568 3,622 3,748 3,839
Public patients® 2,720 2,963 3,058 3,222 3,347
Private patients 489 438 393 355 319
Public psychiatric hospitals® n.a. 25 20 23 20
Private hospitals® 1,460 1,577 1,685 1,793 1,875
Public acute & private hospitals*) 4,880 5,146 5,307 5,541 5,715
Total 4,880 5,171 5,327 5,563 5,735
Patient days (*000)
Public acute hospitals*) 15,567 15,607 15,181 15,152 14,989
Public patients® 12,086 12,608 12,494 12,460 12,691
Private patients 2,173 1,878 1,622 1,419 1,274
Public psychiatric hospitals® n.a. 948 1,350 1,409 1,285
Private hospitals® 5,407 5,893 5,834 5,995 6,045
Public acute & private hospitals*) 20,974 21,499 21,015 21,146 21,034
Total 20,974 22,448 22,366 22,555 22,319
Patient days per 1,000 population®
Public acute hospitals*) 826.7 817.8 789.4 774.1 751.3
Public patients® 642.5 662.3 652.1 640.4 639.6
Private patients 114.9 97.8 83.6 71.7 62.6
Public psychiatric hospitals® n.a. 89.8 72.3 74.7 66.6
Private hospitals® 293.2 311.6 302.0 303.8 299.4
Public acute & private hospitals*) 1,115.9 1,125.9 1,089.4 1,075.9 1,048.7
Total 1,115.9 1,177.1 1,161.7 1,150.6 1,115.3
Average length of stay (days)
Public acute hospitals*) 4.6 4.4 4.2 4.0 3.9
Public patients*) 4.4 4.3 4.1 3.9 3.8
Private patients 4.4 4.3 4.1 4.0 4.0
Public psychiatric hospitals® n.a. 52.1 66.3 62.4 63.4
Private hospitals® 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.3 3.2
Public acute & private hospitals*) 4.3 4.2 4.0 3.8 3.7
Total 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.1 3.9
(a) For 1994-95 Victorian private hospital data are incomplete. About 98% of the separations were included.
(b) Statistical separations were introduced in 1995-96 and would have resulted in an increase in separations reported for 
that and subsequent years compared with previous years.
(c) Some data on patient days have been revised since previously published.
(d) Includes the Department of Veterans’ Affairs hospitals.
(e) Although public and private patients account for the bulk of separations from public hospitals, there are also separations 
for other categories of patients, as detailed in Table 5.1.
(f) Public psychiatric hospital data were not included until 1995-96, and that year Queensland was unable to report. Victoria 
was not able to provide patient days data for all separations in 1995-96 and for 407 separations in 1996-97, as leave 
days could not be identified.
(g) Includes private psychiatric hospitals and private free-standing day hospital facilities.
(h) Excludes public psychiatric hospitals.
(i) Figures are rates per 1,000 directly age-standardised to the Australian population at 30 June 1991.
For public psychiatric hospitals and private hospitals, rates were derived using populations of the reporting 
States and Territories only, without adjustment for incomplete reporting, 
n.a. not available.
Source: AIHW, Australian Hospital Statistics 1998-99 
http://www.aihw.gov.au/inet/publications/health/index.html. Table 4.1.
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There was a significant increase in the average number of beds at free­
standing day hospital facilities, for “many investigations and operations that 
previously required hospitalisation can now be performed as day procedures in 
centres located close to where patients live”, due to improvements in diagnostic and 
surgical techniques.37 There were 1.9 million private hospital separations in 1997- 
98, 85% of which were from hospitals and 15% from day hospital facilities. The 
average length of stay in private hospitals was 3.3 days, 1.1 days shorter than in 
public hospitals, due to the higher proportion of same day separations (53% of all 
private hospital separations compared to 43% of public hospital separations). The 
most recent data on hospital separations, patient days and length of stay for 
private and public hospitals are presented in Table 2.2.
Separations from public acute hospitals grew at an average annual rate of 
5%, compared with 6.9% growth in separations from private hospitals over the 
period 1992-1996. Patient days per 1,000 of population declined in public hospitals 
at 1.2%pa on average over the same period, compared with a 3%pa increase in 
private hospitals. This could reflect the fact that psychiatric hospitals were 
included in private hospital statistics and excluded from the public hospitals 
separations/patient days statistics for the period 1992-96. The average length of 
stay declined faster for public hospitals compared with private (4.2%pa vs. 1.7%pa 
decline)38.
Data since financial year 1996-97 show that separations from public acute 
hospitals have grown at an average rate of 2.5% p.a., with the number of 
separations attributed to public patients in public hospitals growing at 4%pa, and 
separations of private patients in public hospitals declining at 10% per year for the 
period 1997-99. There was a significant decrease in separations from public 
psychiatric hospitals, as mentioned above. Over this period of time separations 
from private hospitals grew at a rate of 6% per year (this number includes private 
psychiatric hospital separations).
37 Komesaroff (1997), pg.18.
38 AIHW, Australian Hospital Statistics 1995-95,
http:// www. aihw. gov. au/inet/p ublications/health/index.html.
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Patient days, both in absolute numbers and per thousand of population, 
were falling the fastest for the private patients in public hospitals, with a 12-13% 
annual decline for the period 1997-99. This was accompanied by a decrease in the 
average length of stay for both public and private hospitals (3.7%pa and 4.8%pa 
decline respectively). Shorter lengths of stay in private hospitals can be attributed 
to the expansion of private day hospital facilities.
In financial year 1998-99, private acute and psychiatric hospitals generated 
$3,798m revenue, an increase of 8% over the previous year. Over the five years to
1998-99, the average annual increase in revenue was 7%. Free-standing day 
private hospital facilities were growing even faster, with an average annual 
increase in revenue over the five years to 1998-99 of 13%. Their revenue in 1998- 
99 amounted to $161m, an 11% increase on the revenue for the previous year. 
Almost 91% of 1998-99 revenue was attributed to patient fees and charges, with 
private health funds covering a major part of contributors’ fees.39
All of the above suggests there is strong growth in the utilisation of private 
hospitals, especially of free-standing day hospital facilities. There is also a shift of 
privately insured patients from the public hospital system to private, demonstrated 
by the continuous fall in separations of private patients from public hospitals. The 
reasons for the shift in the relative usage of public and private facilites include 
large investments by private hospitals and the privatisation process, as well as 
reduced capacities in the public hospital system (Palmer (2000)). Lastly, registered 
health benefits organisations play an important role in private health care finance 
by providing a significant proportion of private hospital finance. Decreased 
coverage by private health insurance did not translate into decreased utilisation of 
private facilities, because the population which remained insured were higher 
users of inpatient medical care due to their age. The following section addresses 
the performance of the Australian private health insurance industry and changes 
in the demographic profile of its membership base over the last decade in more 
detail.
39 ABS (2000).
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2.5. Th e  Pr iv a t e  H e a l t h  In su r a n c e  In d u s t r y
In financial year 1998-99, registered health benefits organisations 
comprised a $4.9 bn industry ($4.5 bn in 1996-97) and consisted of forty-four 
registered funds, fifteen of which were restricted membership organisations, and 
the rest - open membership funds. Most of the private health insurance funds are 
non-profit (mutual) entities -  only four registered funds operated for profit.
Figure 2. 2. Sources of funding of health services, 1990-97
Sources of Australian health funding, 
1990-97
100
—  20
j Private: Other
| Private: Individuals
| Private: Health 
Insurance Funds
j Public: State &  loca
I Public: Com m onwealth
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97
Year
Source: AIHW (1999) ,AIHW (2000), AIHW Health Expenditure Database.
The private health insurance industry financed 11.5% of total health 
expenditure in Australia in 1998-99, down from 12% in 1992-93. Data on the share 
of private health funds in total health care finance for financial year 1998-99 was 
not available at the time of the writing. Even so, it is known that the share of all 
private sources in health care finance went down from 33.1% in 1997 to 30% in
1999 (AIHW (2000)), with the exact breakdown between health insurance funds, 
individuals and other non-government sources (mainly Compulsory Third Party 
Motor Vehicle insurers and Workers’ Compensation) not available. Data for the 
years 1990-97 are presented in Figure 2.2.
40
Figure 2. 3. Total number of hospital policies by category, 1990-2000, ‘000
Number of hospital policies by type
4000 ,--------------------------------------
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Year
Source: PHIAC Annual PHIAC (1999), PHIAC data for various years, http://www.phiac.org.au/. data 
for year 2000 http://www.phiac.org.au/phiac/fr index.htm
About 5.8 million persons, or 30.5% of the Australian population, were 
covered by hospital insurance tables in 1999, down from 31.9% (5.9 million 
persons) in 1997, and 44.5% of the population (7.6 million persons) in 199040. Until 
1997-98, there were two categories of coverage, single and family. Since then, two 
new categories -  couple only, and single parent -  have been offered by registered 
health funds. Family membership was falling continuosly between 1989 and 1998, 
dropping from 1.98 million family policies in 1989 to 1.48 million in 1999. Single 
membership remained relatively stable, showing a much slighter decline (Figure 
2.3).
There was a pronounced growth in the proportion of policies with a front- 
end deductible (38.4% of insured persons in 1998-99 compared to 5.8% of insured in 
1989), with an excess varying from $100 to $1,000 for a single policy, and from
40 PHIAC membership data, http://www.phiac.org.au/phiac/stats. accessed September 2000.
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$200 to $2,000 for other types in 1998-99.41 The proportion of contributors to a 
hospital fund with exclusionary cover (cover that did not insure against certain 
types of treatment) grew after this type of cover was introduced in 1995, and stood 
at 6.5% at the end of financial year 1998-99. On the utilisation side, the proportion 
of privately insured hospital days in private hospitals rose from 55% in financial 
year 1989-90 to 72% in 1995-96. This confirms the conclusions of Section 2.4 about 
the falling utilisation of public hospitals by privately insured patients who choose 
to be treated as private patients.
2.5.1. Community Rating
The major regulatory principle upon which the private health insurance 
industry functions in Australia is community rating. Along with the compulsory 
contributions to the reinsurance pool, which effectively redistribute resources 
between funds with different demographic profiles, this created a situation wherein 
private health insurance has become actuarially unattractive for younger people 
with low expected medical expenditure.
There is no formal definition of the community rating principle in the 
National Health Act 1953. However, the nature of the National Health Insurance 
Scheme implied that there should be equal access to health care, and people should 
not be discriminated on the basis of their medical history. According to the 
National Health Act 1953 Section 66,
“improper discrimination means a discrimination that is related 
to all or any of the following matters:
(a) the suffering by a person from a chronic disease, illness or other 
medical condition or from a disease, illness or medical condition of a 
particular kind;
(b) the age of a person;
(c) the frequency of the rendering of professional services to a person;
(d) the amount, or extent, of the benefits to which a person becomes, 
or has become, entitled during a period”,
and the registered health benefits organisations are forbidden from such a 
discrimination. Section 73ABA of the National Health Act 1953 states that
41 PHIAC (1999) , pg. 33.
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“It is a condition of registration of a registered organization that it 
must expressly undertake not to discriminate against an eligible 
contributor on the grounds of race, sex or sexuality”.
The principle of community rating as applied to the Australian private 
health insurance business means that no-one can be rejected a policy, and everyone 
is charged the same premium for the same type of coverage, with no regard to the 
individual risk factors of the insured. Two categories of coverage were initially 
allowed, single and family, where family could include parent(s) with any number 
of dependent children. The premium charged for the family policy was prescribed 
to be twice the premium for a single policy for the same level of coverage. 
Protecting the community rating principle has been a political issue since its 
adoption. Any attempt to undermine it and move towards risk rating would be a 
highly unpopular political measure.
2.5.2. Reinsurance Pool
All registered health benefits organizations contribute to the Health 
Benefits Reinsurance Trust. The Fund is administered by the Private Health 
Insurance Administration Council (PHIAC) established in June 1989. The purpose 
of PHIAC is to regulate registered health funds, to develop regulatory policies, and 
to . facilitate a balance between the objectives of fostering an efficient and 
competitive health insurance industry, protecting the interests of consumers, 
minimising the level of health insurance premiums, and ensuring the prudential 
safety of individual registered organizations. The other functions of the PHIAC 
include collecting and making publicly available statistical information from the 
private health insurance funds on their performance and on the implementation of 
new government policies and initiatives in health insurance.
The costs of providing hospital benefits to chronically ill contributors (those 
who require hospitalisation for more than thirty-five days per year) and to those 
aged 65 and over are shared by the funds operating within the State, and the 
Commonwealth. This is not equivalent to reinsurance in general insurance terms, 
when abnormal losses are insured with another insurance company in exchange of 
premium. In the context of Australian private health insurance arrangements, by
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contributing to the reinsurance pool, funds with a higher proportion of younger 
members subsidise other funds operating within the State whose membership base 
has a higher proportion of high risk groups. The community rating principle is 
supported by this means. At its inception, the reinsurance arrangements created 
an incentive for the funds to enrol older people, in anticipation of higher transfers 
from the reinsurance pool, thus exacerbating adverse selection. This problem was 
corrected in 199542 by reducing the rebate from 100% to 79%. Since 1995 average 
reinsurance contributions paid by the private health funds for each insured aged
65 and over were approximately 50 times as high as the average reinsurance per 
member younger than sixty-five.43 Clearly, the need to attract younger people into 
the private health insurance member base became more apparent.
2.5.3. Rise in Risks and Premiums
Premiums calculated as contributions per Single Equivalent Unit (equals 
one for a single policy, and two for any other type, including family, and couples or 
single parent categories introduced in 1998) have risen steadily over the last 
decade, at a higher rate than the Health Price Index and the Consumer Price Index 
(with the exception of fiscal years 1994-95 and 1995-96) (Figure 2.4).
42 Industry Commission (1997), pg. 445.
43 PHIAC (1999).
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Figure 2. 4. Annual change in private health insurance premiums*»), 
Health Price Index*1») and Consumer Price Index*0), 1990-2000
Per cent increase in insurance 
premiums
Year
Source: (a) Premiums defined as contributions per SEU: PHIAC Annual Report PHIAC (1999) , 
PHIAC data for various years, http://www.phiac.org.au/:
(b) Health Price Index: AIHW (2000), pg. 36
(c) Consumer Price Index: ABS
Premium increases in excess of general health price inflation can be 
attributed to a number of factors: changes in medical technology, which induced an 
increase in the average cost of treatment; to the shift of insured patients to private 
hospitals as illustrated in Section 1.4 above; and to changes in the age composition 
of the insured population, namely to the growth in the proportion of aged insured.
The proportion of older people among insured members grew from 10% in 
1990 to 14.8% in 1998 (Figure 2.5). This contrasts strikingly with the 
corresponding shares of people aged 65 and over in the Australian population as a 
whole. In 1990, 11.1% of Australians fell into the 65+ age group, higher than for 
the insured population. By 1998 the percentage of people in the 65+ age bracket 
increased to 12.2% of the population, lower than the corresponding number for the 
insured subpopulation. It follows that the demographic profile of the insured 
population continuously worsened until 1998. Indeed, there was a 30% reduction in 
the number of persons under 64 years of age covered by private health insurance
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over the period 1989-98, while the number of insured persons older than 65 grew 
by 12% over the same period.44 The data suggest that younger people contributed 
most to the fall in private health insurance coverage in 1990-98.
Figure 2. 5. Proportion of people aged 65 and over among insured under 
hospital tables, 1990-2000
Proportion of 65+: insured and Australia
Year
Source: PHIAC Annual Report PHIAC (1999) , http://www.phiac.org.au/: ABS, Estimated Resident 
Population by Single Year of Age, Australia
2.5.4. The Financial Performance of the Private Health Insurance Industry
Contributions income was falling between 1993-94 and 1995-96, while the 
total benefits for all tables, including reinsurance benefits, were rising (see Figure 
2.6). This trend resulted in a decline in reserves between 1995-98, from 3.67 
contribution months on June 30 1995, to 2.68 contribution months three years 
after. Management expenses as a proportion of contribution income remained 
approximately constant at 12% since 1991. Annual increases in reinsurance
44 PHIAC (1999), pg. 22.
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benefits outpaced growth in ordinary benefits payable over the period 1990-97, 
signalling problems with an ageing membership base.
Figure 2. 6. Per cent annual change in contribution income, reserves*»), 
total cost of benefits*1»), and management expenses of registered health 
benefits organisations, Australia, 1990-99, in constant 1997-98 prices*0)
Per cent annual change in reserves, 
contributions, and costs, 1990-99
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(a) Reserves calculated as toted assets;
(b) Total costs include benefits paid for all tables, including ancillary, payments to/from 
Reinsurance Trust Fund, and provision for unpresented and outstanding claims;
(c) Constant 1997-98 prices using CPI deflator.
Source: PHIAC (1999), ABS.
By 1996, the situation within the private health insurance industry 
required immediate attention. The regulatory environment of the time, including 
the community rating and contributions to the reinsurance pool, in addition to the 
uncertain out-of-pocket residual costs of treatment as a private patient and adverse 
changes in the demographic composition of the insured population, all contributed 
to a general perception that private health insurance was not “value for money”, 
especially by younger people. The new Federal Government’s private health 
insurance initiatives to aid the ailing sector are discussed in the following section.
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2.6. In d u s t r y  Co m m issio n  In qu iry , 1996-97
The Howard Coalition (Liberal - NPA) Government elected in 1996 began a 
series of legal initiatives to revive the private health insurance sector, without 
threatening the Medicare arrangements. The private health insurance incentives 
package was a major part of the Coalition election promise. On 17 September 1996 
the Industry Commission (IC) was issued with terms of reference for an inquiry 
into private health insurance. The final report was submitted in April 1997, and 
most of the Commission’s recommendations were supported by the Government. 
Problems detected in the private health insurance industry included rising 
premiums, falling memberships, and growing demand for public health care 
facilities.
As was pointed out in the IC Report (Industry Commission (1997)), existing 
arrangements and regulations created a vicious circle of falling memberships. 
Risks of the insured population rise when younger members drop out, and the 
expected medical expenditure of the remaining insureds increases, which leads to a 
premium rise, and further drop-outs of lower risk members. This mechanism of 
adverse selection, exacerbated by the “hit-and-run” memberships of those who join 
funds opportunistically in expectation of an expensive procedure, e.g. obstetrics, 
and then leave, manifested itself in the Australian private health insurance 
market. This vicious circle was created as a result of the existing public health care 
system -  Medicare, which provided a safety net for people without private 
insurance.
The recommendations submitted in the final report of the Private Health 
Insurance Inquiry included:
■ the introduction of unfunded lifetime community rating to stimulate early entry 
and discourage hit-and-run members;
■ an examination of the community rating principle as part of a wider review of 
the health system;
■ abandoning the community rating principle for ancillary cover;
■ liberalisation of premium changes;
■ exclusion of palliative and rehabilitative care from the mandatory coverage 
under the hospital table;
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■ maintaining the restrictions on no claim bonuses;
■ a review of pre-existing conditions rules to be included as part of any review of 
the community rating;
■ extending the waiting period for would be “hit-and-run” conditions;
■ the reinsurance scheme to remain States based and designed so as not to 
redistribute resources from the more efficient funds to the less efficient, after 
controlling for demographics of the insured populations;
■ to allow “hostile” takeovers of mutual health funds under the conditions of 
transparency;
■ to facilitate through the legislation transition of mutual health funds into for- 
profit organisations;
■ to allow funds to act as retail agents for Medicare;
■ to improve prudential regulations of the private health insurance industry, 
including risk-adjusted reserve requirements;
■ to divest regulatory powers of the PHIAC into an independent body;
■ to simplify billing procedures;
■ to allow payments in excess of MBS when there exists a medical purchaser- 
provider agreement;
■ full charging of private patients in public hospitals;
■ to abandon tax subsidies for ancillary coverage.
Finally, the Industry Commission recommended a broad public inquiry into 
the Australian health system, including financing, the role of the States and the 
Federal Government, the role of private insurers, competitive neutrality, and 
community rating. The last recommendation was supported by members of the 
medical profession, who also expressed their concerns about the lack of long-term 
coordinated health-policy plans on the government side and de facto health care 
rationing, calling for an in-depth review of the Australian health system (Duggan 
(1997)) . Some radical proposals included a massive reform of the health system 
through the establishment of special medical accounts for every Australian with 
the government-guaranteed Health Bank (Harper (1998)). The Government chose 
not to pursue an uncertain and politically charged path of radical reforms to the 
existing health care system, and instead concentrated on policies aimed at one 
particular sector, the private health insurance industry.
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2.7. P r iv a te  H e a lth  In su r a n c e  R e fo r m , 1996-2000
Following the Industry Commission (IC) Inquiry, a number of policy steps 
were taken to legalise and implement its recommendations. The guidelines of the 
policies state “the Government position on the role of private health insurance is to 
maintain it as an essential feature of the mixed public/private health financing 
framework, with Medicare’s ability to deliver being dependant on a stable and 
viable private sector”45.
2.7.1. The Private Health Insurance Scheme
The Private Health Insurance Incentives Act 1997 (No. 55 of 1997) was 
designed to subsidise premiums for private health insurance, including hospital, 
ancillary or combined. Relevant legislative changes were made to the Health 
Insurance Commission Act 1973 and the National Health Act 1953, which legalised 
the functions of the HIC in administering the Private Health Insurance Scheme 
(Health Legislation Amendment (Private Health Insurance Incentives) Act 1997 
No. 45, 1997). The scheme commenced on July 1, 1997, and was intended to boost 
private health insurance membership by creating subsidies to private health 
insurance premiums, based on the means test and subject to certain conditions. 
Annual hospital cover premiums of no less than $250 per year for single and $500 
per family policy, and ancillary premiums of no less than $125 for single and $250 
for family policy became eligible for the Private Health Insurance Scheme (PHIS) 
rebate. An income test was applied to establish eligibility for the rebate, with the 
ceiling on the annual income for a single person of $35,000 and $70,000 for a 
family, with or without a child, plus $3,000 for each additional child after the first. 
The policy had to be registered by the Health Insurance Commission to test the 
eligibility. The annual incentive amount for a single policy was set at $125 for 
combined cover, $100 for hospital only, and $25 for ancillary only policies. For 
families without children, corresponding annual incentive amounts were $250 
(combined), $200 (hospital only) and $50 (ancillary only), for a single-parent family 
and families with at least one dependent child - $450, $350 and $100 respectively.
45 EM (1999).
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Registered funds applied to participate with the PHIS, and received payments 
from the HIC, passing reduced premiums to the policy-holders. Otherwise, a tax 
offset was provided to cover whole or part of the income year as stipulated by the 
Taxation Law Amendment (Private Health Insurance Incentives) Act 1997 No. 56 
of 1997.
The costs of the PHIS were estimated at $1.7 billion over four years ($600m 
for the first year of policy implementation); the expectations were that the measure 
would add a one-off increase in private health coverage from 2 to 5 percentage 
points based on different estimates, thus raising the coverage of private health 
insurance to at least 34%46. The problem with achieving this result rested with the 
fact that most of the rebates went to existing private health insurance policy 
holders. PHIS was not successful: in fact, coverage of hospital insurance dropped 
from 31.9% of the population at inception of the new policy on July 1, 1997 to 30.5% 
by July 1, 1998. The planned savings to Medicare were not achieved, yet the costs 
of the policy were substantial. There was a certain historical analogy with Fraser’s 
policy of opting-out of the Medibank scheme (see Section 1.2.9). The situation was 
aggravated by the health insurance premium increases, approved by the federal 
Minister of Health shortly after the Budget was announced (Hall, De Abreu 
Lourenco et al. (1999) ). The premium increase was due to the overall losses 
suffered by the private health insurance industry in 1995-96, and the timing of the 
increase was coincidental. The combination of both factors, the failure to boost 
private health coverage, the high budgetary costs of the policy and the increase in 
insurance premiums induced a chain reaction of critique both in the media and in 
Parliament. The opposition criticised the government Private Health Insurance 
Schemes as wasteful, claiming that $1.7 billion of taxpayers’ money was tipped to 
be spent on “failed health insurance tax rebates, which ... have been swallowed up 
by premium increases”47.
46 Ireland and Mackey (1996, December 13).
47 Lee, Michael MP (Dobell ALP), Matters of Public Importance: Health Insurance, March 3, 
1998.
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2.7.2. Federal Government 30% Rebate
PHIS was short-lived, discontinued on December 31, 1998 and replaced by 
the Government’s 30% rebate on premiums according to the Private Health 
Insurance Incentives Act 1998 No. 121 of 1998. It was claimed that the new 30% 
rebate was welfare-improving for most policy-holders, with the exception of some 
who received the maximum benefit of $450 under the Private Health Insurance 
Scheme. Financial year 1998-99 contained combined reimbursement through both 
PHIS and the 30% rebate. The health fund registered the policy with the HIC upon 
the application of the policy holder and received reimbursement from the HIC. The 
policy allows the health fund to charge reduced premiums straight away, or the 
policy holder may choose to claim his or her 30% premium rebate on the income tax 
return (Taxation Laws Amendment (Private Health Insurance) Act 1998, No. 128 
of 1998), or to claim it from the Government through the Medicare office. The 
Federal Government’s 30% Rebate is provided without a means test and 
irrespective of family type, and is available on hospital, ancillary or combined 
cover. The estimated budgetary impact resulting from the Federal Government’s 
30% Rebate Scheme is a $1.09 bln deficit in fiscal year 1999-2000.48 Calculations of 
the Opposition concerned with the costs of the Government 30% rebate policy 
should the private health insurance premiums rise, state that “for every one per 
cent increase in the population taking up private health cover, it will cost $45 
million per annum, based on the 30 per cent rebate. For every one per cent increase 
in premiums, it will cost the government an average of $13 million, based on the 30 
per cent rebate.”49
48 Private Health Insurance Incentives Amendment Bill 1998, Private Health Insurance 
Incentives Bill 1998, Taxation Laws Amendment (Private Health Insurance) Bill 1998, 
Explanatory Memorandum, the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, House of 
Representatives, 1998. ISBN: 0642 378371.
49 Denman, Sen Kay (ALP, TAS), Health Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 1999, Senate 
Hansard, pg. 3011, March 23, 1999.
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2.7.3. Medicare Levy and Medicare Levy Surcharge
The Medicare levy surcharge was proposed by the Commonwealth 
Government in the 1996-97 Budget and was designed to relieve the pressure on 
public health finance. It became a law by the Medicare Levy Amendment Act (No. 
1) 1997, No. 64 of 1997. It was imposed on high income families (individuals) 
without private hospital insurance. The amount of the Medicare levy surcharge 
was set to be equal to 1 per cent of the taxable income and was payable either with 
the income taxes at the end of the year, or by payroll deductions. Single people with 
annual incomes in excess of $50,000 and families, with or without children (single 
parent families included) with incomes above a threshold of $100,000 (plus an 
additional $1,500 per dependent child after the first) were subject to the Medicare 
levy surcharge. The surcharge became effective from 1 July, 1997. The dependent 
child category included children under 16 years of age and student children under
25 years of age. To discourage high income earners taking up private health 
insurance coverage with a high front-end deductible, changes were made to the 
definition of private patient hospital cover (Taxation Laws Amendment Act (No. 6) 
2000 No. 76, 2000). According to the Act, a person is not covered by an insurance 
policy that provides private patient hospital cover if the policy excess is greater 
than $1,000 for a family cover, and $500 for a single table. Subsection (5a) was 
added to Section 3 of the Medicare Levy Act 1986 to reflect this change. Other 
recent government legal initiatives in the health care area include Health 
Legislation Amendment Act 1998, No. 19 of 1998, which provided a legal base for 
electronic transmissions of claims for, and payment of, Medicare benefits, and the 
Health Legislation Amendment Act (No. 2) 2000, No. 6 of 2000, related to the 
National Health and Medical Research Council regulatory activities.
In the financial year 1996-97, Government commitment to funding of a gun 
“buy back” scheme following the deadly shooting of 35 people at Port Arthur, 
Tasmania, led to a one-off increase of 0.2% in the base Medicare levy (The 
Medicare Levy Amendment Act 1996 No. 16 of 1996). As a result, Australians who 
were not on low incomes or other exempt categories and were liable to pay the 
Medicare levy, had 1.7% of their taxable incomes deducted, of which the medical 
component still comprised 1.5%. The Medicare levy was brought back to 1.5% in 
fiscal year 1997-98, with the new Medical levy surcharge introduced.
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In 1998, the base Medicare levy was 1.5% of taxable income, with low 
income earners (annual income $13,389 or less for single people, and $22,594 for 
the family without children, plus $2,100 for each dependent child) exempted from 
the levy, and family/individuals close to the lower limit of income paying a reduced 
levy according to the “shade-in” schedule. In fiscal year 2000, the minimum income 
threshold for Medicare levy contributions was increased to $13,550 for individuals 
and $22,865 for families, plus $2,100 for each dependent child or full-time student 
younger than 25 years of age (Medicare Levy Amendment (CPI Indexation) Act
2000 No. 54, 2000). Individuals with incomes less than $14,649 and families with 
income less than $24,718 plus $2,270 for each additional child or student are 
paying a reduced levy at the rate of 20% of the excess income over the threshold. 
The tax rebate on out-of-pocket annual medical expenditure, excluding 
contributions to the private health insurance funds, is provided at the rate of 20% 
on expenditure in excess of $1,250.
2.7.4. Increasing Flexibility of Private Health Insurance
The Health Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 4) 1998 was introduced in the 
House of Representatives on December 3, 1998. It was passed by the House and 
Senate in March 1999 as the Health Legislation Amendment Act (No. 2) 1999, No. 
21 of 1999. The aim of the Act was to provide the private health insurance 
industry with greater flexibility and a means to improve efficiency, as well as to 
make private health insurance more attractive for consumers. Following the 
Industry Commission Inquiry into PHI recommendations and taking into account 
the weak success of previous Government incentives to private health insurance, 
new measures were proposed to reverse falling health insurance membership 
trends. These measures appear to be “a major recasting of private health insurance 
in Australia and are a significant departure from the mainly incremental changes 
introduced since Medicare began in 1984”50
Changes proposed in the first version of the Health Legislation Amendment 
Bill (No.4) 1998 included extension of the benefit categories; permission for the
50 Mackey and Norberry (1998, December 3).
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private health funds to offer discounts on premiums if the payment was made in 
advance or by direct debit, contributing to savings in the funds’ administrative 
costs; offering loyalty bonuses for the contributors, based on the time insured with 
the fund; allowing reimbursement by the private health insurance companies of 
expenditure on out-of-hospital procedures performed in “approved procedures 
facilities”; allowing prescribed pharmaceutical benefits for in-hospital treatments. 
The first reading of the Bill proposed a new type of benefit for the out-of-hospital 
specialist services provided in consulting rooms, which was prohibited by existing 
regulations. The new benefit was planned to be provided as an additional product 
for an additional premium, and would be applicable if a Medical Purchaser- 
Provider Agreement between the specialist and the health insurance company/fund 
was in place. This proposal was later removed in reaction to concerns expressed by 
the AMA which feared this provision would jeopardise existing Medicare 
arrangements and hurt general practitioners, whose out-of-hospital services would 
not be eligible for a benefit.
The original reading of the Bill also proposed a move towards de-regulation 
of private health insurance premiums (Schedule 3). It drafted that the function of 
monitoring and approving premiums should be transferred from the Minister to 
the PHIAC within 2 years, with the subsequent removal of any controls within the 
next two-year period. This move would take political pressure off the Government 
for rising private health insurance premiums. The proposal received sharp 
criticism from the Opposition, who claimed the Government had lost “political 
courage about monitoring private health insurance premiums” and was trying to 
avoid responsibility for their political decisions.51 Schedule 3 was rejected by the 
Senate and was not included in the final version of the Health Legislation 
Amendment Act (No.2) 1999 passed by the Senate on March 30, 1999.
New legislative moves stipulated by the Act included provision for discounts 
if the premium is paid at least 6 month in advance, through a payroll deduction, by 
direct debit, or for group memberships. Health funds were given legal powers to 
offer loyalty bonuses to their customers — actual or contingent financial benefit in
51 Evans, Sen Chris (ALP, WA). Health Legislation Amendment Bill (No.2) 1999, Second 
Reading, March 23, 1999. Senate Hansard, pg. 3019.
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recognition of the period of time contributions were made to the fund. Precautions 
were made so that the community rating principle is not violated by the provision 
of loyalty bonuses -  the funds cannot discriminate from participation in the bonus 
scheme on the grounds of medical conditions, age, frequency of claims, and the 
amount of benefits purchased. All persons insured under the same table (contract) 
have to be eligible for the same type of loyalty bonus. Registered health benefit 
organizations gained power to waive waiting periods for the benefits. They were 
also allowed to cover 100% of the cost to the contributor of inpatient treatment 
when admitted to the hospital or day hospital facility with which the fund has a 
hospital purchaser-provider agreement, including the costs of prescribed 
pharmaceuticals. Necessary changes reflecting options mentioned above were made 
to the National Health Act 1953.
New prudential standards, including solvency standards and capital 
adequacy standards for registered health benefits funds were introduced in Health 
Legislation Amendment Act (No. 3) 1999, No. 159 of 1999. A concept of outreach 
service as an alternative model of health care delivery is a principle new legal 
proposal under the Health Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 3) 2000. Outreach 
services are designed to be a substitute to in-hospital care in a private or public 
hospital, thus giving private patients the same choices of medical care as those 
available to Medicare patients, and reducing expected length of private hospital 
admissions. This policy measure is also designed to increase the attractiveness of 
private health insurance products to consumers.
2.7.5. Protecting the Community Rating Principle
The Health Legislation Amendment Act (No. 2) 1998, No. 37 of 1998, made 
changes to the National Health Act 1953 to outlaw insurance products, like trauma 
insurance, which could undermine the community rating principle by attracting 
younger and healthier people (“cream-skimming” )52 through offering lump sump 
payments for certain conditions or diseases which require hospitalisation. To make 
sure that such products are subject to regulations for health insurance business,
52 Jones and Mackey (1997, November 27).
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Subsection 67(4) of the definition of health insurance business was amended with 
paragraph (ab), which moved the business of undertaking liability, by way of 
insurance, “with respect to the happening of an occurrence that ordinarily requires 
the provision of hospital treatment or relevant health services”, to the jurisdiction 
of the private health insurance business. The major goals as set up by the IC 
recommendations were moves to unfunded lifetime community rating and to 
making private health insurance more attractive for a consumer, providing better 
value for money. Risk rating as the major principle of insurance business in other 
types of insurance and in health insurance in the United States, for instance, 
cannot be acceptable and is inadmissible according to the National Health Act 1953 
regulations. The Health Legislation Amendment Act (No. 2) 1998 also extended the 
waiting period for obstetrics coverage from 9 to 12 months, in an attempt to 
prevent “hit-and-run” contributors to the health funds, and made a number of 
other changes concerning nursing-home type patient arrangements, purchaser- 
provider agreements transparency, composition of PHIAC, and reciprocal health 
care arrangements.
2.7.6. Lifetime Community Rating
The National Health Amendment (Lifetime Health Cover) Act 1999 (No. 
130, 1999), passed by House on June 9, 1999 and amended and passed by Senate 
on September 29, 1999, made changes to the National Health Act 1953 which 
imposed penalties for joining private health insurance late. The penalty of 2% 
increase in base premium for each year of age above 30 is imposed for those who 
did not have private hospital cover by July 1, 2000 and for those 31 years of age 
and above who want to join the funds in the future. People born on or before 1 July 
1934 are exempt from this rule. The maximum amount of any increase under this 
Act in premiums for private hospital cover is set to be 70% of the base rate. 
Transfer to a different fund won’t affect the continuity of coverage for Lifetime 
Health Cover premium calculation purposes. The purpose of the Act, expressed in 
the Explanatory Memorandum circulated by the Minister for Health and Aged 
Care, Dr. Michael Wooldridge, was to “stabilise health fund membership numbers 
and improve the membership profile of health funds by providing incentives for 
consumers to take out private hospital cover early in life and maintain this cover 
throughout their lifetime”. A total aggregate period of 1094 days is allowed for
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adult beneficiaries with hospital cover on their 31st birthday to cease coverage 
without penalty to contributions: the first 730 “permitted days without hospital 
cover” after ceasing the existing cover or an approved suspension, plus 364 days 
other than permitted days without hospital cover. If an adult beneficiary ceases his 
cover for longer than the permitted maximum, the penalty of 2% of a base rate for 
each year without hospital cover applies when he re-joins. A grace period was given 
for those over 31 years of age without private health insurance coverage to join the 
health benefits fund before July 1, 2000 without paying the age penalty provisioned 
by the Act. This “carrot-and-stick” measure boosted the private health insurance 
rate to 41.2% by the policy commencement date, July 1, 2000. This was the largest 
increase of 9 percentage points in hospital coverage in just one quarter, the last 
quarter of the countdown for a Lifetime Cover to be launched -  hospital coverage 
stood at just 32.2% of the population at the end of the first quarter of 200053. The 
policy had such a big response that Federal Health Minister Dr. Wooldridge 
allowed private health funds to accept new applications with the extended deadline 
of July 15, in order to accommodate the high demand and cope with increased 
administrative pressures. Those policies were backdated and took effect on July 1, 
2000.
2.7.7. Closing the Gap
Uncertain out-of pocket expenditure for medical care of an insured with a 
private fund remained one of the deterrents to taking up private health coverage 
(see various submissions to the Private Health Insurance Inquiry, Industry 
Commission (1997)). Legislative steps to cover the gap between schedule fee and 
fees charged by the private hospital or medical practitioner were taken in 1995, 
when private health funds were allowed to enter into purchaser-provider 
agreements with hospitals and medical practitioners. The Health Legislation 
(Private Health Insurance Reform) Amendment Act 1995, No. 41 of 1995, provided 
for the following amendments to the National Health Act 1953. Division 4, 
“Purchaser-provider agreements” was added, section 73BD of which stated that a 
registered organization may enter into an agreement, with a hospital or a day
53 PHIAC (2000).
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hospital facility so that the hospital agrees to accept payment by the health fund 
for an episode of treatment of the contributor to the fund. Section 73BDA provided 
a legislative basis for medical purchaser-provider agreements, according to which a 
medical practitioner may enter into an agreement with a registered health fund 
and accept payment from the fund for the services rendered to the beneficiary of 
the fund. Section 73BDAA allowed a hospital or a day hospital facility to enter into 
an agreement (the “practitioner agreement”) with a medical practitioner relating to 
the rendering of professional services by the medical practitioner at this hospital or 
a day hospital facility. Insurable fees charged by the participating medical 
practitioner were permitted to exceed the schedule fee. This allowed insurance 
companies to offer a certainty of no out-of-pocket medical expenditure for the 
consumers, if the medical care was provided in preferred hospitals and by preferred 
practitioners — those who entered into agreements with the private health 
insurance company. Hospital purchaser-provider agreements proved to be a better 
success story than medical purchaser-provider agreements, very few of which were 
signed between medical practitioners and the health funds. This was in part due to 
the reaction from the AMA, which claimed that medical purchaser-provider 
agreements are similar to the US managed care arrangements and can limit a 
medical practitioner’s choices of treatment. To avoid this happening, the contracts 
between health funds or hospitals and medical practitioners were to include 
explicit reference to the freedom of the doctor to choose an appropriate treatment 
within the accepted options according to the current medical practice.
The next legislative steps aimed at closing the gap between the actual 
medical fee and the total (public and private) insurance benefit, capped at the 
amount of Schedule Fee, were undertaken in the Health Legislation Amendment 
(Gap Cover Schemes) Act 2000, No. 72, 2000, passed by the Senate on June 27, 
2000, with changes and amendments made to the Health Insurance Act 1973 and 
National Health Act 1953. Under the new gap cover scheme, registered health 
funds gained the power to provide “known gap policy”, an insurance contract that 
covers all but a specified amount or percentage of the full cost of hospital treatment 
and medical services, and “no gap policy”, an insurance contract that covers the full 
cost of particular hospital treatment and medical services. Section 73BDDA, 
amended to the National Health Act 1953, allows registered health funds to 
provide insurance against medical service fees in excess of the Schedule fee, even
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when there is no hospital or medical purchaser-provider agreement between the 
insurance company and the hospital/practitioner. The consumer is liable for a pre­
determined deductible and/or contributes a co-payment for the services at a 
predetermined coinsurance rate. Private health insurance companies have to apply 
to the Minister to get approval of their gap cover scheme. They have to provide 
enough evidence to “demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the Minister, that the 
operation of the gap cover scheme for which approval is sought will not have an 
inflationary impact” (Division 4A 73BDD, National Health Act 1953).
2.8. F ir s t  Eff e c t s  o f  G o ve r n m e n t  In it ia t iv es
From the membership trends presented in Figure 2.7 below, it appears that 
the Mark I “carrot-and-stick” initiative, as referred to in Hall, De Abreu Lourenco 
et al. (1999), the Private Health Insurance Scheme, was unsuccessful.
Figure 2. 7. Hospital Private Insurance Coverage by State, June 96 to 00
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It achieved a very brief increase of 0.1 percentage points in private hospital 
coverage, followed by a further decline. The first and second quarters of 1999 were
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the first two consecutive quarters where membership rose since 198954, with 
coverage rising 0.2 percentage points in each of these quarters. The increase of 
65,000 persons over the fiscal year 1998-99 could be attributed to the Government 
30% rebate policy. The impact of the tax incentive, “carrot”, part of the policy 
initiatives was still very modest.
However, the introduction of Lifetime Health Cover appeared to have a 
much stronger positive effect on membership rates. A very sharp jump in the 
proportion of population with private hospital insurance occurred in the last 
quarter before the deadline, the second quarter of 2000. There was a 9 percentage 
points increase in private health coverage, which, by July 2000, exceeded a 41% 
mark reaching the 1992 level55. The “stick” component of the policy seems to have 
produced a much stronger effect, at least in the short run. The goal of bringing 
younger people back under the umbrella of private health insurance has been 
achieved. The penalties promised for joining late brought in those who preferred to 
join now rather than take the risk of either the Medicare levy surcharge or an 
increased premium sometime in the future.
As a result, the proportion of 65+ among those insured reduced from 14.6% 
in 1999 to 11.3% in 2000. For the Australian population, people aged 65 and over 
constituted 12.2% of the total in 1999, and the proportion is extrapolated to 12.3% 
in 200056 (see Figure 2.5 section 2.5.3). This suggests that the recent policies were 
followed by a considerable improvement in the demographic profile of the insured 
population, at least in the short run. If for the past decade those insured 
represented worse than average risk, the situation has now reversed. There was 
also a noticeable positive impact on the financial situation of the private health 
insurance industry. Positive growth in reserves has been achieved since June 30, 
1998, and at 30 June 1999 reserves regained $131 million and reached the level of
54 PHIAC (1999), pg. 1.
55 Latest data released by the PHIAC show that the proportion of insured under hospital 
tables reached 46% in the quarter ending September 30, 2000.
56 ABS (1999), author’s extrapolation based on a three-year average growth rates of total 
pop illation and 65+ age group.
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2.91 contribution months57. The proportion of policies with front-end deductibles 
continued to grow and reached the level of 50.7% on July 1 2000, with the amount 
of a front-end-deductible being subject to the new ceiling for eligibility purposes. At 
the same time, the proportion of hospital members with exclusionary policies 
reduced from 6.5% to 4.4% over the financial year 1999-2000.
The last, but not the least, policy initiative recently implemented, is the Gap 
Cover described in Section 2.7.7. Data on the number of privately insured services 
below and above the Schedule Fee (SF), for which benefits were payable under the 
hospital tables, are presented in Figure 2.8.
Figure 2. 8. Privately insured services below Schedule Fee, up to 16% 
above SF, and over 16% above SF, 1996-2000
data for year 2000 http://www.phiac.org.au/phiac/fr index.htm
It is not difficult to see that the number of claims for services below 
Schedule Fee (SF) seasonally fluctuated around approximately 2.8 m during 1 July 
1996 -  31 June 2000. At the same time, there was a very sharp increase in the
57 PHIAC (1999), pg. 1-4
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number of claims presented for services in excess of the SF, both for payments up 
to 16% above the SF, and for those which were over 16% above the SF. The average 
growth in the number of services up to 16% above the SF over four years between 1 
July 1996 -  31 June 2000 was 43% per quarter, and the corresponding number for 
the services over 16% above the SF was an even more striking 95% average 
increase per quarter. This could be attributed to the legislation permitting the 
insurance companies to cover benefits in excess of SF (MBS fee) when hospital and 
medical purchaser-provider agreements were in place. With the current “no-gap” 
and “known gap” policies development, the proportion of services above the 
Schedule Fee will most likely tend to increase even further58.
58 Apparently, the medical gap statistics currently published by PHLAC suffers from 
misreporting of medical gap services. As it was pointed out to me by Andrew Gale, of 
Medibank Private (previously with AXA), some funds have been splitting services into the 
three components (up to 100% of SF, next 16% of SF, excess over 116% SF), whereas other 
funds have clearly been putting the service into one of the three categories depending upon 
whether the benefit paid was up to 100% of SF, between 100 and 116% of SF, or above 
116% of SF. This can be confirmed by examining the data provided by each health fund 
within each state over 1999-2000. It is believed that this problem only exists for the 
number of services, however the benefit payments have been split and reported correctly. I 
am grateful to Andrew Gale for this valuable comment. Hence, the conclusions of the 
previous paragraph should be taken with caution.
Figure 2. 9. Share of benefits above the Schedule Fee (SF) in total medical 
benefits paid, 1996-2000
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Source.PHIAC Annual PHIAC (1999), data for 3 Q 99 -  1 Q 00 not available, data for 2 Q 00 
http://www.phiac.org.au/pb.iac/fr index.htm
While the number of claims for services in excess of the Schedule Fee was 
increasing rapidly, the benefits payable by the insurance companies to compensate 
for those services were, quite logically, expanding as well (Figure 2.9). On July 1 
1997, almost 99.6% of benefits payable by the health funds were for services below 
or at the Schedule Fee. The proportion reduced to 98.3% on July 1 1998, 94.3% on 
July 1 1999, and was down to 85.5% on July 1 2000. Correspondingly, the share of 
benefits in excess of the SF in total benefits has been rapidly increasing over 1997- 
2000, from 0.23% for benefits up to 16% above the SF on July 1 1997 (0.21% for 
the benefits over 16% above SF) to 2.9% on July 1 1999, and further to 6.6% on 
July 1 2000 (increase to 2.8% and 8.0% for the benefits over 16% above SF on 
respective dates).
Returning to Figure 2.6 Section 2.5.4, it is not difficult to see that the total 
amount of benefits payable by the registered health funds (denoted as “Costs” in 
the graph), has been steadily increasing since 1995. Part of this increase can be 
attributed to increased pressure from the above-SF benefits. At the same time, 
contributions to the funds have been falling up until 1997, and total reserves were 
depleting. In the fiscal year 1997-98, after the fall in membership rates was halted,
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the trend was corrected, and the growth in contributions outpaced the rise in costs. 
The reserves were rebuilt in 1998-99. By July 1 2000 the demographic composition 
of the membership base has improved significantly as well. Even so, it will be 
interesting to see whether the introduction of a Gap Cover is indeed capable of 
increasing consumer demand for medical services which were not insurable under 
previous regulations. If introduction of insurance induces an increase in the 
demand for services, premiums will have to increase in order to keep the health 
funds solvent. Rising demand can also bid up the price of medical services. In such 
a case, it will be difficult to demonstrate that the gap cover scheme “will not have 
an inflationary impact”, which was the caveat for approval of the gap cover scheme 
by the Minister.
2.9. Co n clu sio n
Health insurance in Australia has been a matter of public concern for many 
decades. A hybrid system has developed combining a universal public health 
insurance system, Medicare, and a private health insurance sector, which plays a 
significant role in health care finance and is subject to extensive government 
regulation.
Worsening of the demographic profile of the privately insured population, 
falling private coverage rates, and financial difficulties of the private health 
insurance industry became apparent by 1996. Recent government policies have 
been aimed at stimulating private health insurance, increasing its flexibility and 
relaxing certain regulations on the types of products that can be offered by the 
health funds. The most important initiatives include Lifetime Health Cover based 
upon a lifetime community rating principle, and the “known gap” and “no gap” 
schemes. The introduction of the Lifetime Health Cover produced a significant 
increase in the number of privately insured and achieved a reversal in the falling 
private coverage rate. At the same time, the demographic profile of the insured 
population improved considerably, due to the high inflow of younger people among 
the newly insured.
The Gap Cover Scheme imposes a condition upon which the gap cover 
scheme can be approved by the regulator. This condition presumes no inflationary 
impact of the policy in operation. The first data available from the Private Health
65
Insurance Administration Council suggest that there has been a sharp increase in 
the number of services above the Schedule Fee, as well as in the amount of benefits 
payable for those services. Elimination of the out-of-pocket expenditure on medical 
care through availability of a “no gap” cover creates a behavioural response by the 
consumers of medical care. To quantify the magnitude of this response, a number 
of approaches can be used. There is a vast scope of international literature on the 
demand for medical care and its insurance price elasticity. The next chapter, 
“Theory of the Demand for Health, Medical Care, and Health Insurance”, provides 
an overview of the existing literature on the theoretical aspects of modelling the 
demand for medical care and insurance.
C h a p t e r  3 . T h e o r y  o f  t h e  D e m a n d  f o r  
H e a l t h , M e d i c a l  C a r e , a n d  H e a l t h  
I n s u r a n c e
The most widely used theoretical framework for studying the demand for 
health was pioneered by Michael Grossman in his seminal paper Grossman (1972). 
Conceptually, health was treated as a durable good - a form of capital different 
from physical and human capital. Medical care was modelled as one of the inputs 
into the health production function. The concept of health capital was inspired by 
the human capital theory which studied the impact of a growing stock of human 
knowledge on productivity. Models of optimal quantity of investment in human 
capitals were developed by Becker (1967) and Ben-Porath (1967); Grossman’s
(1972) model of demand for health became a logical extension of the human capital 
literature. A rich body of research in health capital theory has since been carried 
out, adding to what now constitutes a major part of a rapidly growing field of 
health economics, whose general prospects are outlined in Fuchs (2000).
Health capital is different from other forms of human capital in that it 
determines not just an agent’s efficiency in the labour market, but also the total 
amount of time spent on market activities. It has been recognised that medical care 
cannot be thought of as being the only determinant of good health. There is an 
empirical evidence that medical care may be an unimportant determinant of health 
in developed countries, and there is a lack of positive relationship between good 
health and medical care on the micro level59. Health economists reached a 
consensus in understanding that medical services are demanded not because of the 
immediate utility they bring to a consumer, but because of their role in producing 
“good health”, which is of ultimate value. Hence, it will be correct to treat medical 
care as one of many inputs into the health production function, and to study the
59 Grossman (1999), pg. 7, Grossman (2000) pg. 353.
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demand for health rather than the individual’s demand for medical care. Medical 
care can be divided into curative and preventive. When an episode of illness occurs, 
to restore the health stock to its higher level curative care is needed. Preventive 
care reduces the probability of an adverse shock to health, and can be purchased at 
high levels of health. Cure and prevention can be viewed as substitutes. For an 
extensive literature review on prevention see Kenkel (2000).
3.1. D e te r m in ist ic  M o d els  Of  D e m an d  F or  H e a l t h
In the original Grossman (1972) paper, the individual is endowed with an 
initial stock of health that depreciates at an increasing rate over time. Investment 
into health helps maintain or increase a current stock of health capital. In this 
model, death occurs when the health capital falls below some pre-defined level, and 
hence the length of the consumer’s life is an endogenous variable. Health is a 
choice variable in the consumer’s problem, as sick days produce disutility. On the 
other side, health is an investment commodity, and the total amount of time 
available for economic activities depends on the stock of health capital. Gross 
investment in health is produced using a constant-returns-to-scale (CRTS) 
technology.
The Grossman model is a discrete time multi-period deterministic model 
which does not account for random shocks to health. The consumer in this model 
desires health for two reasons: first, a one unit increase in the stock of health 
capital yields monetary benefits of a one-unit increase in the total amount of time 
available for market and household production activities, and second, it increases 
the utility of healthy time that enters directly the consumer’s preferences. 
Analysing a pure investment model when healthy days are not in the utility 
function (hence, health is a pure investment commodity), Grossman studies 
marginal efficiency of health capital (MEC) as a demand function for health. Using 
a supply-demand diagram together with sensitivity analysis, the following 
conclusions have been made:
1) If the health capital deteriorates at an increasing rate over the life cycle, the 
quantity of health capital demanded declines. If the MEC schedule is 
inelastic, then expenditure on medical services rise with age;
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2) The consumer’s demand for health and medical care are positively 
correlated with the wage rate;
3) Given the assumption that education increases efficiency of investment into 
health, more educated consumers would demand a larger optimal stock of 
capital.
A number of studies have been devoted to generalisation and extension of 
the Grossman model. In the original model, education was included in the gross 
health investment production function and was supposed to raise the marginal 
product of the direct inputs60. Muurinen (1982) used a more general specification 
for the health capital depreciation rate, allowing it to depend on time and a set of 
other exogenous variables, including the environmental variables and education. 
By means of this assumption, education was removed from the specification for a 
health production function. Muurinen also relaxes the assumption about the role of 
time input into health production, which was one of the theoretical criticisms of 
Grossman’s original model. Time input in the form of travelling or waiting time has 
a fixed-cost nature, and may not be a key factor of production. To avoid the time- 
allocation problem, earned income was modelled as a function of sick time, medical 
care, and a set of exogenous variables. Wolfe (1985) constructed a Grossman-type 
model of investment in health to explain an early retirement decision, which 
corresponded to a jump in optimal health investment at a certain point of a 
planning horizon.
An important paper which contained a critique of Grossman’s model was 
that of Ehrlich and Chuma (1990). The deterministic model developed by Ehrlich 
and Chuma (E-C) was formulated in continuous time and used a decreasing 
returns to scale (DRTS) health production technology specification, with the inputs 
of medical services and investment time. The DRTS assumption was crucial to 
ensure the consistency of the solution for the life cycle path of health capital and 
longevity (defined as an optimal terminal point) through the appropriate 
transversality conditions. An agent derives utility from consumption good and
60 Kenkel (1991) provided empirical evidence for the positive correlation between schooling 
and good health, and tested the hypothesis that schooling improves efficiency of health 
production.
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healthy time. Longevity serves as a measure of quantity of life, and demand for 
health is interpreted as a demand for quality of life61. Unlike Grossman’s model, 
the optimal path for health capital accumulation is not myopic: the complete set of 
dynamic equilibrium conditions must be used to obtain an optimal path for 
investment satisfying initial and terminal conditions.
One of the results of Ehrlich and Chuma concerns optimal longevity. They 
conclude that people may voluntarily choose to live finitely if the marginal cost of 
extending life outweighs the marginal benefits. Through the comparative dynamics 
exercise which followed the approach formulated in Oniki (1973), Ehrlich and 
Chuma trace the effects of changes in the model’s parameters on the optimal paths 
of endogenous variables. They found that an increase in wage leads to higher 
demand for longevity, higher optimal capital stock, and higher gross investment 
into it. The effect on optimal consumption is ambiguous. An increase in the rate of 
health capital depreciation implies a fall in demand for longevity, lower gross 
investment into health capital, and a lower demand for health. Important 
differences between E-C and Grossman’s model concern the ways the initial 
conditions for health and wealth are treated in both models. In Grossman’s 
settings, the demand for health and optimal investment are independent of initial 
levels of wealth and health capital, due to the myopic decision rule that recognises 
just current variables in determining the optimal investment in health. In contrast, 
the E-C model predicts that initial endowments of health and wealth are highly 
relevant to the model, with higher initial levels leading to higher demand for 
longevity and health. Another example of a more recent comparative dynamics 
study in a model of health investment is Eisenring (1999), who applied Oniki’s 
approach to derive dynamic properties of optimal controls which solved the models 
of Dardanoni (1986) and Forster (1989).
The Ehrlich-Chuma critique of the original Grossman (1972) model was 
addressed by Ried (1998), who used the method of comparative dynamics analysis
61 For a discussion of a conceptual framework of evaluating quantity and quality of life, and 
valuation of life expectancy in economic models, see Rosen (1994). Yaari (1965) is an earlier 
seminal paper into uncertain lifespan and insurance.
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and the technique of Frisch demand functions to trace the impact of parameter 
changes on the optimal path of endogenous variables, and suggested an iterative 
algorithm for choosing the optimal length of life. Grossman (1999) and Grossman 
(2000) contain an alternative proof of validity of his baseline model. Other recent 
developments within deterministic framework include Jacobson (2000), who 
expanded Grossman’s model by including family as a producer of health. She 
considered cases of a single person household, the husband-wife family, and 
parents with children, under the assumption of common preferences. It has been 
shown that marginal benefits of health capital are not equalised among the family 
members. Instead, the family invests in health until the ratio of marginal utilities 
of health to the effective price of health is the same for all family members, equal to 
the marginal utility of wealth.
All models covered in this subsection fail to address the random nature of 
illness and health. Modelling uncertainty about health outcomes and a resulting 
uncertainty of medical expenditure became an important direction of development 
in health economics literature. Without constructing a proper theoretical 
framework to analyse these issues, the role of health insurance could not be 
investigated within the scope of the consumer choice theory. The following 
subsection provides a review of the models of demand for health and medical care 
under uncertainty.
3.2. M o d els  o f  D em an d  fo r  He a l t h  Un d er  Un c e r t a in t y
Kenneth Arrow's (1963) paper on uncertainty and economics of medical care 
opened a new line of theoretical inquiry into the models of demand for medical care 
and insurance. Arrow made a very strong point describing the medical care 
market: “That risk and uncertainty are, in fact, significant elements in medical 
care hardly needs argument,” and “..virtually all the special features of this 
industry, in fact, stem from the prevalence of uncertainty”62. In recognition of the 
need to address the stochastic nature of health explicitly, a number of studies were
62 Arrow (1963), pg. 946.
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devoted to extension of Grossman (1972) model to incorporate uncertainty about 
health.
3.2.1. A Model of Demand for Preventive Care
Among the first of the papers to explicitly recognise the random nature of 
illness and death was developed by Cropper (1977). A representative consumer in 
this model invests in health to avoid the disutility of being sick, thus the model can 
serve as an example of a model of demand for preventive medical care. The relation 
between health capital and illness is stochastic: illness occurs whenever the health 
stock falls below some critical sickness level, which is assumed to be a random 
variable characterised by the density function. It is further assumed that utility in 
the state “ill” equals zero. The consumer receives an exogenous income which is 
exhausted on consumption good and investment in health capital. Time of death is 
fixed.
Cropper establishes that the path of optimal investment is dynamically 
consistent and solves the standard optimal control problem with a fixed end point 
under the assumption of non-negativity of gross investment into health capital. 
The conclusions of her model are that life-cycle behaviour differs for different types 
of consumers, based on their initial health endowment. “Unhealthy’ individuals 
with a low initial stock of health capital will build up their stock of health during 
the early stages of their life, and let it decay during old age. Investment into health 
capital will be decreasing over their life cycle. “Healthy” individuals with a high 
initial stock of health capital will choose their optimal health stock to decrease over 
time, and the optimal gross investment is no longer monotonous: for a sufficiently 
large terminal date, investment into health capital would first increase to allow an 
additional health stock to build up, and then decrease steadily over the remaining 
life. These optimal investment schedules differ sharply from Grossman’s 
predictions about the life-cycle paths of investment into health capital, which is 
due to the fact that Cropper models preventive medical care while Grossman’s 
model deals with curative care.
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Shortcomings of Cropper’s model include lack of physical wealth 
accumulation (no savings decision), and lack of labour supply decision (exogeneity 
of income). The assumption of zero utility for the “sick state” seems to be extreme, 
given the applicability of the model to minor illnesses and preventive care only. 
Cropper’s concept of a distributed threshold for critical health level has its 
analogues in the survival analysis literature. More recent applications of survival 
analysis for modelling medical risks can be found in Etzioni, Feuer et al. (1999) and 
Blough, Madden et al. (1999).
3.2.2. Grossman-Type Models with Uncertainty
Dardanoni and Wagstaff (1987) introduced uncertainty in a simplified, 
static setting of the Grossman model. They conclude that by defining the health 
production function as linear in medical expenditure with multiplicative noise, the 
separability of consumption and health investment decisions, inherent in 
Grossman’s model, is broken. It has been shown that investment in health is a 
normal good for the decreasing-absolute-risk-aversion (DAKA) utility function. The 
sequel to this paper, Dardanoni and Wagstaff (1990), analyses two types of 
uncertainty. The type I, ex-ante uncertainty, concerns the state of health in the 
future period. Type II uncertainty is pertinent to the effectiveness of ex-post 
utilisation of medical care. Type I uncertainty was modelled by means of a linear 
health production function in medical expenditure, contaminated with noise. Type 
II uncertainty was introduced by posing that the health production function 
exhibited a constant marginal product of medical care, drawn from a particular
I
distribution. Comparative static effects of increase in mean of the distribution and 
a mean-preserving spread of the underlying distributions were analysed. Both 
scenarios were shown to produce an increase in the amount of medical care 
demanded.
Selden (1993) constructed a model of health capital with additive noise, and 
concluded that for the DARA utility function the income elasticity of health 
investment can be negative, and investment in health can thus become an inferior 
good. Chang (1996) reconciled these contradicting results of Selden (1993) and 
Dardanoni and Wagstaff (1987) by proposing a more general model of how
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uncertainty can change the rate of return on health capital, depending on the 
income elasticity of the demand for health. Ehrlich (2000) extended the previous, 
deterministic, version of the model in Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) to study the value 
of life saving defined as a shadow price of the probability of survival, with 
conditional mortality risks modelled as outcomes of self-protection.
An important study which brought the Grossman-type models of demand for 
health under uncertainty back into the dynamic framework was that of Picone, 
Uribe et al. (1998). It is a discrete time model in which a retired individual 
maximises expected lifetime utility of consumption and health. Uncertainty of two 
kinds enters the health capital accumulation equation: multiplicative shock in the 
medical care transformation function represents uncertainty about effectiveness of 
the medical care; additive shock to health capital models uncertainty about future 
state of health. The solution to the model is implemented numerically under the 
assumption of constant relative risk aversion of the utility function. The model 
provided a useful illustration of the effects of uncertainty on the dynamic paths of 
consumption, demand for medical care, and health. No closed form solution was 
constructed, and the model presumed that all initial wealth had to be exhausted 
over the remaining life. Focusing on retired individuals eliminated a problem of 
modelling endogenous labour supply decision and wage income, which would be a 
useful feature to incorporate in the model.
Attempts to incorporate labour supply decision into the Grossman-type 
framework were made by O'Donnell (1995). In his model, consumption and leisure 
were used as arguments of the additive utility function in the setting similar to 
those of Grossman. Sickness time was assumed to be a random variable with a 
distribution function subjectively assessed by the individual. It was a two-period 
expected utility maximisation problem which allowed O’Donnell to derive 
comparative statics results. This model did not incorporate medical care, and was 
based on the properties of the distribution of sickness time. It was shown that an 
increase in expected sickness (uncertainty over sickness) led to an increase in 
current period labour supply and savings. Availability of social disability insurance 
was shown to reduce the magnitude of these changes. The model suffered from a 
lack of dynamic features, and a failure to model demand for medical care explicitly.
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3.3. H e a l t h  In su r a n c e  an d  D e m an d  fo r  M ed ic a l  Ca r e
Health insurance provides an individual with a contractual reimbursement 
of a certain amount up to the total of medical expenses incurred during an episode 
of illness. In a hypothetical situation of zero-profit operational condition for the 
insurer and costless provision of the insurance, an actuarially fair premium would 
equal the expected amount of total reimbursement. Insurance premium loading 
reflects administrative costs of the insurance company and is equal to the amount 
over and above the actuarially fair premium charged by the insurer. Cost-sharing 
instruments used in health insurance contracts include deductibles (fixed 
contribution by an insured for each claim) and coinsurance (contribution of a 
certain proportion of the total claim amount). Introduction of deductibles helps 
reduce the required loading, and also serves as a deterrent to small claims. The 
insurance contract can also be of indemnity form, providing a specified payment 
contingent on a certain condition. Insurance contracts often have a specified 
maximum of benefits payable per accounting period (a year), or provide the 
consumer with a stop-loss amount (a maximum contribution an insured can expect 
to pay within a given contractual period). Exclusionary contracts specifically 
eliminate certain medical procedures from the scope of insurable services. A more 
detailed discussion of rationale of different health insurance contract instruments 
is provided in e.g. Pauly (1986).
Studies of health insurance comprise an important part of the health 
economics literature. The choice of health insurance by the risk-averse consumer 
has been on the research agenda since Arrow (1963). Health insurance has been 
modelled as a decision of a risk-averse individual who maximises his or her 
expected utility. In a model with zero insurance premium loading and no moral 
hazard, full insurance will be bought by a risk-averse consumer (Arrow (1963)). It 
has been shown that in the case of a risk-neutral insurer who charges a non-zero 
loading, an optimal contract from the consumer’s point of view includes full 
coverage in excess of a deductible (a stop-loss amount). For a risk-averse insurer, 
whose loading is a function of risk, the Pareto optimal allocation involves both the 
deductible and coinsurance.
The value of health insurance to a consumer is explained by the value of 
risk-spreading of uncertain financial losses, resulting from the incident of illness
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and consequent medical expenditures. Access to otherwise unaffordable health care 
adds to the financial risk-avoidance benefits of the health insurance. Nyman (1999) 
estimated an additional access value of the health insurance in the state-dependent 
utility model, and found that the magnitude of access value could exceed the value 
of risk-spreading.
One of Arrow’s conclusions was that failure to introduce insurance for 
insurable risks represented welfare loss and that government intervention was 
called for in such circumstances.63 The latter proposition was questioned in Lees 
and Rice (1965), who demonstrated that if the provision of insurance is not costless 
on a supply side (as reflected in the premium loading, proportional to either 
actuarial cost or the probability of loss), the risk-averse consumer may prefer not to 
purchase market insurance for certain losses, and self-insure instead. Costs on the 
demand side can have a similar effect. The losses which are more likely not to be 
insured are smaller losses with larger probabilities. For such losses, the cost of 
provision of insurance is more likely to exceed the gains from risk-sharing, defined 
as the difference between the actuarial income and the certainty equivalent. 
Catastrophic losses with small probabilities are likely to be insured, and empirical 
evidence has been provided in Lees and Rice (1965) in support of this statement. 
Responding to this critique, Arrow (1965) stated that, even when transaction costs 
are taken into account, household production of insurance (self-insurance) still 
could not be more efficient than market insurance. He argued that provision of 
medical care and insurance by non-profit institutions filled the optimality gap in a 
less than competitive health insurance market.
Less than full insurance becomes optimal if the marginal utility of a given 
level of income is allowed to differ across the states of health (the case of state- 
dependent utility). This case was studied in a more recent paper of Viscusi and 
Evans (1990), who conducted empirical work on testing the hypothesis of a state- 
dependency of preferences, and on its implications for the optimal decision under 
uncertainty64.
63 Arrow (1963), pg. 961.
64 Viscusi (1993) contains results of further research in the value of life and health, and 
provides a summary of findings on monetary valuations of different non-fatal health risks.
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Following up the discussion on the role of moral hazard started by Arrow, 
Pauly (1968) suggested this could be a misnomer. Overconsumption of medical care 
is consistent with the behavioural response of a consumer on a fall in the effective 
price induced by insurance, given a sufficient degree of elasticity in the demand for 
medical care. Hence, such features of insurance contracts as deductibles and 
coinsurance can be helpful in reducing the effects of moral hazard. Pauly’s 
distinction between “rational economic behaviour” and “moral perfidy” received a 
very sharp and witty comment in Arrow (1968), yet the conclusion was made that 
to ensure efficiency, imposition of nonmarket controls (either moral principles or 
external measures) might be necessary.
Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) developed a general framework of studying 
interactions between sequencing of optimal moves taken by individuals and 
random moves of nature, and information available to the insurer, drawing 
attention to addressing ex-ante and ex-post issues separately. The earlier models of 
medical insurance that cover the individual against uncertain medical expenses 
have been developed in numerous studies including Zeckhauser (1970), Spence and 
Zeckhauser (1971), Ehrlich and Becker (1972), Phelps (1973), Feldstein (1973), and 
Friedman (1974).
Zeckhauser (1970) studied how the optimal choice of the sharing function 
for the insured, subject to the varying ability of the insurance company to 
discriminate against different types of insureds according to their health status, 
would alter the premiums charged for the plan. He used a state-dependent utility 
approach with a sharing function (consumer’s copayment) varying according to the 
three scenarios. If the insurance company does not discriminate based on the 
medical condition in setting the required copayment, the sharing function is the 
same function of total medical expenses across all conditions. Perfect 
discrimination yields to different sharing arrangements among the conditions (this 
plan is equivalent to the actuarially fair contingent claims market), and limited 
discrimination option is the third plan considered. Zeckhauser (1970) constructs an 
example of optimal insurance plans with a linear sharing function, including the 
plans with a deductible and a limit provision, in a particular case of a separable 
utility function with exponential components.
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Friedman (1974) used an expected utility maximisation model to study a 
choice between two insurance options, and applied a logit model in the case of a 
constant absolute risk aversion specification for a utility function. Different levels 
of coverage imply different demands for medical care. This effect was labeled 
“moral hazard”, and many studies were devoted to qualification and quantification 
of moral hazard in the health insurance market.
3.3.1. Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Health Insurance Market
There are a number of problems associated with the provision of health 
insurance - agency costs, moral hazard, adverse selection and supplier-induced 
demand, to name just a few. Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) contains an excellent 
review of modern developments in the theory of health insurance, including 
optimal insurance contracts, supplier-induced demand, moral hazard, adverse 
selection, and welfare implications.
The health status of the insured is not directly observable to the insurance 
company, thus the insurance policy under such asymmetric information will 
necessarily be second-best. People with poorer health and higher expected medical 
spending will be willing to pay higher premiums for more generous plans. Pooling 
together bad risks raise the costs of providing the medical insurance on average 
and detract healthier people from the more generous plans. Thus, adverse selection 
leads to a separating equilibrium in the insurance market, with different health 
groups choosing different levels of coverage. See Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) for 
the discussion of the existence of equilibrium and its structure with imperfect 
information.
3.3.1.1. Studies of Adverse Selection
The equilibrium with the adverse selection in the health insurance market 
is discussed in Cutler and Zeckhauser (1998) and Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000). 
The latter also provides an extensive bibliography on the up-to-date references on 
this topic. Pauly (1986) contains a review of the earlier work on adverse selection in 
the health insurance market. Empirical evidence on adverse selection was found in 
a number of studies. For example, Cutler and Reber (1998) analysed the health 
insurance choice of Harvard University employees following a policy change in
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subsidising private health insurance coverage, and estimated the welfare loss due 
to adverse selection, and the gains from premium reduction, due to the increased 
competitiveness. Their results were confirmed in the consequent study by Cutler 
and Zeckhauser (1998). The empirical study of Browne (1992) demonstrated 
adverse selection in individual health insurance markets: low risk individuals 
purchased more coverage in the group market than they would in the individual 
market. He also found a subsidisation of high risk by low risk in the individual 
insurance market. Feldman and Dowd (2000) addressed the issue of risk 
segmentation in health insurance markets, and analysed its efficiency from both 
ex-post and ex-ante perspectives.
Recent research in adverse selection includes Zabinski, Selden et al. (1999), 
who simulate the self-selection mechanism of choice between comprehensive plans 
and medical savings accounts combined with the catastrophic health plans. The 
latter policy is shown to be able to lead to the premium increases which, in turn, 
can crowd out comprehensive policies. Medical savings accounts and catastrophic 
health plans were also analysed in Pauly and Herring (2000), as an option 
available to the employer who wants to minimise adverse selection between 
competing insurance plans on offer. Chernew and Frick (1999) study existence of 
equilibrium in the insurance market when a cost-saving (managed care) option is 
introduced, in a model which incorporates adverse selection and a behavioural 
response to insurance (moral hazard). Van de Ven, van Vliet et al. (2000) 
considered risk-adjusted premium subsidies as a preferred approach to increasing 
access to health insurance for high-risk individuals, and to minimising adverse 
selection which results from premium rate restrictions (e.g. community rating, a 
ban on certain rating factors, or a requirement to keep premiums within a certain 
band for a particular class of insured).
A paper of Hemenway (1990) suggests there might be a force counteracting 
adverse selection in the real world. The hypothesis developed in the paper and 
supported by evidence from the non-life insurance markets was that those people 
who choose to purchase insurance are generally more risk averse than average, 
thus their behaviour after the insurance is purchased won’t be prone to the ex-ante 
moral hazard, and they will exercise the same level of precaution as they would 
without insurance. This “propitious selection” (“pro-selection”) mechanism may be 
the force which facilitates favourable selection in the insurance market. In the
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context of the health insurance market, propitious selection might lead to the 
situation where the insured group also exercises more self-protection, both of which 
result from their higher risk-avoidance, compared to the uninsured population. 
Even so, empirical evidence suggests that adverse selection significantly outweighs 
potentially counteracting propitious motives.
3.3.1.2. Studies of Moral Hazard and an Associated Welfare Loss
Two types of moral hazard exist associated with the provision of health 
insurance (Pauly (1968), Pauly (1986)): ex-ante moral hazard and ex-post moral 
hazard.
The ex-ante moral hazard is linked to changes in the consumer’s behaviour 
before a shock to his or her health status is realised (e.g. lower self-protection). 
Demand for self-protection, self-insurance and market insurance was studied in 
Ehrlich and Becker (1972). Self-protection is defined as a set of actions which 
reduces the probability of a bad state of nature, for example, choosing a healthy 
lifestyle, not becoming overweight, quitting smoking, avoiding drink-driving, 
wearing seatbelts etc. Self-insurance includes reducing expected loss when a bad 
state of nature occurs. Ehrlich and Becker (1972) shows that market insurance and 
self-insurance substitute for each other, while market insurance and self-protection 
can in principle be complements. If market insurance fails to reflect the efforts of 
the individual aimed at self-protection in pricing the premium, then availability of 
market insurance crowds out self-protection. This situation represents an ex-ante 
moral hazard. This type of moral hazard was addressed in Pauly (1974), who also 
extended the model to study the public provision of insurance with its possible 
welfare implications.
Ex-post moral hazard includes changes in the consumer’s behaviour after a 
negative shock to health is realised. In this context, moral hazard refers to an 
insurance holder demanding more medical care compared to his or her demand 
when without insurance, or under a less generous policy. Ex-post moral hazard 
attracted significant attention in the health economics literature. A number of 
studies, including Feldstein (1973), Feldman and Dowd (1991), and Manning and 
Marquis (1996), evaluated a welfare loss associated with moral hazard in the 
health insurance market, and were aiming to construct an optimal insurance policy
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that balances the benefits of risk spreading against losses attributed to moral 
hazard.
In Feldstein (1973), the relationship between the demand for insurance and 
the price of medical care was studied. It was found that an increase in price of 
medical care leads to a higher desired level of coverage; the level of health 
insurance and the price of care were found to be interdependent. Price distortions 
at the margin, caused by higher coverage purchased (modelled as a lower 
coinsurance rate) led to a deadweight loss due to the overconsumption of medical 
care. An increase in the coinsurance rate would produce a smaller deadweight loss 
from overconsumption, with the increase in the loss due to risk-bearing. The 
difference in risk bearing between two contracts with different coinsurance rates 
was modelled as a difference between the maximum premiums the households 
would be willing to pay to avoid the risk. The welfare gain from reduced price 
distortions had to be balanced against the welfare loss of increased risk bearing. 
Relative magnitudes of these two effects were estimated for a constant absolute 
risk aversion utility function. The example considered in the paper implied that 
decreasing insurance coverage by raising the average coinsurance rate from 0.33 to 
0.5 would produce a net welfare gain between $2 -$4 billion (based on 1969 data).
Feldman and Dowd (1991) provided their estimate of welfare loss of excess 
health insurance using the RAND Health Insurance Experiment data65. Utility was 
assumed to be additive in consumption of nonmedical goods and medical care. 
Exploiting the scenarios of increases in the price of medical care induced by 
insurance, suggested in Feldstein (1973), they estimated the net welfare loss of 
excess insurance, resulting from both overconsumption of medical care and a 
decrease in risk-bearing, to be between $33.4 and $109.3 billion in 1984 dollars, 
depending on the assumptions on the coefficient of absolute risk aversion66.
In the model of Manning and Marquis (1996), a distinction is made between 
the ex-ante choice of health insurance and ex-post demand for care. Using health
65 See Newhouse and The Insurance Experiment Group (1993) for the detailed description 
of RAND Health Insurance Experiment design and implementation. Section 3.3.2 of this 
chapter, Insurance Price Elasticity, contains more on this subject.
66 Estimate of absolute risk aversion was within 0.0028 and 0.0036 range.
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expenditure data, they estimated indirect utility function and applying duality 
theory, derived the demand for health care and a deadweight loss associated with a 
particular insurance plan. A risk premium equal to the difference between the 
maximum premium the family would be willing to pay, and the actuarially fair 
premium, was calculated and compared to the deadweight loss. An indirect utility 
for medical care and consumption good was assumed to be of constant price and 
income elasticities. Under the assumption that the decision to exceed a stop-loss 
amount (maximum dollar expenditure, MDE) was made after the uncertainty 
about the health status had been resolved, a probit model of the binary choice to 
exceed the MDE produced estimates of the indirect utility function, from which the 
demand function for health care was obtained. Manning and Marquis estimated 
the coefficient of absolute risk aversion67 and, using compensating variation, 
calculated risk premium and a deadweight loss associated with different insurance 
plans. Among the pure coinsurance plans, a coinsurance rate of about 45% 
provided the maximum net gain and was optimal. At this rate, marginal gains from 
increased risk pooling were equalized with marginal loss due to moral hazard.
There is also a spill-over effect of moral hazard behaviour on the insured 
pool, which was pointed out in Feldstein (1973) as a “vicious circle” of increase in 
medical costs due to the prevalence of insurance, which, in turn, induced demand 
for further insurance. A number of studies were devoted to quantify the externality 
caused by the ex-ante moral hazard through the increase in premiums for the rest 
of the insured group (see Kenkel (2000) for an extensive review). Empirical studies 
suggest that the effect of the ex-ante moral hazard is probably not too strong. This 
can be explained by high and uninsurable utility losses intrinsically present in the 
bad health state. Utility losses of healthy time and quality of life associated with a 
major illness might prevent the consumer from neglecting the self-protection goals, 
even when health insurance is available.
Newhouse (1996) pointed out that, while the tradeoff between moral hazard 
and risk aversion is a well documented and studied subject in health economics 
literature, another important phenomenon, a tradeoff between the efficiency in
67 Estimated 0.00021 in 1995 dollars.
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production (supply of medical care) and the selection of plans by individuals, is far 
less exploited. The paper provides analysis of the theory of selection, a review of 
empirical studies and policy implications for the supply side of the health 
insurance market. A summary of the current research on moral hazard in the 
health insurance market is provided in Zweifel and Manning (2000).
3.3.2. Insurance Price Elasticity
A significant value-added in understanding the links between health 
insurance and demand for medical care was produced in the scope of the RAND 
Health Insurance Study. The controlled RAND Health Insurance Experiment 
(HIE) was conducted in the United States in 1974-1977. Participating families 
were assigned to the plans with different coinsurance rates (0, 25, or 95 percent), 
and a different Maximum Dollar Expenditure (MDE) of 5, 10, or 15 percent of 
family income, with the stop-loss amount of $1,000. For more details on the study 
design and implementation, see Newhouse and The Insurance Experiment Group 
(1993). As discussed in the previous section, availability of health insurance 
reduces the out-of-pocket price of medical care, with the demand response to follow. 
This static ex-post moral hazard effect is equivalent to the insurance price 
elasticity of the demand for medical care. Estimating this elasticity became a 
research objective in the studies whose results are reported in Newhouse and The 
Insurance Experiment Group (1993) and in a number of individual papers 
including Manning, Morris et al. (1981), Manning, Newhouse et al. (1987), Keeler 
and Rolph (1988), Manning and Marquis (1996), Marquis and Holmer (1996), 
Chernew and Frick (1999), and others. A summary of the various econometric 
methods used in these and other studies to estimate insurance price elasticities 
with further references to empirical works can be found in Jones (2000).
There are certain empirical problems with determining the “price” of 
insurance. One could observe heterogeneous products in the insurance market, 
offering different levels of coverage under different conditions. There is no obvious 
transformation of a policy with a deductible into a policy with a constant 
coinsurance rate, due to the non-linear marginal coinsurance rate intrinsically 
present in the former. Newhouse (1981) discussed general issues concerning 
measuring the demand for medical care (expenditure or units of utilization),
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measurement of the price of insurance (including coinsurance rate, deductible and 
a stop-loss amount), and the pro and cons of estimates of price elasticities derived 
from the different study designs (studies based upon insurance claims and 
premiums data, natural experiment, inter-policy comparisons, and designed 
experiments).
Studies of coinsurance and other price elasticities of the demand for medical 
care include Phelps (1973), Phelps and Newhouse (1974), and Newhouse (1981). 
Phelps (1973) constructed a model of medical insurance with a deductible and a 
“ceiling” on covered expenses. Insurance served as a vehicle to transfer income 
from the good state of the world to the sick state, in a manner similar to an earlier 
model of Ehrlich and Becker (1972). Health capital was subject to an additive shock 
drawn from a continuous distribution. It was a one-period model, from which many 
useful insurance price elasticities were derived and tested on data.
The responsiveness of demand for care to changes in coinsurance rates and 
deductibles was studied in Phelps and Newhouse (1974) and Keeler, Newhouse et 
al. (1977). The former study was based upon insurance claims and premiums data 
and used the methodology on a total price elasticity of the demand for medical care 
developed in Phelps (1973). Using their estimates of the total price elasticity, a 
decrease in the coinsurance rate from 25% to zero yielded an estimated 12% 
increase in total medical expenditure. The elasticity of demand for medical care fell 
with the coinsurance rate: it was estimated to be 0.12 for the coinsurance rate 
between 25% and 20%, and 0.04 for the coinsurance rate between 15% and 10%. 
Medical services with a higher time price (e.g. waiting time) exhibited relatively 
higher time price elasticity and a lower price elasticity. Money-price elasticities 
were found to be decreasing with coinsurance rate.
Concentrating on the policies with deductibles, a study of Keeler, Newhouse 
et al. (1977) showed that higher deductibles lowered utilization, but the decision to 
use additional care depended on whether past utilization of services had reached 
the threshold (the deductible), implying a non-linear behavior of the optimal 
spending strategy. Keeler, Newhouse et al. (1977) used a multi-period discrete 
model of expected utility maximisation, where the utility function depended on the 
consumption good and health. Shock to health was modeled analogously to Phelps
(1973). The budget constraint had a kink at the amount of deductible: the
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consumer paid the full price for services below the deductible, and the proportion of 
a price equal to the coinsurance rate, after the amount of medical spending 
exceeded the deductible. The further assumption of linear utility (risk-neutrality in 
money and health) was made, and the loss was drawn from a binomial distribution. 
The illness was assumed to be minor. The effective price was constructed, 
depending on the amount of days left in the accounting period. The model predicted 
that individuals on insurance plans with deductibles would exhibit different 
behaviour, depending on their health status: those with worse health would exceed 
their deductible faster than those who were healthier. Correct specification of a 
price of medical care in case of the insurance policies with deductibles was 
discussed.
Keeler and Rolph (1988) analysed data on episodes of treatment derived 
from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE). The episode of treatment was 
considered to be a “natural” unit to study the effect of price change on the demand 
for medical care. A linear regression model was fitted to the data on the logarithm 
of the cost of hospital episodes used as a dependent variable. No statistically 
significant difference was found in the cost per episode of treatment between 
insurance plans with different coinsurance rate. Occurrence ratio (compared to the 
free care plan) for episodes of outpatient treatment was found to be consistently 
lower on the insurance plans with coinsurance, both during the pay period (before 
the maximum dollar expenditure, MDE, cap was reached), and after the stop-loss 
threshold was exceeded. For example, occurrence of episodes of acute outpatient 
care on the plan with 95% coinsurance was 55% of the occurrence on the free care 
plan; the 50 percent coinsurance plan produced the occurrence ratio of 0.61, and 
the 25 percent coinsurance plan yielded an estimated 0.76 occurrence ratio. 
Estimated occurrence ratios for hospital episodes were greater than one for all 
coinsurance plans, after the maximum dollar expenditure was exceeded. The main 
conclusion of the study was that most of the reduction in medical use due to cost- 
sharing comes from a reduction in the number of episodes of care, especially in 
small hospitalisation. A conclusion different from Keeler, Newhouse et al. (1977) 
was reached concerning the timing of medical costs by the consumer, so that to 
take advantage of change in effective prices after a stop-loss (MDE) amount was 
surpassed. It was found that the rate of spending on all cost-sharing plans for 
outpatient and dental episodes of treatment remained below that of the free care
/
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plan, even after the MDE was exceeded. This study concluded that deductibles 
remain an effective tool to control excess demand for medical care even in the 
presence of expenditure caps.
Manning, Morris et al. (1981) reported results of an early work based on a 
subset of data available from the RAND HIE. They examined total medical 
expenditure, excluding dental and outpatient mental health care, using two 
alternative specifications of the insurance plans, ANOVA and the coinsurance 
function specifications. The two-part model consisted of logistic regression for the 
binary choice of seeking medical care, and the regression of logarithm of total 
medical expenditure on a set of explanatory variables for those observations where 
the reported medical expenditure was positive. Their estimates of the overall 
elasticity of demand for medical care revealed that an important contribution is 
made by the decision to seek care. The overall insurance price elasticity of -0.2 was 
calculated from the data. The income elasticity estimate was obtained as well, 
equal 0.38. It was shown that income influenced both the decision to seek care and 
the level of medical expenditure.
In Manning, Newhouse et al. (1987) it has been emphasised that health 
insurance has to be treated as an endogenous variable in cross-sectional studies. 
Those who anticipated higher medical costs made their decision to purchase an 
appropriate level of private coverage, leading to the selection issue. Studies which 
ignored endogeneity of private health insurance choice showed a high 
responsiveness of demand for medical care to the presence of insurance. Manning, 
Newhouse et al. (1987) used the data from the RAND HIE. The four-equation 
model was used to study coinsurance price-elasticity of demand for medical care. 
The first equation was a probit equation to identify users of medical care from non­
users. The second, probit equation, applied to users only, identified the conditional 
probability of using in-patient medical care by those who have positive medical 
expenditure during the year. The third equation applied to outpatient-only users 
was a linear regression with the logarithm of total medical expenditure as a 
dependent variable. The fourth equation was constructed for the users of any 
inpatient services, with the total medical expenditure being a dependent variable. 
The smearing estimate was used to correct for departures from lognormality. A 
consistent estimate of the expected medical expenditure was obtained and used to 
predict expenditure for each enrolled person. It was found that mean predicted
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expenditure in  the free care p lan was 46 percent higher than  in  the 95 percent 
plan. I t  was also established th a t d iffe rent arrangements in  cost-sharing for 
in p a tie n t and outpatient services produce d ifferent results. For ou tpa tien t services, 
cost-sharing reduces to ta l expenditure compared w ith  free care by reducing the 
like lihood of seeking medical care. The estimates for coinsurance price elasticities 
were in  the range of -0 .1  to -0 .2 . The growth in  aggregate hea lth  expenditure, 
according to M anning, Newhouse et al. (1987), cannot be solely explained by a 
spread of hea lth  insurance. Technological innovations in  medical care may have 
contribu ted to the m ain proportion o f th is  increase.
Van de Ven and van Praag (1981a) assumed a lognorm al d is tribu tion  for the 
hea lth  expenditure and used an adjusted Tobit model to study the effect of 
insurance on the demand for hea lth  services. The expected u t il i ty  gains from 
ho ld ing a hea lth  insurance policy w ith  a deductible, compared to the case of 
complete coverage, were estimated. The estimate o f absolute r isk  aversion was 
obtained through exam ining the responses on indifference between prem ium  
reduction and a corresponding increase in  deductible68. I t  has been established in  
van de Ven and van Praag (1981a) that, for fam ilies w ith  insurance coverage, the 
p robab ility  o f positive expenditure on physicians’ services is about 5% higher than 
fo r fam ilies w ith ou t insurance, and to ta l expenditure is about 19% higher. Part of 
the increase in  the u tiliza tio n  under a lower coinsurance ra te  and lower out-of- 
pocket price of medical care m igh t be a ttribu ted  to the m ora l hazard and would 
represent a welfare loss compared to the optim al policy. Van de Ven and van Praag 
(1981b) used an a lte rna tive  specification, a prob it model w ith  sample selection, to 
study the demand for deductibles. A  m u ltiva ria te  prob it analysis was applied in  
Gibbons and W ilcox-Gok (1998) to study the re lationship between u tilisa tio n  of 
medical services and supplem entary health insurance held by Medicare 
beneficiaries.
M arquis and Holm er (1996) proposed an a lterna tive  specification of the 
in d iv id u a l choice under uncerta in ty  and applied i t  to estim ate insurance price
68 The estimate of average risk aversion is 0.0048 (in 1976 guilders), compared to 0.0026 in 
1968 dollars (0.00039 in 1995 dollars) in Friedman (1974), 0.00021 in 1995 dollars of 
Manning and Marquis (1996), and 0.0006 which is based on the estimates of Marquis and 
Holmer (1986) and used in Zabinski, Selden et al. (1999).
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elastic ity. In  th e ir model, the ind iv idua l valued gains and losses asymmetrically. 
The value function exhib ited r is k  aversion fo r positive gains, risk-seeking for small 
losses, and reverted to r is k  aversion for large losses. A  reference plan was chosen 
as a benchmark to evaluate gains and losses, and the optim al solution depended on 
the choice o f the reference point. Under the assumptions o f the model, the e lastic ity 
o f demand for insurance (defined as arc e lastic ity  for the change in  im plied 
prem ium  expenditure w ith  respect to the change in  effective afte r-tax price) was 
estim ated to be w ith in  -0 .13 to -0 .38  range69.
A  model of demand for hea lth  insurance w hich exp lic itly  takes in to  account 
the tim e costs, expressed in  term s o f the length o f w a iting  tim e for surgery, was 
proposed in  Johannesson, Johansson et al. (1998). The demand functions for 
p riva te  insurance were em pirica lly  estimated using log it model for the Swedish 
data.
The presence o f adverse selection and m oral hazard in  the health insurance 
m arket, topped w ith  the need to control the costs o f provid ing medical care 
contribu ted to the grow th o f managed care in  the U n ited  States. Managed care 
organisations, inc lud ing  H ea lth  Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), may be seen 
as a m arke t response to in fo rm ationa l asymmetries to ensure better risk  
segmentation in  a s itua tion  o f m arke t fa ilu re 70. These questions are beyond the 
scope of th is  thesis, bu t they receive lots o f a tten tion ’ in  the health economics 
lite ra tu re . As an example, Cutler, M cC le llan et al. (1998) studied the effects of 
in teg ra ting  the provision o f hea lth  services and insurance in to  HMOs, and found a 
substantia l p roductiv ity  im provem ent compared to tra d itio n a l insurance 
arrangements, due to lower u n it costs. A  paper of Abraham, A rora et al. (1999) 
develops a model of HM O  behaviour which combines production decisions in  both 
commercial and Medicare markets. Frank, Glazer et al. (2000) proposed a model of 
op tim is ing  behaviour o f the H M O ’s (or any other hea lth  p lan ’s reimbursed by 
capita tion princip le) who solve for an optim al shadow price on access to pa rticu la r 
medical services, and constructed an em pirica l index to id en tify  the most distorted
69 Estimate depended on a choice of a reference plan (full coverage and a catastrophic plan
with $2000 deductible, respectively).
70 Glied (2000), pg. 721.
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services and an associated welfare loss. Eichner, M cC le llan et al. (1999) contains 
an em pirica l investigation in to  the decomposition of cost differences o f several 
employer-provided hea lth  plans. For a detailed review of recent developments in  
managed care research, see G lied (2000).
Sum m arising the discussion o f th is  subsection, reduction in  the out-of- 
pocket price o f medical care due to insurance leads to h igher consumption o f 
medical care. Lower deductibles, coinsurance rate and gross price o f medical care 
have a positive im pact on the amount of care demanded. This is a static m oral 
hazard effect o f hea lth  insurance. Zweifel and M anning (2000) po in t out a possible 
dynam ic m oral hazard effect: hea lth  insurance can have an im pact not only on the 
grow th o f hea lth  care expenditure, bu t also on a rate o f change of the growth rate, 
by fa c ilita tin g  the access of consumers to innovations in  medical technology.
3.3.3. Policy-Induced Effects
Understanding the im pact of hea lth  insurance on the demand for medical 
care is crucia l for the successful analysis o f policies which affect the price of 
insurance. In  the U n ited  States, for example, the tax system does not assess the 
employer’s contributions to the employee’s hea lth  insurance plan as pa rt o f the 
employee’s taxable income, and thus subsidises the hea lth  coverage. In  A ustra lia , 
recent government in itia tive s  include a 30% rebate on priva te  hea lth  insurance 
contribu tions (th is and other recent policy measures were covered in  Chapter 2 o f 
th is  thesis). In  both cases, im plem entation o f the public policy provides prem ium  
subsidies for priva te  hea lth  insurance. In  view o f the rap id  growth in  hea lth  care 
spending, changes in  government policies m igh t be considered to combat the ris ing 
costs o f medical care and apparent inefficiencies in  the medical care m arket.
Policy-induced effects on the demand for insurance and medical care can be 
analysed using the insurance price e lastic ity  approach described in  the previous 
section. Pauly (1986) addresses the issue o f tax  subsidies to hea lth  insurance to 
conclude th a t tax incentives create distortions resu lting  in  over-insurance 
(quan tity  distortions), as w e ll as price distortions, followed by excessive growth of 
m edical expenditure on aggregate. A  tax subsidy w h ich offsets the effects of 
prem ium  loading (due to which an incomplete insurance is optimal), induces
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ind iv idua ls  to purchase more insurance coverage. M arqu is  and Buchanan (1994) 
studied the effect on hea lth  care costs o f changes in  hea lth  insurance tax policies 
and the tax trea tm ent for the employer’s contributions. They conclude th a t should 
tax  subsidies be reduced, a large proportion o f low-income employees would choose 
not to purchase any insurance, w h ile  the rest would demand modestly less medical 
services. The increase in  tax revenue due to the e lim ina tion  o f favourable tax 
trea tm en t m igh t be re-d istribu ted  to provide coverage for those who have chosen 
not to insure under the new conditions. A  model developed in  Jack and Sheiner
(1997) yields the in teresting conclusion that, given existing tax subsidies to private 
hea lth  insurance premiums, add itiona l subsidies to out-of-pocket expenditure may 
lead to the consumer choosing a h igher coinsurance rate, w hich w il l  resu lt in  
welfare im provem ent and reduced to ta l hea lth  expenditure.
G ruber (2000b) discusses curren t and proposed tax policy aimed at reducing 
uninsurance, and proposes measures to increase the efficiency of tax  policies in  
achieving th is  goal. Proposed reforms include moves from  deduction of health 
insurance expenditure from taxable income to a fixed tax credit (subsidy) which 
would apply independently from  the m arg ina l tax  rate; re fu ndab ility  of tax credit; 
im posing a cap on hea lth  insurance expenditure eligible fo r tax subsidy, and other 
measures. The costs and benefits o f d iffe rent policy measures are estimated in  
order to id en tify  a tax policy w ith  the lowest cost per new ly insured, the m aximum 
num ber o f new ly insured, and the extent to w hich the policy reaches the target low 
income group. Overall, the best policy option (tax credits) discussed in  the paper 
was estim ated to cover less than  a th ird  of uninsured a t a cost o f $40 b illion  pa. 
The lik e ly  effect of tax-based subsidies also includes a reduction in  the number of 
holders o f employer-based insurance cover, and a move towards non-group 
coverage, w hich could have a positive effect by reducing the “job lock” (relative 
im m o b ility  o f labour due to the employer-provided hea lth  insurance).71
71 See Gruber (2000a), Gilleskie and Lutz (1999) for estimates of the insurance-induced job- 
lock.
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3.4. S tu d ies  o f  He a l t h  Ex pe n d itu r e  a n d  H e a l t h  F in a n c e  M ix
The grow th o f hea lth  expenditure in  the developed countries is a w e ll 
documented fact which worries politic ians and the general public. In  many 
countries, inc lud ing  A ustra lia , hea lth  expenditure has been growing faster than 
GDP, w h ich resulted in  a steady growth o f the share o f hea lth  expenditure in  the 
Gross Domestic Product. A  study of B lom qvist and C arter (1997), based on the 
pooled cross-sections and tim e series OECD data, examined income e lastic ity  o f the 
demand for hea lth  care on the aggregate level. Income e lastic ity  greater than one 
(health care as a lu xu ry  good) found in  previous cross-sectional studies was 
questioned, recognising non-sta tionarity  of the underly ing  tim e series. Getzen 
(2000), app lying a nested m u ltileve l model of hea lth  care spending, concludes tha t 
hea lth  is ne ither a necessity nor a luxury : the income e lastic ity  depends on the 
level o f analysis.
In  the U n ited  States, the prevalence of priva te  hea lth  insurance and a 
m ora l hazard effect were blamed for the booming hea lth  expenditure growth. A t 
the same tim e, countries w ith  a d iffe rent pub lic-priva te  finance m ix also 
experienced growth in  hea lth  expenditure as a proportion o f GDP. Numerous 
studies were conducted in te rna tiona lly  to address th is  issue. A n  overview of those 
studies w ith  extensive b ib liography can be found in  Gerdtham  and Jonsson (2000). 
A p a rt from  the role o f hea lth  insurance, other factors may be used to explain the 
cu rren t trend  in  aggregate hea lth  care expenditure. Demographic change and 
popula tion ageing could provide one possible explanation. An increase in  medical 
expenditure over the recent period and its  lin ks  to population ageing was analysed 
in  C u tle r and Meara (1999). The effects of population ageing and unbalanced 
gender grow th of the elderly on the m arkets for old-age care were studied in  
Lakdaw a lla  and Philipson (1999). Another possible explanation for the growth of 
hea lth  care expenditure takes in to  account rap id  im provements in  medical care 
technology. These issues a ttracted sign ificant a tten tion  in  the lite ra tu re , and are 
fa r beyond the scope of th is  thesis. Gerdtham and Jonsson (2000) is an excellent 
source on the results of in te rna tiona l studies and on the methods used.
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3.4.1. Crowding-Out Effect of Public Schemes on Private Health Insurance
A ustra lia , like  many developed countries, has a m ixed system of health 
insurance. A n  extensive discussion o f the re lationship between the public-private 
finance m ix  and its  effect on the tradeoff between comprehensiveness and 
completeness is provided in  Chernichovsky (2000), w ith  p a rticu la r emphasis on 
combined systems like  th a t in  Austra lia . I t  has been suggested th a t less efficient 
or more costly options have to be financed from private sources. Combined systems 
have th e ir  po ten tia l dangers by a llow ing pub lic ly  and p riva te ly  financed demands 
to compete fo r the same medical resources through the same providers. I t  is of 
pa rticu la r im portance for combined systems to secure en titlem ent for the public 
program  for a ll income groups, given th a t h igher income groups are contribu ting 
more to public finance through the taxation system, and ought to be satisfied w ith  
the system. In  the US context, D iam ond (1992) proposed a new universal health 
insurance system w hich would be provided for large groups, formed by the 
government on the compulsory basis, w ith  p riva te  hea lth  insurance companies 
competing fo r these group markets. This approach would help disentangle 
em ployment and hea lth  insurance, prevent adverse selection and ere am -skimm ing 
by the insurers, and resu lt in  a h igher allocative efficiency. Jack (1998) found tha t 
a com m unity ra ting  princip le provides an effic ient life tim e  insurance against 
medical spending by spreading the risks across generations.
A  body of in te rna tiona l research has found an em pirica l evidence o f the 
crowd-out effect which public schemes have on priva te  hea lth  insurance. The 
studies o f C u tle r and Gruber (1996a), C utler and G ruber (1996b) cover the 
re la tionsh ip  between private hea lth  insurance membership and government- 
financed hea lth  care programs in  the USA. Expanded e lig ib ility  for Medicaid for 
pregnant women, in fan ts  and children, resu lting  from the reforms started in  the 
la te 80s, was associated w ith  fa lling  priva te  hea lth  insurance rates. The private 
coverage drop-outs were concentrated in  lower income groups, whose fam ily  
members became elig ible fo r the extended Medicaid. C u tle r and Gruber estimated 
th a t about a h a lf o f the increase in  M edicaid coverage was a ttribu ted  to the
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crowding out o f p riva te  hea lth  insurance. Estim ates o f other researchers were more 
modest72.
In  Shore-Sheppard, Buchm ueller et al. (2000), firm -leve l data was examined 
to fin d  th a t expansion of M edicaid has an effect on the p robab ility  th a t a firm  offers 
fa m ily  coverage, and on the proportion o f fu ll-tim e  employees who accept the 
employer-provided hea lth  insurance offered. F irm s employing a la rger proportion 
o f low-income workers are found to be less lik e ly  to offer hea lth  insurance, w ithou t 
d irect testing for employees’ e lig ib ility  for public programs. The crowding-out and 
safety-net (decrease in  num ber o f uninsured) effects of public hea lth  programs were 
demonstrated in  Rask and Rask (2000). They constructed a m u ltinom ia l log it 
model to show th a t d iffe ren t public health programs, inc lud ing  provision of medical 
services through public providers, subsidies to priva te  providers, and direct 
provision o f public hea lth  insurance, a ll have the same effect of crowding out 
p riva te  hea lth  insurance coverage. According to th e ir estimates, the ava ilab ility  of 
pub lic hospitals crowds out 11% o f the persons in  the low income group (4% in  the 
m iddle income group) who would otherwise be p riva te ly  insured. Public health 
insurance is found to be a substitute for private coverage, a lbe it an imperfect 
substitute, producing d iffe ren t effects based on income level.
A  recent paper of Propper (2000) studied the demand for private health in  
the U n ited  Kingdom. Private sources (both private hea lth  insurance and out-of- 
pocket expenditure) accounted for about 15 percent o f hea lth  care finance in  the 
U K  in  1995, and th is  share has been growing, p a rtia lly  due to policy changes. The 
paper analyses data from  the B ritish  Household Panel Survey and finds tha t 
income, a set o f demographic variables and po litica l a ttitudes are strongly related 
to the priva te  hea lth  insurance choice. I t  also finds th a t the p riva te ly  insured are 
hea lth ie r on average than those who re ly  on the public system, the NHS. In  the 
competing risks model constructed in  Propper (2000), the in d iv idua l faces three 
choices: to seek no medical care, to use priva te  care, or to re ly  on public care. The 
determ inants o f choice are severity of illness, qua lity  and costs o f public medical 
services, and qua lity  and costs o f private care. The qua lity  d iffe ren tia l is modelled
72Yazici and Kaestner (1998) reported an estimate of 14.5 percent, and a 17 percent crowd- 
out effect was found in Rask and Rask (2000).
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by a single param eter w hich reduces the value o f the medical care i f  i t  is obtained 
from  the public system. This loss o f value param eter can be associated w ith  e.g. 
longer w a iting  time. There is cost associated w ith  acquiring medical services 
through the public system, which is less than the price o f priva te  care. The model 
uses indifference conditions between no care and public care, and public care and 
priva te  care. The m u ltinom ia l log it model o f the use o f public and priva te  medical 
care is estimated, and factors determ ining the use o f private hea lth  care are 
studied. A  strong association between past and present use o f medical care 
provided by a specific sector (public or private) is found, contro lling  for health 
status. Those who used only the public system in  previous periods tend to re ly  on 
the public system at present. The same is true  for the priva te  hea lth  care users. 
The paper finds th a t there is no d is tinct group among medical services users who 
opted out of the public system (the NHS) completely. Public and private systems 
serve as complements: those p riva te ly  insured use the pub lic system as well, and 
express po litica l support for it.
In  the A us tra lian  context, the a va ila b ility  of un iversa l insurance, Medicare, 
has had a defin ite  crowd-out effect on priva te  hea lth  insurance. This has been 
covered in  Chapter 2 o f th is  thesis. Recent government policies are aimed at 
increasing priva te  hea lth  insurance coverage. They include subsidies to private 
hea lth  insurance contributions, tax penalties for h igh income group members 
w ith ou t private coverage, and prem ium  penalties for jo in ing  priva te  health funds 
la te in  the lifecycle (life tim e com m unity ra ting  principle). The economic effects of 
these policies and the extension to which they address the ta rge t group (those 
w ith ou t private hea lth  insurance coverage), as w e ll as the combined effect of an 
increase in  priva te  coverage on the price o f medical care and on aggregate health 
expenditure, need to be evaluated, and more research needs to be done in  th is  area.
3.4.2. Equity in Health and in Access to Health as a Rationale for Public 
Insurance
Issues o f equ ity  in  hea lth  belong to the scope o f norm ative economics. They 
are based on the competing concepts o f d is tribu tive  justice and social values. L inks 
between the economic theory o f equ ity and the underly ing philosophical basis are 
discussed in  W ilham s and Cookson (2000). E qu ity  in  hea lth  is a d is tinc t issue from
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equ ity  in  access to hea lth  care resources. A  concept o f social justice (equity) based 
on a pa rticu la r ideology determines the mechanism o f d is tr ibu tion  o f lim ited  
resources w ith in  a society. As has been emphasised in  W agstaff and van Doorslaer 
(2000), two d is tinc t ideological platforms, ega lita rian  and libe rta rian , have led to 
d iffe ren t hea lth  care systems in  the developed countries. The ega lita rian  viewpoint 
had much a stronger influence on European policy-makers, resu lting  in  a larger 
involvem ent o f the state in  hea lth  finance and provision. In  the U n ited  States, the 
predom inantly  lib e rta ria n  approach contributed to the curren t hea lth  care 
arrangements.
Eva lua ting  equ ity in  hea lth  care finance, the d istinction  is made between 
horizon ta l equ ity  (equal contributions from  households o f the same ab ility ) and 
ve rtica l equ ity  (contributions to hea lth  care dependent on the household’s abilities). 
V e rtica l equ ity  in  health care finance is linked  to contributions made by specific 
income groups to hea lth  care finance. These contributions can be progressive (i.e. 
h igher income groups bear a larger proportion o f to ta l hea lth  expenditure), 
p roportiona l or regressive. Studies of the red is tribu tive  effect o f hea lth  care finance 
systems include van Doorslaer, W agstaff et al. (1999) and Wagstaff, van Doorslaer 
et al. (1999). Kakwani, W agstaff et al. (1997) covers issues o f measurement, 
com putation and s ta tis tica l inference o f two indices of hea lth  inequa lity  (Relative 
Index o f Inequa lity  and Concentration Index) w ide ly used in  the lite ra tu re . 
H o rizon ta l equ ity relates to equalisation o f contributions from  agents of s im ila r 
ab ility , and can be underm ined by tax distortions (for example, tax-favour able 
trea tm en t o f p riva te  hea lth  insurance premiums). For the discussion o f theoretical 
and em pirica l issues in  m easuring vertica l and horizonta l equ ity see W agstaff and 
van Doorslaer (2000).
3.4.3. Income-Related Inequalities in Health
Income-related inequa lities in  self-assessed hea lth  were found in  a cross- 
sectional study of nine OECD countries by van Doorslaer, W agstaff et al. (1997). 
These results were fu rth e r supported in  van Doorslaer, W agstaff et al. (1999) and 
W agstaff, van Doorslaer et al. (1999). Papers by Deaton (1999) and Deaton and 
Paxson (1999) presented a model in  which health was a function o f income relative
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to the mean income of a reference group, and found no s ign ifican t re lationship 
between m o rta lity  and income inequa lity  in  the US data.
Relations between hea lth  and income have been studied in  Contoyannis and 
Forster (1999) who modelled ind iv idua l's  hea lth  as a function o f income conditional 
on a health-re la ted behavior. Health-re la ted behavior was assumed to be 
characterised by a parameter, a p robab ility  o f behaving hea lth ily , which increases 
w ith  income. D iffe ren t scenarios were studied under the assumption o f lin e a rity  of 
hea lth  production function, w ith  income as an argument, in  both hea lthy and 
unhea lthy behavioural modes. Assuming th a t incomes were drawn from a 
d is tribu tion , the concentration curve for expected hea lth  was constructed and used 
to assess the effects o f hea lth  prom otion policies and the im plications o f income 
grow th on inequalities in  health. The crucia l measure upon which the conclusions 
depended was the e lastic ity  o f expected health to income, and three cases were 
analysed based on the e lastic ity  being less (greater) than, or equal to one. The 
effects o f grow th in  income on inequa lity  in  health were found to be dependent on 
the dynamics of the income e lastic ity  o f expected health, w h ich does not support 
the general claim  made in  the earlie r w ork of van Doorslaer, W agstaff et al. (1997).
A  lack of insurance w h ich could be p a rtia lly  a ttr ib u te d  to low income status 
is linked  to increased m o rta lity  risks in  the em pirica l analysis o f Franks, Clancy et 
al. (1993) who used Cox proportional hazards su rv iva l analysis to study the 
re la tionsh ip  between insurance status and subsequent m orta lity . Gerdtham and 
Johannesson (2000) found inequalities in  hea lth  favouring h igher income groups in  
Swedish data, m easuring hea lth  outcomes by a lte rna tive  measures of life-years 
and Q ua lity  Adjusted Life Years (QALYs). The measures o f hea lth  adopted by 
hea lth  economists w il l  be discussed in  the fo llow ing section.
3.5. Me a s u r in g  H e a l t h
In  order to construct a m eaningful model of demand for health, i t  is 
necessary to know w hat exactly is being dealt w ith , th a t is, to be able to measure 
health. There are many competing measures of hea lth  outcomes used by health 
economists. Effects on m o rta lity  rates and life  expectancy provide the f irs t ins igh t 
in to  the effectiveness o f hea lth  policy on aggregate level. M easuring qua lity  o f life
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is a much more d iff ic u lt theoretical issue, due to the sub jectiv ity  inheren tly  present 
in  the in d iv id u a l evaluation process.
3.5.1. Measures of Quality of Life
One of the measures of qua lity  of life  developed in  the lite ra tu re  is health- 
re la ted qua lity  o f life  (HRQoL). O ther approaches include the D isab ility  Adjusted 
L ife  Year (DALY), representing the loss of years o f life  in  fu ll health due to 
prem ature m orta lity ; the Q ua lity  Adjusted L ife  Year (QALY) measure o f gains in  
hea lth  assigns a w eight from  1 (fu ll health) to 0 (equivalent to death) to the time 
spent in  a p a rticu la r hea lth  status. The Healthy-Years E qu iva len t (HYE) approach 
maps a p a rticu la r hea lth  profile to the am ount o f years in  fu l l hea lth  so th a t the 
in d iv id u a l is in d iffe re n t between them. The necessary condition for the HYE to be a 
v a lid  representation o f the preferences over hea lth  outcomes is r isk  neu tra lity  
( lin e a rity  o f u t i l i ty  function w ith  respect to years in  fu ll health).
States o f hea lth  can be in d iv idua lly  rated using the V isua l Analogue Scale 
(VAS) based on the bisection method applied to the hea lth  states represented as a 
f in ite  in te rva l. The Standard Gamble (SG) approach establishes an equivalent 
gamble between a trea tm ent w ith  uncerta in outcomes and a certa in  interm ediate 
leve l of health. The Tim e-Trade-O ff (TTO) method is based on the ra tio  between 
the tim e in  fu ll hea lth  and tim e spent in  a chronic condition, between which the 
in d iv id u a l is ind iffe ren t. Discrete hea lth  states can be evaluated against each other 
using the W illingness To Pay (WTP) approach. Dolan (2000) provides an extensive 
discussion o f the issues of measurement o f health, hea lth-re la ted qua lity  o f life, 
and other re levant theoretical problems. M u llahy  (2000) studies stochastic 
properties o f Q ALY-like measures of hea lth  outcomes, tak ing  in to  account 
popula tion va ria tion  in  and covariation between longevity and qua lity  measures. I t  
has been pointed out in  Groot (2000) th a t self-assessed in d iv id u a l well-being can be 
biased by adaptation behaviour and d iffe rent scales o f reference. Estimates of th is 
bias in  a subjective measure o f hea lth  and in  the Q ALY weights have been 
obtained.
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3.5.2. Probabilistic Assumptions about Health and Health Expenditure
The continuous measure o f health based on a self-assessed health index 
proposed by W agstaff and van Doorslaer (1994) makes i t  possible to model health 
status as a lognorm ally d is tribu ted  index. The competing methods for measuring 
the hea lth  status, used for the calculation of the qua lity-adjusted life  years, include 
the ra ting  scale method and the tim e-tradeoff method. As has been shown in  
Gerdtham, Johannesson et al. (1999), the W agstaff and van Doorslaer’s health 
measure is s ta tis tica lly  no d iffe rent from the tra d itio n a lly  used methods, and thus 
its  v a lid ity  has been confirmed. Kakwani, W agstaff et al. (1997) also uses the 
assumption th a t underly ing the categorical self-assessed hea lth  is a continuos 
la te n t variable o f ill-h e a lth  which is drawn from  a lognorm al d is tribu tion . Taking 
th is  in to  account, the theoretical model of Chapter 5 o f th is  thesis adopts the 
hypothesis th a t the hea lth  capita l is measured by a continuous index which is 
lognorm ally  d istributed.
Assum ption of lognorm ality  of in d iv id u a l hea lth  expenditure was used in  
Keeler, Newhouse et al. (1977), van de Ven and van Praag (1981a), and Manning, 
M orris  et al. (1981). Newhouse (1981) pointed out tha t, based on the H ealth  
Insurance Experim ent data, the hypothesis of lognorm ality  o f medical expenditure 
was rejected at 1% level. The conditional d is tribu tion  o f medical expenditure for 
those who reported a positive level s ign ifican tly  departed from  lognorm ality in  its  
righ t-hand  ta il.
3.6. Gr o ssm a n -T ype  S to ch astic  M o d e ls  o f  D em a n d  fo r  He alt h  
w it h  In su r a n c e
Blom qvist (1997) proposed a model of op tim a l non-linear health insurance 
contract w ith  an exogenous income. In d iv id u a l u t i l i ty  was derived from 
consumption and health, w hich was modelled as a sum o f hea lth  services and a 
random  shock drawn from  a pa rticu la r d is tribu tion . Income was exhausted on 
consumption, purchase of medical care, and insurance prem ium . The insurance 
contract was b u ilt  in  such a manner th a t a consumer was held responsible for 
con tribu ting  some function o f to ta l medical expenses as a copayment. An op tim a lity  
condition for the non-linear sharing function was obtained, lin k in g  the optim al 
coinsurance rate, constant coefficients o f re la tive  risk  aversion w ith  respect to
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consumption and health, and elastic ity o f demand for hea lth  services. B lom qvist’s 
model introduced insurance in  a one-period setting, and in  a fram ework quite 
d iffe ren t from  the Grossman approach. The dynamic questions o f hea lth  capita l 
depreciation and investm ent in to  health were not addressed. L itt le  was said about 
determ ination of the insurance prem ium.
Chernew, Encinosa et al. (2000) proposed a model o f an op tim a l insurance 
contract in  the case o f an observable severe illness th a t allows a lterna tive  medical 
treatm ents w ith  d iffe rent costs. By provid ing the pa tien t w ith  a cash payment for 
choosing a low cost treatm ent, and requ iring  a copayment for choosing a high-cost 
treatm ent, a m oral hazard is shown to be s ign ifican tly  reduced under the shared 
savings policy.
A  recent paper by L iljas  (1998) develops a stochastic model o f the demand 
for hea lth  th a t incorporates insurance against loss of income due to illness. This 
model closely follows the o rig ina l Grossman assumptions, w h ile  i t  is set up in  
continuous tim e, w ith  hea lth  measured by a continuous index. U ncerta in ty  about 
hea lth  is introduced by assuming th a t hea lth  fluctuates around its  expected value 
according to the rea lisa tion o f an additive shock. M arg ina l u t i l i ty  o f income is 
assumed to be constant. I t  has been derived from  the model th a t the stock of 
cap ita l under uncerta in ty is h igher in  the stochastic case. As a next step, an 
insurance was introduced in  the model under the assumption of no m oral hazard. 
The insurance contract provided an ind iv idua l w ith  reim bursem ent for the amount 
o f income from  w ork hours lost to illness. This led to a reduction in  optim al stock of 
hea lth  compared to the no insurance case. L ilja s ’ paper was the f irs t attem pt to 
introduce insurance in  the setting most s im ila r to the o rig ina l Grossman model of 
demand for health. U nfortunate ly, the optim al contract constructed in  L iljas  (1998) 
d id not exist, as was pointed out in  Tabata and Ohkusa (2000) -  by solving a 
system of equ ilib rium  conditions, the coefficient o f reim bursem ent had to be equal 
one identica lly , w h ich was equivalent to no insurance case. Tabata and Ohkusa 
(2000) proposed an a lte rna tive  specification of the reim bursem ent function, based 
on the to ta l tim e lost to illness, adm itting  th a t “ th is  type o f insurance has no 
foothold in  the actual w orld ” .73 In  h is rep ly to th is  critique, L iljas  (2000) proposed a
73 Tabata and Ohkusa (2000), pg. 818.
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corrected model o f demand for hea lth  in  which m arg ina l u t i l i ty  o f income was 
allowed to be a function o f tim e (a shadow price o f wealth), and called for a fu rthe r 
theoretica l investigation in to  in troducing insurance in to  the Grossman model of 
demand for health under uncerta inty.
3.7. Co n clu sio n
Economists have pu t a great deal o f e ffo rt in to  bu ild ing  models of demand 
fo r hea lth  and medical care. Research in  demand for hea lth  pioneered by Grossman 
resulted in  elaborate static and dynamic models w h ich are capable o f incorporating 
uncerta in ty. A  body o f studies of hea lth  insurance and analyses o f em pirical 
evidence suggest th a t the presence o f insurance leads to overconsumption of 
medical care. This m ora l hazard effect is w e ll documented and quantified. A t the 
same time, there is no Grossman-type model in  the lite ra tu re  w hich incorporates 
insurance against uncerta in medical expenditure in  a dynamic setting, and is 
capable o f quan tify ing  m oral hazard.
There is an em pirica l m icro- and macro-economic evidence on interactions 
between hea lth  status and income. Even so, i t  does not seem plausible th a t health 
is a d irect function o f income, as i t  has been modelled in  a number of studies. 
H ea lth  more like ly  belongs to those th ings th a t “money cannot buy” , otherwise 
m u ltim illiona ire s  would not be observed dying o f cancer. A t the same time, i t  is 
reasonable to assume th a t both hea lth  and w ealth  can experience exogenous 
shocks, and those shocks can be correlated. For example, car accidents may lead to 
both financ ia l losses (ignoring the effect o f insurance) and hea lth  losses. Exogenous 
negative shock to income often causes severe stress and depression. Thus, an 
assum ption o f corre lation between exogenous shocks to hea lth  status and wealth 
seems to be more rea lis tic  than  m aking hea lth  a direct function o f w ealth  in  a 
stochastic model.
A  num ber o f measures o f hea lth  have been proposed in  the hea lth  economics 
lite ra tu re . Based on the results from previous studies, a stochastic model of 
demand for health can be b u ilt  on the assumption tha t hea lth  capita l is measured 
by a continuous index which is lognorm ally d istributed.
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Very li t t le  research was done in  incorporating labour supply decision in  the 
model o f demand for health. U nder classic assumptions, a ll hea lthy tim e is spent 
on producing consumption good and on m arke t activities. I t  w ould be in teresting to 
have a model w ith  an exp lic it op tim a l choice o f leisure.
The fo llow ing two chapters of the thesis develop new theoretical models of 
demand for health. A  model of Chapter 4 assumes th a t the p robab ility  of surv iva l is 
endogenous and controlled by investm ent in  health. Chapter 5 presents a dynamic 
stochastic model o f demand fo r medical care which incorporates hea lth  insurance 
w ith  a constant coinsurance rate, f ill in g  the gap in  the existing lite ra ture .
C h a p t e r  4 . A  M o d e l  o f  D e m a n d  f o r  H e a l t h  
a n d  M e d i c a l  C a r e  U n d e r  U n c e r t a i n t y  w it h  
E n d o g e n o u s  L i f e  a n d  E l a s t i c  L a b o u r  
S u p p l y
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4.1. In tr o d u c t io n
I t  has been recognised in  the m ainstream  lite ra tu re  on hea lth  capital, 
pioneered by M ichael Grossman in  Grossman (1972), th a t medical care should be 
viewed as one o f the inputs in to  the hea lth  capita l production function. I t  is the 
commodity o f “ good hea lth” th a t ind iv idua ls  are demanding, not medical care per 
se. A  num ber o f studies have been devoted to m odelling the demand for health 
using generalised Grossman models , e.g. M uurinen  (1982), E h rlich  and Chuma 
(1990), Ried (1998), and Grossman (2000). These models are determ in istic dynamic 
optim isa tion models, where the te rm ina l period occurs once the level o f health 
cap ita l fa lls  below some predeterm ined c ritica l level. A n  im portan t feature of these 
analyses is the tim e in p u t in to production of health. A n  agent derives u t il i ty  from 
the consumption good, and d is u tility  from  sick time, w h ile  the rest of his or her 
tim e is allocated for m arket activ ities and investm ent in to  hea lth  and household 
production of a consumption good.
A n im portan t extension o f the model o f demand for hea lth  capita l has 
attem pted to recognise the random nature o f health, illness and death. Stochastic 
models o f th is  type were developed in  Cropper (1977), Dardanoni and W agstaff 
(1990), and Picone, U ribe et al. (1998). In  Cropper (1977), the critica l value of 
hea lth  stock is assumed to be a random variab le drawn from  a specific d is tribu tion. 
In  Picone, U ribe et al. (1998), negative random shocks to the hea lth  capita l are 
introduced, and the medical care is purchased by an agent to add to the stock of 
hea lth  cap ita l a fte r the realisation of the shock.
An in te resting  problem arises due to the endogeneity o f an agent’s life : after 
an op tim a l path  o f consumption and investm ent in  hea lth  capita l is chosen, the 
tim e of death is determ ined in  the model as the moment when the level of health
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cap ita l fa lls  below some threshold. This te rm in a l po in t is therefore a function o f the 
solution to the consumer’s optim isation problem, and m igh t be thought o f as being 
an endogenous life  span determ ined by an ind iv idua l. In  E h rlich  and Chuma 
(1990), the problem was addressed in  determ in istic settings. The problem of 
exp lic itly  m odelling the uncerta in ty o f death and su rv iva l seems to be an 
in te res ting  issue. This chapter introduces a new model which incorporates the 
endogenous probabilities of survival, determ ined by investm ent in  hea lth  services, 
the endogenous duration of life  and elastic labour supply. The assumptions of the 
model, p a rticu la rly  the form  of m o rta lity  hazards, are ra th e r ad hoc, yet 
ana ly tica lly  convenient. The aim of th is  exercise is to qua lify  the lin ks  between the 
exogenous parameters o f the model and endogenous variables o f in te res t74.
Since completing th is  chapter, a new paper o f E h rlich  (2000) was published. 
The model developed here is compared to E hrich  (2000) at the end o f th is  chapter.
4.2. Th e  M odel
4.2.1. Probabilistic Assumptions
Consider an economy w ith  continuous time. A  representative agent derives 
u t i l i t y  from  consumption ct, and leisure A j ,norm alised to be 0< Aj <1, and buys an 
add itiona l good, medical services, . The term  “medical services” is used broadly
and stands for any goods and services th a t increase hea lth  capital, e.g. qua lity  
housing, diet, recreation, etc. The m ain feature o f the model is th a t the consumer 
faces an endogenous instantaneous hazard rate, ^  , dependent on the current
medical services. The rate of change in  the hazard rate depends on the exogenous 
param eter 77 , wh ich reflects the na tu ra l increase in  the r is k  o f death, and on the
function  (p{m) o f medical services purchased at the curren t moment, th a t is,
fit =(ri-(p(mt))jut. (4.1)
74 For extensive discussion of survival hazard models, see Sickles and Taubman (1997).
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Function (p(m) is assumed to be increasing and twice continuously 
differentiab le, (p*>0, <p(0) = 0. To ensure th a t ¡it e [0,1] V />  0, the condition 
t
J <p(ms )ds > T]t + In ¡Uq has to be satisfied Vf > 0.
0
Blanchard (1985) studied a model w ith  constant instantaneous probability  
o f death, equal to tj, and the expected rem ain ing life  for the agent given by r j_1. In  
the model form ulated by (4.1), the life  span is endogenous, and the ind iv idua l 
chooses its  optim al length by choosing the medical expenditure path. I f  parameter 
r\=Vt is allowed to vary in  time, e.g. monotonously increase in  t, the concept of 
gradual hea lth  decay can also be incorporated in to  th is  model.
The hazard rate equals the conditional p robab ility  o f death exactly at tim e t, 
given th a t the consumer survived up to th a t age. Le t Pt be the probab ility  o f 
su rv iv ing  exactly u n t il age t o f an agent born at tim e 0. Le t Ft be the p robab ility  of 
su rv iv ing  at most to age t, and 1- Ft be the survivor function -  the probability  of 
su rv iv ing  to a t least age t. Suppose th a t Fq =0. The functiona l form  of P t , which is
dF.
the p robab ility  density of Ft , is Pt = — - .  The hazard rate and the probability  of
dt
l iv in g  exactly t periods o f age are linked through the fo llow ing re la tionsh ip75:
t t 
~f Vsds ~ J My d.S
Ft = l-e  0 , and Pt = ¡ite 0 (4.2)
Hence, Ft = \xt (1 -  Ft )
(4.3)
Suppose also th a t the p roductiv ity  o f an agent depends on his or her health 
status, w hich would in  tu rn  be determ ined by the stock o f medical services 
purchased up to tim e t or, a lterna tive ly, by the hazard rate. This assumption 
d iffe rs from  classical ones, e.g. Grossman (2000), bu t can nevertheless be reconciled
75 See Rosen (1994), pg. 237.
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w ith  them  by noting that, in  a standard setting, hea lth  capita l would determine the 
am ount o f sick tim e y ie ld ing d isu tility , and hea lthy tim e spent on m arke t and non- 
m arke t activities. Thus, a higher stock of hea lth  cap ita l enters through the tim e 
a llocation constra in t and enhances wage income through add itiona l tim e available 
on the m arket. This im pact w ill be modelled exp lic itly : i f  the consumer supplies 1- 
Xt un its  o f labour, his or her effective un its supplied are (1-Xt), where
et = 1 -  fint , (4.4)
0</3<l. For a hea lth ie r consumer w ith  a lower death hazard rate, the efficiency of 
labour is higher. Le tting  (3 vary w ith  time, the life-cycle effects of p roductiv ity  
d iffe ren tia ls  due to ageing can be studied.
4.2.2. Optimisation Problem
A  representative consumer maximises the expected u t il ity ,  where 
instantaneous u t il i ty  is of CES form  in  consumption and leisure, 0>O, a>0, by 
choosing optim al paths for consumption ct , le isure A*, and medical expenditure
mt :
00 r 1
maxct,Àt,mt>0 J pt v)~6 + °dj~d ]H9 e~ptdt, (4.5)
0
where p is the rate o f tim e preference, subject to the w ealth  accumulation 
equation
Wt = rtWt +cot( 1 -  A, )£t - c t -  Xîmt, (4.6)
and conditions (4.1)-(4.4). In  th is  model, œt is a rea l wage rate a t time t, rt 
is  a rea l in te rest rate, and %t is the price o f medical care in  term s of a consumption 
good. For the rest o f th is  chapter, the wage and in te rest rate are assumed to be 
constant parameters.
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Factor Pt = jnte 0 in  the in tegrand (4.5) reflects the probab ility  o f 
su rv iva l exactly u n t il age t, calculated in  (4.2)76. The instantaneous u t i l i ty  function 
in  (4.5) is s im ila r to one studied in  Auerbach and K o tlik o ff (1987)77. The 
in tra tem pora l e lastic ity  o f substitu tion between consumption and leisure is given 
by 1/0. The instantaneous u t i l i ty  function becomes linea r when 0 =0, Cobb-Douglas 
when 0=1, and Leontie ff for 0— . Param eter a defines re la tive  w eight attached to 
le isure w ith  respect to consumption, and is bounded from  below by zero.
The present value H am ilton ian  fo r (4.5)-(4.6) is given by
[¿ i,(i-F ; )|c;1-0 +caj-0 ]ï: ë + 
» =  +n,(r,W, +m,Q-XtXl-Pfit ) - c l - x tmt) + zt(Jl-<p(ml ))tit + (4.7)
+V,n,(l-F,)]e-C“
In  the expression (4.7), nt corresponds to the shadow price of wealth 
(m arg ina l u t i l i ty  of wealth), zt is a shadow price o f m o rta lity  rate \it , and vt is a 
shadow price o f the p robab ility  o f surv iv ing  to at most the age t , Ft .
The f irs t  order necessary conditions (FONCs) for th is  optim al control 
problem  are
d# A d# n n (AO \-----= 0,------= 0,------ = 0, (4.8.a-c)
dct d\ dmt
- ^ -  = [®f-POTr]e"p ,> (4.9.a)oWt
- - —  = [zt -pzrfe'f*, (4.9.b)
- z ^ r  =  [vt -  p v t } e ~ p t . ( 4 .9 .C)dFt
76 The problem of choosing the optimal consumption with the uncertain lifetime goes back 
to Yaari (1965), and is further developed in Davies (1981), Hurd (1989), Ehrlich and 
Chuma (1990) etc.
77 Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), Chapter 3, pg.27.
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= W,, ~ -  = jit} —  = vt (4.10.a-c)
dnt "  dzt dFt '
and the transversahty conditions are: 
lim e~ptntWt = 0 , lim  ztlLt = 0 , lim (1 -  F, ) = 0
t —>oo i — >00 f —>oo
(4.11.a-c)
To ensure sufficiency o f the FONCs, the concavity of the H am ilton ian  is 
confirmed.
D iffe ren tia ting  (4.7), the equations in  (4.8.a-c) become 
/it(X-FtyUc=nt , (4.8. a’)
nt a - Ft wx = a - ft** ) > (4-8-b’>
=-ztHt(p\mt), (4.8.c’)
where t / c = [c/-6 ]l-0  cr-0  , i / ^  = ¡cr1-0 +aA j_0 ]l-0  •
The f irs t two equations above are standard conditions equating the 
m arg ina l cost of reducing curren t period consumption (leisure) by one u n it to the 
m arg ina l benefits o f having an extra u n it of wealth  available (of spending an extra 
u n it  of tim e w ork ing  at the m arket and earning a curren t e ffic ient wage). The th ird  
condition states th a t the shadow price of reduction in  m o rta lity  rate due to the 
m arg ina l increase in  medical care equals the opportun ity  cost o f medical care, 
expressed in  term s of m arg ina l u t i l i ty  o f income.
D iv id ing  (4.8.a*) through (4.8.b’), the follow ing is true  along the equ ilib rium
path:
( f L ) 0 = ® ( i - 0^ )  , or £A. = G)(l-PfJLt ) (4.12)
Xt a U c
Condition (4.12) states tha t the m arg ina l rate o f substitu tion  of le isure for 
consumption equals the efficiency-adjusted cost o f leisure, expressed in  term s of the
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wage rate and the m o rta lity  factor. A n  optim a l consumption-to-leisure ra tio  is 
positive ly re lated to the curren t wage rate, and negatively re lated to the current 
death hazard rate, ¡it , th rough the efficiency coefficient .
The FONC (4.9) are equivalent to the following:
iit = (p - r t)nt, (4.9.a’)
-z , =-lp+V(mt)-T))zt +a-F,)U -n,Pco  ( l - A , ) + v , ( l - F t), (4.9.b’)
and vt = (p + Ht )vt + HtU , (4.9.c’)
1
1 - 0
The f irs t equation (4.9.a’) for m arg ina l value o f w ealth  can be in tegrated to 
produce the fo llow ing result:
t
pt-\ rsds 
711 — TiQe ® ,
and the te rm in a l condition under the assumption o f constant in terest rate
yields
lim  e~nWt = 0 , 
t—>°°
which is equivalent to a no-Ponzi-game condition (NPG).78 The NPG 
condition states th a t the debt is not increasing faster then the in te rest rate.
Taking derivative w ith  respect to tim e o f the expression (4.8.c’), yields
ZtlitV'imt) + ztfit(p\mt) + zt/ut(p\mt )mt = ~xnt .
A fte r substitu tion  in to  the last id e n tity  expression (4.9.b’) for zt and 
collecting terms, the fo llow ing re la tionship is established:
78 Blanchard and Fischer (1989), pg. 49.
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= '—— (V +vt) +—fi,<p\mi)(oP(l-Xt) - r .  (4.13)
<P(mt) zt X
This is the dynamic equation for the optim al choice o f medical care.
The term  0< 1 -Ft <1 in  (4.13) represents the p robab ility  o f su rv iv ing  past 
the age t, and is decreasing from  1 to 0. The te rm in a l condition
lim  e~ptvt (1 -  Ft ) = 0 states th a t the m arg ina l u t i l i ty  gains from  extending life  past 
t—
period t cannot be growing faster then the rate o f tim e preference plus the rate of 
decrease in  su rv iva l probability . Under the assumption o f a convex medical 
transform ation  function, <p'>0,(p"> 0 , equation (4.13) im plies th a t a lower price of 
medical care and lower in te rest rate lead to a h igher op tim a l level o f medical care. 
S im ila rly , a h igher wage rate and a h igher “loss of efficiency” param eter ¡5 y ie ld 
h igher op tim a l demand for medical care. H igher subjective discount ra te yields to 
the h igher m arg ina l value o f life  extension, vt , through the equation (4.9.c’), and, 
consequently, to a lower optim al amount o f medical care.
The life-cycle effect is driven by the re la tive  magnitudes o f positive and
1 — F 1 — F
negative term s in  the RHS of (4.13). Terms ------ -U  and ------— vt are negative
zt zt
(because zt < 0, Ht e [0;1], and 1 -F ^O  is approaching zero at the rate - ¡ut ). The 
shadow price o f increase in  hazard rate is growing in  absolute value no faster then 
the rate o f subjective preference m inus the growth in  the hazard rate, due to the 
te rm in a l condition
-(P -—)t
lim  e~^tzt^t = e  ^ zt — lim  e ^  Tl+(P(mt^ tzt = 0.
f —>00 >oo i —>oo
1 — F
The term s ------ -(U +vt) represent the re la tive benefit of the combined
zt
atta inab le  u t i l i ty  and the shadow price (value) o f life  extension, given surv iv ing 
past t, to the u t i l i ty  cost o f increase in  m o rta lity  rate. The shadow price of 
su rv iv ing  past t, or life  extension, is growing according to (4.9.c’) and is increasing 
w ith  the m o rta lity  rate.
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On the other hand, the middle term  — fit(p'(mt )coP(l-At ) in  the RHS of
(4.13) is positive. I t  corresponds to the gains in  term s of m arg ina l u t i l i ty  of wealth 
o f reduction in  m o rta lity  rate due to the m arg ina l increase in  medical care and the 
consequent increase in  the efficiency o f labour. The add itiona l u t i l i ty  benefit in  
term s of w ealth  due to the increased efficiency is proportional to the labour supply 
tim es the wage rate. R e-w riting  th is  term  using the FONC (4.8.c’) yields 
711— —(op( 1 - A , ), which is exactly the ra tio  o f u t i l i ty  gains in  term s of w ea lth  of th a t
- z t
add itiona l labour income to the u t il i ty  cost o f reducing m o rta lity  rate. The direction 
o f change in  op tim a l medical care depends on the re la tive m agnitude o f those two 
effects, and on th e ir re la tion  to the in te rest rate. A t the la te r stages o f p lanning 
horizon, w ith  su ffic ien tly  h igh m o rta lity  rates (le tting  r]=rjt be an increasing
function), the negative term s of the costs o f “ figh tin g ” the increase in  m o rta lity  may 
outweigh the u t il i ty  benefits o f ha lting  the fa ll o f efficiency, thus leading to the 
tu rnaround  in  the schedule of optim al investm ent in  medical care.
4.2.3. Expected Life and Euler Equations
I f  the te rm ina l po in t T is fin ite , then Fj - 1, and the probab ility  of 
su rv iv ing  past T  is zero. The length of the expected life  can be calculated as
t
oo 2~ — /
J tPtdt = J  tPtd t , where Pt - f i te 0 
0 0
The length o f life  is endogenous -  i t  depends on the whole path o f demand 
fo r medical care which influences the path  of hazard rate and surv iva l 
probabilities. Any param eter change th a t leads to h igher optim al medical care 
yields h igher expected length  o f life. Hence, both the lower price of medical care, 
h igher wage rate and lower in te rest rate y ie ld  a h igher expected life  span. H igher 
ra te  o f tim e preference yields to the lower life  expectancy for the same reason.
D iffe ren tia ting  equation (4.8.a’) w ith  respect to time, yields the follow ing 
evolution for the m arg ina l u t i l i ty  of consumption:
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7T  = Lit + P ~ r t - - -  = n t + P ~ r t +(p(mt)-r) • (4-14)
Uc H
This is analogous to the standard E u ler equation, where the subjective rate 
o f tim e preference (the psychological discount rate) is augmented w ith  the hazard 
ra te  (physiological discount rate), m inus the endogenous change (improvement) in  
hazard rate due to investm ent in  medical services.
Analogously, from the equation (4.8.b’) the fo llow ing evolution o f m arg ina l 
u t i l i t y  of le isure is derived:
U x 1 <P(mt)-r i  /a ik\- ^  = Ht + p -rt -Z!~— - =  fi,+ p -rt + y  ‘ (4.15)
Ux n i-flu i -Pm
Expanding tim e derivatives in  the le ft hand sides o f (4.14), (4.15),
UCCct cX^t
Uc
H + p - r  + (p(mt ) - r ] ,
(4.14’)
u Xcdt + u U ^ t _ r |  <P(mt)~ri
M 1-ftz
(4.15’)
This system in  identica l to the fo llow ing hnear system:
-RXc— -R U T -  = » + P - r  + —, '~ - L , ct Af 1 - ftx
where
MCC
Uc u c ' ~ U X U X
R c c = - ^ > 0 ,  R a = - ^ <  0, Rxc = - £^ < 0 -  * ; u = - ^ > o ,
I l l
and Rcx *  Rfc in  the general CES u t i l i ty  function specification case.79 
Using the Cramer’s form ula  and suppressing the tim e index,
c _ 1 
c A
(4.14”)
A = i
A A
( r - p - p K R ; U -R cX ) + m m ) - i i X ^ — R xx)1 - ß ß
( r - p - p ) ( R cc -R f c )  + {<p{m)-T))(Rfc '§-)
1-ßM
(4.15”)
where A = RccR x^ ~^Xc^cX > 0 ^ ue to the concavity o f the u t il i ty  function. 
E xam in ing the signs of the term s in  brackets o f the RHS of (4.14”), (4.15”),
r  2
the term s R^ X ~ RcX an(  ^ Rcc ~^Xc are positive, w h ile  the term s —-------R^x and1 — PjW
ft
R fc ------ <^~  are negative. I f  cp(m)>ri, th a t is, i f  the investm ent in  medical care
l-P fi
outweighs the force o f m o rta lity  a t some po in t o f the op tim a l trajectory, then the 
combined resu lt on the level o f consumption/leisure depends on the relative 
m agnitude o f the terms w ith  the opposite signs (assuming r>r] + /j,). I f  the
investm ent in  medical care ju s t compensates for the increase in  hazard rate, then 
the consumer is facing a constant instantaneous death rate i , and the expected
life  is jU-1 , as studied in  B lanchard (1985). The equation (4.14”) then im plies tha t 
consumption is growing (m arginal u t i l i ty  o f consumption is fa lling ) as long as the 
in te res t rate outweighs the sum of psychological and physiological discount rates. 
This is the adjustm ent made to the standard E u le r equation.
4.3. Th e  Eh r l ic h  (2000) M odel
A fte r the model o f the previous sections was developed, a paper of Isaac 
E h rlich  (E hrlich  (2000)) was published, which addressed s im ila r issues in  a very 
s im ila r probabilis tic  setting. E h rlich  studied the value o f life  saving defined as the
79 For logarithmic or linear utility functions, Rcx = RXc -  0 •
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shadow price o f the p robab ility  of surv iva l and modeled conditional m o rta lity  risks 
as outcomes o f self-protection. In  his model, the p robab ility  o f surv iva l between 
periods a,b equals
b
p(a,b) = exp(-m(a,b)), where m{a,b) = J f{t)dt,
a
and f(t) is the conditional p robab ility  o f death occurring a t tim e t, given 
surv iva l to th a t date. This is identica l to nt in  the models of Section 4.2, and 
p(0,t)=l- Ft as defined in  (4.2). E h lich ’s assumptions about the m o rta lity  rate d iffer 
from  the assumptions o f the model above. He assumes th a t f(t)=j(t)-I(t), where J is  a 
flow of self-protection produced via in p u t of tim e, m arke t good, and efficiency 
param eter (education) a t a quadratic cost. Term j(t) corresponds to the endowed 
(biologically determ ined) m orta lity , and is assumed to be monotonously increasing.
Follow ing the orig ina l Grossman fram ework, a consumer derives u t il i ty  
from  the consumption good Z and “hea lthy tim e” , which is modeled as a function of 
m o rta lity  risks: h(t) = h(f(t),P ) . I t  is assumed th a t the to ta l amount of healthy 
tim e is spent on wage-earning activities. There is no exp lic it choice of leisure in  
th is  model. In  other respects, E h rlich ’s model is much more general than the model 
presented earlier: i t  incorporates self-protection, annuities m arket, complete life 
insurance and bequests. He also uses a more general stochastic optim ization 
technique based on the Ham ilton-Bellm an-Jacobi conditions to maxim ize
D
J(A(t), t; a ) = Maxzj E J exp(-p(s -  t))U(Z(s), h(f(s))ds s.t.
t
A(t) = rA(t) + wh(fU)) -  cl2 ( i) -  Z ( r ) , A(t)>0,
and the te rm in a l condition A(D)>0, J(A(D),D\a) = 0 (a represents 
exogenous param eters o f the model).
E h rlich  found a dynamic path for the op tim a l investm ent in  health (called 
“ self-protection”). The effect is a combination o f two competing influences: the 
positive effect on investm ent stemming from the na tu ra l increase in  biological 
m orta lity , and the m ixed effect o f the change in  value o f reducing m o rta lity  risk.
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The la tte r may become negative a t the la te r stages o f the p lann ing  horizon, thus 
y ie ld ing the decrease in  optim al self-protection. The expression derived by E hrlich  
for the consumption path  is s im ila r to equation (4.16”), w ith  the m o rta lity  rate 
serving as an add itional discount factor. Comparative statics exercise reported by 
E h rlich  show th a t an increase in  the price of medical care (protective services) lead 
to lower optim al self-protection and expected length o f life , w h ich is s im ila r to the 
predictions o f the model developed in  Section 4.2. A n  increase in  wage rate yields 
h igher op tim a l self-protection both in  his model, and in  the model o f the previous 
section. A  h igher exogenous in terest rate leads to h igher consumption in  both 
models, bu t the predictions are d iffe rent for the op tim a l self-protection (demand for 
medical care). In  E h rlich ’s model, optim al protection increases, w h ile  in  the model 
o f Section 4.2, an increase in  in te rest rate leads to a lower op tim a l level o f medical 
care. An increase in  the subjective discount factor has iden tica l effects in  both 
models, leading to a decrease in  the optim al level o f self-protection (demand for 
medical care), and a consequent decrease in  the expected length  o f life .
An im po rtan t advantage o f E h rlich ’s model lies in  the extension of 
the model to incorporate insurance markets. F irs t, he introduces an actuaria lly  fa ir  
annuities m arket, wh ich offers the rate o f re tu rn  equal to the sum of the in terest 
rate and the m o rta lity  rate. The m o rta lity  rate is e lim ina ted from  the Eu ler 
equation for the optim al consumption, and increases incentive to delay 
consumption. The value o f life  saving now depends on w hether the ind iv idua l is a 
net borrower or a net lender of assets, w ith  a h igher net assets position y ie ld ing a 
h igher value o f life  saving.
Lastly, E h rlich  introduces a bequest motive in  h is model along w ith  the 
ac tua ria lly  fa ir  life  insurance, and solves for the op tim a l self-protection, 
consumption and bequest. He provides extensive discussion o f the lin k  between the 
re la tive  bequest preference and the value of life  saving. Addressing the issue of 
m ora l hazard in  the presence of insurance, he deduces th a t a va ila b ility  of an 
ac tua ria lly  fa ir  insurance leads to a h igher value of life  saving, and higher demand 
for self-protection
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The model o f demand for medical care presented in  th is  chapter stems from 
the various previous studies w ith in  the theory o f hea lth  capita l. Its  s im plified 
probabilis tic  assumptions make i t  possible to solve for the equ ilib rium  conditions 
fo r consumption, leisure, and medical care, which in  tu rn  determ ine endogenously 
the m o rta lity  rate and life  expectancy.
The model developed in  th is  chapter is rem arkab ly close in  its  form ulation 
to the model of E h rlich  recently published in  E h rlich  (2000), even though there are 
certa in  technical differences in  the fo rm ula tion  o f the u t i l i ty  function and the 
specification for the m o rta lity  rates. E h rlich ’s model is much richer than  the model 
presented in  th is  chapter. M ost o f the conclusions from  the model o f section 4.2 
coincide w ith  the prediction o f E h rlich ’s model o f self-protection, includ ing the 
effects o f price o f medical care, wage ra te  and subjective discount factor on the 
op tim a l level o f self-protection (medical care) and consumption. The model of 
section 4.2 can be expanded along the lines suggested in  E h rlich  (2000) to 
incorporate the annuities m arke t and bequest motive. This could constitute a 
d irection for fu rth e r research.
The benefit o f the model developed in  th is  chapter is an exp lic it solution for 
labour supply (leisure). The drawback is neglecting the role o f hea lthy tim e in  the 
u t i l i t y  function, w h ich is a standard assumption o f the Grossman type model of the 
demand for health. Another departure in  th is  model from  the standard fram ework 
is the lack o f a tim e in p u t in to  production o f hea lth  (reduction in  m o rta lity  rate). 
F u rth e r research is needed in to  find ing  em pirica l evidence for the appropriate 
functiona l form  to model instantaneous m o rta lity  risks, and fu rth e r refinements of 
the probabilis tic  assumptions o f the model are possible. A  more elaborate 
functiona l form  fo r instantaneous m o rta lity  risks m igh t be called for, wh ich w ill be 
the subject o f fu rth e r research. The same comment applies to the efficiency factor. 
Despite its  deficiencies and lim ita tions, the model presented in  th is  chapter is an 
in te res ting  theoretica l exercise tha t m igh t have practica l im plications in  
estim ating  the demand for medical care purchased by a consumer to enhance his or 
her su rv iva l chances. The model can be extended along the lines o f E h rlich  (2000) 
to incorporate annuities, life  insurance and a bequest motive.
4.4. Co n clu sio n
C h a p t e r  5 . S t o c h a s t ic  M o d e l  o f  D e m a n d  
f o r  M e d i c a l  C a r e  w it h  H e a l t h  I n s u r a n c e
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5.1. I n t r o d u c t io n
Since A rrow ’s (1963) paper on the uncerta in ty  and economics o f medical 
care, i t  has been recognised th a t the predictions of the stochastic model m ight be 
quite  d iffe ren t from  those o f the determ in istic one. Stochastic models o f demand for 
hea lth  were discussed in  Chapters 3 and 4, inc lud ing  those o f Cropper (1977), 
Dardanoni and W agstaff (1990), Picone, U ribe et al. (1998), and E h rlich  (2000). 
None of these studies model insurance against uncerta in  medical expenditure, or 
hea lth  insurance.
Studies of hea lth  insurance comprise an im po rtan t p a rt of the health 
economics lite ra tu re  and include Spence and Zeckhauser (1971), E h rlich  and 
Becker (1972), Feldstein (1973), Friedm an (1974), and the RAND H ea lth  Insurance 
Study, whose results are reported in  Newhouse and The Insurance Experim ent 
Group (1993) and in  a number of ind iv idua l papers. The coinsurance and other 
price e lasticities of the demand for medical care were studied in  Phelps (1973), 
Phelps and Newhouse (1974), van de Ven and van Praag (1981a). I t  has been 
established th a t demand for medical services is h igher at a lower coinsurance rate 
or a lower deductible, and th a t the optim al spending strategy under the la tte r 
policy option exhib its a non-linear behavior.
There are a num ber of problems associated w ith  the provision of health 
insurance - agency costs, m oral hazard, adverse selection and supplier-induced 
demand to name ju s t a few. The hea lth  status o f the insured is not d irectly 
observable to the insurance company, thus the insurance policy under such 
asym m etric in fo rm ation  w i l l  necessarily be second-best. Adverse selection leads to 
separating equ ilib rium  in  the insurance markets, w ith  d iffe ren t hea lth  groups
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choosing d iffe ren t levels of coverage80. M ora l hazard arises when insurance holders 
demand more medical care than  e ither uninsured or insured under less generous 
plans. A  num ber of studies, inc lud ing  Feldstein (1973), Feldm an and Dowd (1991), 
and M anning and M arquis (1996), evaluated a welfare loss associated w ith  m oral 
hazard in  the hea lth  insurance m arket, and were aimed at constructing an optim al 
insurance policy th a t balances the benefits o f r is k  spreading w ith  losses a ttribu ted  
to m ora l hazard.
Models o f medical insurance have been developed in  several studies, 
inc lud ing  Zeckhauser (1970), Phelps (1973), M arquis and Holm er (1996), and 
B lom qvist (1997). Zeckhauser (1970) studied how the op tim a l choice of the sharing 
function  for the insured, subject to the vary ing  a b ility  of the insurance company to 
discrim inate against d iffe ren t types o f insureds according to th e ir hea lth  status, 
w ould a lte r the prem ium s charged for the plan, van de Ven and van Praag (1981a) 
assumed a lognorm al d is tribu tion  for the hea lth  expenditure and used an adjusted 
Tob it model to study the effect of insurance on the demand for hea lth  services. 
B lom qvist (1997) used a dynamic optim isation technique to construct an optim al 
non-linear hea lth  insurance contract w ith  an exogenous income. A  paper by L iljas
(1998) developed a stochastic model o f the demand for hea lth  th a t incorporates 
insurance against loss o f income due to illness. The model was fu rth e r improved by 
Tabata and Ohkusa (2000) (see Section 3.6 for details).
This chapter develops a dynamic stochastic model o f demand for medical 
care and hea lth  insurance under the assumption of lognorm ality  of underly ing 
w ea lth  and hea lth  d is tribu tions. The model incorporates a corre lation between 
hea lth  and w ea lth  processes w ith ou t m aking hea lth  a d irect function of income, 
w h ich was one o f the assumptions in  Contoyannis and Forster (1999). I t  is a 
continuous tim e model th a t rests on a probabilis tic  assumption o f lognorm ality  of 
hea lth  ju s tified  by previous studies, inc lud ing W agstaff and van Doorslaer (1994) 
and Gerdtham, Johannesson et al. (1999).
80 See Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) for the discussion of the existence of equilibrium and 
its structure with imperfect information. Equilibrium with adverse selection in the health 
insurance market is discussed in Cutler and Zeckhauser (1999b).
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There are several departures in  the model presented in  th is  chapter from  
Grossman’s orig ina l fram ework. F irs t, there is no tim e in p u t in to  the health 
production function. Second, the consumer’s u t i l i ty  depends on the health-adjusted 
le isure as opposed to the “hea lthy tim e” . This allows labour supply to be modelled 
exp lic itly  and income to be endogenised. L ife span is not endogenous: the 
representative consumer is alive as long as his or her hea lth  index is positive. 
Fu tu re  extension o f the model could incorporate an endogenous tim e of death by 
defin ing a positive threshold for health capita l below w h ich death occurs.
The structure  o f the chapter is as follows: Section 5.2 contains a b rie f 
discussion o f the stochastic optim isation technique used fo r the analysis. Section
5.3 proposes a stochastic model of demand for medical care under the 
aforementioned assumptions, compares results w ith  a certa in ty  case and 
illu s tra tes  them  for logarithm ic u t i l i ty  function. Section 5.4 extends the model by 
in troducing  hea lth  insurance and finds th a t the d is tr ibu tion  o f optim al medical 
expenditure changes a fte r the in troduction of insurance. The results o f the analysis 
are summarised in  Section 5.5.
5.2. S t o c h a s t ic  Co n tr o l  P r o b l e m  a n d  I t o ’s  l e m m a
The stochastic optim iza tion technique81 used in  solving the model o f the 
next sections can be summarised as follows. I f  the stochastic process dy is 
generated by the equation
dy = f  (y,t)dt + dv, (5.2.1)
where dv ~ N{0,^{y,t))dt, then for any twice d ifferentiab le in  its  arguments 
function G(y,t) its  stochastic d iffe ren tia l is given by the Ito ’s Lemma:
81 See Turnovsky (1995) Chapter 14, Malliaris and Brock (1982) Chapter 2.
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dG = G(y(t + dt),t + dt) -  G(y(t)j) = ~ d t  + (^-)'dy + \(dyy ^ - d y  +  o(dt) =
dt dy 2 dydy
dG ,dG s,„  1+ (— Y f+ - tr (G yyX) d t+ ^ y d v
dy
(5.2.2)
where tr stands for the trace o f a m atrix , and stochastic process dy is defined in  
(5.2.1).
A  d iffe ren tia l generator Ly[G(y,t)] of the function G(y,t) is defined as the
expected rate o f change in  G(y(t),t), when evolution o f dy is given by (5.2.1), th a t is,
dGLy[G(y,t)]= lim  Et 
7 dt^O dt
As i t  follows from  (5.2.2), the d iffe ren tia l generator o f G(y,t) w ith  dy given 
in  (5.2.1) equals
Ly [G(y,t)\ = ^  + ( | i ) 7  + | i r ( G „ , X ) . (5.2.3)
The stochastic control problem is generally stated as find ing
oo
max V ( y (0),0) = E0 jU( y(s), x(s), s)ds,
0
subject to stochastic accumulation equation (5.2.1) for the state variable ys , and 
xs being control variable. The optim um  solution has to satisfy the stochastic 
Be llm an equation
0 = ma \{U ( y(t),x(t),t) + Ly \V ( y ( i ) , i ] }, (5.2.4)
where the contro l variables Xs are chosen so th a t they satisfy th e ir firs t-order 
o p tim a lity  conditions, and V(y(t),t)is a value function defined by
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V(y(0 , t) = max Et J U(y(s), x(s), s)ds .
x s t
5.3. S to ch astic  M odel  Of  D em and  F or  M ed ical  Ca r e
Consider a stochastic version o f the representative agent model. The model 
is form ulated in  rea l terms, and the consumer is op tim iz ing  expected u t i l i ty  of the 
stream  of consumption and health-adjusted leisure, w ith  the adjustm ent factor 
given by (¡)(Ht ) ,  where (ft' > 0, (j)" < 0, and Ht is the curren t hea lth  status:
oo
max EQjU(ct,(f)(Ht)\)e~ptdt, (5.3.1)
ct ,Xt ,mt q
w ith  respect to consumption ct , leisure Xt , and medical expenditure mt , subject 
to the dynamic constraints discussed below.
The hea lth  capita l Ht is assumed to be governed by the stochastic 
accum ulation equation, w ith  the standard deviation proportionate to the level of 
hea lth  capital. The depreciation rate is given by St , and the investm ent in to  
hea lth  capita l stock on the in te rva l of the length dt is given by the expression 
\f/(mt)Htdt, w ith  lf/'> 0, if/'< 0 ,1/" > 0 .  The stochastic component is assumed to
be a W iener process, dht ~ N(0 ,<7 Hdt). The evolution o f hea lth  cap ita l is given by
dHt = (y/(mt ) - S t )Htdt + Htdht . (5.3.2)
Analogously, change in  wealth is compounded from  the in te rest earned on 
the stock o f w ea lth  over tim e dt, income from  m arket activities, less expenditure on 
the consumption stream and medical care. The u n it o f labour supplied by the 
consumer is assumed to be paid an efficiency wage, dependent on his or her health 
status. This would reflect changes in  labour p roductiv ity  due to changes in  the 
consumer’s health. The efficiency coefficient is given by the function e(H t ) ,  e' > 0,
£*< 0 . The erro r term  enters m u ltip lica tive ly  in  Wt , in  line  w ith  the hea lth  
accum ulation equation. The real price of medical services in  term s of consumption
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good is given by Xt • The stochastic w ealth  accum ulation equation is given by
<Wt = ( rtwt + (Ote(H t )(1 -?it) - c t -X tmt)dt + Wtdwt , (5.3.3)
where (Ot is a wage rate, rt is a real in te rest rate, and dwt ~ N(0,<J]ydt) is a 
W iener process for w ealth  disturbances. The instantaneous covariance between the 
two disturbances is given by cov(dht,dwt) = crHWdt. The in it ia l values for stocks of
hea lth  and w ea lth  are given by H$ and Wq respectively. A  consumer maximises
expected u t i l i ty  (5.3.1) subject to two stochastic accum ulation equations (5.3.2),
(5.3.3). This problem represents a case o f a self-insured consumer who spreads his 
or her own risks by purchasing medical care and smoothing consumption and 
le isure under uncerta inty.
App ly ing  the stochastic optim isation technique discussed in  Section 5.2 to 
the problem (5.3.1) - (5.3.3), note th a t yt =(H t,Wt)\ xt = (ct,At,mty , and
dV dV dV
Ly[V(y(t),t)] = ^ -  + ^ 7 )H, + ^ ( # , + (  1-A, )(oe(H,) -
. 1 d2V „ 2  2 d2V ,n „  1 32V „ , 2 2 
— Ct ~ X t m t) + ---------r i i  O u  +  ———----H W (J rjW + ---------- - W  Oxu
2 dH2 dHdW HW 2dW 2
To s im p lify  notations, the tim e index is dropped, and subscripts w il l  denote 
p a r t ia l derivatives w ith  respect to the re levant variable. The value function is 
assumed to be o f the form  s im ila r to the in tegrand in  the u t i l i ty  functional:
V(H,W\t) = V(H,W,t)e~p‘ .
Consider
(5.3.4)
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= U(c,<l>(.H)X) + Vte~pt - p V + V H (v (m )-S )H  +
+ Vw (rW + (oe(H)( 1 -  A )-c -% m ) +
+ \ vh hH 2<j 2h +VhwHWcthw + l v wwW2a l
M axim is ing (5.3.4) , the f irs t order necessary conditions for the optim al 
choice o f controls are
= 0 ,~~~ = 0,~~~ = 0, which imphes th a t 
dc 3A dm
UC=VW, (5.3.5.a)
U rfiH ) = 0)VW£(H), (5.3.5.b) 
VHV ( m)H = %VW (5.3.5.C)
Expression (5.3.5.a) is a standard condition equating the m arg ina l cost o f reducing 
cu rren t period consumption by one u n it to the m arg ina l benefits o f having an extra 
u n it  o f w ealth  available. Condition (3.5.b) states th a t the health-adjusted u t il i ty  
gain from  the additional u n it o f leisure is equal at the optim um  to the efficiency- 
adjusted loss of an extra u n it of tim e spent on wage-earning activities. The th ird  
condition (3.5.c) states th a t the gain in  terms of the value o f hea lth  o f the m arg ina l 
product o f the u n it o f medical expenditure in  the production o f new health  m ust be 
equal to the m arg ina l loss o f % un its o f wealth, where % is a price per u n it of
m edical care. These are standard and in tu itiv e  in te rpre ta tions o f the FONCs
(5.3.5).
In  addition, the Bellm an equation has to be satisfied when the optim al 
values from  the FONCs (5.3.5) are substituted, which in  th is  case is equivalent to
0 = max {U(c,<f)(H)?i) -p V + V t +VH (if/(m) -S )H  +
c,A,m
+ Vw(rW + (o e(H )(l-X )-c-x m )+  (5.3.6)
+ \ vh h H 2o 2h +VhwHWc7HW + iv wwW2(7^}
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The solution o f the FONCs (5.3.5.a-c) are functions o f H, W, and t, c = c(H, 
W, t), X — , m = m(H, W, t), and the p a rtia l derivatives o f the value
function are o f the form VH = V# (H,W,t), Vw = Vw (H,W,t) .
P a rtia lly  d iffe ren tia ting  the Bellm an equation (5.3.6) w ith  respect to H  and 
W, and using the f irs t order o p tim a lity  conditions (5.3.5.a-c) along w ith  Itô ’s 
lemma, one could establish th a t under the add itiona l assumption of
T]é = - H — —-  and r\F = - H — — - ,
* <p(H) £ e(H)
def
w ith  T](j) =rie = r]<0 - constant e las tic ity  o f 0 ( - ) , £(•) w ith  respect to H, the
fo llow ing dynamic stochastic equations for m arg ina l value o f hea lth  and wealth  can 
be obtained (see Appendix 5.A for derivation):
dVH ={ -V hhHg 2h
XV(rn)
~VhwWg hw }dt + VHHHdht + VHWWdwt
dvw = 1 P ~ rWw ~ vhwH(Thw -  VwwWcrw^ 1 +
— V\VH HdJlt + VyyyyWd\Vt
(5.3.7)
(5.3.8)
Equations (5.3.5.a-c), (5.3.7) and (5.3.8) constitute an equ ilib rium  solution 
fo r the stochastic optim isation problem (5.3.1)-(5.3.3).
5.3.1. Example: No Uncertainty
The general solution o f the previous section could also be applied in  the
2 2absence of risk . Assuming th a t dwt = dht = 0, and = Gfj = GHW = 0 , one could
get the FONCs (5.3.5.a-c) and the fo llow ing determ in istic  evolution for m arg ina l 
values of w ealth  and health:
dVw = ( p - r ) V w ,
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d V — ( p  + <5 — i//(?7i)
V(rn)x
from  w hich the fa m ilia r E u le r’s equation follows
1 dUc  -  = p - r .
Uc dt
The shadow price o f wealth, or the m arg ina l im pact o f w ea lth  on the value 
function, depends only on the in te rest rate and a subjective discount rate. A  much 
la rge r set o f model parameters determ ine the shape o f the m arg ina l value o f health 
schedule. The optim al m arg ina l va luation of hea lth  is positive ly related to the 
subjective discount rate, the depreciation rate o f hea lth  capital, and the price of 
medical care, increases in  which lead to the lower optim al stock o f health capital. 
The m arg ina l value o f hea lth  a t optim um  is lowered by increases in  the health 
investm ent rate, wage rate, efficiency param eter and the steepness o f the health 
investm ent schedule, a ll of wh ich im plies h igher optim al hea lth  capita l stock.
Note th a t m arg ina l va luation of hea lth  and wealth  under uncerta in ty differs 
from  the certa in ty  case: under regular assumptions about the value function, an 
increase in  variance of the hea lth  process leads to a h igher m arg ina l value of 
hea lth  (and lower equ ilib rium  stock o f health). The positive corre lation between 
w ea lth  and hea lth  shocks has a negative effect on the expected m arg ina l value of 
hea lth  (hence, a positive effect on the equ ilib rium  level o f hea lth  capital), and a 
negative effect on the expected m arg ina l value o f w ealth  (positive effect on the 
equ ilib rium  stock o f wealth). H igher uncerta in ty about w ea lth  translates in to  a 
h igher expected m arg ina l value of w ealth  and is associated w ith  the lower optim al 
level of wealth. Variance o f w ealth  (health) adjusted by the r is k  aversion 
param eter o f the value function serves as an extra discount factor in  the value of 
w ea lth  (health) accumulation equation.
5.3.2. Example: Logarithmic Utility Function with Uncertainty
Assume th a t the u t i l i ty  function is given by
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U(c,<t>{H)X) = a i n e  + /3 In [<t>(H)X], (5.3.9)
The health-adjustm ent function and the efficiency function are o f the
def nconstant e lastic ity  form  w ith  - r = - T ] e = T], th a t is, they are -a^H  1 and
£(H) = aeH ri respectively, where a(j) ,ae ,r ]e K + . Assume th a t the investm ent 
function  is logarithm ic: \j/(m) = y/ l n m , y/ > 0.
Given the logarithm ic form  of the u t i l i ty  function, s im ila r logarithm ic value 
function  for the problem (5.3.1)-(5.3.3) w i l l  be looked for,
V(H,W\t) = V(H,W,t)e~pI, where
V(H,W,t) = a0 \nW + £ 0 ln f f  + y0 . (5.3.10)
The firs t-o rder conditions (5.3.5.a-c) im p ly  th a t the op tim a l solutions for the 
choice variables are
c = — W ,X  = ------ ------- W, and m = ^ - W .  (5.3.11)
ao aoùxiçH71 a0Z
The Bellm an equation has to be satisfied iden tica lly  at the optimum, which 
makes i t  possible to solve for the unknown parameters CCq,Po,Yo in  (5.3.10).
Perform ing the calculations presented in  Appendix 5.B, the value function is given 
by the fo llow ing expression:
V ( H ,W , t )  = ------- a  + f t  l n i V +  <Me(u  +  P)  ZLln H  +  Yq (5.3.12)
p  + aEco( 1 -  — ) p  + ae(o( 1 -  — ) p
Assum ing th a t < 1, the optim al consumption, according to the FONCs, is 
P
given by
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p + a£0 ) ( l - ^ )
c = ——— (p + aEa>(l-^-))W , the le isure A = ----------------------------- ——W , and the
a + P p cc + P cua^V
riy/coap
op tim a l medical expenditure is given by m - ---------—W .
PX
Note th a t medical care demanded does not depend on the contemporaneous 
hea lth  status, which reflects the smoothing effect o f the op tim a l solution. Another 
resu lt to notice is th a t the consumption-to-leisure ra tio  along the optim al path
equals — = f t  i s determined by the underly ing  parameters o f the u t il ity
A ¡3
function, wage rate and the curren t hea lth  status which acts through the efficiency 
ad justm ent function.
The solution o f th is  pa rticu la r case has been illu s tra te d  by runn ing  
sim ula tions o f the W iener processes for disturbances under the assumption o f zero 
corre lation between them. Constant rea l in te rest rate, wage, health capital 
depreciation rate and price o f medical care were assumed throughout the 
sim ulations. For a pa rticu la r rea lization of the random disturbances, different 
scenarios concerning model parameters and in it ia l values were investigated.
The paths o f wealth  and health capital, th e ir  m arg ina l values, and optim al 
solutions for consumption, leisure and medical expenditure when parameter a (a 
re la tive  w e igh t of consumption in  the u t i l i ty  function) varies, are presented in  
F igure 5.1. H igher weight pu t on consumption quite in tu it iv e ly  leads to higher 
op tim a l consumption, lower optim al le isure (hence, h igher labour supply) and to 
low er op tim a l medical spending, which results in  a lower optim al level o f health 
cap ita l and lower efficiency of labour. The m arg ina l va lua tion  of wealth and 
op tim a l stock o f w ealth  are not affected.
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Figure 5. 1. Optimal wealth, health, Vw , VH , efficiency, consumption, 
leisure and medical expenditure for various (X .
Wealth, W H ea lth ,  H
M arg ina l  va lue  o f  he a l th ,  VhM arg ina l  va lue o f  wea lth ,  Vw
C o n s u m p t io n ,  c Le isure ,  X
E f f ic ie n c y  C o e f f ic ie n t ,  t M edica l e x p e n d i tu re ,  m
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I t  has been established th a t higher hea lth  depreciation rates lead to lower 
op tim a l hea lth  capita l and lower efficiency o f labour. In te res ting ly  enough, the 
op tim a l choice o f medical expenditure is independent o f <5 , and so are op tim a l 
consumption and labour supply. A n  increase in  in te rest rate is associated w ith  
h igher levels o f accumulated w ealth  and its  lower m arg ina l value at optim um . The 
w ea lth  effect drives consumption, leisure and medical expenditure up, and the 
hea lth  cap ita l stock and efficiency coefficient both increase. A  h igher price o f 
medical care has a negative im pact on the consumption o f medical care and, 
consequently, on the op tim a l level o f health capita l stock. Efficiency is lower, and 
the solutions for consumption and labour supply are unaffected. The effects o f 
changes in  other model parameters can also be studied in  a s im ila r way.
5.4. S t o c h a s t ic  M o d e l  Of  D e m a n d  F or  Me d ic a l  Ca r e  Wi t h  I n s u r a n c e
The purpose of th is  section is to introduce insurance in to  the stochastic 
model developed in  the previous sections. The insurance company observes the 
d is tr ibu tion  o f the optim al medical expenditure o f the self-insured consumer and 
assumes th is  d is tribu tion  w il l  not change after in troduction  o f insurance (no m oral 
hazard assumption). The consumer w ill be liable for pa rt o f his or her medical 
spending, th a t is, the insurance contract includes a positive coinsurance 
parameter, k. A n insurance prem ium  is paid a t tim e t, and medical spending is 
incurred  over the in te rva l (t, t+dt), of w hich a fraction  k is pa id by the insured. The 
question o f how the insurance company is financed is not addressed exp lic itly .
F irs t, i t  is necessary to establish the equation for the evolution o f medical 
spending. W ith  the stochastic equation fo r dmt in  hand, the expected am ount of
m edical care consumed over the in te rva l (t, t+dt) would be given by E tdmt , and the
ac tua ria lly  fa ir  prem ium  flow charged by the insurance company at tim e t would be
dmt
given by n t = (1 — k)% lim  E t — -  under the assumption o f zero loading82.
dt^O dt
82 This corresponds to the expected value principle as set out in Buhlmann (1970), pg. 86.
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5.4.1. Stochastic Accumulation Equation for Demand for Medical Services
As shown in  Appendix 5.C, under the add itiona l assumptions o f constant 
re la tive  r is k  aversion of the u t i l i ty  and value functions, and constant elasticity, 
re la tive  r is k  aversion and re la tive  prudence of the hea lth  investm ent schedule, the 
d is tr ib u tio n  of op tim a l medical expenditure o f the self-insured consumer o f Section
5.3 is given by
dm = m
'
*73r~v i + — v 3 • -  Q-yim) j — e(H )ri -  v 2 } dt + djit , (5.4.1)
rh ^2 . m  [x  )
mv/'im) m\i/*(m) mv/^irn) w h e re ------* -------= f]x, ------ xiL—  = r]2 , ------Ï L ^  = r?3j
y/(m)
(5.4.2)
7]I < 0 ,T]iE R ,i = 2,3, and v,-,i = 1,3 are constants depending on the curvature of
the value function and on the variances and covariance of the disturbance 
processes.
Based on the observed d is tribu tion  of medical expenditure by a self-insured 
consumer (5.4.1), the insurance company sets the instantaneous prem ium  equal to
n = (\-k)X - r - v 1+ ^ - v 3 e(H )rj-v 2
V2 { V2 J V2 [X
(5.4.3)
5.4.2. Optimisation Problem With The Insurance Contract
The consumer is optim ising the expected u t i l i ty  of the stream of 
consumption and health-adjusted leisure:
oo
max E0 jU(ct,(j>(Ht)Àt)e~ptdt , (5.4.4)
ct ,Ar ,mt q
w ith  respect to consumption ct , leisure , and medical expenditure mt , subject to
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the dynamic constraints discussed below. The hea lth-adjustm ent function (¡>{Ht) 
is assumed to be (f)' > 0, (J)" < 0, and rj^  =r] .
The hea lth  capita l is assumed to be governed by the fo llow ing stochastic 
accum ulation equation:
dHt = (y/(mt) - S t)Htdt + Htdht , (5.4.5)
where the investm ent function is assumed to satisfy conditions (5.4.2) and
dht ~ N (0 ,<7 fjdt).
In  view o f the discussion about the nature o f the insurance contract and the 
am ount o f prem ium  charged, the wealth  accum ulation equation is as follows:
dWt = ( rtWt + cote(H t )(1 -X t) - c t - n t -  kxtmt )dt + Wtdwt -  
= (rtWt +(ote(H t)(l-X t) - c t -
- d  - k ) x t
-  kxtmt )dt + Wtdwt ,
r  _ V  + - l v 3 — V K )  - e(Ht yn -v2 
*12 I V2 V2 [Xt
(5.4.6)
where (Ot is a wage rate, rt is a real in te rest rate, Xt a rea  ^ Pr ice ° f  medical
2services in  term s of consumption good, and dwt ~ N (0,<7^ dt) is a W iener process 
for w ealth  disturbances. The instantaneous covariance between the two 
disturbances is given by cov(dht,dwt) = G ^ d t . The efficiency function £{Ht)
satisfies the conditions e '> 0 ,  e ' < 0 ,  and f]£ =T]. The in it ia l values for stocks of 
hea lth  and w ea lth  are given by Hq and Wg respectively.
A  consumer maximises expected u t i l i ty  (5.4.4) subject to two stochastic 
accum ulation equations (5.4.5), (5.4.6). App ly ing  the fa m ilia r stochastic
optim isa tion technique, form  the value function V(H,W;t) =V(H,W ,t)e~p t . As 
previously, the tim e index is dropped, and subscripts denote p a rtia l derivatives.
Consider
130
e~ptU(c,(f)(H)À) + L v \V(H,W;t)] = (5.4.7)
= e~pt i/(c,0(H)A) + -  pV + VH (y/(m) -  S)H  + 
+ Vw{rW + (0£ {H ){\ -X )-c-k x m -
- a - v x — I r -  Vj + ^ v 3 } -  ^ V (m )  j — e(//)ry -  v2 
*12 [ *12 J V2 [X
) +
+  - V h H h 2 ( J H  + V h \VH W (J HW  + -V \V W w 2 (JW-
M axim is ing (5.4.7) , the f irs t order necessary conditions for the optim al 
choice o f controls are:
uc=vw, (5.4.8.a)
U À(KH) = (0Vwe(H\ (5.4.8.b)
^3r - v l + — v 3 
________*12
*?2
+ k} (5.4.8.c)
I t  is obvious th a t the f irs t  two FONCs are identica l to the previous case 
w ith o u t insurance, w hile  the o p tim a lity  condition for the choice o f m has changed.
Follow ing the procedure described in  Appendix 5.D, the fo llow ing equations 
fo r evolution of the m arg ina l values o f hea lth  and w ealth  are derived:
dVH ={{p  + S - V (m)yH + Vw‘0£‘; H)71 + } -
H [ 1\2 J , (5.4.9)
~vHWWcyHW + VHHHdh, +VHWWdw,
and
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dVW -V hwHVrw ~VWWW<7W } * +  . i r\\
(5 . 4 . 1U)
+ VwH Hdht + VyyyyWdwt
The w ealth  accumulation equation ( 5 .4 . 10) for the problem w ith  insurance 
is iden tica l to the equation (5 . 3 .8) w ith ou t any insurance. R e-w riting the equation 
( 5 .4 . 8 .C),
VHy/'(m)H =
= %Vw-
« ( l- fc )
W hen the coinsurance rate equals one, insurance does not technically exist, 
and the op tim a l solution for medical expenditure is equ ivalent to the self-insurance 
case covered in  Section 5 .3 . The evolution o f the m arg ina l value o f hea lth  given by 
( 5 . 4 . 9 ) when k=l is identica l to the previously derived (5 . 3 . 7),  which could be re­
w ritte n , using the FONCs, as
dVh = i\P + $ ~V(m)yH  + —^ —77— ^~~VhhH(7H -V hwW<Jhw }dt +
H
+ Vjjh Hdht + Vfjyy Wdwt
I t  is not d iff ic u lt to notice th a t the m arg ina l va lua tion  o f health w ith  
insurance differs from  the case w ith o u t insurance by the term
*7i „  , x ✓ Vw(oe(H)t]2 , . , . . .— (l-k)y/(m ) -------------------  which is negative (f]i < 0,?72 > 0). Hence, m  the
V2 H
presence o f insurance, the m arg ina l va lua tion  o f hea lth  is lower, and optim al 
hea lth  cap ita l stock is h igher than w ith ou t insurance. For any k e  (0;1), the in it ia l 
assum ption made by the insurance company o f no m oral hazard in  setting the ir
*73r - v  + — v? 
*12
*72
- • ^ V ' ( m ) j — - v 2 
V2 (X
+ k = l£=> k=l.
ri3r ~V\ "i V3
(1 -k ) — ------ 2 j
ni f?2 [X )
+ k =  X VW
<=>
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prem ium s leads to changes in  the optim al solution on the consumer’s part, and 
proves to be wrong. To study the direction o f change in  op tim a l paths for 
consumption, leisure and medical expenditure, i t  is necessary to introduce fu rth e r 
restric tions on the random processes for disturbances and curvature o f the value 
function. Even though the op tim a lity  condition for le isure looks the same w ith  
insurance as w ithout, i t  depends on the stock o f hea lth  th a t changes a t optim um  
according to (5.4.9), so the path  m ight change as well, inducing changes to 
consumption through the w ea lth  accumulation equation.
5.4.3. Example: Logarithmic Utility Function
The problem w ith  insurance was sim ulated under the assumptions of the
logarithm ic  u t i l i ty  function covered in  Section 5.3.2, bu t the health investm ent
r
schedule was assumed to be a CRRA form, \J/(m) --------- .
1-y/
For \f/ = 0.9 and under the assumption o f zero corre lation between the 
disturbance processes and constant rea l in te rest rate, wage, hea lth  capita l 
depreciation rate and price o f medical care, the im pact o f changes in  coinsurance 
ra te  from  one (no insurance) to 50% and 20% were sim ulated. The results are 
presented in  Figure 5.2, which demonstrates that, w ith  a lower out-of-pocket price 
o f medical care, optim al medical expenditure rises, which leads to h igher health 
cap ita l stock. The prem ium  calculated on the basis o f the pre-insurance 
d is tr ib u tio n  of medical expenditure is h igher a t a lower coinsurance rate. This 
F igure illu s tra tes  the fact th a t d is tribu tion  of medical expenditure does change 
a fte r the in troduction  o f hea lth  insurance, and the assumption o f no m ora l hazard 
in  setting prem ium s is not justified . Proper adjustm ent to the prem ium  has to be 
made, w h ich would take the m oral hazard effect in to  account.
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Figure 5. 2. Optimal wealth, health, Vyy , V# , insurance premium, ct , 
, mt , for various coinsurance rates, k
In su ra n ce  p re m iu m ,  7T
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5.4.4. Optimal Insurance Contract
Now consider a choice o f insurance as a two-stage procedure which 
combines choosing the op tim a l coinsurance rate ex-ante, and optim al medical 
expenditure, consumption and le isure ex-post, after the shocks to health and 
w ea lth  were realised. This approach follows Phelps (1973), who applied i t  to model 
an insurance which transfers income from  the good state o f the w orld  to the sick 
state, w ith  additive hea lth  shock drawn from  a continuous d istribu tion. The 
Phelps’s model is a one-period model which extended an earlie r model of E h rlich  
and Becker (1972).
Consider the problem when both prem ium  n and a coinsurance rate k are 
given to the consumer at the onset o f the in te rva l [t, t+dt). Insurance prem ium  w ill 
depend on the coinsurance rate, and characteristics of the consumer, and not on
As in  Section 5.4.2, the consumer is optim ising the expected u t il i ty  o f the 
stream of consumption and health-adjusted leisure:
w ith  respect to consumption ct, le isure \ , and medical care mt , subject to
the ex-post medical expenditure over (t, t+dt): — — = 0. Le t’s assume tha t
dmt
nt = a  + 0)E[(l-k)xmt] (5.4.12)
oo
(5.4.13)
(5.4.14)
dWt =(rtWt +cot£(Ht)(l-At) - c t - n t -k xtmt)dt + Wtdwt
(5.4.15)
dht ~ N{Q,a^dt) , dwt ~ N(0,cr^dt) , cov(dht,dwt) = crHWdt,
<j)'> 0, (¡>"<0 , £ > 0 , £ *< 0 , and r)e = = r\, where
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rid, = - H ----------- , 77 p =  - H ---------- .
9 <p(H) e e(H)
Consider ^ = e _p iC /(c ,0 (//)A ) + Ly [V(H,W\t)] =
= e~pt U(c,(f)(H)À) + Vte~pt -  pV+VH (y/(m)-ô)H +
+ Vw (rW + coe(H)( 1 - X )- c - n t -  kzm) + (5.4.16)
! t 7  tj 2 2 , t7 rrTI, , 1 x 7  11/2^2
+ -^VH H H  + V HWHW (JHW + ~ VWWW G
M axim is ing  (5.4.16) w .r.t. ct ,Xt ,mt , and trea ting  the prem ium  and the
coinsurance rate as fixed, the f irs t order necessary conditions fo r the op tim a l choice 
o f controls are:
Uc(.c,<KH) A) = % ,  (5.4.17.a)
Ux{cM H)^mH) = coVwe(H), (5.4.17.b)
VH xii\m)H=kxVw (5 .4 . 17 . C)
I t  is not d iff ic u lt to ve rify  by the methods used in  Section 5.4.2 th a t
dVH ={\p+S-y(m))/H + Vwm(H)T’ -VHHHa2H -
H "  (5.4.18)
- V HWW c HW )dt + VH H Hdh, +V HW Wdw,
and
d v W = \ p ~ r W w  ~ VHW H(THW ~ VWWWc7w \il 
+ Vw h  Hdht +  Vww Wdwt
(5.4.19)
To study p a rtia l effects o f changes in  coinsurance ra te  k on equ ilib rium  
solution, p a rtia lly  d ifferentia te equ ilib rium  conditions (5.4.17.a-c.) w .r.t. k, and 
tre a t and V\y as functions of param eter k. This yields the fo llow ing linea r
, dc c)A dm v 
system i n z = ( v > w ) : ok ok ok
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Az—b, (5.4.20)
where A =
u cc u cXm ) 0 
u xcW )  o
0 0 VHHy/\m)
^ L - U C^ W  —  dk c/i dk
dH __ dVyy{(oVweXH)-4>(H)Uu <t’XH)X-Uxip,(H)}— +coe(H)
ok ok
awk x ~ — w\m)H
ok
// M/ 3// (m )VH -
In troducing  elasticities w ith  respect to k,
r\
k dV}W k dVH
%>* Vw dk ’ '' vH>k Vft dkV r\ W,k
k dW
W dk ,T] HJc
k dH 
H dk ’
and using assumption (5.4.2), - —^ —^  = rl2 ’ the system (5.4.20) and the
V (m)
optim ah ty  condition (5.4.17.c) im m ediate ly y ie ld
(5.4.21)
where r]m/c = - —^~  - e lastic ity  of demand for medical care w ith  respect to the 
m dk
coinsurance rate.
dc 3ASolving for — and using the op tim ahty conditions (5.4.17.a-b), the 
dk dk
fo llow ing re lationships are derived under the assumption T]e = 77^ = 7 7 :
=~
1 UU UC -U cXUX
c,k r  2 V w ,k’
c V CCU U  - U  cX
(5.4.22)
= -7*]
1 UxcUc - u ccu x
k A H’k A0(H) r r  r r  r r  2  ' %  , k  ’U CCU X X - U  cX
(5.4.23)
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k de k dX
where ric jc = — — , rj^k ----------- --- elasticities o f consumption and le isure w ith
c dk ’ A dk
respect to the coinsurance rate.
Expressions (5.2.21-23) can be fu rth e r s im p lified  by noting th a t
expenditure, consumption and leisure. E las tic ity  o f demand fo r medical care w ith  
respect to the coinsurance rate depends on both the e lastic ity  o f hea lth  and wealth. 
N o ting  th a t 77 >0, RHH the change in  demand for medical care resu lting
from  the change in  coinsurance rate is composed o f two effects, hea lth  and income 
(wealth) effect, which m ight be pu lling  in  opposite directions. There is a co­
movement o f demand for medical care w ith  changes in  w ealth  due to the increase 
in  the coinsurance parameter. A t the same time, d irection o f change in  demand for 
medical care a ttribu ted  to change in  hea lth  status depends on the degree o f risk  
aversion w ith  respect to health. I f  R hh< 1» then demand for medical care is 
decreasing when the coinsurance rate increases, assuming th a t the increase in  
coinsurance rate leads to both a lower hea lth  cap ita l stock (7 7 H k >0) and lower
w ea lth  ( 7 7^  >0). In  case of a u n it  r is k  aversion to health, / / / /  =1, the change in
^vw,k
k dV\Y _  k dVyy dW _  VyvWW k dW 
%  dk ~ %  dW dk %  W~dk
and analogously 77 ^  k =-R hh t1 h * ’ wbere ^WW^HH € R+ are the coefficients of 
re la tive  r is k  aversion as defined in  Appendix 5.C.
Hence,
*lm,k (1 ^HH fj k ~*"^ 2 w k > (5.4.21’)
(5.4.22’)
(5.4.23’)
These are the equ ilib rium  conditions for the ex-post op tim a l medical
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demand for medical care is driven by the income effect only. I f  the consumer 
exhib its re la tive  r isk  aversion to health o f the degree greater than  1, then 
assuming no income effect from  the change in  coinsurance rate (7 7  ^  =0), the
direction o f change in  demand for medical care is in  fact opposite to the direction of 
change in  hea lth  status. In  th is  case, the demand for medical care can increase 
w ith  rise in  coinsurance rate, to offset negative im pact to hea lth  which was caused 
by increase in  coinsurance rate.
Changes in  demand fo r consumption good depend on the income effect only, 
and are inversely related to the current magnitude of consumption. The num erator 
o f the ra tio  in  (5.4.22’), U xx^ c CX^ X> is always negative under the regular
assumptions on the u t i l i ty  function. The denominator, U CCU XX cX, is positive
for the same reason (assuming s tric t concavity). Hence, the d irection of change in  
consumption is the same as change in  w ealth  when the coinsurance rate changes.
Analysing the demand for leisure, the f irs t effect is linked  to the changes in  
hea lth  stock. H ea lth  enters the u t il i ty  function by means o f the health-adjustm ent 
to leisure, represented by the function 4){H) .  The f irs t term  in  (5.4.23’) is negative 
(r]H  ^>0, 77 <0), d riv ing  the demand for le isure in  the opposite direction to the
change in  health. I f  the stock o f hea lth  is reduced due to the increase in  
coinsurance rate, then more leisure is needed to enjoy the same level o f u t i l i ty  from 
the health-adjusted leisure. A t  the same tim e, there is an income effect o f reduced 
labour supply. Note th a t the efficiency o f labour also depends on hea lth  status 
through the efficiency function e(H), and i t  is assumed th a t both and 
e( / / )have  the same e lastic ity  w ith  respect to health, 7 7 . Under th is  specification, 
the effect o f reduction in  hea lth  on leisure combines both the increase in  desired 
le isure to keep the level of health-adjusted leisure constant, and the decrease in  
desired le isure to keep the efficiency of labour constant. The income effect is given 
by the second term , in  which the num erator UXc^c ~^cc^X>0> an(  ^ the
denominator, UCCUXX~U cX>0, are both positive. I f  the change in  coinsurance 
rate leads to the increase in  wealth, then the demand for le isure increases. The 
fin a l effect on the demand fo r leisure depends on the re la tive  strength of these
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effects. Percentage change in  le isure due to the change in  coinsurance param eter is 
inversely related to the current level of leisure. Those are the comparative-static 
im plications o f the op tim a lity  conditions (5.4.21’-5.4.23’). The last two o f these 
conditions can be also re -w ritten  as
± (£c.) a (£ A }
2 3A U X T1 1 2 3c U c
71c,k =  U X  ^  R W W Vw k > x,k = ~xT]H,k +  m H )  U c  A  R WWT1w,k ’
where A = U CCJJ xx ~U2cX>0.
R eturn ing  to the beginning o f the in te rva l [t, t+dt), the consumer can select 
the value of the coinsurance param eter k which maxim ises the expected u tility , 
w ith  the knowledge th a t a fte r the shocks are realised, the optim al behaviour is 
given by (5.4.17.a-c). The consumer maximises
U(c, <J)(H )A) + Vt -  pV + VH (i\j/(m) - 8 )H +
& = +Vw (rW + (0£ (H )(l-X )-c-n t -kxm) +
+ ^ vh h h 2(Jh +vhwHW(Jhw +-^vwww 2<j w
w ith  respect to k.
*
The Bellm an equation (BE) has to be satisfied iden tica lly  at the optim um  k : 
‘»(k*)=0.
P a rtia lly  d iffe ren tia ting  BE w .r.t. k yields
Uc ^  + UA<l>'(H)^-^ + U x<t>(H )^-pVk +Vkt+VkH(V (m ) - 8 )H  +
+VHVXm)H^-+VH (w(m)-8 )^ -+ V kw(rW + m (H )a -^ )-n -c-X h n ) + ok ok
T7 ✓ 3W , . rr.dH .. .. /Ttx3A dn dc . dm.+Vw(r —  + coe (H) —  (\-X )-m {H )— - — - — -x m -k x — ) + 
ok ok ok ok ok ok
+  ^ Vk H H H 2 (T H + V H H H ° h  ^ j r  +  VkW HH W (JHW + VWHW (JHW + VWH H (JHW +  
+  - ^ v k W W w 2 ( J w  + V W W W (Jw  ^ jT  = ° '
(5.4.24)
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Using the FONCs (5.4.17.a-c) for the optim al ex-post choice o f ct ,\ ,m t , 
and applying the Ito ’s Lemma
dVk = Vktdt + ykHdH+vkWdw + (^vkHHH2crH +VkHWHW(JHW +^ VkWW w2(Jw d^t ’ 
the fo llow ing evolution of is derived:
„  „  3W „  2 dW „  „  2 dH „  3W,,-VWHHc7hw — -Vm ,Waw — ~VHHHoH - ^ - V WHW° HW ^ ]dt+
+ VHk Hdht +VWkWdwt
(5.4.25)
Substitu te
. .  t . dH  __ dW
v k = VH ~ ^  + VW -jjj- (5.4.26)
, __ dH  __ , ,d H .  JT/ dW  __ J / 3 W X /c  /i o<7\
and d v k = d v H ^ r + v H d (~^r) + d v w ~ ^ r + v Wd ( - ^ r )  (5.4.27)
d£ oa: dA: dA:
in to  (5.4.25). The optim al evolution of V# ,Vfy for the ex-post problem is given by
d v H = { [ p  + <5- y / ( m ) y H + - ^ ^ - ^ - V h H h <j h  ~ VHWW(THW^d t+  (5 4 2 8 )
+ VHH Hdht + VHWWdwt
d v W = { p “ r ) %  -  VHW H<JHW ~ VWWW(Jw  V  + (5.4.^y)
+ V\yH Hdht -1-VyrwWdWf
I t  is not d iff ic u lt to show th a t equations (5.4.25)-(5.4.29) together w ith  the FONC 
(5.4.17.b) im p ly  tha t
dn
u +zm
dt. (5.4.30)
The las t expression (5.4.30) has to be satisfied iden tica lly  a t the optim um
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coinsurance rate chosen by a consumer.
Equation (5.4.30) states th a t the sum of u tih ty-w e igh ted gains from  the 
change in  is equal at optim um  to the rate o f change in  w ea lth  due to the
increase in  coinsurance parameter. There are two counteracting effects. F irs t, an 
increase in  coinsurance leads to higher out-of-pocket medical expenditure given by 
the term  ym. Second, there is a reduction in  prem ium  due to the increase of 
djt
coinsurance rate, —  < 0. Tota l effect depends on a re la tive strength o f these two 
components.
Figure 5. 3. Average effects of coinsurance on demand for medical care
mo m 2 m i E D B m, medical care
Figure 5.3 represents the effects o f coinsurance rate on the demand of 
medical care in  the Phelps’s model83. AE represents an uninsured budget line, and 
Po is the o rig ina l equ ilib rium . When the coinsurance is introduced, the out-of- 
pocket price of medical care in  terms of the consumption good decreases, which 
leads to the ro ta tion  of budget line  to AB, i f  the income effect through prem ium  is
83 Phelps (1973), pg. 31, Fig. 6.
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not taken in to  account. The new position is Pi, w ith  the am ount o f medical care 
demanded mi>mo. In  rea lity , the rotated budget line m ust sh ift to CD to reflect 
am ount of prem ium  charged for the insurance contract, y ie ld ing the equ ilib rium  
po in t P2 , and medical care m 2>mo. The fin a l am ount o f medical care consumed w ith  
in troduction  o f insurance on average exceeds the qua n tity  consumed when no
dm
insurance is present (— <0) .  By adjusting a prem ium  loading, i t  is possible to
dk
constrain budget so th a t demand for medical care w ill be r is ing  w ith  the 
coinsurance rate.
5.5.CONCLUSION
This chapter contributes to the research in to  demand for hea lth  and medical 
care under uncerta in ty by constructing a continuous tim e stochastic model in  
wh ich both hea lth  and w ealth  are governed by possibly correlated W iener 
processes. The model includes an endogenous le isure (labour supply) decision. The 
op tim a l solutions for consumption, le isure and medical expenditure are firs t 
derived in  the case of a self-insured consumer. I t  is shown th a t the presence of 
uncerta in ty  changes the m arg ina l evaluation o f both hea lth  and w ealth  compared 
to the determ in istic case, w ith  variances o f the shock components adjusted by the 
parameters o f r isk  aversion being add itiona l discount factors.
The model is then extended to incorporate hea lth  insurance, under the 
assumption tha t the insurance company sets the prem ium s based on the 
d is tr ibu tion  o f medical expenditure observed for a self-insured consumer. The 
results o f the analysis show th a t the no m ora l hazard assumption proves to be 
wrong: afte r insurance is introduced, the optim al solution changes and the 
m arg ina l evaluation of hea lth  decreases, hence the optim al stock o f health 
increases. A n  increase in  the optim al consumption o f medical care afte r the 
in troduction  o f insurance is illu s tra te d  by computer sim ulations.
An a lterna tive  insurance contract has been proposed and is implem ented as 
a two-stage procedure. The optim al coinsurance rate is chosen ex-ante according to 
the equ ilib rium  condition, and the optim al medical care, consumption and leisure 
are derived ex-post. This chapter establishes a theoretica l re la tionship between the
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coinsurance rate e lastic ity  of the demand fo r medical care and the coinsurance 
elastic ities o f hea lth  and wealth. I f  an increase in  coinsurance rate leads to the 
lower level of health, and the income effect is e lim ina ted by an appropriate 
adjustm ent to the insurance prem ium , then the demand for medical care can either 
increase or decrease, depending on the degree o f the re la tive r is k  aversion w ith  
respect to health. I t  has been found th a t for the u n it r isk  aversion to health, 
changes in  demand for medical care are pure ly income-driven. I f  the r is k  aversion 
w ith  respect to hea lth  is greater (less) than one, then a decrease in  hea lth  level due 
to the increase in  coinsurance param eter w i l l  lead to a h igher (lower) level of 
demand for medical care.
Coinsurance rate elasticities o f consumption and leisure have also been 
obtained. I t  is shown th a t changes in  consumption due to the increase in  
coinsurance rate are driven by the income effect, and th a t the overall effect of 
change in  the coinsurance rate on leisure (and labour supply) is ambiguous. These 
predictions depend on a range of assumptions about the underly ing u t il i ty  function 
(namely, constant re la tive r isk  aversion w ith  respect to hea lth  and wealth), and on 
the assumption o f constant and equal e lastic ity  o f the hea lth-adjustm ent factor in  
the u t i l i ty  function, and the transform ation function in  the hea lth  accumulation 
equation. W ithou t m aking these assumptions, ana lytica l tra c ta b ility  o f the 
optim isa tion problem would be s ign ifican tly  im paired. F u rthe r research is needed 
in to  re laxing the assumptions o f the model and its  expansion to endogenise lifespan 
by incorporating a positive threshold - a c ritica l level o f health, below w hich death 
occurs.
This chapter contributes to the existing lite ra tu re  by proposing a new 
dynamic model o f the demand for medical care w ith  insurance against medical 
expenditure, w h ich incorporates labour supply and recognises the random nature 
of hea lth  and shocks to income. Some assumptions o f and im plications from  the 
model w il l  be tested em pirica lly  in  the fo llow ing two chapters. Chapter 6 contains 
detailed description of the 1993-94 Household Expenditure Survey, A ustra lia , and 
the p re lim ina ry  analysis of the data. Chapter 7 studies re la tionship between the 
p riva te  hea lth  insurance choice and medical expenditure, m aking use o f the 
theoretica l model developed in  Chapter 5.
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Ap p e n d ix  5.A. D e r iv a t io n  o f  E v o l u t io n  o f  Ma r g in a l  Va l u e  o f  H e a l t h  
a n d  We a l t h  (N o I n s u r a n c e )
P a rtia lly  d iffe ren tia ting  the Bellm an equation (5.3.6) w ith  respect to H, and 
using the f irs t order op tim a lity  conditions (5.3.5.a-c), one could establish th a t
(V(m) -  p - S ) V H + Ux<t>\H)X + VH, + VHH (¥ (m) - S ) H  +
+VWH (rW + (1 -  X)(oe(H) - c ~ x m )  + Vw<oe\H){ 1 -  A) +
+ \ vhhhH 2o 2h +VhhwHW(j hw +U?hwwW2oI  + <5‘A '1)
+ v h h H ( J h  +  v h w W (Jh w  = 0
This could be fu rthe r s im p lified  by noting th a t 
U =  —----------------------A, and collecting term s contaim ng Vy? in  (5.A.1)
<KH)
yields the fo llow ing expression:
( y ( m ) - p - ô ) V H +VHt +VHH (V(m )-Ô )H  +
+ VHW (rW + (1 -  X ) m ( H ) -  c-%m) +
/ 4>'(H) , e\H )
+ Vw m ( H ) A + —-—-(1 -A )
(K H ) e ( H )
+ (5.A.2)
+ ^ VH H H h 2<j ‘h + VHHWHW ° h W +
+ -^VHWWw 2(Tw  + VH H H(7h  + V HWW(JHW = 0
Vw Vzj\i/'(m) (t)'(H) 
F ina lly , by noting th a t ----- = — ---------- , and by denoting 7]^ , = - H ----------
H x  <P(H)
e '(H)
and 77 e = - H --------- , < equation (5.A.2) is reduced to the following:
e(H)
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yr(m) - p - S -  (^ D H L  (m) fo x  + qg ( i -  A )) VH +VHt +
X J
+VHH (h(m) -  5)H  +
+ Vw  (rW + (1 -  A )flie (ff ) - c - f f n )  +
+ ~ VHHHh 2 ( J H +VHHWH W gHW + 2 VHWWw2<jW +
+ v h h H(7h  + v h w Wcjhw  = 0
(5.A.3)
Using Ito ’s lemma,
dVH =VHtdt + VHHdH +VHwdW + ( ^ VHHHh 2 ( J h  +VHHWHW(JhW + ^ VHWWw2<7w d^t
and substitu ting  from (5.A .3), i t  follows th a t
d V „= { p + S -y /(m ) + 0>S<'H '^  — (vtA + rie ( 1 - A ) ) ÌV„ -V HHH aj, -
(5.A.4)
~VHWW(JHW ìdt + VH H  Hdht +VHWWdxvt
def
Suppose Tfy =Tje = 77 - constant e lastic ity  o f 0( -) , £(•) w ith  respect to i7. 
Then expression (5.A.4) could be fu rth e r s im p lified  to the fo llow ing form,
dVH ={ p + S -y/(m)( 1 -
ti)£(H)\i/'(m)r]
XV (m)
VH ~ VHHH<7H ~ VHWWcfHW idt + (5.A.5)
+VHH Hdht + VHW Wdwt
w hich is an equation (5.3.7) in  the text. The procedure for the other state variable, 
wealth, is completely analogous and yields equation (5.3.8) in  the text.
Ap p e n d ix  5.B . S o l u t io n  o f  t h e  P a r t ic u l a r  Ca s e  w it h  L o g a r it h m ic  
Ut il it y  F u n c t io n
S ubstitu ting  (5.3.9) - (5.3.11) in to  the Bellm an equation (5.3.6), the 
fo llow ing expression is true identica lly:
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a Inf aW^ + /Jin pw
UQù)a£H r>
+ prjlnH + /Jlna^ -  p{agInH7 + /3gIn/ /  + /q }+
+ Aj w  In
«0*
- 5  +
+ «0 rW + œaeH 11 1- £
a 0 œaeH ri
-W
a0 a0
1 *y I <y
~ ~ P o a H  ~ 2 a ° G W  = 0
A pprox im ating  term  ^-CoaeH^ by the firs t-o rder expansion
W
aQ(Oae (1 + rj In H -  I n W ) , and collecting coefficients on constant, InW, and InH, we 
need to fin d  (Xq,Pq,Yo th a t solve the fo llow ing system:
a  + fi -  pa0 + pQ\ff -  a0(oae = 0 ; (5.B.1)
- p P 0 + a 0 coa£r i = 0 ; (5.B.2)
a  In + p  In — ——  + p  In a a -  pyn + PoV
a0 a0°^e Xa 0
- p 00 + a 0r - a - P - P 0\f/ +
1 2 1 o
+ a 0 coa£ -  — P qCTh  - —(XqOw  =  0
(5.B.3)
The f irs t two equations can be solved for (X^ , Pq using Cram er’s formulae:
1
«0 = 7A
a  + p  - i f /  
0 - p
» Po -
p + a£0) a + P 
œaerj 0
, where A =
p + aEœ —y/ 
coa£ri - p
or, expanding the determ inants,
a0 ~
a + P
p + a£(0 ( l - — )
a£co(cc + p ) Tj
p + a£co( 1 - — ) P 
P
The rem ain ing unknown coefficient Yo is chosen so th a t the condition (5.B.3) is
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satisfied.
Hence, for the problem (5.3.1)-(5.3.3) where the utility function is of the 
form (5.3.9), the value function is given by the expression (5.3.12) in the text.
Ap p e n d ix  5.C. D e r iv a t io n  Of  Th e  S to ch astic  A cc u m u la tio n  E q uatio n  
F or  D em a n d  F or  M e d ic a l  Services
From the FONC (5.3.5.c), m-(p
HVh
of the derivative of the investment function \|/.
, where (p = ^ is the inverse
The previous section established the laws of evolution for Vfj ,Vyy and H, so 
we could apply Ito’s lemma again to derive the evolution of mt . Calculating the 
derivatives involved in the Ito’s lemma expansion and using the fact that 
if/' = (p^ ~^  , it is easy to verify that
dm <pV_1  ^ 0m (p'(p(~V dm (p'(p^
dVw %  dVH VH dH H
dVw V# dVwdVH vfjH
 ^ "I = ------+<P% = ^ - [ < P > (“1) + 2 (p'l
dVwdH V[]H2 dvjj Vjj
d2m (p( ^ , d2m (p^  ^ „ (_n ,
dVHdH VhH t o 2 H 2
(5.C.1)
where (p' and (p^  ^ are evaluated at XVw
HVH
def
Recall that under the assumption Tfy =rj£ = T] - the constant elasticity of 
0 0  > £(*) with respect to H, the evolution of V# is given by the expression (5.3.7),
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which is reproduced here for convenience:
dVH = { p + ô-y/(m)( 1 - (0£(H)y/\m)Ti 
XV (m)
V H ~ V H H H < jH  ~ V HW W a HW + ,g c  2j
+VHH Hdht + VHW Wdwt 
and the evolution of wealth by the equation (5.3.8), which is:
VM(dVfj) =  (Vhhh2(JH + ^ HW r^2(7W + ^HH^/HW^^(TW H ^  
var(d%) = (vfiwH2^  +V&wW2o l  +2VHWVwwHW<Jwr])dt, 
vai(dH) = H2irj/dt, 
cov(dVH ,dV]ÿ ) = (Vjjyy Vjih H 2<jh  +  vw w v h h H W (Th w  +  
+V%wWHcjhw +VHWVm vW 2G2H )dt, 
co v(dVyr ,dH ) = (Vjjyy H <7 ^  a-V^^HWg ^ ^ )dt,
COy(dVH ,dH ) = (Vh h H 2<j 2h +VhwHW(Jhw )dt.
dVw -  j(P ~ rWw ~VhwH°hw ~ ^w w ^(7w\^t + VWH Hdht + VwwWdxvt (5.C.3)
It is easy to verify that
Using Itô’s formula,
co v(dVH , d H )  +
1 d 2 m
I d H 2
var(J//) +
After substitution from (5.C.1)-(5.C.4), the expression for dm could be
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simplified under the additional assumption that the utility function and 
corresponding value function exhibit constant relative risk aversion.
Let by definition - ^ Æ L = R HH, - * Ù B L = % f f , and
VH  VW VW
Rwh = Rhw > be some constants equal to the coefficients of relative risk aversion84
. Then after some algebraic manipulation, the following dynamic equation is 
obtained:
dm = (p'(p{ 1){ - r  + v 1}+<p'[<p( ! ) ]2 j - ^ £ ( H ) j j  +  v 2 J  +  <p'[<p( x)]2 v 3 dt +
(5.C.5)
+ dfit
where
v i = ( J h ( 1- r h h ) 2 + r w w ( ° h w  + ° w  ^+ r h w ( r h w cjw  ~ RWWcrw
2 2 
- R HW(JHW + ( J H + 2 R H H (JHW ~ c7 H w '} ~ RWWR H H ((JHW + (7 h
v 2 ~ - R WHg H  + ~ RWWg W +  R WHRWW(7H W ’
(5.C.6)
2 1 2 2 2 
v 3 = RHW ( 2 a W ~ (TH W ) ~ r WWRH H ( ,j h  +(T H W ) ~  r HW HW ~ g H ^ ~
- RWW(RHWg w  ~ a H W )  + G 7 k ^ R]iH  +1) + R H H ( RHW<j HW ) ’
and d^t = (p'(p  ^ ^ f e / #  ~ RWH ~ ^ ht ~ iRWW ~ R H W 1dwt }
From the definition of the function (p, (p^~^ =y/', and the theorem about the
derivative of the inverse function85, it follows that ( p ' =  [ ( t y O ^ , and
¥
84 See Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974), Karni (1979) for the discussion of multivariate risk 
aversion.
85 Bronshtein and Semendyayev (1964), pg. 372.
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(p* = — — , where (p' and (p* are evaluated at , and ys',y/"and y/* are
t y 'Y  h v h
evaluated at m. Assume further that the investment function is as smooth as 
necessary, and exhibits constant elasticity with respect to m, constant relative risk 
aversion, and constant relative prudence86, that is,
mxf/'im) _ _ my/\m) _ m\ffm{ni) _
-------- -----------------------------7, Z~ ~ rl2 > --------V -  ^3»yt{rri) y/ (m) y/ (m)
where t]i <0,?7Z e R+ ,i = 2,3.87 (5.C.7)
Under the assumption above on the investment function, (p'(p^  ^ = —— ,
*12
<P'[<P^  ^ ] 2  = -^-yf(m)> (p"[<p^  ^ ] 2  = ~^rm, and equation (5.C.5) can be simplified to
m  v i
obtain the expression (5.4.1) in the text.
Ap p e n d ix  5.D. D e r iv at io n  Of  E vo lu tio n  Of  M a r g in a l  Va l u e  Of  H e alth  
An d  We a l t h  (Wit h  In suran ce)
After substitution of the optimal values from the FONCs (5.4.8) into the 
Bellman equation, the following is true identically:
0 = max {U(c4(H)X) -p V + V t +VH (yr(m) -ô )H  + 
cXm
+Vw (rW + c o e ( H ) ( l - À ) - c - k x m -
- a - k ) x —  r_V l + „  V3V2 [ V2
yr(m)\—£(H) r )-v 2 
V2 [X
) +
(5.D.1)
+ ~ VH H h 2 ( J H +  VHWHW <jHW + ~ VWWw 2(JW }
86 The notion of prudence and properties of the marginal utility functions yielding constant 
absolute or relative prudence is introduced and studied in Kimball (1990), Blanchard and 
Mankiw (1988).
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It is not difficult to establish by partially differentiating the Bellman 
equation (5.D.1) with respect to H, and taking into account FONCs (5.4.8.a-c), that
{V(m )-p -S )V H + Ux<!>'(H)X + Vh, + Vhh (V (m )-8)H  +
+VWH (rW + (1 -  A)a>e(H)- c -k x m -
~a~k)X —  jr -V j + — v3 1- — £( / / ) tj- v2
V2{ Vi V2 [%
+
+ Vw {(0£ ' ( H ) ( l - X ) + ( l - k ) x — ¥ ( m ) - e \ H ) r 1} + Vf{HH a j1 + (5D2)
*12 X
+ V HWW<jHW +  2  VHHHh 2 ( J H +
+VhhwHW<j hw + \ v HWWw 2o l  =o
Equation (5.D.2) could be further simplified by noting that 
Ux<(>\H)?i = O H 2,, and collecting terms containing Vyy yields the
<P(H)
following expression:
- p - S ) V H +VHt+ VHH -S )H  + 
+VHW (rW + (1 -  X)(0£(H) - c - k x m -
- d - k ) X —  | r - Vj + ^ - v 3 -  — e{H)T] - v2
Vi  { V2 \ V2 [X
+Vwcd£(H ) e\H)+ (1- k)— y/(m)ri 
<t)(H) £(H ) 772 £(h )
+ ^ VHHHh 2 ( J H + v h h w H W cjh w  + ^ VHWWw 2 (T W +  
+ v h h H g h  + v h w W(7h w  = 0
Denoting rift, = - H --------  and r)F = - H -------- , with ^  = 77 by
* <K#) e £(//)
assumption, equation (5.D.3) is reduced to the following:
87 An example of the function with all desired properties is y/(m) = -------
1-0
m1-0
152
p - S y H +VHt + VHH (\//(m)-Ô)H + 
+ % w (r^  + (1~ X)coe(H) -  c -  k%m -
(1 ~k)X
m r )+  (5.D.4)
_ Vwœe{H)r] | l  + ^ - ( l - k)\ff{m)r^ + ±VHHHH 2g 2h + 
+ V H H W H W c f HW + 2 V HWWw 2 ( 7 W + v h h H ( 7 h  +  v h w W ( J h w  = 0
Using Ito’s lemma,
dVH =VHtdt+VHHdH +VHWdW + { lv HHHH 2aji +
1 , (5.D.5)
+  Vh H W H W g HW + 2 VHWWw 2 (J w  idt
and substituting from (5.D.4), it follows from the equation (5.D.5) that
~ x V2 J (5.D.6)
~VHHH aH * VHWWaHW }dt + VHHHdh, +VHWWdwt
which is the equation (5.4.9) in the text.
Performing the same procedure for another state variable, wealth, it is easy 
to establish that
dVw = {p  -  r)Vw -V hwHghw ~ VwwWcrw\ t^ + Vy/HHdht + Vw\yWdwt ,(5.D.7)
which corresponds to the equation (5.4.10).
C h a p t e r  6 . P r iv a t e  H e a l t h  I n s u r a n c e  
C h o ic e  a n d  M e d ic a l  E x p e n d i t u r e : A n a l y s is  
o f  t h e  1 9 9 3 -9 4  H o u s e h o l d  E x p e n d i t u r e  
S u r v e y , A u s t r a l ia
6.1. I n t r o d u c t io n
In Australia, health care and finance have attracted significant political 
attention for many decades. After a long political battle, a national tax-financed 
scheme, Medicare, was introduced in 1984. The main elements of this compulsory 
health insurance scheme were first developed by Scotton and Deeble (Scotton and 
Deeble (1968)), and used as a basis for the Medibank program introduced in 1975, 
which was the first trial of compulsory health insurance in Australia. It was 
virtually dismantled under the Fraser Government, and then brought back to life 
as Medicare with the return of the Hawke Labor Government. These issues were 
covered in detail in Chapter 2, Sections 2.2.7-10.
Figure 6. 1. Private health insurance coverage, 1990-1999
Private Health insurance Coverage 
December 1990 to December 1999
Australia
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Source: PHIAC, http://www.phiac.org.au/phiac/fr index.htm. April 2000.
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The need for introducing a universal health coverage scheme was motivated 
by the failure of voluntary health insurance to cover all of the population. 
According to Scotton (1969), about 15% of Australians did not have any cover for 
hospital expenses, and 17% were not insured against medical expenses.
The role of private health insurance (PHI) has been significantly 
undermined by the availability of universal coverage. As a result, the proportion of 
privately insured fell from almost 80% in 1966 to 31% in 1999. Data on private 
health insurance coverage during the nineties are presented in Figure 6.1.
The position of private health insurance in the Australian health care 
system has been ambiguous. The important question to address is whether it 
should be a complement to the public scheme, or a substitute for it. If the policy 
objective is to reduce the public burden of increased health care costs, then 
promotion of private health insurance coverage, including the necessary easing of 
regulations, becomes a priority.
Private health insurance in Australia has been subject to numerous 
regulations. The principle of community rating precludes insurance companies 
from discrimination “on the basis of health status, age, race, sex, sexuality, use of 
hospital or medical services, or general claiming history” (Industry Commission 
(1997)). An insurance company cannot refuse to issue a policy, nor can it refuse to 
renew a current policy. Hence, charging actuarially fair premiums based on risk 
evaluation is forbidden by the regulations.
A set of restrictions has been imposed on the types of services eligible for 
private coverage, and on the level of reimbursement. Expenditure on outpatient 
medical services, refundable under Medicare, cannot be insured against. Ancillary 
policies can cover medical services for which there is no rebate from the public 
scheme (dentists, opticians, etc.) Hospital cover provides benefits equal to the 25% 
gap between the full MBS charge, with the 75% rebate available through Medicare. 
When admitted as a public patient in a public hospital, an individual cannot choose 
his or her medical doctor, while private patients are allowed to do so. The caveat is 
the uncertain out-of-pocket expenditure under private health insurance regulations 
in place until recently. If the fee charged by a doctor in the hospital exceeded MBS,
155
the excess was not covered by the policy and had to be paid by the patient. Thus 
the very concept of insurance as a vehicle for eliminating uncertainty about future 
medical spending was undermined. For the recent changes in government 
regulations and their effect on the private health insurance industry, see Chapter 
2, Sections 2.7-8.
Health funds are also required to enter into a reinsurance pool. Funds with 
better risk subsidise funds with a larger proportion of older and sicker people. 
Inside the fund, single premiums are charged with no regard to the actuarial risk 
of the policy (community rating). Two types of tables, singles and family, existed in 
1995, and the premiums for families were set at twice the premium of a single 
policy. In actuarial terms, younger people found the terms of the contracts 
unfavourable and dropped out. Studies of Butler (1999, May) show that, for the age 
group 20-40 covered by family policies, the ratio of premiums collected from the 
corresponding age group to benefits paid is between 3 and 4, while for family 
policies issued to the 60+ age group, benefits outweigh premiums, and the ratio 
falls to 0.5. This means there is cross-subsidisation going on within the insurance 
pool, with younger people subsidising older cohorts. This is not sustainable in the 
long run, given the falling membership rates of younger people. Attempts are being 
made to overcome this tendency. A lifetime community rating scheme has recently 
been introduced (see Chapter 2, Section 2.7.6 for detailed discussion of recent 
policy changes). It is still an unfunded scheme, because the reserves are not pooled 
within an age cohort, but within the existing membership pool. Lifetime 
community rating penalises late entry and is designed to encourage younger people 
to enter the insurance pool which would result in an improved risk profile for the 
insured population.
To successfully implement a policy directed at the increase of private health 
insurance coverage, one has to determine the factors influencing the household 
decision to purchase private health insurance. Studies of determinants of private 
health insurance in Australia include Cameron, Trivedi et al. (1988), Cameron and 
Trivedi (1991), Burrows, Brown et al. (1991), Burrows, Brown et al. (1993), ABS 
(1995a), Schofield (1997), Schofield, Fischer et al. (1997). These studies were based 
on the National Health Survey (NHS) and Health Insurance Survey (HIS) data.
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The major drawback of the NHS and HIS is the lack of expenditure data. The 
advantage is the detailed health status descriptors, and information on the types of 
coverage purchased as well as subjective reasons for purchasing private health 
insurance. This chapter will examine medical expenditure data available from the 
Household Expenditure Survey, along with other household characteristics, and 
will establish the relationship between the household’s decision to purchase private 
health insurance and the factors identified as determinants of this decision.
6.2. H o u s e h o l d  E x p e n d it u r e  S u r v e y
The latest expenditure survey data publicly available from the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) refer to the 1993-94 Household Expenditure Survey 
(hereafter referred to as HES 93) which was conducted during the financial year 
beginning July 1993 and ending June 1994. I am grateful to the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics for making the dataset available for the analysis through the 
Confidentialised Unit Record Files (CURF) arrangements with the Australian 
National University. All results of the data analysis and the views expressed 
hereafter are those of the author, and not necessarily those of the ABS.
The data pertain to the period of falling PHI membership rates. The final 
sample represented 8,389 households, comprising residents of private dwellings. 
This corresponded to the 86% responses out of 9,733 households originally selected 
for the survey. The sample loss was adjusted for by making appropriate changes to 
initial weighting, through post-stratification and calibration procedures, details of 
which might be found in ABS (1995b). Other sources on structure of the data and 
characteristics of the households include ABS (1996a), ABS (1996b).
The survey questionnaire contained an extensive set of questions covering 
household composition and demographic characteristics, detailed household and 
personal expenditure and income items. The data included expenditure on hospital, 
medical and dental insurance, household and personal expenditure on general 
practitioners, specialists, dentists and other medical practitioners’ fees, on 
medicines and various pharmaceutical products, and on hospital charges among 
other items. The flag variable for whether the household contained a person with a
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The interviewing procedures included filling out one household 
questionnaire, which contained data on health insurance expenditure, and 
personal questionnaires for household members aged 15 and above. Within 8,389 
households, 17,271 individuals responded on personal questionnaires. Imputing the 
number of dependant children younger than 15 years old from the household 
responses, the survey covered a total of 22,178 people.
The design of the survey creates a problem for attributing health insurance 
contributions to a particular family or income unit within the household in the case 
of multi-family multi-income unit households. There is also no information about 
the type of health insurance coverage: there is no explicit question as to whether 
the health insurance is hospital, ancillary or both. Given these data limitations, it 
was necessary to restrict analysis to the subset of households which could be 
treated as a single unit for health insurance choice. In 1993-94, only singles and 
family health insurance could be issued, where family would include a couple, 
whether legally married or de-facto, a couple with dependant children 15 years old 
and younger and unmarried full-time students aged 15-25, or a single parent with 
children falling into the categories mentioned above. Families with both dependant 
and non-dependant children were excluded from the analysis on the basis that it 
was not possible to attribute health insurance contributions unambiguously to 
either the core family (parents with dependant /student children) or to the non­
dependant co-residing child. Households containing “other relatives” were also 
excluded from the analysis on the same grounds. As a result, 6,496 households 
were identified as qualifying as health insurance decision units for this exercise. 
The dataset contains 11,500 personal records for this subset of households. Adding 
4,641 children younger than 15 years of age, attributed to the families, the subset 
covers a total of 16,141 persons of all ages.
For the purposes of this analysis, the household was assumed to have 
private health insurance coverage if positive expenditure was reported on hospital, 
medical and dental insurance coverage. As was emphasised earlier, because it is 
not possible to specify what level of coverage a household possessed, the focus is on
health condition was also included in the dataset.
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the decision to take up any kind of private health insurance at all, as opposed to 
relying on Medicare only. In the sample, 50.4% of respondents in the decision units 
(5,791 persons), or 46.8% among the 6,496 households, reported positive 
expenditure on health insurance, which is higher than the results from the 
National Health Survey 1995 (43.8% of all respondents). According to the data for 
membership trends available from the PHIAC, by the end of 1993, hospital 
coverage was purchased by 39.4% of the Australian population, and ancillary 
coverage by 36.1% of the population (PHIAC). By the end of 1994 and 1995, 
respectively, hospital coverage fell to 37.2% and then to 34.9%, and ancillary 
coverage fell from 34.5% to 33.4%, a fall of 4.5 percentage points from the end of 
1993 for hospital tables and 2.7 percentage points for ancillary tables. This could 
explain the reduction in overall coverage from 50.9% at the time of the HES in 
1993 to the estimated 43.8% from the NHS in 1995.
The sample constructed for the analysis excludes multiple families within 
the household, and families with other relatives, where average coverage might be 
lower, and the estimate of the private insurance coverage in the subsample of 6,496 
households has an upward bias. The bias could also be exacerbated by the HES 93 
sampling procedure: only residents in private dwellings were included in the 
survey, leaving aside residents of public institutions, including nursing homes, who 
would be much less likely to have private health insurance of any kind. With this 
in mind, any estimates provided by further analysis cannot be extrapolated to the 
population of Australia as a whole, and are only valid as estimates of the 
microdata.
6.3. F a c t o r s  I n f l u e n c in g  H e a l t h  In s u r a n c e  D e c is io n : Wh a t  Ar e  Th e  
E x p l a n a t o r y  Va r ia b l e s ?
Examination of the sample of 6,496 households will explore what factors 
influenced the decision to purchase private health insurance (PHI) coverage, and 
how different the units are in their medical utilisation and socio-economic 
characteristics, given their private coverage status. This would assist in choosing 
proper explanatory factors for the model of health insurance choice. The following 
analysis relies upon two major data files: the household records file discussed 
above (6,496 records), and the unit record file for persons aged 15 and above
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included in those households (11,500 records). All the conclusions about children 
younger than 15 are imputed from the information contained in the household file. 
The SPSS package is used to produce the statistical results presented in the tables 
and figures that follow.
6.3.1. Health Insurance Coverage by Age
As confirmed in a number of earlier studies, e.g. by the Industry 
Commission, in 1993-94, private insurance exhibited a vicious circle of membership 
fallouts. Younger and healthier members found private coverage to be actuarially 
unfair, and dropped out from private health insurance. The remaining insured 
population represented higher risks due to its demographic composition. This 
resulted in a necessary rise in premiums, and further dropouts by younger 
members. It would be interesting to see whether this tendency is supported in the 
HES 93 data.
In the sample of 6,496 households, 3,043 report private health insurance 
expenditure, which represents 46.8% of all selected households. Table 6.1 contains 
data on the average composition of the household by the health insurance group. It 
appears that the mean number of children aged 19 and younger in the insured 
households is lower within any age group than the corresponding number for the 
uninsured households (e.g. 0.4 children aged 5 to 12 per family without health 
insurance compared to 0.38 children per family with insurance, etc.). The 
household with PHI contains 0.06 persons in the 20-24 age group, while the 
uninsured household contains 0.11 persons of this age group on average. For all the 
older cohorts, the average number of persons within the insured household is 
higher than the relevant number for the household without insurance. For 
example, the average household with PHI contains 0.31 persons aged 45-51, while 
the uninsured household provides a mean of 0.19 persons for this age group. The 
age distribution within insured households is skewed to the right compared to that 
of uninsured households. Additional data on age distribution for individuals older 
than 15 by the PHI coverage are provided in Table 6.2. It follows from the data that 
the average insured person is older than the average uninsured person, and that 
the average head of household of the uninsured household is 1.35 years younger
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than the head of the insured household.88 This is consistent with younger and 
healthier people leaving the private health insurance scene, given the availability 
of Medicare and actuarially unfavourable premiums.
One interesting point to note is the reverse proportions for the oldest age 
group, 74 and over. On average, an insured household has 0.08 persons of this age, 
while there are 0.11 persons in the household without PHI. It is also worth noting 
that the average number of retired persons per insured household is 0.19, 
significantly less than the 0.26 per household without insurance. About 86% of 
households with positive health insurance expenditure do not contain retired 
persons, compared to the 79% of households without PHI. This also supports the 
finding that many aged and retired people find it difficult to keep up with the 
rising premiums, and are forced to leave the private scheme and rely on the public 
universal system. The income effect at an older age, and the regulations of the 
insurance market which created out-of-pocket expenditure for private hospital care 
that was often high and unpredictable, drived bad risks out of the insurance pool, 
which, in turn, improved the risk profile of the insured community. However, this 
tendency was unable to overturn the general trend of falling membership for 
younger and healthier people.
6.3.2. Health Insurance by Geographical Region, Tenure/Ownership of 
Dwelling, and Socio-Economic Status
The data presented in Table 6.3 suggest that the proportion of population 
covered by private health insurance differs across the states. In this sample, the 
highest coverage reported was for Tasmania (57.5%), and South Australia (54.9%). 
Northern Territory, where predominantly urban areas were sampled, also reports 
high prevalence of PHI (52.8%), followed by the ACT (51.8%) and Western 
Australia (51.1%).
88 C a lcu la te d  from  th e  a v e ra g e  age  of re feren ce  h ead  of h ouseh old  6 .8 5  for no in su ra n ce , 
a n d  7 .1 2  for th e  h ouseh old  w ith  in su ra n ce . T h e s ix th  an d  se v e n th  a g e  b ra ck e ts  a re  4 0 -4 4  
a n d  4 5 -4 9  y e a rs  old, an d  assu m in g  th a t  5 y e a rs  re p re s e n t a  u n it in cre a se  in  th e  code v alu e, 
th e  d ifferen ce  o f 1 .3 5  y e a rs  is ob tain ed . T h ese  ca lcu la tio n s  sh ould  be ta k e n  w ith  cau tio n , as  
th e y  o p e ra te  on  th e  ca te g o rica l, n o t scale , v a ria b le  “ag e ”, an d  th e  re s u lt  w ould be d ifferen t if  
th e  a c tu a l  ag e  v a lu e s  w ere  u sed .
161
Figure 6. 2. Tenure of dwelling by PHI status
Owner Renting publ fum Renting privturn Living rent-free
Purchaser Renting publ unfum Renting priv unfurn
Tenure (nature of occupancy)
New South Wales and Victoria residents are more likely to be uninsured 
(50.2% and 51.8% uninsured within the respective states), and the lowest 
proportion of insured respondents is in Queensland (44.7%). Historically, 
Queensland has a longer record of free health coverage, which began well before 
the Medicare program, and the lower number in our sample is consistent with 
what should be expected from experience.
Analysing data on health insurance membership by type of tenure of occupied 
dwelling, it appears that, not surprisingly, the proportion of owners and purchasers 
is much higher among the households with PHI coverage (82.5%) than for the 
uninsured households (56.2%). Households with private health insurance are much 
less likely to occupy public dwellings rented from the state or territory housing 
authority (3.4% among households with insurance versus 14.3% for households 
without PHI). Results of the comparison of nature of occupancy by the PHI status 
are presented in Table 6.4 and Figure 6.2.
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Figure 6. 3. Relative socio-economic disadvantage (Seifa) status of 
the households by PHI coverage
Lowest 10% Third decile Fifth decile Seventh decile Ninth decile
Second decile Fourth decile Sixth decile Eighth decile Highest 10%
Relative socio-economic disadvantage - decile - Australia
For those households who own or are purchasing their occupied dwellings, 
the mean value of the dwelling is higher for those with insurance ($175,346) than 
without ($134,752). In our sample, 83.3% of households with private health 
insurance lived in separate houses (compared to 71.3% of uninsured households), 
and an additional 7.5% in semi-detached houses/townhouses (compared to 10.5% of 
uninsured households). Only about 9% of households with PHI lived in flats or 
other types of housing (caravan, houseboat etc.), while almost twice as large a 
proportion of uninsured households, namely 17.4%, report this class of dwellings 
(see Table 6.5). This suggests a relatively higher socio-economic status for 
households that are able to afford private health insurance coverage, as confirmed 
by Figure 6.3.
Almost half the uninsured households belong to the four lowest Seifa 
deciles, while more than half the households with private health insurance fall into 
the sixth decile and above. Among the households without PHI, the proportion of 
those in the lowest Seifa decile is 2.5 times higher than the relevant proportion 
calculated for insured households (14.6% versus 5.7% of households within
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uninsured and insured groups, respectively, falling into the lowest socio-economic 
decile). The least disadvantaged decile is 7% of all uninsured households and 
15.7% of the insured households. This observation suggests that the prevalence of 
private health insurance is strongly associated with the socio-economic status of 
the household. The distribution of the socio-economic status of household by PHI is 
presented in Table 6.6.
6.3.3. Health Insurance by Employment Status, Occupation and Country of 
Birth of the Head of Household
In line with the previous findings, the employment status of household 
members and the occupation of the head of household influences the likelihood of 
having positive expenses on some type of private health insurance. These 
characteristics would clearly be correlated with the socio-economic status of the 
household. When the household was covered by PHI, its head was not in the 
labour force or unemployed in less than a quarter of cases, while for uninsured 
households the number was as high as 45%. Selecting only those households in 
which the head of household reported an usual occupation, the proportion of 
managerial, professional and administrative occupations of the household head is 
higher within the insured group than uninsured, in which blue-collar and sales 
occupations prevail. Relevant frequencies are presented in Table 6.7. 
Unemployment appears to be an important factor in the insurance decision. Only 
about 4% of insured households reported at least one unemployed person within 
the household. The figure was significantly higher for households without PHI, 
totalling 11.4% of all households without insurance.
Country of birth of the household head is also important in explaining the 
household’s insurance status, as it could serve as a proxy for the comparative 
disadvantage of migrant families in accessing private health insurance, due to 
language and other cultural differences, in addition to the economic characteristics 
of the household. As data suggest, among households with health insurance, 77% of 
household heads were born in Australia and Northern America, compared with 
69% among households without PHI. The proportion of households whose head was 
born overseas (Europe and the former USSR, Asia, Central America and Africa) is
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lower in the group of insured households than in the uninsured group. A more 
precise measure of comparative disadvantage based on recent migrant status 
would be the language spoken at home, but the data available from the HES 93 
survey do not allow this issue to be unambiguously resolved. Household heads born 
in Australia and Northern America are assumed to be native English speakers, 
whilst the categories “Europe and the Former USSR” and “Other Oceania and 
Antarctica” are not disaggregated enough to establish ethnicity. More detailed 
descriptive statistics for the country of birth of the household head by PHI status 
are presented in Table 6.8.
6.3.4. Health Insurance by Type of Family
Examining the data presented in Table 6.9, it could be observed that 
persons living alone are more likely to rely on the public medical system: only 34% 
of lone person households report positive expenditure on private health insurance, 
while 66% have no coverage. For couples without children, 57% are covered, and for 
couples with children the proportion of coverage is 51.5% for those with children 
younger than 15 years old, and 65.8% for those with children aged 15 and above. In 
general, couples with or without children are more likely to have some type of 
private health insurance coverage, while more than 70% of single parent families 
remain uninsured. This is understandable from the pricing rule of health insurance 
contracts: family tables cover both couples with any number of dependant children, 
and single parents with dependants, for the same premium. This makes private 
coverage relatively cheaper for two-income couples with children compared to one- 
income single parent families.
Within the insured group, about 20% were lone person households 
(presumably, single insurance tables), and the rest family coverage, among which 
couples without children represented 39%, couples with children 38%, and single 
parent families less than 3%.
Among the 2,605 families with children in the subsample, 598 or 23% report 
children attending independent pre-schools, primary or secondary schools. For the 
households in which children attend public schools, the proportion of those with
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health insurance is 43%, which is significantly lower than the 62% of insured 
households which report children in independent educational establishments (see 
Figure 6.4).
Figure 6. 4. Private health insurance coverage by type of education 
for children
No Yes
Private Health Insurance
This observation suggests that children in private schools are more likely to 
belong to families with some level of private health insurance. The opposite is true 
for children in the public system, who are more likely to come from families 
without health insurance. Whether this can be explained by income effect 
influencing both the private health insurance and private education decisions of 
the households simultaneously, or is instead the revealed preferences of those 
households for private versus public services, is an open question. It might be 
speculated that households with children in the private school system and with 
private health insurance put more weight on the private good in their utility 
function, but it is hard to test this hypothesis from the limited microdata. In either 
case, having children in private schools is linked to the increased probability of the 
household to be covered by some type of private health insurance.
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6.3.5. Health Insurance by Household Income and by the Principle Source 
of Income
The 1993-94 Household Expenditure Survey provides several measures of 
income, including total household income from all sources, total earned gross 
income, weekly taxable income, private income, disposable income and final 
income. The first of these, the total household income from all sources, will be used 
for analysis in this section. Total income appears negative for self-employed 
individuals with business losses, or otherwise as a result of capital loss. Reported 
negative incomes do not provide a reliable measure of the true status of a 
household, and could be influenced by the desire of households to minimise 
reported taxable income. Only 41 households out of the sample of 6,496, or 0.06% of 
the sample, reported negative total household income from all sources. Among 
those 41 households, 19 reported private health insurance expenditure, which is 
about the rate observed in the sample as a whole (46.3% versus 46.8%). The 
households with negative income could thus be excluded from the analysis in this 
section without loss of generality.
Income quintiles constructed for the subsample of households with 
positive reported total income from all sources are as follows: the first (the lowest) 
has income of less than $247 a week, the second has income in the range $248 - 
$405, the third $406 -  658, the fourth $659 -  1,012, and the fifth (the highest) 
reports total household income in excess of $1,013 a week. The median income 
within the quintiles is higher for households with PHI, namely, it is $167 vs. $166 
for the 1st quintile, $309 vs. $306 for the 2nd, with differences more pronounced for 
the higher quintiles. For example, $529 vs. $511 for the 3rd, $823 vs. $803 for the 
4th, and $1,347 vs. $1,250 for the highest income quintile (see Table 6.10).
Table 6.11 crosstabulates income quintiles with a private health 
insurance dummy, revealing that more than a half of the households without 
health insurance coverage belong to the bottom two quintiles, while more than half 
of the insured households report total household income from all sources falling 
into the two top quintiles. More than 70% of households within the lowest income 
quintile are uninsured, with the proportion exactly reversed for the highest 
quintile. In the middle quintile, the proportion of households with positive health
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insurance contributions is close to the original sample average and equals 43.5%.
Given the data limitations, it would be interesting to see how private 
health insurance expenditure differs by income groups for those who choose to 
purchase PHI. This would shed some light on the types of policies the households 
purchase, even though the exact breakdown by type of coverage (hospital, ancillary, 
or both) is impossible in this dataset. As Table 6.12 suggests, the median weekly 
expenditure on private health insurance for households with PHI coverage is $17 
for a household in the lowest income quintile, $23 in the middle, and $29 for a 
household in the highest income category. Reported maximum weekly expenditure 
is quite close within the first three income quintiles (about $55), but is higher in 
the fourth and fifth quintiles ($61 and $82 per week respectively). These 
observations would most probably represent expensive comprehensive policies 
covering both hospital and extras. The minimum reported is within a range of 1-2 
dollars per week. Unsurprisingly, income appears to be an important variable 
influencing health insurance, both in terms of whether to insure or not, and how 
much coverage to purchase.
6.3.6. Health Insurance by Health Conditions of the Household Members
Unlike National Health Surveys, the Household Expenditure Survey 
provides little information on the health conditions of interviewed persons. Even 
so, some minimal information on general health status is provided, and variables 
on whether the household contains a person with a health condition at household 
level, and the severity of handicap at persons level, are available from the dataset. 
As well, one survey question on principal source of income being sickness 
allowance, would imply the person had a health condition. By merging the personal 
files by household, a variable indicating the number of persons with a health 
condition was constructed, as well as a variable which calculates the number of 
persons in the household with a handicap.
The results are presented in Tables 6.13, 6.14. Of the households with no 
private health insurance, 42% contain a person with a health condition, compared 
with 39% among the households with some level of private coverage. About 9% of
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insured households contain at least one person with a handicap, compared with 
11% of uninsured households. Mean total household income from all sources is 
lower for households containing persons with a health condition, compared with 
the households with no health disadvantaged members ($536 compared to $745 per 
week). As becomes clear from the data, a large proportion of the households 
containing a person with a health condition is comprised of older sick people. 
Pensions are the principal source of income for 29% of households in which there is 
a person with a health condition (compared with 8% for the households without), 
and wage and salary is a major source of income in just 37% of cases (compared 
with 63%). For the households which report a health condition, the proportion of 
those who rely on superannuation and Veteran’s Affairs pensions as a principle 
source of income is also significantly higher (see Table 6.15). The age composition 
of households reporting a health condition indicates that they are indeed the older 
households: the age distribution places more weight into every age group from 50 
years of age and above, compared with the households with no health 
disadvantaged persons. As presented in Table 6.16, more than half of the 
interviewed household members are 50 years of age and older, for households 
reporting a health condition, compared with 16% for households not reporting a 
health condition, in which more than half of the members are younger than forty. 
The data suggest the prevalence of a health condition is mainly linked to the age of 
household members, with the older households exhibiting poorer health status, 
which is a trivial and expected conclusion.
6.4. L in k s  B e t w e e n  H e a l t h  In surance , M e d ica l  Sp en d in g , a n d  Health -  
Im p r o v in g  Ex pe n d itu r e
To study whether utilisation of medical care expressed in terms of 
expenditure depends on health insurance status, the household dataset is split into 
two parts, single person units and family units. The latter category includes 
couples with or without children, and single-parent families. Without separating 
the observations into two categories by family composition, it is impossible to 
distinguish between a high PHI contribution for a single person household and a 
lower level of family coverage. Recall that, subject to regulations, the premiums for 
a family policy are set at twice the premium for a single person, for both hospital,
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ancillary and the mixed tables. By breaking down the sample of 6,496 households 
into two subsets of single person and family units (the latter category includes 
couples with or without children and single-parent families), they could be ranked 
by total income to explore whether wealthier families buy more private health 
coverage and spend more on medical care and health-improving activities, 
including gym memberships, sports lessons, sports facilities hire and alike.
The 1993-94 HES provides data on personal expenditure on fitness-related 
items, which are further aggregated to a household level. It is worth noting that 
expenditure on sports and fitness does not necessarily reflect the true magnitude of 
health-improving activities. Many forms of exercise might not incur any cost -  
individuals can walk, jog or do yoga for free, thereby reporting zero expenditure on 
fitness, yet significantly improving health status. The quality of exercise is another 
important unmeasured variable, which could not be properly reflected in the 
expenditure data. Cheaper training facilities do not necessarily provide a lesser 
health benefit compared with a fashionable expensive club, which might be higher 
priced merely for additional comfort. Even so, the data on fitness and sports 
expenditure still provide insights into the marketed health-improving activities 
accessible by households, even when allowing for the substitution possibility of free 
or relatively cheaper forms of exercise for more expensive forms. The same quality 
adjustment is also necessary for evaluation of medical care utilisation. Higher 
expenditure on a particular type of service might reflect either a higher usage of 
standard service, or could be attributed to the same level of service purchased from 
a more expensive provider. Acknowledging these limitations, expenditure data will 
be used as a proxy for the true quality-adjusted consumption of medical care and 
health-improving private activities. The public goods essential for health 
maintenance, i.e. water supply, sanitation, pollution control, vaccination, health 
promotion, education and so on, are available to all members of the society and are 
homogeneous in our sample.
To justify separating single person households from families, the 
mean and median private health insurance contributions were computed by total 
household income quintile and the PHI tercile (Table 6.17). The results suggest 
there is little variability within any tercile of PHI contribution by income quintile
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group, which is conformant with the community rating principle. For example, all 
households with the lowest level of coverage spend about $12 a week, without 
regard to income status, between $23.5 in the 1st income quin tile and $25 in the 5th 
quintile for the middle level of coverage, and about $36.5 a week for the most 
expensive levels of coverage. Those are averages for the households sample, and 
one would expect different conclusions after splitting the data into the two 
categories discussed above.
6.4.1. Analysis o f Single-Person Households Data
Based on Table 6.9, there are 1,790 one-person households, 34% of which 
have some type of private health insurance coverage, and 85% of which belong to 
the three lowest total household income quintiles, according to the ranking from 
the previous analysis on the household level. Re-ranking single person households 
by total income and excluding from the analysis 29 observations for which negative 
(11 observations) or zero total household income was reported, the new income 
quintiles are constructed. The lowest quintile reports weekly incomes below $161, 
with median $157, the 2nd lowest ranges from $162 to $188 (median $170), the 3rd 
is $189-$316 (median $232), the 4th is $317-$552 (median $435), and the highest, 
fifth, quintile reports total weekly income from all sources in excess of $553 
(median $777). The households are evenly distributed across income quintiles (see 
Table 6.18).
Among the 1,761 single person households with positive total income 
reported, 34% are insured, with a mean health insurance contribution of about $15 
per week. Splitting the file by health insurance contribution terciles, finds the 
median contribution in the lowest tercile is between 8 and 9 dollars a week across 
all income groups, the middle is about $15 a week, and the highest tercile spends 
about $20 per week on some type of private health insurance coverage (Table 6.19). 
This roughly corresponds to the three levels of coverage: ancillary, basic hospital,
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and comprehensive policy including both89, even though a direct analogy could not 
be established due to the complicated pricing structure of the contracts.
It also appears that persons in the highest income quintile are more likely 
to purchase more expensive coverage: more than 72% of the singles in the top 
quintile and more than 76% in the second top quintile purchased at least the 
median tercile of private health insurance. Again, the conclusion is that income 
plays an important role in both the decision to insure, and the decision of how 
much coverage to purchase.
Table 6.20 provides data on the mean medical expenditure, net of any 
rebates, of single person households by income quintile and private health 
insurance status. It is apparent from the table that, at any income level, persons 
with PHI coverage spend more on general practitioners, specialists and other 
practitioners services. Mean expenditure on opticians services is higher for people 
without health insurance in the lowest income quintile than for those with PHI 
coverage ($1.10 per week compared to 0.79). In the higher income quintiles, 
persons with PHI spend more on average on opticians’ fees, with the exception of 
the 3rd quintile, in which mean expenditure is about the same for insured and 
uninsured persons. Persons with private health insurance spend more on 
prescription drugs, except for the 3rd income quintile where, again, the spending is 
close and a little higher for the uninsured. Mean hospital charges are higher for the 
insured group within each income quintile except for the highest, where persons 
without PHI contributions spend 0.98 compared to 0.61 for insured. Hospital 
charges for the uninsured population would occur if the patient without PHI 
chooses to use private hospital services. The data suggest that this event is more 
probable in the highest income quintile, and in such a case, quite understandably, 
a self-insured individual will have higher out-of-pocket expenditure than an 
insured one.
89 This seems to be reasonable compared to the current premium trends. For example, the 
NIB Health Fund’s singles table cites weekly contribution rates (without the 30% Federal 
Government Rebate deducted) of $28 for the Gold Hospital&Extra package with zero 
excess, $21 for private hospital only cover, and $10 for ancillary only cover. The ratio is 
2.8:2 .1:1, and in the 1993 sample estimate, it is 2.4:1.8:1. There is also a great variability in 
the types of products offered by the health insurance funds, and premiums vary a lot
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Figure 6. 5. Major components of total health care expenditure 
excluding PHI contributions for insured single person households
PHI
Other
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Figure 6. 6. Major components of total health care expenditure for 
uninsured single person households
No PHI
A a b & S ic k & A c d d  ins 
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depending on the excluded items and front-end-deductibles, therefore direct mapping of the 
tables is hardly possible.
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Data on mean expenditure on different components of medical care by single 
person households, with and without private health insurance contributions, are 
presented in Table 6.21. The average person with PHI coverage tends to spend 
more on other types of health-related insurance (i.e. ambulance, sickness and 
personal accident insurance), and on any other item of medical expenditure listed 
in the questionnaire, compared to the person without PHI. The breakdown of total 
health care expenditure (excluding private health insurance contributions) for 
insured and uninsured single person households is presented in Figures 6.5 and
6.6. It appears that, for both insured and uninsured persons, the most significant 
component of total medical expenditure is non-prescription medicines, including 
proprietary tablets, ointments and other pharmaceutical products (26.8% of the 
total for insured and 29.1% for uninsured). Dental fees are the second largest 
component, representing about 19% of total expenditure for both categories. 
Prescription medicines follow, making up to 12.7% for insured and 16.8% for 
uninsured persons. Opticians fees take up a larger share of total medical 
expenditure for persons without PHI than for insured (10.8% vs. 7.9%). These 
findings are consistent with the expectation that out-of-pocket expenditure on 
services non-refundable under Medicare will be lower for the person with ancillary 
coverage than for the uninsured person.
Specialists’ fees represent a larger proportion in the total medical bill of 
insured persons (8.8% compared to 5% for uninsured), and hospital charges are 
relatively more important as a share of the total for the insured (8.4% as opposed to 
less than 4% for uninsured).
Comparing total medical expenditure for persons who reported a positive 
amount, it can be seen that households without private health insurance, with or 
without a health condition in the household, spend less on medical care than those 
with some level of PHI coverage. Within the uninsured group, those with a 
health condition spend more on medical care. Interestingly, there is no significant 
difference in the median expenditure of those with a health condition and those 
without, within the insured group. The results are presented in Figure 6.7a.
Analysing total medical expenditure for those who incurred it, by private 
health insurance contribution quintile and by PHI contribution tercile (see Table
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6.22), it is difficult to draw a definite conclusion about the effect of the level of 
coverage on actual medical spending. There are major limitations to analysis, due 
to the artificial breakdown of premiums into three groups, which is probably a very 
rough approximation of the types of single policies individuals purchase. One 
possible explanation is suggested by the data in Table 6.23. It appears that single 
person households differ significantly by age, with single persons aged 65 and over 
clustered in the three lowest income quintiles. The median age bracket of the 
typical single person in the highest income quintile is 35-39 for those with the 
lowest PHI contribution rate, 40-44 with the medium, and 45-49 years of age for 
those with the highest. This conforms with the previous conclusion that the desired 
level of coverage increases with age, given that income allows the individual to 
afford private health insurance.
Figure 6.7. a. Logarithm of total medical expenditure^ by PHI 
status and health condition, single person households
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Turning to the analysis of other health improving expenditure, namely total 
expenditure on exercise and fitness, mean fitness expenditure for uninsured
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persons was $2.4 per week, compared to $2.7 for persons with some level of PHI 
coverage. Among 1,176 single person households without insurance, 151 persons, 
or 12.8%, reported positive expenditure on sports and fitness. Among the insured 
subsample, the corresponding proportion was 93 out of 614, or 15%. In the 
subsample of those reporting positive fitness expenditure, mean weekly 
expenditure was $18.4 for insured, which is higher than the calculated mean 
expenditure of $18.1 for uninsured. The independent-samples T test fails to reject 
the hypothesis about the equality of means, so the difference in mean expenditure 
is insignificant. The median weekly expenditure on fitness for both groups equals 
$6. For persons with private insurance of some kind, with a few minor exceptions, 
the mean expenditure on sports-related activities increases with income level and 
with the level of health insurance contributions. The tendency is violated for the 
second income quintile compared with the first, and for those in both the highest 
PHI tercile and the highest income quintile, who spend less on average on fitness 
than persons in the previous income quintile and the same level of PHI 
contribution, or than persons within the same income quintile holding the 
immediately lower level of PHI coverage (Table 6.24).
Figure 6.7. b. Logarithm of total sports and fitness expenditure by 
PHI status and health condition
P r i v a t e  Heal t h  I n s u r a n c e
176
Controlling for the presence of a health condition, private health insurance 
does not seem to have a significant influence on the amount of sports and exercise 
purchased: the median is the same across the PHI status for people without a 
health condition. Persons who report a health condition spend a lesser amount 
without regard for their insurance status. This is illustrated in Figure 6.7.b.
An interesting observation could be made by examining Table 6.25, which 
contains data on the mean and median expenditure on fitness and sports by 
insured households with positive levels of fitness expenditure. It appears that 
persons in the highest income quintile level (and as we confirmed before, the 
youngest people in the singles sample) tend to have sports and fitness expenditure 
inversely related to the amount of their PHI contributions. In the fifth income 
quintile, the median weekly fitness expenditure decreases from $10.3 for persons 
with the lowest level of PHI coverage, to $6 for persons with the highest private 
health insurance contributions. This result could be interpreted as indicating that 
younger healthier people tend to regard exercise as an activity which improves 
their health status, hence reducing the probability of a negative health outcome. 
The asymmetric information about the true or expected health status available to 
the individual leads to a decision not to purchase expensive health insurance 
coverage, which is perceived as actuarially unfavourable. Instead, the lower level of 
coverage is chosen by the rational individual, who prefers to exercise more and 
derive pleasure in the process, rather than pay more in health insurance 
premiums.
An interesting gender differential is observed in the expenditure 
patterns of males and females. According to Table 6.26, in the subsample of single 
person households not covered by any type of private health insurance, the 
proportion of females is 53.7%, which is lower than 58.6% of females among those 
with private health coverage. About 36% of all females in the sample are insured, 
which is higher than the corresponding 32% for males. Gender might also be one of 
the determinants of the PHI decision, as females might anticipate higher 
pregnancy-related costs and be more willing to take up private coverage. The data 
imply that for persons with positive total medical expenditure, median weekly 
expenditure of females with insurance is higher than the median weekly
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expenditure of males within the same insurance category ($8.2 compared to $6.2), 
while it is the opposite in the uninsured group ( $4.6 compared to $5.3). Females 
are more likely to represent the hit-and-run portion of the private health insurance 
pool, joining funds when the need for extra services arises, and leaving soon after.
When it comes to exercise, or at least to expenditure on exercise and 
fitness as reflected in the data, about 11% of female respondents in single person 
households reported positive levels of expenditure on sports and fitness, compared 
with almost 17% for males. For those females who do exercise, the median 
expenditure is the same whether insured or not, equal to $4.5 per week. 
Corresponding numbers for males are $7 for persons without private health 
insurance, and $7.5 for those who have some level of PHI coverage. It could be 
concluded that females either exercise less than males on average, or substitute 
cheaper alternatives like walking, jogging or aerobics at home for free, for paid 
sports activities. Age effect might also provide an explanation. If there are more 
females than males in the number of older age groups, as would be expected from 
the gender differentials in life expectancy, then the lower estimates of fitness 
expenditure for females on average are easy to explain.
Other activities like smoking and alcohol consumption influence health 
status and might also serve as an indicator for the degree of risk aversion of the 
persons in the sample. The HES 93 contains expenditure data on these items. The 
health effects of alcohol consumption have been found to be non-monotonous. Some 
studies found an inverse U-shape relationship between alcohol consumption and 
health status: moderate alcohol consumption is found to be positively correlated 
with physical and mental health90. The health effects of tobacco smoking are 
considered by modern medical science to be negative91. Smoking is used as a proxy 
for a lesser degree of risk aversion in a number of studies. Any insurance will be 
more likely to be purchased by a relatively more risk averse individual, so smoking 
could be expected to have a negative impact on the probability of a person reporting 
health insurance coverage. In the single person household subsample, the mean 
weekly expenditure on tobacco products is $6.1 for uninsured persons, which is
90 Cook and Moore (2000), pg. 1651.
91 Chaloupka and Warner (2000), pg. 1544-6.
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indeed higher than the $4.7 reported by persons with positive PHI contributions. 
About 29% of uninsured persons reported positive expenditure on tobacco products, 
compared with 22% for the insured. The median weekly expenditure of the 
uninsured smoker on tobacco was $18.7, compared to $17.5 for the insured smoker.
The age distribution of smokers in both genders, with or without PHI, is 
presented in Figure 6.8. It appears that men are over-represented in the middle 
age group, 25-45 years of age, and then the proportion reverses, with females 
predominant in the 65+ smokers’ group.
Figure 6. 8. Age distribution of single persons with positive 
expenditure on tobacco products: Gender differentials
16 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
14 .
1? ■
Age of household reference head
After breaking down the smokers’ data according to private health 
insurance status, it appears not only that fewer people smoke within the insured 
population, but they also spend less, and possibly smoke less than the uninsured. 
This is true for both males and females, as can be seen from Table 6.28. One 
interesting observation is that smoking males are far less likely to be privately 
insured than smoking females: only 22.4% of males in the single smokers’ 
subsample report positive expenditure on any kind of private health insurance,
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which is significantly lower than the corresponding proportion for the male 
population at large - 31.8%, reported in Table 6.26. It is also much lower than the 
proportion of smoking female respondents with some level of PHI coverage, 36.3%, 
which is exactly the proportion of insured among all single females in our sample. 
This allows the conclusion that smoking seems to be of more importance in 
explaining a private health insurance decision for males than for females, and 
there are also interactions with age.
From examining the data in Tables 6.29a and 6.29b, male smokers are 
clustered around 35-39 years age group, both for the insured and uninsured 
subsamples. Female smokers are more evenly spread across the age categories, 
with the highest proportion in the 55-65 age groups for the uninsured, and the over 
65 years of age groups for the insured.
The relationship between health insurance status and alcohol 
expenditure is complex and hard to interpret. Even so, the data suggest that 
persons without PHI coverage on average tend to spend more on beer and less on 
wine, both highly significant in a one-sample means T-test, than respondents in 
the insured group. The normal caveat concerning the question of whether alcohol 
expenditure reflects true alcohol consumption applies. If the health insurance 
choice is influenced by income and socio-economic status in general, then higher 
expenditure on wine by the insured group might be consistent with lifestyle. 
Relatively more disadvantaged groups might consume cheaper products, and the 
exact alcohol-equivalent intake is impossible to determine from the HES 93 data.
6.4.2. Analysis of Family Households Data
From the original sample of 6,496 households, 4,706 were identified as 
couples only, couples with children, and single parent families. Those records 
compose what will be further referred to as a family file. In the family subsample, 
51.6% reported some level of private health insurance coverage. About 7% of the 
families belong to the lowest income quintile according to the original ranking of all 
households, including single-person ones. About 23% of families fall into the 2nd 
and 4th quintiles, 21% into the middle quintile, and 26% into the highest. Re­
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ranking families by total income and, as before, excluding 47 observations with 
negative (30 observations) or zero total household income reported, new income 
quintiles are constructed. About 1% of observations are lost by excluding those 
households for whom the PHI rate is lower than the sample average (46.8% 
compared to 51.6%). Due to the low weight of excluded households, dropping them 
out from the analysis will not lead to a significant loss of information.
The lowest family income quintile reports total weekly income below $324, 
with median $268, the 2nd lowest ranges from $325 to $529 (median $415), the 3rd 
$530-$800 (median $659), the 4th $801-$ 1,139 (median $954), and the highest, 
fifth, quintile reports total weekly income from all sources in excess of $1,140 
(median $1,452). Using data on per-capita household income, the median weekly 
income per household member in the lowest total income quintile is $130, $164 for 
the second, $202 for the 3rd, $313 for the 4th, and $572 for the highest quintile (see 
Table 6.30).
The mean health insurance contribution for those families who report some 
level of private health insurance coverage is $26.7 per week. Repeating what was 
done for the singles subsample, finds the median contribution in the lowest tercile 
is between $14 and $15.5 a week across all income groups, the middle is about $28 
a week, and the highest tercile reports contributions of about $36 per week on some 
type of private health insurance coverage (Table 6.31).
As in the previously analysed case, it appears that the proportion of low 
income families decreases as the PHI contribution increases. Among families 
within the lowest PHI tercile, 15% belong to the lowest income quintile, and the 
proportion reduces to 10% within the most expensive PHI tercile. At the same time, 
the corresponding proportion of the top income quintile families rises from 22.5% to 
34%. Mean total medical expenditure of families increases with income and with 
the level of coverage purchased (see Table 6.32).
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Figure 6. 9. Major components of total health care expenditure 
excluding PHI contributions for insured families
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Figure 6. 10. Major components of total health care expenditure 
excluding PHI contributions for uninsured families
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By breaking down total medical expenditure into its components, it can be 
seen that insured families spend more on average on almost every item of medical 
expenditure for each income group. The exceptions are dental services, for which 
uninsured families in the three upper income quintiles spend more on average than 
those with PHI ($3.8 vs. $3.4 for the 3rd quintile, $4.2 vs. $3.9 for the 4th, and $5.4 
vs. $4.3 for the top quintile), and opticians’ fees which are higher on average for 
uninsured families in the 3rd and 5th quintiles than for their insured counterparts 
(see Table 6.33).
Comparing the relative importance of separate medical expenditure items in 
the total family medical bill (Figures 6.9 and 6.10), shows that the major 
expenditure item for both insured and uninsured households is non-prescription 
medicines. This item takes up to 29% of the uninsured family’s medical spending, 
and 24% for the family with some level of private health insurance. The second 
largest expenditure item for both insured and uninsured families is dental services 
(22.5% for uninsured families and 17.7% for families with PHI), followed by 
prescription drugs (14.4% for uninsured and 13.2% for insured). Specialists’ fees 
comprise a larger proportion of the family medical bill of insured households (11.3% 
compared to 6.2% for uninsured), while opticians fees are relatively more 
important for those uninsured (7.1% compared to 5.4% for families with PHI). 
Hospital charges represent less than 5% of the total medical bill of the average 
household with some level of PHI coverage.
The total medical expenditure of families who report positive consumption 
of medical care differs significantly between insured and uninsured groups. The 
mean expenditure, excluding private health insurance contributions, of the insured 
families reporting positive expenditure is $21.3, compared with mean expenditure 
of $14.3 for uninsured families with some level of medical spending. It appears that 
the presence of a medical condition in the family makes a difference for households 
without PHI. As Figure 6.11 suggests, mean medical expenditure for uninsured 
families containing a member with a health condition is higher than the medical 
expenditure of uninsured healthy households, yet it is still lower than the mean 
expenditure of a healthy insured family. Similar to the single person households 
case, medical expenditure within the insured group seems to be much less sensitive
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to the presence of a household member with a health condition. The variance of 
medical expenditure is also lower for the insured households with no health 
condition than for the uninsured healthy families.
Figure 6. 11. Logarithm of total medical expenditure by PHI status 
and health condition, families
Health condition
Yes
Private Health Insurance
The total medical expenditure of families depends on the number of family 
members, that is, on the number of dependant children in the household. It would 
be expected that families with more children would consume more medical care on 
average. Data presented in Table 6.34 suggest this is true for insured families. The 
median total medical spending increases by about $3 per week for the first 
dependent child, from $10.5 for a couple with no dependants to $13.7 for a family 
with one dependant aged under 20. Insured families with two dependants spend 
$15.3 per week, and, as the number of dependants increases to three or more, 
median medical spending increases to $17.7 per week. Families that do not report 
any level of private insurance coverage exhibit a different pattern. Median total 
medical expenditure actually decreases for families with one dependant compared 
with couples only, from $5.7 to $5.3. This could be explained by the age of the 
family members: couples without dependant children are older on average than
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parents with young children, thus the amount of medical care could be higher for 
the former. The medical expenditure of uninsured families increases on average as 
the number of dependants rises to 2, and then decreases when there are three or 
more dependants younger than 20 years of age in the household. One possible 
explanation might involve income effect: families with a large number of children 
are worse off in per capita income terms, hence they would tend to spend relatively 
less on medical services. It is worth noting that median expenditure on medical 
care for insured families is higher than for uninsured families with the same 
number of dependants. Insured couples spend 1.8 as much as uninsured couples 
when median expenditure is compared. The difference is more pronounced for 
families with dependants: the ratio of median total medical expenditure of insured 
compared to uninsured is 2.6 for families with one dependant, 2.1 for those with 
two dependants, and 2.8 for families with at least three dependants. It may be 
concluded that the number of children and insurance status have a significant 
influence on the amount of medical care purchased by families.
Taking expenditure on sports and fitness as a proxy for household 
health-improving activities, it is found that households without any level of PHI 
spend less than insured families (mean weekly expenditure of $5 compared to $9 
for insured). About 31% of uninsured families reported positive spending on fitness, 
compared with 40% of families with PHI coverage. Both numbers are significantly 
higher than the proportions derived previously for single person households (12.8% 
and 15% respectively). The median weekly expenditure on fitness for those who use 
paid sports facilities is $7 for uninsured families compared with $8 for insured 
(mean expenditure is $16.2 and $23). The same conclusion as in the singles 
analysis can be drawn: households with some level of private health insurance 
coverage tend to exercise more, or at least to purchase fitness services more often, 
than uninsured households, and also spend more on those activities.
Briefly repeating the steps of the previous analysis for single person 
households, it is found that mean expenditure on tobacco products of uninsured 
families is almost twice as high as that of insured. About 42% of family households 
without any level of PHI coverage contain at least one smoker, compared to 25% of 
insured families. The median weekly expenditure of families with at least one
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smoker on tobacco products is $23.6 for uninsured and $21.5 for insured families. 
The presence of PHI seems to be linked to lower smoking rates, but also to the 
lower expenditure on tobacco products. Positive expenditure on alcoholic beverages 
was reported by 57% of family households without insurance and 69% of insured 
families. As before, uninsured adult members of family households tend to consume 
more beer (median weekly expenditure of $8.2 vs. $7.1 for insured), and less wine 
(median $0 for uninsured compared to $2.2 for insured).
6.5. D is t r ib u t io n  o f  Me d ic a l , F i t n e s s  E x p e n d it u r e , a n d  I n c o m e
Crossectional data provided in the HES 93 makes it possible to test whether 
medical expenditure for those who incur it is lognormally distributed. This would 
be valuable evidence in support of the theoretical model of demand for medical 
care, developed in Chapter 5.
Analysing data for the 6,496 households originally selected as PHI decision 
units, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the hypothesis of lognormality (see 
Table 6.35 in the Appendix). This should not be surprising, because for a large 
sample size almost any goodness-of-fit test results in the rejection of the null 
hypothesis, so that exact normality cannot be expected in a sample of this size. 
What is of more interest is the departure from normal distribution, and this could 
be illustrated by the normal probability plots. A P-P normal probability plot is 
constructed by plotting expected cumulative normal probability against observed 
probability. A quantile-based Q-Q plot matches expected value from a normal 
distribution with the observed value. The expected value is calculated from the 
rank of an observed value and the sample size. The following normal probability 
plots were constructed using Blom’s transformation. If a sample is drawn from the 
normal distribution, the points of the P-P and Q-Q normal probability plots are 
clustered around a straight line.
By examining plots presented in Figures 6.12-6.17 in the Appendix, it can 
be seen that the logarithms of total income, medical expenditure and fitness 
expenditure are fairly well approximated by normal curves. Logarithm of total 
income has the most significant departures from the normal distribution at its 
tails. By observing fitted parameters of normal distribution in Table 6.35, it can be
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seen that fitness and medical expenditure estimated from the sample is 
remarkably close by distribution. This supports the probabilistic assumptions of 
the theoretical model of demand for medical care with endogenous probability of 
survival developed in Chapter 4, in particular the broad definition of medical care 
as an activity that improves one’s survival chances.
Total income and medical expenditure is positively correlated. The 
correlation coefficient is significant and equals to 0.2. Fitness expenditure is also 
positively correlated with income (coefficient 0.1) and with medical expenditure 
(coefficient 0.06). This is reflected in Table 6.36, while more detailed analysis for 
the households reporting positive total medical expenditure by PHI status is 
presented in Table 6.37. The results imply that correlations between 
medical/fitness expenditure and income are higher for uninsured households, yet 
are still very weak (within 0.15-0.18).
6.6. Co n c l u s io n
Private health insurance is an important part of the Australian health care 
system, and has been subject of growing attention, due to falhng membership rates 
and adverse changes in the quality of the insured pool over the last decade. For 
government policies aimed at revitalising the private health insurance market to 
be successful, it is necessary to identify the major determinants of private health 
insurance choice.
This chapter continues research into the determinants of the private health 
insurance decision, and the results are in line with findings from previous studies. 
The analysis is based on the 1993-94 Household Expenditure Survey, which was 
not used in the previous work on PHI determinants. The data was made available 
by the Australian Bureau of Statistics through the CURF arrangements with the 
ANU. Any results of the analysis of the data and views expressed hereafter are 
those of the author, and not necessarily those of the ABS. The major data 
limitation is lack of information on the type of coverage (single vs. family, or 
hospital vs. ancillary or both), so only those households for whom the insurance 
type could be derived unambiguously in respect of single/family classification are
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In this study, income is found to be the major determinant of the PHI 
decision. Half of the households without private health insurance coverage belong 
to the bottom two income quintiles, while more than half of insured households 
report incomes in the top two quintiles. Expenditure on private health insurance 
increases with income, with insured households in the upper quintile paying 
premiums almost twice the amount of premiums paid by the insured in the lowest 
quintile. Income is found to be an important determinant of both the decision to 
insure, and the level of coverage chosen.
Relevant to income is socio-economic disadvantage status, which is found to 
be directly related to the PHI choice. Among the households without private health 
insurance, the proportion of those in the lowest Seifa decile is 2.5 times higher than 
the relevant proportion calculated for the insured households. The least 
disadvantaged decile encompasses twice as high a proportion of insured households 
than uninsured. Correlated with both income and socio-economic status are the 
employment and occupation status of the head of household. The proportion of 
insured households with an unemployed member is almost three times lower than 
the corresponding figure for the households without PHI. A managerial and 
professional occupation of the head of household is linked to the increased 
likelihood of some level of PHI coverage. Private ownership of dwelling is strongly 
positively linked with the private health insurance decision, and a pensioner status 
has a negative effect on the decision to insure.
Age is another important determinant of the private health insurance 
decision. It is found that insured households are “older” than uninsured, that is, 
the age distribution within the insured households is skewed to the right compared 
to that of uninsured households. For single persons data, younger age has a 
significant negative effect on the probability of taking up private health insurance 
coverage. The results of the analysis also suggest there is a tendency for people in 
the oldest age groups to forgo private health insurance and fall back onto the public 
system, mainly due to income.
included in the analysis.
Family composition provides an additional factor in explaining the private
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health insurance choice. Couples with or without children are much more likely to 
have some type of PHI coverage compared to singles, while the single parent 
families are predominantly uninsured. Private education for children is found to be 
linked with the private health insurance choice, perhaps signalling a relatively 
higher weight attached to the private good, as opposed to its public substitute, in 
the household’s utility function.
Health status and the existence of a handicap have not been found to be 
significant in explaining the health insurance decision. In fact, relatively fewer 
insured households in the sample do contain a person with a health condition or a 
handicap, compared to the uninsured subsample. The relative insignificance of 
health status in explaining the PHI decision was confirmed in a number of 
previous studies based on the National Health Survey data.
Geographical region provides additional information for explaining the PHI 
decision, with residence in South Australia and Tasmania leading to a significant 
increase in the probability of being insured, and residence in Queensland being 
associated with lower odds for PHI. An overseas non-English speaking country of 
origin for a household head is linked to a lower chance of the household possessing 
any type of private health insurance coverage.
Smoking seems to be a good proxy for risk aversion on the households level, 
with households reporting positive expenditure on tobacco being less likely to 
insure than non-smoking households. At the same time, the effect of smoking is 
insignificant on an individual level when a gender variable is included. An 
interesting result is found for females: their decision to smoke seems to be 
separable from their decision to purchase private health insurance. The proportion 
of insured among female smokers is equal to the average for all females, while 
insurance rates for smoking males are much lower than the average for all males. 
There are also age differentials between smokers of both genders, with male 
smokers concentrated in the younger age groups compared with female smokers.
Alcohol consumption has a more complex relationship with a PHI decision. 
This study has found that consumption of wine is significantly higher for insured 
households compared to uninsured, but no explanations are provided for this
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result.
Extensive expenditure data provided in HES 93 made it possible to analyse 
detailed medical expenditure items for both insured and uninsured households. It 
appears that, at any income level, persons with PHI spend more on general 
practitioners and specialists. Opticians fees represent a larger proportion of the 
total medical bill for uninsured than for insured. Hospital charges for uninsured in 
the highest income quintiles are higher than those for insured, representing cases 
of self-insured patients choosing to use private hospitals. In general, households 
with some level of PHI coverage are found to spend more on medical care than 
uninsured households. The presence of a health condition is linked to an increase 
in medical spending for the uninsured, while no significant difference is observed 
within the insured group. Total current medical expenditure used as a proxy for a 
future expenditure is found to be a significant factor in the PHI decision.
Health-improving activities measured by total expenditure on fitness and 
sports-related activities are found to be of lesser significance in explaining the PHI 
choice. An interesting finding relates to persons in the top income quintile, for 
whom fitness expenditure is inversely related to the amount of PHI contribution. It 
can be concluded that younger healthier people choose to invest in their health by 
purchasing more exercise rather than more comprehensive health coverage. There 
are gender differentials in both medical and fitness expenditure: females are found 
to be spending more on medical care when insured, compared to males, and 
spending less on fitness.
Tests for lognormality of income, medical expenditure and fitness 
expenditure were conducted as part of this study. Departures from lognormality 
are found to be slight, and a theoretical assumption about lognormality of income 
and medical expenditure used in the model of demand for medical care developed 
in Chapter 5 seems justified by the data. It is also of interest that fitness and 
medical expenditure are close in distribution, hence a wider concept of medical care 
as an investment into health capital formation used in Chapter 4 finds its support 
in the data. Chapter 7 continues analysis of the 1993-94 HES data and offers 
econometric models which are based on the theory developed in Chapter 5.
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Ap p e n d ix
Table 6. 1. Mean Number of Persons in the Households with/without 
PHI by Age Group92
Number of persons in household
N Mean
Private Health 
Insurance
Private Health 
Insurance
No Yes No Yes
aged under 2 3453 3043 0.094 0.085
aged 2 to 4 3453 3043 .16 .15
aged 5 to 12 3453 3043 .40 .38
aged 13 to 14 3453 3043 0.083 0.076
aged 15 to 17 3453 3043 0.082 0.098
aged 18 to 19 3453 3043 0.027 0.025
aged 20 to 24 3453 3043 .11 0.063
aged 25 to 44 3453 3043 .79 .89
aged 45 to 54 • 3453 3043 .19 .31
aged 55 to 59 3453 3043 0.083 .11
aged 60 to 64 3453 3043 0.081 .13
aged 65 to 74 3453 3043 .18 .20
aged 74 and over 3453 3043 .11 0.076
Valid N (listwise) 3453 3043
92 Source: Households file
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Table 6. 2. Age distribution (persons 15 y.o. and older) of the 
households by private insurance coverage93
Frequency Percent Valid Percent CumulativePercent
Private Health 
Insurance
Private Health 
Insurance
Private Health 
Insurance
Priva te Health 
nsurance
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
V
al
id
15 to 19 years 376 376 6.6 6.5 6.6 6.5 6.6 6.5
20 to 24 years 376 193 6.6 3.3 6.6 3.3 13.2 9.8
25 to 29 years 654 469 11.5 8.1 11.5 8.1 24.6 17.9
30 to 34 years 831 765 14.6 13.2 14.6 13.2 39.2 31.1
35 to 39 years 739 754 12.9 13.0 12.9 13.0 52.1 44.2
40 to 44 years 515 720 9.0 12.4 9.0 12.4 61.1 56.6
45 to 49 years 384 570 6.7 9.8 6.7 9.8 67.9 66.4
50 to 54 years 269 385 4.7 6.6 4.7 6.6 72.6 73.1
55 to 59 years 287 326 5.0 5.6 5.0 5.6 77.6 78.7
60 to 64 years 279 382 4.9 6.6 4.9 6.6 82.5 85.3
65 to 69 years 302 342 5.3 5.9 5.3 5.9 87.8 91.2
70 to 74 years 322 279 5.6 4.8 5.6 4.8 93.4 96.0
75 to 79 years 211 130 3.7 2.2 3.7 2.2 97.1 98.3
80 to 84 years 119 71 2.1 1.2 2.1 1.2 99.2 99.5
85 and over years 45 29 .8 .5 .8 .5 100.0 100.0
Total 5709 5791 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
93 Source: Persons file
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Table 6. 3. Private Health Insurance by State (Source: Persons file)
PHI Total
No Yes
Count 1504 1490 2994
New South % within State 50.2% 49.8% 100.0%
Wales % within Private Health Insurance 26.3% 25.7% 26.0%
% of Total 13.1% 13.0% 26.0%
Count 1271 1182 2453
Victoria % within State 51.8% 48.2% 100.0%% within Private Health Insurance 22.3% 20.4% 21.3%
% of Total 11.1% 10.3% 21.3%
Count 876 708 1584
Queensland % within State 55.3% 44.7% 100.0%% within Private Health Insurance 15.3% 12.2% 13.8%
% of Total 7.6% 6.2% 13.8%
Count 446 544 990
South Australia % within State 45.1% 54.9% 100.0%% within Private Health Insurance 7.8% 9.4% 8.6%
% of Total 3.9% 4.7% 8.6%
Count 466 487 953
Western % within State 48.9% 51.1% 100.0%
Australia % within Private Health Insurance 8.2% 8.4% 8.3%
% of Total 4.1% 4.2% 8.3%
Count 470 636 1106
Tasmania % within State 42.5% 57.5%
100.0%
% within Private Health Insurance 8.2% 11.0% 9.6%
% of Total 4.1% 5.5% 9.6%
Count 396 443 839
Northern % within State 47.2% 52.8% 100.0%
Territory % within Private Health Insurance 6.9% 7.6% 7.3%
% of Total 3.4% 3.9% 7.3%
Count 280 301 581
Australian % within State 48.2% 51.8% 100.0%<DCapital Territory % within Private Health Insurance 4.9% 5.2% 5.1%
% of Total 2.4% 2.6% 5.1%
Count 5709 5791 11500Total % of Total 49.6% 50.4% 100.0%
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Table 6. 4. Tenure of Dwelling by PHI Status94
Frequency Percent CumulativePercent
Private Health 
Insurance
Private Health 
Insurance
Private Health 
Insurance
No Yes No Yes No Yes
V
al
id
Owner 1094 1428 31.7 46.9 31.7 46.9
Purchaser 847 1081 24.5 35.5 56.2 82.5
Renting dwelling from state or 
territory housing authority -  
furnished
19 14 0.6 0.5 56.8 82.9
Renting dwelling from state or 
territory housing authority -  
unfurnished
473 87 13.7 2.9 70.5 85.8
Renting dwelling from other 
landlord - Furnished 192 55 5.6 1.8 76.0 87.6
Renting dwelling from other 
landlord -  Unfurnished 712 312 20.6 10.3 96.6 97.8
Living in the dwelling rent -  
free 116 66 3.4 2.2 100.0 100.0
Total 3453 3043 100.0 100.0
94 Source: Households file
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Table 6. 5. Dwelling structure classification 95
Frequency Percent CumulativePercent
Private Health 
Insurance
Private Health 
Insurance
Private Health 
Insurance
No Yes No Yes No Yes
V
al
id
Separate house 2461 2535 71.3 83.3 71.3 83.3
Semi-detached/row or terrace 
house/townhouse: One storey 274 155 7.9 5.1 79.2 88.4
Semi-detached/row or terrace 
house/townhouse: Two or more st 89 73 2.6 2.4 81.8 90.8
Flat attached to house 28 4 .8 .1 82.6 90.9
Other flat/unit/apartment: One or 
two storeys 383 150 11.1 4.9 93.7 95.9
Other flat/unit/apartment: Three 
storeys 135 74 3.9 2.4 97.6 98.3
Other flat/unit/apartment: Four or 
more storeys 41 36 1.2 1.2 98.8 99.5
Caravan 16 4 .5 .1 99.2 99.6
Houseboat, Improvised 
home/campers out, House/flat 
attached
26 12 .8 .4 100.0 100.0
Total 3453 3043 100.0 100.0
95 Source: Households file
195
Table 6. 6. Seifa of relative socio-economic disadvantage - decile - 
Australia96
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Private Health Private Health Private Health
Insurance Insurance Insurance
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Lowest 10% 503 173 14.6 5.7 14.6 5.7
Second decile 395 219 11.4 7.2 26.0 12.9
Third decile 392 239 11.4 7.9 37.4 20.7
Fourth decile 356 269 10.3 8.8 47.7 29.6
Fifth decile 320 322 9.3 10.6 56.9 40.2
Sixth decile 336 309 9.7 10.2 66.7 50.3
Seventh decile 287 303 8.3 10.0 75.0 60.3
Eighth decile 331 317 9.6 10.4 84.6 70.7
Ninth decile 290 415 8.4 13.6 93.0 84.3
Highest 10% 243 477 7.0 15.7 100.0 100.0
V
al
id
Total 3453 3043 100.0 100.0
96 Source: Households file
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Table 6. 7. Occupation of household reference person by PHI 
status97
Frequency Percent Valid Percent CumulativePercent
Private
Health
Insurance
Private Health 
Insurance
Private Health 
Insurance
Private
Health
Insurance
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Managers and 
administrators 221 441 11.6 19.2 11.6 19.2 11.6 19.2
Professionals 261 515 13.7 22.4 13.7 22.4 25.3 41.5
Para-professionals 127 210 6.7 9.1 6.7 9.1 32.0 50.7
Tradespersons 335 314 17.6 13.6 17.6 13.6 49.6 64.3
Clerks 243 323 12.8 14.0 12.8 14.0 62.3 78.3
Sales persons and 
personal service workers 243 199 12.8 8.6 12.8 8.6 75.1 87.0
Plant and machine 
operators and drivers 194 158 10.2 6.9 10.2 6.9 85.3 93.8
Labourers and related 
workers 280 140 14.7 6.1 14.7 6.1 100.0 99.9
Inadequately described 2 .1 .1 100.0
V
al
id
Total 1904 2302 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
97 Source: Households file, subsample of non-zero occupation
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Table 6. 8. Country of birth of household reference head by PHI 
status98
Frequency Percent Valid Percent CumulativePercent
Private Health 
Insurance
Private Health 
Insurance
Private Health 
Insurance
Private Health 
Insurance
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Australia 2381 2331 69.0 76.6 69.0 76.6 69.0 76.6
Other Oceania and 
Antarctica 99 61 2.9 2.0 2.9 2.0 71.8 78.6
Europe and the former 
USSR 689 496 20.0 16.3 20.0 16.3 91.8 94.9
Middle East and North 
Africa 49 17 1.4 .6 1.4 .6 93.2 95.5
Southeast Asia 99 45 2.9 1.5 2.9 1.5 96.1 96.9
Northeast Asia 50 25 1.4 .8 1.4 .8 97.5 97.8
Southern Asia 34 26 1.0 .9 1.0 .9 98.5 98.6
Northern America 7 14 .2 .5 .2 .5 98.7 99.1
South America, Central 
America and the 
Caribbean
22 7 .6 .2 .6 .2 99.3 99.3
Africa (excluding North 
Africa) 23 21 .7 .7 .7 .7 100.0 100.0
V
al
id
Total 3453 3043 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
98 Source: Households file
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Table 6. 9. Household type by PHI status (Source: Households file)
Private Health
Insurance Total
No Yes
Count 1176 614 1790
Person Hving % within Household type (pso) 65.7% 34.3% 100.0%
alone % within Private Health Insurance 34.1% 20.2% 27.6%
% of Total 18.1% 9.5% 27.6%
Count 903 1198 2101
Couple only % within Household type (pso) 43.0% 57.0% 100.0%
% within Private Health Insurance 26.2% 39.4% 32.3%
% of Total 13.9% 18.4% 32.3%
Couple with Count 68 131 199
children aged % within Household type (pso) 34.2% 65.8% 100.0%
15 or more % within Private Health Insurance 2.0% 4.3% 3.1%
only % of Total 1.0% 2.0% 3.1%
Couple with Count 830 882 1712
children aged % within Household type (pso) 48.5% 51.5% 100.0%
less than 15 % within Private Health Insurance 24.0% 29.0% 26.4%
only % of Total 12.8% 13.6% 26.4%
Couple with
unmarried
children
Count 118 144 262
% within Household type (pso) 45.0% 55.0% 100.0%
% within Private Health Insurance 3.4% 4.7% 4.0%
% of Total 1.8% 2.2% 4.0%
One parent Count 42 17 59
one family % within Household type (pso) 71.2% 28.8% 100.0%
with children % within Private Health Insurance 1.2% .6% .9%
aged 15 or 
more only % of Total .6% .3% .9%
One parent Count 278 47 325
one family % within Household type (pso) 85.5% 14.5% 100.0%
oCO with children % within Private Health Insurance 8.1% 1.5% 5.0%
3
a>a
aged less than 
15 only % of Total 4.3% .7% 5.0%
-u One parent Count 38 10 48
<o one family % within Household type (pso) 79.2% 20.8% 100.0%
with % within Private Health Insurance 1.1% .3% 7%
1
unmarried
children % of Total .6% .2% 7%
Total Count 3453 3043 6496
% within Household type (pso) 53.2% 46.8% 100.0%
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Table 6. 10. Total income from all sources by income quintile and by 
PHI status"
Total household 
income from all 
sources, $/week
Private Health Insurance
No Yes
Minimum Median Maximum Minimum Median Maximum
Q
ui
nt
ile
s 
of
 
to
ta
l 
in
co
m
e ]st 1 166 2 4 7 1 16 7 2 4 7
2nd 2 4 8 3 0 6 4 0 5 2 4 8 3 0 9 4 0 5
3 rd 4 0 6 51 1 6 5 8 4 0 7 5 2 9 6 5 8
4th 6 5 9 8 0 3 1012 6 5 9 8 2 3 1012
5 th 1 0 1 3 1 2 5 0 6 8 3 7 1 0 1 3 1 3 4 7 9 0 7 8
Table 6. 11. Percentage of households covered by PHI within the 
income quintile groups100
Private Health Insurance
No Yes
Count Row % Col % Count Row % Col %
Q
ui
nt
ile
s 
of
 
To
ta
l
H
ou
se
ho
ld
In
co
m
e
]_st 9 4 5 72.6% 2 7 .4 % 3 5 6 2 7 .4 % 11 .7%
2nd 8 7 7 6 7 .7 % 2 5 .4 % 4 1 8 3 2 .3 % 13 .7%
3 rd 7 3 5 5 6 .5% 2 1 .3 % 5 6 7 4 3 .5 % 18 .6%
4th 5 1 9 4 0 .0 % 15 .0% 7 8 0 6 0 .0 % 2 5 .6 %
5th 3 7 7 2 9 .0 % 10.9% 9 2 2 7 1 .0 % 3 0 .3 %
99 Source: Subsample of households with positive total income from all sources.
100 Source: Subsample of households with positive income from all sources
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Table 6. 12. Private health insurance contributions by income
quintile groups101
PHI expenc iture
Minimum Median Maximum Percentile25
Percentile
75 Mean
Q
ui
nt
ile
s 
of
 
To
ta
l
H
ou
se
ho
ld
In
co
m
e
1st 1.13 17.08 58.56 11.51 24.50 18.67
2nd .69 20.95 52.61 14.00 29.55 21.93
3rd 1.32 23.03 55.03 15.00 32.24 23.41
4th .46 25.33 61.00 15.48 33.50 24.48
5th 2.00 28.55 82.00 21.00 34.54 27.78
Table 6. 13. Whether household contains persons with health 
conditions, by PHI status102
Frequency Percent Valid Percent CumulativePercent
Private
Health
Insurance
Private
Health
Insurance
Private
Health
Insurance
Private
Health
Insurance
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
V
al
id
Household has person with 
health condition 1454 1183 42.1 38.9 42.1 38.9 42.1 38.9
Household does not have 
person with health 
condition
1999 1860 57.9 61.1 57.9 61.1 100.0 100.0
Total 3453 3043 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
101 Subsample of households with positive income from all sources
102 Source: Households file
201
Table 6. 14. Number of persons with handicap aged 15 and over in 
the households, by PHI status103
Frequency Percent Valid Percent CumulativePercent
Private Health 
Insurance
Private Health 
Insurance
Private Health 
Insurance
Private Health 
Insurance
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
V
al
id
0 3076 2782 89.1 91.4 89.1 91.4 89.1 91.4
1 356 241 10.3 7.9 10.3 7.9 99.4 99.3
2 21 20 .6 .7 .6 .7 100.0 100.0
Total 3453 3043 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 6. 15. Principal source of gross household income by health 
condition within the household 104
Frequency Percent Valid Percent CumulativePercent
Whet' 1er household contains persons with health conditions
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Wage and salary 982 2443 37.2 63.3 37.2 63.3 37.2 63.3
Self-employed 139 348 5.3 9.0 5.3 9.0 42.5 72.3
Superannuation 106 66 4.0 1.7 4.0 1.7 46.5 74.0
Investment 121 152 4.6 3.9 4.6 3.9 51.1 78.0
Other private income 7 21 .3 .5 .3 .5 51.4 78.5
Pensions 754 326 28.6 8.4 28.6 8.4 80.0 87.0
Sole parent benefit 135 158 5.1 4.1 5.1 4.1 85.1 91.1
»
Newstart/Job Search 
allowance 114 184 4.3 4.8 4.3 4.8 89.4 95.8CÖ
> Sickness allowance 22 j 5 .8 .1 .8 .1 90.3 96.0
Veteran's affairs 
pension 183 64 6.9 1.7 6.9 1.7 97.2 97.6
Family payments 18 33 .7 .9 .7 .9 97.9 98.5
Other government 
benefits 39 41 1.5 1.1 1.5 1.1 99.4 99.5
No income 17 18 .6 .5 .6 .5 100.0 100.0
Total 2637 3859 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
103 Source: Households file.
104 Source: Households file
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Table 6. 16. Age distribution (persons 15 y.o. and older) within households 
by presence of health condition for one of the household members105
Frequency Percent Valid Percent CumulativePercent
Whether househo d contains persons with health conditions
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
V
al
id
15 to 19 years 266 486 5.8 7.0 5.8 7.0 5.8 7.0
20 to 24 years 146 423 3.2 6.1 3.2 6.1 9.0 13.2
25 to 29 years 272 851 5.9 12.3 5.9 12.3 14.9 25.5
30 to 34 years 433 1163 9.4 16.8 9.4 16.8 24.3 42.3
35 to 39 years 461 1032 10.0 14.9 10.0 14.9 34.4 57.3
40 to 44 years 420 815 9.1 11.8 9.1 11.8 43.5 69.1
45 to 49 years 330 624 7.2 9.0 7.2 9.0 50.7 78.1
50 to 54 years 280 374 6.1 5.4 6.1 5.4 56.8 83.5
55 to 59 years 322 291 7.0 4.2 7.0 4.2 63.8 87.7
60 to 64 years 367 294 8.0 4.3 8.0 4.3 71.8 92.0
65 to 69 years 411 233 8.9 3.4 8.9 3.4 80.7 95.4
70 to 74 years 418 183 9.1 2.6 9.1 2.6 89.8 98.0
75 to 79 years 261 80 5.7 1.2 5.7 1.2 95.5 99.2
80 to 84 years 143 47 3.1 .7 3.1 .7 98.6 99.8
85 and over 
years 63 11 1.4 .2 1.4 .2 100.0 100.0
Total 4593 6907 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
105 Source: Persons file
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Table 6. 17. Households mean and median health insurance contributions
by income quintiles and PHI terciles106
Terciles of PHI contribution
1 2 3
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Q
ui
nt
ile
s 
of
 
to
ta
l 
in
co
m
e ]st PHI contribution 12.08 12.66 23.75 23.43 36.94 34.54
2nd PHI contribution 12.44 12.66 23.94 23.64 36.11 35.42
3rd PHI contribution 12.16 12.20 24.30 24.41 35.50 34.54
4th PHI contribution 11.65 11.82 24.63 24.91 36.38 35.00
5th PHI contribution 11.84 11.63 25.02 25.33 36.73 35.00
Table 6. 18. Mean and median weekly income from all sources for 
single-person households by income quintile107
Count Col % Mean Median
Q
ui
nt
ile
s 
of 
to
ta
l 
in
co
m
e 
wi
th
in
 
si
ng
le
s
1st Total household income from 
all sources 329 18.7% 134 157
2 nd Total household income from all sources 374 21.2% 171 170
3rd Total household income from all sources 353 20.0% 234 232
4th Total household income from 
all sources 353 20.0% 438 435
5th Total household income from all sources 352 20.0% 893 777
106 Source: Households file, negative income excluded, expenditure on private health 
insurance positive.
107 Source: single person households file, negative income excluded.
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Table 6. 19. Mean and median private health insurance contribution
by income quintile and PHI tercile108
PHI contribution Quintile of total income from all sources1 2 3 4 5
Te
rc
ile
 
of 
PH
I 
co
nt
ri
bu
tio
n
]st
Count 27 33 37 48 56
% within PHI 13.4% 16.4% 18.4% 23.9% 27.9%
Mean 7.97 8.90 8.25 8.18 8.33
Median 8.56 9.44 9.21 9.06 9.47
% within Income 40.3% 42.9% 31.4% 33.8% 28.1%
2nd
Count 17 26 38 46 75
% within PHI 8.4% 12.9% 18.8% 22.8% 37.1%
Mean 15.37 14.95 14.80 15.18 15.00
Median 15.66 15.09 14.94 15.31 15.20
% within Income 25.4% 33.8% 32.2% 32.4% 37.7%
3rd
Count 23 18 43 48 68
% within PHI 11.5% 9.0% 21.5% 24.0% 34.0%
Mean 20.61 18.82 20.01 21.46 22.40
Median 19.27 18.50 18.96 20.00 19.65
% within Income 34.3% 23.4% 36.4% 33.8% 34.2%
108 Source: Single person households file, positive PHI contribution, negative incomes 
excluded.
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Table 6. 20. Mean medical expenditure of single person households
by income quintile and PHI status109
Private Health 
Insurance
No Yes
Mean Mean
cy's Hospital, medical and dental insurance .00 14.19
Ambulance insurance .09 .22
Sickness and personal accident insurance .08 .03
General practitioners fees .07 .14
Specialists fees .09 1.23
Dental fees .36 1.51
Opticians fees 1.10 .79
Practitioners fees other .12 .45
Hospital charges .00 .51
Prescriptions 1.10 1.381 Pain relievers .26 .14
Ointments .19 .16
Proprietary medicines other .80 .84
Tablets and creams other .17 .63
Surgical dressing .05 .18
Therapeutic appliances .00 .00
Pharmaceutical products other .09 .10
Medicines undefined .04 .00
Health charges other .05 .06
Hire of therapeutic appliances .00 .00
Hospital, medical and dental insurance .00 13.46
Ambulance insurance .12 .14
Sickness and personal accident insurance .04 .05
General practitioners fees .05 .07
Specialists fees .43 .89
Dental fees .42 1.53
Opticians fees .64 1.23
Practitioners fees other .20 .82
Hospital charges .28 .64
Prescriptions 1.24 1.51Z
Pain relievers .34 .23
Ointments .23 .82
Proprietary medicines other 1.01 1.83
Tablets and creams other .28 .56
Surgical dressing .23 .07
Therapeutic appliances .06 .03
Pharmaceutical products other .04 .36
Medicines undefined .04 .33
Health charges other .11 .16
Hire of therapeutic appliances .00 .00
3 Hospital, medical and dental insurance .00 14.52
Ambulance insurance .13 .23
109 Source: Single persons file, negative income excluded.
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Sickness and personal accident insurance .14 .05
General practitioners fees .10 .19
Specialists fees .14 .70
Dental fees .52 1.53
Opticians fees .37 .34
Practitioners fees other .12 .25
Hospital charges .02 .40
Prescriptions 1.21 1.17
Pain relievers .20 .30
Ointments .40 .77
Proprietary medicines other .90 1.41
Tablets and creams other .21 .30
Surgical dressing .12 .17
Therapeutic appliances .00 .00
Pharmaceutical products other .00 .00
Medicines undefined .01 .22
Health charges other .13 .08
Hire of therapeutic appliances .00 .00
Hospital, medical and dental insurance .00 14.74
Ambulance insurance .17 .21
Sickness and personal accident insurance .42 .90
General practitioners fees .29 .51
Specialists fees .28 1.36
Dental fees 1.58 2.24
Opticians fees .36 1.15
Practitioners fees other .38 .32
Hospital charges .20 2.61
Prescriptions .80 1.634
Pain relievers .24 .26
Ointments .16 .48
Proprietary medicines other .83 1.54
Tablets and creams other .06 .79
Surgical dressing .11 .11
Therapeutic appliances .00 .07
Pharmaceutical products other .12 .18
Medicines undefined .07 .07
Health charges other .00 .08
Hire of therapeutic appliances .00 .00
5 Hospital, medical and dental insurance .00 15.75
Ambulance insurance .14 .18
Sickness and personal accident insurance 1.22 1.45
General practitioners fees .41 .55
Specialists fees .80 1.01
Dental fees 3.85 3.47
Opticians fees .87 1.06
Practitioners fees other .65 .99
Hospital charges .98 .61
Prescriptions .56 1.63
Pain relievers .13 .23
Ointments .24 .48
Proprietary medicines other .87 1.52
Tablets and creams other .28 .58
Surgical dressing .06 .13
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Therapeutic appliances .07 .00
Pharmaceutical products other .05 .06
Medicines undefined .00 .39
Health charges other .00 .00
Hire of therapeutic appliances .00 .00
Table 6. 21. Mean expenditure on medical items by PHI status110
Private Health Insurance
No Yes
Mean Mean
Hospital, medical and dental insurance .00 14.82
Ambulance insurance .13 .20
Sickness and personal accident insurance .30 .71
General practitioners fees .16 .36
Specialists fees .31 1.04
Dental fees 1.10 2.35
Opticians fees .67 .93
Practitioners fees other .26 .61
Hospital charges .24 1.03
Prescriptions 1.03 1.50
Pain relievers .25 .24
Ointments .25 .54
Proprietary medicines other .89 1.46
Tablets and creams other .20 .58
Surgical dressing .12 .13
Therapeutic appliances .02 .02
Pharmaceutical products other .06 .12
Medicines undefined .03 .23
Health charges other .06 .06
Hire of therapeutic appliances .00 .00
110 Single person households file.
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Table 6. 22. Total medical expenditure of single person households
by income quintile and PHI contribution tercile111
Total medical expenditure Tercile of PHI contribution
1 2 3
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Q
ui
nt
ile
s 
of
 
to
ta
l 
in
co
m
e 
fro
m 
al
l 
so
ur
ce
s
pt 8.94 4.95 9.77 5.77 12.35 7.67
2 nd 14.64 7.29 11.82 7.55 9.21 4.47
3rd 16.04 6.80 9.24 5.15 10.77 6.26
4 th 15.95 13.12 12.03 5.57 18.02 10.75
5 th 13.81 6.61 18.20 7.03 18.03 10.51
Table 6. 23. Age category of a person in the single person household, 
by income quintile and PHI contribution tercile112
Age of household 
reference head
Tercile of PHI contribution
1 2 3
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Quintiles 
of income
1st 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 2
2 nd 1 2 13 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1
3rd 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2
4 th 6 6 9 8 8 9
5 th 6 5 6 6 7 7
111 Source: Single person households file, negative income excluded, positive total medical 
expenditure reported, insured households only.
112 Source: Single person households file, negative income excluded, positive total medical 
expenditure reported, insured households only.
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Table 6. 24. Mean expenditure of single person households with PHI
coverage on sports and fitness by income quintile and PHI tercile 113
Terciles o] PHI contribution
1 2 3
Mean Mean Mean
Q
ui
nt
ile
s 
of
 
to
ta
l 
in
co
m
e 1 Total sports and fitness expenditure .26 .15 .87
2 Total sports and fitness expenditure .24 .10 .15
3 Total sports and fitness expenditure .34 .32 2.72
4 Total sports and fitness expenditure 2.23 .85 4.32
5 Total sports and fitness expenditure 8.88 6.34 2.36
Table 6. 25. Mean and median expenditure on sports and fitness by 
single person households with PHI coverage and positive level of fitness 
expenditure, by income quintile and PHI tercile114
Total sports and fitness 
expenditure
Terciles of PHI contribution
1 2 3
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Q
ui
nt
ile
s 
of
 
to
ta
l 
in
co
m
e Jst 3.48 3.48 2.50 2.50 10.00 10.00
2nd 1.57 1.98 2.50 2.50 2.75 2.75
3rd 4.23 2.50 4.00 3.00 19.49 8.25
4th 8.24 3.75 7.80 1.00 20.74 4.75
5th 49.75 10.25 25.02 12.00 14.62 6.00
113 Source: Single person households, negative income excluded, insured households only.
114 Single person households, negative income excluded, insured households only, positive 
expenditure on sports and fitness only.
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Table 6. 26. Private Health Insurance by Sex of household
reference head Crosstabulation 115
Sex of household reference 
head Total
Male Female
<x> Count 545 631 1176
Ö
CO$-i
3 No
% within Private Health 
Insurance 46.3% 53.7% 100.0%CO
Ö % within Sex of household 68.2% 63.7% 65.7%
X. reference head
« Count 254 360 614<u
% within Private Health 41.4% 58.6% 100.0%<X>•+J Yes Insurance
cd>
S
a*
% within Sex of household 
reference head 31.8% 36.3% 34.3%
Count 799 991 1790
% within Private Health 44.6% 55.4% 100.0%Total Insurance
% within Sex of household 
reference head 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
115 Source: Single person households file
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Table 6. 27. Mean and median expenditure on sports and fitness by
PHI status and by sex116
Sex of household reference head
Male Female
Mean Median Mean Median
Private Health 
Insurance
No Total sports and fitness expenditure 22.74 7.00 13.63 4.50
Yes Total sports and fitness expenditure 23.65 7.50 9.57 4.50
Table 6. 28. Mean and median weekly expenditure of single smokers 
on tobacco products by sex and PHI status117
Private Health Insurance
No Yes
Tobacco
products
Tobacco
products
Sex of household reference 
head
Male
Mean 22.53 24.77
Median 19.84 21.94
% within PHI 58.2% 41.3%
% within Sex 77.6% 22.4%
Count 198 57
Female
Mean 19.44 18.46
Median 18.20 16.70
% within PHI 41.8% 58.7%
% within Sex 63.7% 36.3%
Count 142 81
116 Source: Single person households file, subsample with positive fitness expenditure.
117 Source: Single person households file, positive expenditure on tobacco only.
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Table 6.29. a. Age distribution of single persons who smoke for both 
genders: No Private Health Insurance
Sex of household reference head
Male Female
Count Col % Row % Count Col % Row%
<20 years 7 3.5% 50.0% 7 4.9% 50.0%
20-24 years 16 8.1% 47.1% 18 12.7% 52.9%
25-29 years 23 11.6% 74.2% 8 5.6% 25.8%
30-34 years 25 12.6% 69.4% 11 7.7% 30.6%
35-39 years 26 13.1% 70.3% 11 7.7% 29.7%
40-44 years 22 11.1% 71.0% 9 6.3% 29.0%
Age of household 
reference head
45-49 years 14 7.1% 58.3% 10 7.0% 41.7%
50-54 years 14 7.1% 77.8% 4 2.8% 22.2%
55-59 years 9 4.5% 39.1% 14 9.9% 60.9%
60-64 years 9 4.5% 36.0% 16 11.3% 64.0%
65-69 years 14 7.1% 53.8% 12 8.5% 46.2%
70-74 years 5 2.5% 29.4% 12 8.5% 70.6%
75-79 years 9 4.5% 52.9% 8 5.6% 47.1%
80-84 years 4 2.0% 80.0% 1 .7% 20.0%
>85 years 1 .5% 50.0% 1 .7% 50.0%
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Table 6.29. b. Age distribution of single persons who smoke for both 
genders: Private Health Insurance Yes
Sex of household reference head
Male Female
Count Col % Row % Count Col % Row%
<20 years 1 1.2% 100.0%
20-24 years 1 1.8% 14.3% 6 7.4% 85.7%
25-29 years 6 10.5% 42.9% 8 9.9% 57.1%
30-34 years 8 14.0% 50.0% 8 9.9% 50.0%
35-39 years 11 19.3% 61.1% 7 8.6% 38.9%
40-44 years 6 10.5% 42.9% 8 9.9% 57.1%
45-49 years 7 12.3% 53.8% 6 7.4% 46.2%
Age of household 
reference head
50-54 years 5 8.8% 55.6% 4 4.9% 44.4%
55-59 years 6 10.5% 75.0% 2 2.5% 25.0%
60-64 years 1 1.8% 11.1% 8 9.9% 88.9%
65-69 years 5 8.8% 45.5% 6 7.4% 54.5%
70-74 years 9 11.1% 100.0%
75-79 years 4 4.9% 100.0%
80-84 years 1 1.8% 33.3% 2 2.5% 66.7%
>85 years 2 2.5% 100.0%
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Table 6. 30. Mean and median weekly total and per capita income
from all sources for family households by income quintile118
f ■
Count Col % Mean Median
Q
ui
nt
ile
s 
of 
in
co
m
e 
w
ith
in
 
fa
m
ily
 
fil
e
1 Total household income from all sources 930 20.0% 244 268Per capita household income 930 20.0% 110 130
2 Total household income from all sources 933 20.0% 421 415Per capita household income 933 20.0% 158 164
3 Total household income from all sources 935 20.1% 661 659Per capita household income 935 20.1% 228 202
4 Total household income from all sources 927 19.9% 960 954Per capita household income 927 19.9% 342 313
5 Total household income from all sources 934 20.0% 1630 1452Per capita household income 934 20.0% 585 572
Table 6. 31. Mean and median private health insurance contribution 
of families, by income quintile and PHI tercile119
Terciles of PHI contribution
1 2 3
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Q
ui
nt
ile
s 
of
 
in
co
m
e 
w
ith
in
 
fa
m
ili
es
1 PHI contribution 15.13 16.03 27.54 27.63 37.42 35.46
2 PHI contribution 14.38 13.82 27.65 27.75 37.41 35.92
3 PHI contribution 14.14 13.91 27.89 28.13 36.85 35.50
4 PHI contribution 14.13 14.00 28.03 28.32 37.89 35.56
5 PHI contribution 15.47 15.96 28.00 28.00 37.79 35.92
118 Source: Family file, non-positive incomes excluded.
119 Source: Families file, positive PHI contribution, negative incomes excluded.
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Table 6. 32. Mean and median medical expenditure of families by
income quintile and PHI contribution120
Total medical expenditure Terciles of PHI contribution1 2 3
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Q
ui
nt
ile
s 
of
 
in
co
m
e 
w
ith
in
 
fa
m
ili
es
Jst 13.45 7.52 15.04 6.77 21.51 8.26
2nd 15.92 8.98 18.04 9.31 20.60 11.52
3rd 18.54 10.69 17.93 12.16 20.92 14.62
4th 19.20 12.42 18.31 11.63 22.09 15.33
5th 21.54 14.11 23.29 17.60 27.15 18.19
Table 6. 33. Mean medical expenditure of families by income 
quintile and PHI status121
Private Health 
Insurance
No Yes
<y'S Prescriptions 1.65 2.63
Pain relievers .46 .58
Ointments .49 .50
Proprietary medicines other 1.58 1.43
Tablets and creams other .47 .54
Surgical dressing .18 .31
Therapeutic appliances .16 .02
Pharmaceutical products other .03 .13
Medicines undefined .20 .48
1 Health charges other .01 .13
Hire of therapeutic appliances .00 .00
Ambulance insurance .21 .32
Sickness and personal accident insurance .18 .98
General practitioners fees .20 .32
Specialists fees .82 1.65
Dental fees 1.31 2.47
Opticians fees .57 1.02
Practitioners fees other .43 .86
Hospital charges .49 1.73
2 Prescriptions 1.45 2.66
Pain relievers .59 .71
Ointments .34 .77
Proprietary medicines other 1.16 2.23
Tablets and creams other .40 .98
120 Source: Families file, positive PHI contribution, negative incomes excluded.
121 Source: Families file, negative income excluded.
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Surgical dressing .17 .17
Therapeutic appliances .01 .20
Pharmaceutical products other .03 .35
Medicines undefined .17 .26
Health charges other .09 .01
Hire of therapeutic appliances .00 .00
Ambulance insurance .22 .34
Sickness and personal accident insurance .53 1.16
General practitioners fees .34 .65
Specialists fees .36 1.95
Dental fees 1.50 2.91
Opticians fees .83 1.10
Practitioners fees other .33 1.06
Hospital charges .07 .43
Prescriptions 1.59 2.71
Pain relievers .50 .52
Ointments .59 .75
Proprietary medicines other 1.42 1.92
Tablets and creams other .60 .62
Surgical dressing .20 .21
Therapeutic appliances .11 .05
Pharmaceutical products other .06 .06
Medicines undefined .15 .54
3 Health charges other .07 .05
Hire of therapeutic appliances .00 .01
Ambulance insurance .33 .34
Sickness and personal accident insurance 1.02 1.98
General practitioners fees .70 1.01
Specialists fees .78 2.36
Dental fees 3.78 3.37
Opticians fees 1.08 .77
Practitioners fees other .48 1.06
Hospital charges .31 .83
Prescriptions 2.57 2.77
Pain relievers .45 .52
Ointments .90 .63
Proprietary medicines other 1.59 2.02
Tablets and creams other .63 .89
Surgical dressing .27 .22
Therapeutic appliances .23 .09
Pharmaceutical products other .16 .16
Medicines undefined .53 .37
4 Health charges other .00 .01
Hire of therapeutic appliances .00 .00
Ambulance insurance .41 .37
Sickness and personal accident insurance .82 2.22
General practitioners fees .90 1.09
Specialists fees 1.18 1.79
Dental fees 4.22 3.87
Opticians fees .64 1.08
Practitioners fees other .69 .99
Hospital charges .35 .69
5 Prescriptions 1.88 2.59
Pain relievers .54 .62
217
Ointments .50 .80
Proprietary medicines other 2.10 1.98
Tablets and creams other .43 .66
Surgical dressing .35 .27
Therapeutic appliances .09 .94
Pharmaceutical products other .02 .22
Medicines undefined .13 .36
Health charges other .00 .04
Hire of therapeutic appliances .00 .01
Ambulance insurance .35 .25
Sickness and personal accident insurance 2.17 2.83
General practitioners fees 1.07 1.42
Specialists fees .96 3.12
Dental fees 5.37 4.33
Opticians fees 1.56 1.38
Practitioners fees other 1.00 1.37
Hospital charges .21 1.19
by
Table 6. 34. Mean and median total medical expenditure of families 
number of dependants and PHI status122
Total medical expenditure Number of dependants in the household aged 
under 20
Not
applicable One person
Two
persons
Three or
more
persons
Pr
iv
at
e 
H
ea
lth
 
In
su
ra
nc
e
No
Mean 10.75 11.69 14.26 13.28
Median 5.69 5.31 7.38 6.40
Col % 39.7% 20.2% j 22.3% 17.8%
Row % 43.0% 54.9% 47.8% 57.7%
Count 903 461 508 405
Yes
Mean 17.64 20.54 23.64 23.49
Median 10.47 13.68 15.30 17.69
Col % 49.3% 15.6% 22.8% 12.2%
Row % 57.0% 45.1% 52.2% 42.3%
Count 1198 379 555 297
122 Source: Families file.
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Table 6. 35. One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for lognormality 
of income, total medical expenditure and total fitness expenditure123
Log total income Log total medical Log fitness
N 6420 5475 1898
Normal
Parameters(a,b)
Mean 6.1979 2.0976 2.0550
Std.
Deviation .8791 1.2884 1.2840
Most Extreme 
Differences
Absolute .052 .041 .030
Positive .036 .031 .030
Negative -.052 -.041 -.024
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 4.192 3.050 1.328
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .059
a Test distribution is Normal.
b Calculated from data.
Table 6. 36. Bivariate correlations between income, medical 
expenditure and fitness expenditure124
Total 
household 
income from 
all sources
Total
medical
expenditure
Total
fitness
expenditure
Total 
household 
income from 
all sources
Pearson Correlation 1.000 .233(**) .130(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
N 6420 6420 6420
Total medical 
expenditure
Pearson Correlation .233(**) 1.000 .063(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
N 6420 6420 6420
Total fitness 
expenditure
Pearson Correlation .130(**) .063(**) 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
N 6420 6420 6420
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailecI)- -  .
123 Source: Households file, positive income, positive medical expenditure and positive 
fitness expenditure respectively.
124 Source: Households file.
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Table 6. 37. Bivariate correlations between income, medical 
expenditure and fitness expenditure125
Total household 
income from all 
sources
Total medical 
expenditure
Total fitness 
expenditure
Private Health 
Insurance
Private Health 
Insurance
Private Health 
Insurance
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Total 
household 
income from 
all sources
Pearson
Correlation 1.000 1.000 .183(**) .168(**) .145(**) .124(**)
Sig. (2- 
tailed) • .000 .000 .000 .000
N 2721 2822 2721 2822 2721 2822
Total
medical
expenditure
Pearson
Correlation .183(**) .168(**) 1.000 1.000 .063(**) .054(**)
Sig. (2- 
tailed) .000 .000 • .001 .004
N 2721 2822 2721 2822 2721 2822
Total fitness 
expenditure
Pearson
Correlation .145(**) .124(**) .063(**) .054(**) 1.000 1.000
Sig. (2- 
tailed) .000 .000 .001 .004
N 2721 2822 2721 2822 2721 2822
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
125 Source: Households file, positive medical expenditure only.
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Figure 6. 12. Normal P-P Plots for logarithm of total household
income
Normal P-P Plot of Total income
Observed Cum Prob
Transforms: natural log
Detrended Normal P-P Plot of Log total income
Observed Cum Prob
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Figure 6. 13. Normal Q-Q Plots for logarithm of total household
income
Normal Q-Q Plot of Log total income
Observed Value
Detrended Normal Q-Q Plot of 
Log total income
Observed Value
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Figure 6. 14. Normal P-P Plots for logarithm of total medical 
expenditure
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Normal P-P Plot of Log totmed
Observed Cum Prob
Detrended Normal P-P Plot of Log med
Observed Cum Prob
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Figure 6. 15. Normal Q-Q Plots for logarithm of total medical 
expenditure
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Normal Q-Q Plot of Log totmed
Observed Value
Detrended Normal Q-Q Plot 
of Log totmed
Observed Value
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Figure 6. 16. Normal P-P Plots for logarithm of total sports and 
fitness expenditure
Normal P-P Plot of Log fitness
Obsen/ed Cum Prob
Detrended Normal P-P Plot of Log fitness
Observed Cum Prob
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Figure 6. 17. Normal Q-Q Plots for logarithm of total sports and 
fitness expenditure
Normal Q-Q Plot of Log fitness
Observed Value
Detrended Normal Q-Q Plot of Log fitness
Observed Value
C h a p t e r  7 . P r iv a t e  H e a l t h  I n s u r a n c e  
C h o ic e  a n d  M e d ic a l  E x p e n d i t u r e : F u r t h e r  
E m p ir i c a l  I n v e s t ig a t io n  B a s e d  o n  1 9 9 3 -9 4  
H E S , A u s t r a l ia
This chapter applies the theoretical results developed earlier to study the 
relationship between the PHI choice and medical expenditure. The structure of the 
chapter is as follows. Section 7.1 contains a general description of the binary choice 
models, including logit and probit models, and discusses their limitations. Logit 
and probit estimates of the PHI choice are calculated for the households and 
singles data from the 1993-94 Household Expenditure Survey, and estimation 
results are discussed. The analysis of Section 7.1 suggests there is a problem of 
heteroscedasticity of error terms in the households data. Section 7.2 confirms this 
suspicion, and uses the quantile regression technique to study the conditional 
distribution of positive medical expenditure. Estimates of income elasticities of 
important quantiles of demand for medical care are obtained and discussed. 
Section 7.3 contains estimates of the probit model of health insurance choice 
corrected for heteroscedasticity. Section 7.4 proposes a bivariate probit model of a 
simultaneous choice of the PHI and the decision to have positive medical 
expenditure. Bivariate probit serves as the first step of a two-part model, the 
second part of which estimates regression model of positive medical expenditure for 
insured and uninsured groups126. Expected medical expenditure, predicted by the 
two-part model based on the vector of household characteristics, is then compared 
to actual outcomes. Section 7.5 concludes.
By completing the analysis of the previous chapter, the factors linked to the 
private health insurance (PHI) choice have been identified. Summarising the 
findings, the health insurance decision can be expected to be related to a range of
226
126 See Jones (2000) for discussion of two-part models used in health econometrics 
literature.
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factors, including total household income, ownership or purchase of an occupied 
dwelling, family composition of the household, number of dependant children, 
geographical location, non-English speaking country of origin of the head of 
household, and age and gender of the household head. Smoking can be included as 
an indicator of risk aversion. Expected medical expenditure, approximated by 
current expenditure, is another factor influencing the PHI decision. However, the 
direction of causality cannot be determined with certainty, as the presence of PHI 
might, in turn, create a moral hazard problem and induce households to consume 
more medical care. This chapter will study the relationship between private health 
insurance choice and medical consumption in greater depth, using the theoretical 
results of Chapter 5.
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 6, privately insured individuals in Australia 
have full access to Medicare benefits, plus any extra benefits provided by their 
health funds. The latter includes the choice of a doctor and private accommodation 
for hospital services, a significant reduction in waiting time for elective surgery, 
and benefits for a range of services not refundable under Medicare, through 
ancillary policies. Taking into account that the basic health care options are still 
available to the privately insured through Medicare, PHI can be modelled as 
insurance for the types of services not available to a publicly insured patient. To 
access those services, a public patient would have to pay the full fee, with no 
Medicare refund available. Medical expenditure of a larger magnitude has to be 
expected when the patient makes use of private out-of-hospital specialists, or uses 
private hospital beds. It is also important to remember that in Australia, low 
medical expenditure does not necessarily mean low usage of medical care: holders 
of the Health Care Card are entitled to the wide range of health benefits, and low 
income users of medical care are not expected to report large health expenditure.
Consider the gross out-of-pocket medical expenditure of privately insured 
individuals after the Medicare rebate for the service. If the benefits payable to the 
insured by the private health fund for the cost of the service can be approximated 
as a fraction 1-k of the residual (after Medicare refund) bill, then private health 
coverage is equivalent to some coinsurance rate k<l. Patients without private 
health insurance effectively self-insure by choosing the coinsurance rate equal to
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one for the range of health services not covered by Medicare. The two-step 
procedure of choosing the optimal coinsurance rate and consequent medical 
expenditure, assuming an interior solution, was developed in Chapter 5, Section 
5.4.4. Equation (5.4.30) for the optimal coinsurance rate reads:
1 /  1 /  T /
Hk w IF  w
dn
~dk
+ %m dt
From this condition, it follows that the optimal coinsurance rate is an 
implicit function of the marginal values of health and wealth. It also depends on 
the degree of adjustment in the health insurance premium when change in the 
coinsurance rate induces change in the consumption of medical care. Because of the 
community rating principle in place in 1993-94, which established uniform 
premiums over a group comprising widely different risks, premiums were 
actuarially unfavourable for younger age groups, and favourable for older age 
groups127. The marginal valuation of health on average is lower at younger ages, 
when the health level is higher, while the marginal value of wealth is higher (levels 
are lower). Therefore, the lower coinsurance rate, equivalent to taking up PHI, can 
be optimal for older age groups, and suboptimal for the younger ages. With private 
information about their idiosyncratic shocks to health, some younger individuals 
(or families as a decision-making unit) will find the offered reduction in the 
coinsurance rate optimal, and take up private health coverage, according to their 
valuation of health and wealth, their relative risk aversion, and their knowledge of 
the variances and correlation of the disturbances. Based on the theory developed in 
Chapter 5, it is possible to assume that the decision to insure privately constitutes 
Step 1 {ex-ante) of the hypothetical insurance contract. This step can be empirically 
modelled by means of logit or probit analysis of binary choice, based on a latent 
variable approach.
127 See Butler (1999, May) for the discussion of price of private health coverage, defined as 
ratio of benefits payable to the particular age group to the premiums collected from this age 
group.
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A decision to consume a positive amount of medical care constitutes Step 2 
(ex-post) of the problem of Section 5.4.4. The optimality conditions for an interior 
solution are given in equation (5.4.17.c):
VH i¡f'(m)H=kxVw
If the marginal benefit in terms of health of an extra unit of medical care is 
less than its marginal cost in terms of wealth, then the corner solution mt -  0 is 
chosen. Hence, the decision to consume a positive amount of medical care depends 
on the marginal evaluations of health and wealth, and on the shape of the health 
investment function. In turn, the marginal value of health and wealth depend on a 
number of parameters including the subjective discount rate, health capital 
depreciation rate, coefficient of relative risk aversion, the curvature of the health 
investment schedule, the covariance matrix of shocks to health and wealth, and 
other parameters according to the equations (5.4.18)-(5.4.19). Therefore, the choice 
of positive medical expenditure can also be studied using an appropriate binary 
choice model. Moreover, in the cross-sectional data, where it is not possible to 
separate timing of the events, the choice of private health insurance and medical 
expenditure can be expected to be correlated, which calls for a bivariate probit 
model of joint decision.
7.1. B in a r y  M o d els  o f  H e a l t h  In su r a n c e  Ch o ic e
Private health insurance choice can be modelled as a dichotomous variable. 
A family unit either purchases private health insurance coverage (PHI=1), or not 
(PHI=0). As was pointed out in the previous chapter, the data used for the analysis 
do not allow for distinction between types of the health insurance coverage. Hence, 
the decision under consideration is whether to purchase any level of private 
coverage as opposed relying on public coverage only.
In the binary choice models, the dichotomous dependent variable is 
assumed to be a function of a set of explanatory variables, and the decision is 
explained according to the following rule:
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p(y = D = F (p 'x), (7.1)
P(Y =0) = 1 -F (p 'x ).
This specification arises in a model with a latent variable yj = p’x + £I , with the 
observed variable
and a symmetrically distributed error term.128
Several distributions are used in the applied work. The most often used is 
the normal distribution, leading to the probit model,
where <!>(•) and <p(-) are normal cumulative distribution and density functions 
respectively.
The logistic distribution gives rise to the logit model:
where A(-) is the logistic cumulative distribution function.
It has been shown in a number of studies that logit and probit models 
produce similar results for the intermediate values of P’x. Results can vary 
significantly if there are few responses (or non-responses), or if one of the 
explanatory variables takes values from a broad range, due to the fact that the 
logistic distribution has heavier tails than those of the normal distribution129.
P'x
(7.2)
—oo
P(Y = i) = ----- _  = A(p’x),
1 i „ P  x
(7.3)
l + ep
128 Jones (2000), pg. 275.
129 See Greene (1997), pp. 636-52.
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Marginal effects of the independent variables can be calculated by noting 
that £[y] = F(P'x), and
^ f ^  = /(P ’x)P, (7.4)
dx
where /(•) is a density function corresponding to the cumulative distribution FQ  
in (7.1).
Models of binary choice are very sensitive to specification errors. For 
example, it has been shown that omitted variables lead to inconsistent parameter 
estimates, even when the omitted variables are orthogonal to the included 
explanatory variables. Heteroscedasticity of the error terms leads to the 
inconsistent maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters and their
variance. 130
The estimation of the binary choice models is based on the method of 
maximum likelihood. Each observation represents an independent draw from a 
Bernoulli (binomial) distribution, and the likelihood function is given by
L = i m P ’*)F ' [l-FCP'x)]1" * . (7.5)
i
For details of estimation procedure and statistical inference, see Greene 
(1997), Hocking (1996), Menard (1995), and Norusis (1992). Studies of Cameron 
and Trivedi (1991) and Schofield (1997) are among the earlier examples of logit 
models of private health insurance choice applied to the Australian data. Butler 
(1999, May) applies multivariate logit and probit analysis to estimate elasticity of 
demand for private health insurance in Australia.
7.1.1. Logit Model of PHI Choice, HES 93-94
Re-writing the binary choice model (7.3) with the logistic distribution in 
terms of the odds, a logit model is obtained:
130 Greene (1997), pg. 648.
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P(PH I =  1) 
P(PH I  =  0 )
=  e
P ( P H I = 0 Y
E W L zH )= p.x
where the estimated coefficients p represent a marginal change in the log of the
odds corresponding to the change in the explanatory variable.
The analysis of this chapter is based on ABS data from the 1993-94 
Households Expenditure Survey, Australia. Detailed description and discussion of 
data is provided in Chapter 6. The logit model was run on three datasets: the 
6,420131 households file, comprising both single person households and families 
with or without children, singles only, and families only. Results of the first two 
sets of analyses (households and singles) are reported in this chapter. Separating 
out families has not produced any additional insights compared to the analysis of 
the households file.
The analysis of the following section treats medical expenditure as an 
explanatory variable uncorrelated with the error term. This assumption will be 
relaxed later in the chapter, and a joint model of health insurance choice and 
medical expenditure will be estimated. Expenditure on fitness is also used as a 
factor in the models. Another variable included in the model is a handicap for one 
of the household members. A pensioner status variable was dropped due to its high 
correlation with income.
The list of the explanatory variables used in the model is presented in Table
7.1.
Table 7. 1. Variables included in the model for households file
ITINC Total household income from all sources
ITINC2 Total household income from all sources, squared
ITINC 3 Total household income from all sources, cubed
OWNER Owner/Purchaser of dwelling
COBHEAD Head of household born in non-English speaking country
SMOKERS Whether there are smokers in the household
131 Households with positive income only.
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FITNESS Total expenditure on fitness activities and sports
TOTMED Total medical expenditure excluding PHI contribution
SINGLE Whether it is a single person household
COUPLE Couple without children
HANDICAP Whether household contains a person with a handicap
PRIVEDUC Whether household contains children in private schools
ST_NSW State dummy for New South Wales
ST_VIC State dummy for Victoria
ST_QNS State dummy for Queensland
ST_SA State dummy for South Australia
ST_WA State dummy for Western Australia
ST_TAS State dummy for Tasmania
ST_NT State dummy for the Northern Territory
HDAG2024 Age of household head: 20 - 24 years
HDAG8084 Age of household head: 80 - 84 years
HDAG85 Age of household head: over 85 years
NUMDEP2 Dependants dummy: Two dependants
NUMDEP3 Dependants dummy: At least three dependants
The reference category for the state variable is ACT, for the age “less than 
20 years”, and for the dependants -  “One dependant”. OWNER, SMOKERS, 
HANDICAP, PRIVEDUC, and SINGLE are indicator variables, coded 1 when the 
relevant condition is present and 0 otherwise. ITINC, TOTMED and FITNESS are 
scale variables, measured in dollars per week. Higher order income terms ITINC2, 
ITINC3 were included to satisfy the Pregibon’s “hat-square” test. Note that both 
ITINC and OWNER variables have been included in the analysis. The underlying 
reasoning is that ITINC (total income from all sources) contains a transitory 
component and is a flow variable, while OWNER is likely to represent a stock of 
wealth, or a permanent income.
Inclusion of income-square and income-cube terms can be justified on 
theoretical grounds as well as statistical. In the example with logarithmic utility 
provided in Section 5.3.2 Chapter 5, a closed-form solution was obtained, in which
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the value function was linear in InW and InH. In case of the more complex 
function, e.g. a general CES function in health and wealth, a value function will be 
non-linear in InW and InH, which justifies a non-linear specification of the model in 
this section.
The results of the maximum likelihood estimation using STATA 6 logit 
function with the robust errors are presented in Table 7.A. 1 in the Appendix, which 
also contains the results of the Pregibon’s “hat-square” test for omitted higher- 
order variables. Overall, the logit regression performed on the households file was 
able to predict 71% of responses, with the presence of PHI being predicted correctly 
in 67% of cases, and the absence of it in 74% of cases (Table 7.2).
Table 7. 2. Logit classification statistics, Households file
L o g i s t i c  m o d e l  f o r  dum_hi
----------------  T r u e  -----------------
C l a s s i f i e d  | D -D T o t a l
----------------- +------------------------------------------ +------------------
+ | 2 0 2 3  8 97  | 2 9 2 0
| 9 8 7  2 5 1 3  | 3 5 0 0
T o t a l  | 3 0 1 0
C l a s s i f i e d  + i f  p r e d i c t e d  P r ( D )  
T r u e  D d e f i n e d  a s  dum_hi  - =  0
3 4 1 0  
>= . 5
6 4 2 0
S e n s i t i v i t y P r  ( + D) 67 . 2 1 %
S p e c i f i c i t y P r  ( - ~D) 73 .70%
P o s i t i v e  p r e d i c t i v e  v a l u e P r  ( D + ) 69 .28%
N e g a t i v e  p r e d i c t i v e  v a l u e P r  ( ~D - ) 7 1 .80%
F a l s e  + r a t e  f o r  t r u e  ~D P r  ( + ~D) 2 6 .30%
F a l s e  -  r a t e  f o r  t r u e  D P r  ( - D) 32 .79%
F a l s e  + r a t e  f o r  c l a s s i f i e d + P r  ( ~D + ) 3 0 .72%
F a l s e  -  r a t e  f o r  c l a s s i f i e d - P r  ( D - ) 2 8 . 2 0 %
C o r r e c t l y  c l a s s i f i e d 7 0 .65%
In this diagnostics, classification is performed on the basis of the predicted 
probability of the positive outcome, pi, and a cut-off probability c. A fraction of the 
positive observations (i.e. pi > c ) for which y /= l is called sensitivity. Specificity 
determines the proportion of the =0 observations which were correctly
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classified as negative, i.e. < c . In Table 7.2, the cut-off point c is assumed to be 
0.5132. Sensitivity is a decreasing function of c, while specificity is an increasing 
function of a cut-off point. A graph of sensitivity versus one minus specificity for 
the varying cut-off point is known as a receiver operating characteristic curve 
(ROC) and is given in Figure 7.1 in the Appendix. The area under ROC curve 
serves as a measure of predictive power of the model and ranges between 0.5 for 
the model with no predictive power and 1 for the perfect model. For the logit model 
of the PHI choice applied to the households file, the area under ROC curve equals 
to 0.77. Figure 7.2 in the Appendix graphs both sensitivity and specificity versus 
the cut-off point.
Table 7.A.2 in the Appendix reports the result of logit estimation in a more 
convenient form of the odds ratios. By examining Table 7.A.2, it is concluded that 
income terms, both linear and of the higher order, and private ownership of the 
occupied dwelling have the highest positive partial correlation with the PHI choice. 
Marginal effect of the increase in income has to be evaluated at a certain level of 
income, due to the cubic structure of income in the model. This is done later in the 
chapter, and the results are compared with the prediction of alternative models. 
Table 7.A.2 suggests that, ceteris paribus, the odds of having private health 
insurance are more than doubled if the household owns or is purchasing the 
dwelling. Residence in SA, WA, Tasmania and NT (compared to the ACT as the 
baseline) is also found to be a significant contributor to the PHI choice. Age of the 
household reference person is also a significant factor in the logit model. The odds 
of being insured, for a household whose head is above forty years of age, are 
between eight and fifteen times the odds of a household headed by a person from 
the reference category (younger than 20 years of age). The significance of the age 
factor remains at 95% level for all age groups above fifty133.
Couples without children are more likely to be insured than other types of 
households (the odds are 1.32 of the family with one child, ceteris paribus). 
Households with three and more dependant children are much less likely to be
132 STATA (1999 H-O), pp. 212-26.
133 The 30-49 age groups positively contribute to the PHI choice at 90% significance.
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insured (the odds are 0.67 of the family with one child). A non-English speaking 
background for a head of household halves the odds of having PHI. The SMOKERS 
variable is significant and negatively correlated with the odds of having PHI 
coverage. Medical expenditure explains part of the PHI choice, but fitness 
expenditure does not carry enough significance. The presence of a handicapped 
person in the household reduces the odds of having private health insurance 
coverage (albeit only at 90% significance level), which is consistent with the earlier 
findings of Schofield (1997) and ABS (1995a) and is explained by the availability of 
the public health insurance scheme, Medicare.
A separate logit analysis was performed on the singles file, excluding 
observations with non-positive total income reported. Additional variables to Table
7.1 included as explanatory factor were
FEMALE Sex of the person, and
FEMALE*HDAGE Interaction between sex and age.
Variables PRIVEDUC, SINGLE and DNDEP1-3 were dropped as irrelevant 
in the analysis of singles data. Using the backward stepwise selection procedure 
based on the likelihood-ratio (LR) statistic, the variable FEMALE*HDAGE was 
dropped. The results of the logit analysis on the singles subsample are presented in 
Tables 7.A.3 and 7.A.4. The major addition to the previous results is the 
significance attached to the gender of the single person. All other things being 
equal, the odds of having some level of PHI coverage for a female are 1.46 the odds 
for a male. Inclusion of a gender variable removes significance from the 
geographical location (state variable), except for Tasmania, and decreases 
significance of most of the age groups (age groups 60-74 and over 80 are still 
significant at 10%). Smoking, fitness and handicap variables are all insignificant. 
Gender appears to play an important role in determining the private health 
insurance choice of single persons, with females being more likely to have private 
health coverage than males.
Correct predictions in the logit model based on the singles file are made in 
72% of cases, with much better specificity than sensitivity (90% compared with
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38%), which is reported in Table 7.3. The explanatory power of the model is 
satisfactory, with the area under ROC curve equal to 0.75 (Figure 7.3 and Figure 
7.4 in Appendix).
Table 7. 3. Logit classification statistics: Singles file
L o g i s t i c  m o d e l  f o r  dum_hi
----------------  T r u e  -----------------
C l a s s i f i e d  | D - D T o t a l
-------------------- +--------------------------------------------------+---------------------
+ | 2 3 1  1 1 4  | 3 4 5
| 3 7 2  1 0 4 4  | 1 4 1 6
----------------- +------------------------------------------ +------------------
T o t a l  | 6 0 3  1 1 5 8  | 1 7 6 1
C l a s s i f i e d  + i f  p r e d i c t e d  P r ( D )  >= . 5  
T r u e  D d e f i n e d  a s  dum_hi  - =  0
S e n s i t i v i t y P r  ( + D) 3 8 . 3 1 %
S p e c i f i c i t y P r  ( - ~D) 9 0 . 1 6 %
P o s i t i v e  p r e d i c t i v e  v a l u e P r  ( D + ) 6 6 . 9 6 %
N e g a t i v e  p r e d i c t i v e  v a l u e P r  ( ~D - ) 73  . 73%
F a l s e  + r a t e  f o r  t r u e  ~D P r  ( + - D) 9 . 8 4 %
F a l s e  -  r a t e  f o r  t r u e  D P r  ( - D) 6 1 . 6 9 %
F a l s e  + r a t e  f o r  c l a s s i f i e d  + P r  ( -D + ) 3 3 . 0 4 %
F a l s e  -  r a t e  f o r  c l a s s i f i e d  - P r  ( D - ) 2 6 . 2 7 %
C o r r e c t l y  c l a s s i f i e d  7 2 . 4 0 %
7.1.2. Probit Model of PHI Choice, HES 93-94
An alternative specification of disturbance terms was applied to model the 
private health insurance choice based on the same dataset and using the same 
variables, listed in Table 7.1. STATA functions probit and dprobit were used to 
estimate model parameters with the robust errors option. Results of the probit 
analysis applied to the households file are reported in Table 7.A.5 in the Appendix.
Implications from the probit analysis about the significance of the factors 
and their relative importance coincide with the results of the logit analysis of the 
previous section. Income up to the cubic term and private ownership of the 
occupied dwelling are again found to have the highest positive partial correlation
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with the PHI choice. Residence in SA, WA, Tasmania, NT, and, additionally to the 
logit case, in NSW, with the ACT as a reference group, contribute significantly to 
the PHI choice. Belonging to every five-year age group above forty increases the 
probability of having private health insurance significantly. Smokers in the 
household, non-English speaking background of the head of household, and a 
presence of handicap have all been found to be negatively linked with the 
probability of the household purchasing some level of private health insurance. 
Couples only are more likely to be insured than families with one dependant child. 
Families with three or more dependants have their odds of having PHI 
significantly reduced.
To make the results of the logit and probit models more easily comparable, 
the marginal effects were calculated based on equation (7.4). Table 7.A.6 in the 
Appendix contains estimates of marginal effects of the independent variables on 
the probability of the positive outcome for probit analysis performed on the 
households file. Table 7.A. 7 (Appendix) reports marginal effects calculated for the 
logit analysis of the same dataset for the same set of variables. It is not difficult to 
notice that marginal effects predicted by both models are fairly close, with the 
exception of age variables, for which the logit model predicts some stronger effects.
Due to the non-linearity in log income in the logit and probit models studied 
in this section, the marginal effects of income on probability of positive outcome 
(PHI choice) are calculated as
3--^ ]c-- = /(P 'xX A  + 2P21TINC + 3^ITINC2) , (7.6)
evaluated at a specific level of income, where /(•) is a density function 
corresponding to the cumulative distribution F(-) in (7.1).
Table 7.4 contains estimates of the marginal effect of income on probability of 
PHI=1, evaluated at a median level of income within five income quintiles 
discussed in Chapter 6.
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Table 7. 4. Marginal effects of income, Households file
INCOME QUINTILE MEDIAN INCOME LOGIT PROBIT
1 st 1 6 7 . 0 0 7 . 6 8 E - 0 4 1 . 2 5 E - 0 3
2  nd 3 0 7 . 0 0 6 . 8 9 E - 0 4 1 . 1 2 E - 0 3
3 rd 5 1 9 . 0 0 5 . 7 5 E - 0 4 9 . 3 3 E - 0 4
4 th 8 1 5 . 0 0 4 . 2 9 E - 0 4 6 . 9 6 E - 0 4
5 th 1 3 1 5 . 0 0 2 . 1 6 E - 0 4 3 . 5 0 E - 0 4
A v e r a g e  e f f e c t 6 7 1 . 4 0 4 . 9 8 E - 0 4 4 . 8 4 E - 0 4
It follows from Table 7.4 that average marginal effect of change in income is 
close for both logit and probit models (0.000498 and 0.000484 respectively). This 
means that a one dollar increase in income leads to an average increase of 
approximately 0.0005 in the probability of a household having private health 
coverage. In both specifications, marginal effect of income on the probability of 
private health insurance coverage is decreasing with the level of income. The effect 
is stronger in probit specification than it is in logit specification.
A separate probit model was run on a subsample of single person 
households. As was the case with the logit analysis, there was a loss of significance 
in a number of factors (smoking, fitness expenditure, handicap, and state of 
residence), and a reduction in significance of the age factor after the gender 
variable was introduced into the model. Table 7.A.8 in the Appendix offers 
estimates of the probit analysis performed on the singles file. Estimates of 
marginal effects derived from the probit and logit specification are reported in 
Tables 7.A.9 and 7.A.10 respectively. As previously, those are reasonably close.
Table 7. 5. Marginal effects of income, Singles file
SINGLES INCOME QUINTILE MEDIAN INCOME LOGIT PROBIT
^st 1 5 7 . 0 0 8 . 9 6 E - 0 4 9 . 7  0 E - 0 4
2  nd 1 7 0 . 0 0 8 . 8 7 E - 0 4 9 . 6 1 E - 0 4
3 rd 2 3 2  . 0 0 8 . 4 6 E - 0 4 9 . 1 8 E - 0 4
4  th 4 3 5 . 0 0 7 . 1 8 E - 0 4 7 . 8 1 E - 0 4
5 tn 7 7 7 . 0 0 5 . 1 7 E - 0 4 5 . 6 8 E - 0 4
A v e r a g e 6 7 1 . 4 0 7 . 5 5 E - 0 4 8 . 2 1 E - 0 4
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Table 7.5 above compares marginal effects of change in income on the 
probability of private health insurance coverage based on logit and probit models 
applied to the singles file. The effects were calculated based on a formula (7.6), and 
evaluated at median income levels within five income quintiles for the single 
person households separately. It appears that, first, the probit model produces 
higher marginal effects than the logit specification, and, second, the marginal effect 
of income on probability of PHI is decreasing with the level of income, analogously 
to the analysis of the households sample. This means that income has more 
marginal impact on the health insurance decision in the lowest quintiles of income 
distribution, than on the top of the distribution.
It is interesting to compare these results with the estimates of income 
elasticity of demand for insurance, calculated in the RAND HIE Study, e.g. 
Manning and Marquis (1996). Re-writing the probit model to include income and 
expenditure terms in logarithmic rather than polynomial terms, and keeping the 
rest of the variables unchanged, the income elasticity of the insurance can be 
estimated. Marginal effects of change in the loginc term on the probability of 
private health insurance are estimated to be within the 0.12-0.14 range, depending 
on the model specifications (logit or probit). Manning and Marquis (1996) report 
estimates of the income elasticity of insurance of 0.07134, based on the US data. 
Butler (1999, May), using Australian data, estimated income elasticity of demand 
in the range from 0.13 for hospital only coverage, to 0.25 for combined hospital and 
ancillary cover. Estimates obtained from the HES 93-94 appear to be consistent 
with the previous studies. The results of this section are not reported in 
logarithmic terms though, due to the better fit of the model with cubic polynomial 
in income.
The analysis of the previous section assumed that the underlying error term 
was homoscedastic. The following section studies the potential problem of 
heteroscedasticity in more detail by applying the quantile regression technique.
134 Based on the plan with 100% coinsurance rate up to a maximum contribution 
contributions of $2,000 in 1995 USD, Manning and Marquis (1996), pg. 26.
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7.2. Q u a n t il e  R e g r e s s io n  An a l y s is  o f  Me d ic a l  E x p e n d it u r e
Quantile regression estimation belongs to the class of M-estimators and 
produces results which are robust to the normality assumption for the error term. 
The quantile regression model as introduced in Koenker and Bassett Jr. (1978) is 
formulated as follows: let yt~ xtP + ut, where the error term is distributed 
according to some distribution function, ut ~ F . The 6 th regression quantile 
solves the following minimisation problem:
mm 
KbeR ~xA +  ~xAte{t:yt>xtb te{t:yt<xtb
This is equivalent to minimising n~^^p(yt,xt,6), where 
p(yt,xt,6) = \0 -  l(yt ~xt'P)\(yt ~xt'P)- Quantile regression studies the 
relationship between the explanatory variables xt and a dependent variable yt at 
different quantiles of the conditional density of yt given xt . It is particularly 
useful for censored data, where the conditional mean technique fails to give an 
adequate picture.135
Statistical properties of the quantile estimators were derived in Koenker 
and Bassett Jr. (1978) and extended in Powell (1984) and Powell (1986) to the case 
of censored quantile regression. General properties of the quantile regression 
estimators are discussed in Koenker (2000). Buchinsky (1994) and Buchinsky 
(1996) are the examples of the application of the quantile regression technique to 
study the return to schooling and experience at different points of the wage 
distribution, using the United States data. STATA (1999 P-St) contains a 
description of the qreg program and the statistical properties of the resulting 
estimators.
In the discussion of the previous chapter it has been determined that mean 
and median medical expenditure differs by income quintiles. The previous section 
of this chapter established a similar result for the probability of taking private
135 Pagan and Ullah (1999), pg. 238-42.
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health insurance coverage (equal to the conditional mean of the distribution). It 
will be instructive to see whether this is confirmed in the quantile regression 
analysis, which allows the study of a set of quantiles of the distribution of the 
logarithm of positive medical expenditure, and not just its conditional mean. It was 
also shown that there were departures from unconditional lognormality in data in 
medical expenditure and income. Robust estimates of the median regression 
analysis will shed light on the severity of those departures. Different regression 
functions for different regression quantiles would signal a presence of conditional 
heteroscedasticity in the data.
In the following partial equilibrium analysis dependent variable is 
logarithm of (positive) total medical expenditure, logmed. Private health insurance 
choice (PHI=0/1) is included as a dummy variable, orthogonal to the error term. 
This assumption is likely to be incorrect, and will be relaxed in section 7.4. Using a 
similar set of variables as for the logit (probit) models, and taking income in 
logarithmic terms, including the second order term to satisfy the model selection 
test, the “naive” OLS applied to the households file suggests that there is a 
heteroscedasticity problem present in the household data (Table 7.A. 11 in the 
Appendix, and Table 7.6)
Table 7. 6. Test for omitted variables and homoscedasticity, Households 
file
Ramsey RESET t e s t  u si ng  powers o f  t he  f i t t e d  v a l u e s  o f  logmed
Ho: model has no o m i t t e d  v a r i a b l e s  
F (3 ,  5437)  = 1 . 0 5
Prob > F = 0 . 3 6 8 9
Cook-Weisberg t e s t  f o r  h e t e r o s c e d a s t i c i t y  u s in g  f i t t e d  v a l u e s  o f  logmed 
Ho: Co ns t an t  v a r i a n c e
c h i 2 (1) = 4 . 6 5
Prob > c h i 2  = 0 . 0 3 1 0
A similar test applied to the singles file does not allow rejection of the 
hypothesis of homoscedasticity. The remainder of this section will focus on the 
households data.
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Table 7. 7. Joint significance of difference in
0 . 1 0 0 . 2 5 0 . 5 0 . 75 . 90
0 . 1 0 n / a Yes No No No
0 . 2 5 N/a No Yes Yes
0 . 5 0 n / a Yes Yes
0 . 7 5 n / a No
0 . 9 0 n / a
Performing median (0=0.5), 0.1, 0.25, 0.75 and .9 quantile regressions for 
the conditional distribution of logarithm of positive medical expenditure by 
households, joint tests of equality of income terms coefficients between different 
regression quantiles were performed, and the results are reported in Table 7.7. The 
slope coefficients on loginc and loginc2 are significantly different between e.g. 0.1 
and 0.25 quantile regression, etc.
Due to the inclusion of the second order term in log income, the income 
elasticity of the conditional quantile of the demand for medical care varies with the 
level of income. To estimate income elasticity of the demand for medical care or, to 
be precise, the derivative of the conditional quantile of log weekly total medical 
expenditure with respect to log total weekly income, it is necessary to evaluate 
Pi + P2 loginc at a specific level of income. Evaluation was performed at the levels 
of income corresponding to the income quintiles reported in Chapter 6 and used in 
the calculations of Section 7.1, Table 7.4. The results are reported in Table 7.8.
Table 7. 8. Marginal effects of income, Households file
Income quintile
Q
U
A
N
TI
LE
 
O
F
M
ED
IC
A
L
EX
PE
N
D
IT
U
R
E
COEFFICIENT 1 st @ 2 nd @ 3 rd @ 4 ra @ 5 th 0 .....
b l b 2 5 . 1 1 8 0 5 . 7 2 6 8 6 . 2 5 1 9 6 . 7 0 3 2 7 . 1 8 1 6
0 . 1 0 - 0 . 3 3 3 8 0 . 0 4 5 4 0 . 1 3 1 4 0 . 1 8 6 8 0 . 2 3 4 5 0 . 2 7 5 5 0 . 3 1 9 0
0 . 2 5 - 0 . 4 3 3 0 0 . 0 6 3 6 0 . 2 1 7 6 0 . 2 9 4 9 0 . 3 6 1 7 0 . 4 1 9 0 0 . 4 7 9 8
0 . 5 0 - 0 . 4 2 6 3 0 . 0 6 1 8 0 . 2 0 5 9 0 . 2 8 1 1 0 . 3 4 5 9 0 . 4 0 1 7 0 . 4 6 0 8
0 . 7 5 - 0 . 3 4 3 9 0 . 0 4 8 3 0 . 1 5 0 6 0 . 2 0 9 4 0 . 2 6 0 2 0 . 3 0 3 8 0 . 3 5 0 0
0 . 9 0 - 0 . 2 6 3 6 0 . 0 4 0 3 0 . 1 4 8 7 0 . 1 9 7 8 0 . 2 4 0 1 0 . 2 7 6 4 0 . 3 1 5 0
Quantile regression analysis allows the conclusion that the marginal effect
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of income on the 0 th regression quantiles, for 6 = 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 0.9, is 
increasing with the level of income for each 6 . The demand for medical care is 
more elastic at higher incomes (the estimate is 0.46 for the median regression, and 
0.32 for the 0.1 and 0.9 quantiles). It is interesting to note that the demand for 
medical care is less elastic at the tails of the distribution of medical expenditure 
than it is around its centre. This trend is present in all five quantile regressions 
studied above. The significant difference between estimated income elasticities of 
the conditional quantiles confirms conditional heteroscedasticity of the household 
level data.
The PHI dummy was treated as an exogenous variable in this exercise. By 
examining individual quantile regression estimates reported in Tables 7.A.12- 
7.A. 16, it can be concluded that an average impact of PHI on medical spending is 
stronger at the right tail of the distribution of medical expenditure (coefficient of 
0.43 for the 0.9-quantile regression) than at its median (0.27) or its left tail 
(coefficient of 0.25 for the 0.1-quantile regression). As was discussed in Chapter 3, 
failure to account for endogeneity of the health insurance choice leads to the 
overestimation of the presence of PHI in the empirical analysis.
7.3. P r o b it  m o d el  w ith  H e te r o sc e d a st ic it y
Probit model with heteroscedasticity relaxes the assumption of o -1  
imposed by the ordinary probit model, and allows for the variance of the
observation to be given by cr2 = [exp(y'zz)]2 . Assumption (7.2) is transformed in
this case into
Pity; = l)  = 0 (p ,x i /exp(y’z I-)).
No correction for heteroscedasticity is needed for the singles file. The 
validity of the heteroscedasticity model was rejected for the singles data. For the 
households data, analysis of the previous section confirms suspected 
heteroscedasticity. To correct for it, the STATA hetprob function is run to estimate 
the probit model with heteroscedasticity. The results of this model are reported in 
Table 7.A.17 in the Appendix.
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Results of the Wald test presented at the bottom of Table 7.A.17 suggest 
that the heteroscedastic specification of the model cannot be rejected. Factors 
explaining conditional heteroscedasticity are gender, residence in Queensland, 
head of households from the age groups 20-24 and 50-79, and three or more 
dependent children in the household. Correction for heteroscedasticity leads to a 
downward revision in the estimates of impact from the explanatory variables in the 
probit model. Compared to the results of the probit model reported in Table 7.A.5, 
coefficients on income terms decreased from 0.0021 to 0.0018 on ITINC, from - 
7.18E-07 to -9.19E-07 on ITINC2, and from 6.62E-11 to 5.8E-11 on ITINC3. The 
coefficient on OWNER reduced from 0.47 to 0.40, and the coefficient on PRIVEDUC 
also decreased from 0.23 to 0.19. Age groups above 24 gained extra significance, 
while residence in NSW lost significance compared to the homoscedastic probit 
model. HANDICAP, which was found to be negatively associated with the PHI 
choice in the previous analysis, became an insignificant factor in the model with 
heteroscedasticity. The direction and relative importance of other factors remained 
the same as in the analysis of the previous sections.
The main drawback of the logit and probit models studied is the inclusion of 
medical expenditure as an explanatory variable. The assumption of zero correlation 
between medical expenditure and the error term of the models has to be relaxed. In 
order to do so, a correlation between the medical expenditure and error term is 
introduced, which gives rise to the bivariate probit model studied in the following 
section.
7.4. B iv a r ia t e  P r o b it  M o d el  o f  P H I  Ch o ic e  a n d  P o s it iv e  Me d ic a l  
E x p e n d it u r e  Ch o ic e
This section will focus on a simultaneous choice of the decision to insure 
privately and the decision to incur positive medical expenditure. It is important to 
remember that in the Australian context, medical expenditure does not serve as a 
measure of actual use of medical services. Public alternatives which require 
minimal contribution from patients exist for most of the specialist services, 
although the quality of services is perceived to be lower in this case. Those patients 
who choose to use more expensive private alternatives have a choice of purchasing 
private health insurance. Thus, the decisions to have positive private medical
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expenditure and to privately insure are linked and correlated decisions. Theoretical 
support for this approach based on the models developed earlier in the thesis is 
discussed in the introductory section of this chapter.
A bivariate probit model can be used to study the joint decision to purchase 
PHI and to spend a positive amount on medical care. Following the notations of 
Greene (1997)136, it is assumed that
* * 
y 1 = Pi'*i + £l > = 1 if yi > 0 , 0 otherwise,
?21 = P2'x 2 + £2> yi =1 yi >°> o otherwise,
E[S\] = E[£2 ] = 0, Var[£i ] = Var[£2 ] = 1, Cov[£j, £2 ] = p .
In our setting, yi = PHI, y2 = I{m>0} ‘ decisions to insure privately, and
to spend a positive amount on medical care, respectively. This model is estimated 
by method of the maximum likelihood, using the STATA library function biprobit. 
Results of the estimation procedure are presented in Table 7.A.18 in the Appendix.
The hypothesis of zero correlation between private health insurance and 
positive medical expenditure (based on the test for the unrelated probit models of 
PHI choice and positive medical expenditure) is rejected. By examining the results 
presented in Table 7.A. 18, it is clear that the same factors that explained private 
health insurance choice in the analysis of section 7.1.2 (medical expenditure now 
excluded from the list of exogenous variables) serve as factors determining the PHI 
choice in this bivariate probit model. Note the increase in significance of the total 
fitness and sports expenditure variable, FITNESS, which is positively contributing 
to the probability of PHI at 90% level.
A similar set of factors explain the choice of having positive medical 
expenditure. Income in both linear and non-linear terms, ownership of dwelling, 
two dependent children (compared to the family with one child) and age of the head 
of household are all found to be significantly positively linked to the probability of 
incurring positive medical expenditure. Non-English speaking country of birth and
136 Greene (1997), pg. 660-4.
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a dummy for a single person household are negatively linked to the incidence of 
positive medical expenditure. Surprisingly, smoking is negatively and significantly 
related to the probability of m>0, which can be explained by referring to the age 
structure of smokers in the sample (see Chapter 6).
One of the possible problems in application of this analysis is an apparent 
heteroscedasticity of the households data. The standard model is better suited for 
the singles data, where no heteroscedasticity of the medical expenditure was 
detected. Results of the analysis based on the singles data is reported in Table 
7.A.19 in the Appendix.
The Wald test on unrelated models suggests that the bivariate probit 
specification for the PHI choice and positive medical expenditure is justified. 
Factors included in the earlier univariate probit model (Table 7.A.8) remain 
significant in the new model specification. Among the significant factors for 
explaining the positive medical expenditure are income, gender of the person (with 
FEMALE coefficient equal 0.42, a very high contributor to the probability of 
positive medical expenditure), residence in Queensland and Western Australia, 
and age above 20. FITNESS is found to be significant and positively linked to the 
probability of positive medical expenditure, which renders empirical support for 
the model of Chapter 4, where medical care was defined in broad terms and 
encompassed any health-improving activities. As is the case with the households 
file, SMOKERS is again found to be negatively and significantly related to the 
probability of having positive medical expenditure. To resolve this paradox, a 
separate analysis should be performed which involves SMOKERS*AGE terms. By 
including the interaction terms, smoking may be found to be linked to younger age 
groups which would imply lower probabilities of medical expenditure and PHI. 
More detailed analysis of this question is not essential for the exposition of this 
chapter.
Based on the estimated model, the marginal probabilities of PHI=1 and m>0 
were evaluated and summarised by income quintiles, separately for the households 
and singles files. According to Table 7.9, both mean probability of having private 
health insurance coverage, and mean probability of incurring positive medical
Table 7. 9. Predicted probabilities of PHI=1 and m>0 by income quintile
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expenditure increase with income quintile.
INCOME QUINTILE P R ( P H I = 1 ) PR( M>0)
H o u s e h o l d s Mean Mean
1 st 0 . 2 6 4 2 0 . 7 3 2 6
2  nd 0 . 3 6 2 5 0 . 8 4 5 1
3 r<^ 0 . 4 1 7 6 0 . 8 5 3 3
4 th 0 . 5 5 6 9 0 . 8 9 4 1
5 th 0 . 7 3 1 0 0 . 9 3 2 4
S i n g l e s
1 st 0 . 2 0 5 6 0 . 6 7 2 9
2  nd 0 . 2 7 2 2 0 . 7 2 8 3
j 3 rd 0 . 2 9 9 1 0 . 7 2 9 1
4 th 0 . 3 7 0 2 0 . 7 2 8 3
5 th 0 . 5 6 3 3 0 . 7 8 4 4
As a second step of the model, a regression analysis was performed for the 
data on positive medical expenditure, grouped according to the private health 
insurance status. A separate analysis was conducted for the households and singles 
files. The results of the estimation are presented in Tables 7.A.20-7.A.23 in the 
Appendix. The variables included in the analysis are the same as used in Section
7.2 above. For the households without private health insurance, significant factors 
explaining positive medical expenditure are income and ownership of dwelling. 
Single person households and couples only spend significantly less on medical care 
than families with a child, ceteris paribus, and households which contain a member 
with a handicap spend more (coefficient of 0.25). All these factors are significant for 
insured households as well, with an additional significant positive contribution 
from such factors as female head of household (coefficient 0.12) and more than 
three dependants (0.18).
Regression analysis of the singles data confirms the major role played by 
income and the presence of handicap for both insured and uninsured groups. The 
significance of the age factor is removed due to the stronger effect of the handicap 
factor present in the singles data. Note that gender (FEMALE) is a significant 
explanatory variable which has a positive effect for the insured group, yet is
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insignificant for the PHI=0 group.
Income elasticity of demand for medical care has been estimated for insured 
and uninsured groups using the singles and households data separately. Due to the 
nonlinearity in income, income elasticity was estimated at the median income 
levels within the corresponding quintiles of income distribution. Table 7.10 
presents the results. The income elasticity of the demand for medical care, 
evaluated at the median household income, is estimated to be 0.33 for uninsured 
households, and 0.28 for the insured. The corresponding estimate reported by 
Manning, Morris, et al. (1981), based on the US data, is 0.38.
Table 7. 10. Income elasticity of demand for medical care, by income 
quintile
SINGLES MEDIAN INCOME, $/W LN(INCOME) PHI=0 PHI = 1
1 s t 157 5 . 0 5 6 2 5 0 . 1 3 4 2 4 6 0 . 1 8 7 7 0 2
2 nd 170 5 . 1 3 5 8 0 . 1 4 1 6 1 9 0 . 1 9 6 2 3 3
3 rd 232 5 . 4 4 6 7 4 0 . 1 7 0 4 3 6 0 . 2 2 9 5 7 6
4 th 435 6 . 0 7 5 3 5 0 . 2 2 8 6 9 5 0 . 2 9 6 9 8 3
5 th 777 6 . 6 5 5 4 4 0 . 2 8 2 4 5 8 0 . 3 5 9 1 8 9
HOUSEHOLDS
1 st 167 5 . 1 1 7 9 9 0 . 1 9 6 0 5 5 0 . 1 6 3 0 4 8
2 nd 307 5 . 7 2 6 8 5 0 . 2 7 0 6 3 0 . 2 2 6 9 0 9
3~a 519 6 . 2 5 1 9 0 . 3 3 4 9 4 2 0 . 2 8 1 9 8 2
4 ch 815 6 . 7 0 3 1 9 0 . 3 9 0 2 1 7 0 . 3 2 9 3 1 6
5 th 1315 7 . 1 8 1 5 9 0 . 4 4 8 8 1 4 0 . 3 7 9 4 9 5
It is interesting to note that for both single person households and all 
households, demand for medical care becomes more elastic with respect to income 
as income increases. This is true within both insurance categories. However, 
estimated elasticities for singles and households exhibit different patterns within 
the same income quintile: for the singles data, demand of the insured group is more 
elastic than that of the uninsured group within the same income quintile. This 
reverses in the households data: income elasticity of demand for medical care, 
evaluated at the median of the income quintile, of the insured households is 
smaller than that of uninsured. Further analysis is needed to explain this 
phenomenon. Heteroscedasticity of the households data require the results of the
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The two-part model (bivariate probit of PHI and positive medical expenditure, 
followed by the OLS for the logarithm of positive medical expenditure) is used to 
calculate expected medical expenditure for each observation, based on the following 
formula:
E[med] =
= E[med | med > 0 & PHI = 1] Pr{med > 0 & PHI = 1} +
+ E[med \med>0& PHI = 0] Pr {med >0&PHI=0} =
6 2 2 
= exp{pi'x + — }Pr{med >0& PHI = l} + exp{P2 'x + — }Pr{med >0& PHI =0}
if the assumption of lognormality of medical expenditure is correct. Given the 
problems present in the households data, a smearing estimate proposed in Duan 
(1983) and utilized in a study of Manning, Newhouse et dl. (1987) has been used to
6 2avoid lognormal re transformation through the exp{—^ —} term. A sample average of
the exponentiated least squares residuals, = ^ e x p , 7  = 1,2, provides a
i
consistent nonparametric estimator of E[exp(et ) ]137.
Combining results of the bivariate probit model of PHI=1 and m>0, and the 
estimates of the regression analysis performed on grouped observations with 
positive medical expenditure, predicted medical expenditure was calculated for 
each observation of the singles and households datasets. Summary of the predicted 
and actual medical expenditure by private health insurance status is given in 
Table 7.11.
Both median and mean medical expenditure are predicted to be higher for 
the insured subgroup. This is true for both singles and households datasets. 
Median and mean of predicted and actual medical expenditure was estimated for 
each income quin tile for households and singles files separately.
analysis for all households sample to be taken with caution.
137 Jones (2000), pg. 291.
251
Table 7. 11. Average medical expenditure: Actual and predicted
HOUSEHOLDS, MEDICAL EXPENDITURE
PHI = 0 PHI=1
Median Mean Median Mean
P r e d i c t e d 4 . 6 8 7 1 4 . 5 8 4 4 1 0 . 2 3 0 0 1 1 . 3 8 8 6
Ac tu al 4 . 3 7 0 0 1 0 . 0 8 3 8 1 0 . 9 5 0 0 1 8 . 6 1 4 1
SINGLES, MEDICAL EXPENDITURE
PHI = 0 PHI=1
Median Mean Median Mean
P r e d i c t e d 3 . 1 8 8 4 2 . 8 3 5 8 4 . 1 7 8 9 5 . 2 6 5 3
Act ua l 1 . 6 7 0 0 6 . 0 7 4 6 5 . 6 4 0 0 1 2 . 1 1 5 0
The results presented in Table 7.12 suggest that both predicted and actual 
medical expenditure increases with income. Prediction error is still very large in 
both models. This had to be suspected, based on a low adjusted (pseudo-) R-square 
reported in the diagnostics of the regression (probit) models, respectively. Another 
aspect is a much smaller variation in the predicted medical expenditure compared 
to the actual data. Actual data have much higher skewness and kurtosis than 
predicted expenditure, and a much higher variance. Low accuracy of prediction is a 
common phenomenon in the cross-sectional data.
Despite its limitations, the model made it possible to study the relationship 
between private health insurance and medical expenditure, and derive estimates of 
income elasticity of demand for insurance and medical care, which are comparable 
to the estimates reported in the literature.
Table 7. 12. Predicted and actual medical expenditure by income quintile
HOUSEHOLDS FILE PHI = 0 PHI = 1
Income
Q u i n t i l e
p r e d i c t e d  medical  
e x p e nd i t ur e
a c t u a l  medi cal  
e x p e n d i t u r e
% e r r o r p r e d i c t e d  medi cal  
e x p e nd i tu r e
a c t u a l  medi cal  
e x p e n d i t u r e
% e r r o r
median mean median Mean median mean median mean median mean median mean median
1 st 1 6 7 . 0 0 0 2 . 9 89 1 13 3 . 40 65 6 3 5 . 8 9 9 2 9 2 . 1 7 - 4 9 . 3 3 1 5 6 . 9 8 4 4 7 3 . 1 0 5 3 9 7 3 . 1 7 5 7 8 9 13 . 48 6 9 5 . 7 7 - 7 6 . 9 7 4 7 - 4 4 . 9 6 0 3
2  nd 3 0 7 . 0 0 0 4 . 7 4 9 5 0 5 5 . 1 8 8 87 1 8 . 1 7 8 6 0 9 3 . 7 5 - 4 1 . 9 2 7 7 3 8 . 3 6 9 8 9 6 . 4 6 0 7 9 9 6 . 8 4 9 9 3 6 13 . 5 4 7 92 7 . 4 1 5 - 5 2 . 3 1 1 5 - 7 . 6 2 0 5 5  !
3 rd 5 1 9 . 0 0 0 5 .3 00 1 34 5 . 8 7 9 70 1 9 . 6 2 9 1 4 3 4 . 9 7 - 4 4 . 9 5 7 4 1 8 . 3 0 3 8 4 7 . 7 9 8 3 6 1 8 . 0 6 5 8 3 18 . 1 8 5 6 8 1 0 . 7 4 - 5 7 . 1 1 8 1 - 2 4 . 8 9 9 2  j
4 th 8 1 5 . 0 0 0 5 . 7 0 14 6 4 6 . 0 5 65 5 5 1 4 . 8 6 8 2 3 8 . 0 1 - 6 1 . 6 5 3 4 - 2 4 . 3 8 7 6 1 1 . 5 8 4 8 3 1 1 . 9 1 7 9 17 . 62 26 4 1 1 . 2 7 5 - 3 4 . 2 6 1 7 5 . 7 0 1 9 9 6
5th 1 3 1 5 . 0 0 0 5 . 0 8 4 1 0 8 5 . 0 0 1 2 1 8 1 8 . 8 2 7 6 4 1 0 . 5 2 - 7 2 . 9 9 6 6 - 5 2 . 4 5 9 9 1 8 . 5 6 6 1 9 1 8 . 3 2 4 1 3 23 . 8 0 93 4 1 6 . 0 6 - 2 2 . 0 2 1 4 1 4 . 0 9 7 9 5  |
SINGLES FILE PHI = 0 PHI = 1
Income
Q u i n t i l e
p r e d i c t e d  medical  
e x p e n d i t u r e
a c t u a l  medical  
e x p e n d i t u r e
% e r r o r p r e d i c t e d  medi cal  
e x pe n di t u r e
a c t u a l  medi cal  
e x p e n d i t u r e
% e r r o r
median mean median mean median mean median mean median mean median mean median
1 s t 1 5 7 . 0 0 2 . 55 4 2 2 . 93 53 4 . 6 6 4 5 4 . 3 8 0 0 - 4 5 . 2 4 0 7 - 3 2 . 9 8 4 9 2 . 4 4 1 6 2 . 3 2 0 1 8 . 3 8 5 4 4 . 3 8 0 0 - 7 0 . 8 8 2 1 - 4 7 . 0 2 9 2
2 nd 1 7 0 . 0 0 3 . 11 66 3 . 48 5 8 5 . 8 0 8 7 2 . 6 0 0 0 - 4 6 . 3 4 5 4 3 4 . 0 7 1 0 3 . 4 9 1 8 3 . 3 6 0 3 1 1 . 4 6 6 0 5 . 9 1 0 0 - 6 9 . 5 4 6 6 - 4 3 . 1 4 1 8
3rd 2 3 2 . 0 0 2 . 74 7 2 3 . 18 84 4 . 6 8 5 1 1 . 5 4 0 0 - 4 1 . 3 6 1 8 1 0 7 . 0 3 8 5 3 . 6 1 7 6 3 . 6 6 6 4 9 . 3 6 7 5 3 . 2 3 5 0 - 6 1 . 3 8 1 2 1 3 . 3 3 4 2
4th 4 3 5 . 0 0 2 . 6 3 3 0 3 . 08 15 6 . 0 4 2 5 0 . 9 3 0 0 - 5 6 . 4 2 4 6 2 3 1 . 3 4 3 2 4 . 9 0 4 3 4 . 4 9 7 7 1 3 . 2 2 4 2 6 . 7 9 0 0 - 6 2 . 9 1 4 3 - 3 3 . 7 6 0 5
5th 7 7 7 . 0 0 3 . 18 8 6 3 . 17 85 1 1 . 1 8 3 9 3 . 0 7 0 0 - 7 1 . 4 8 9 5 3 . 5 3 3 3 8 . 1 3 6 8 7 . 4 1 3 9 1 4 . 4 5 9 5 5 . 7 7 0 0 - 4 3 . 7 2 6 7 2 8 . 4 9 1 2
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This chapter studies the relationship between health insurance choice and 
medical expenditure, based on the theoretical results presented in Chapter 5. The 
1993-94 Household Expenditure Survey data, available from the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, was used for the analysis. Details of building the dataset for 
the analysis and detailed description of data were covered in Chapter 6. The first- 
order optimality conditions for the coinsurance rate and medical expenditure 
derived in Chapter 5 allow the choice of private health insurance to be put in a 
binary choice framework, following a latent variable approach.
Section 7.1 of this chapter proposes separate univariate logit and probit 
models of health insurance choice. Analysis was performed on households and 
singles datasets separately. About 71% (72%) of the cases were identified correctly 
in the logit model applied to the households (singles) files. Predictions of the probit 
models are found to be similar to the predictions of the logit models. Among the 
factors positively contributing to the probability of having PHI are income, 
ownership of dwelling, expected medical expenditure, older age of the head of 
household, couple-only composition of household, residence in South Australia, 
Western Australia, Tasmania and Northern Territory, and private education for 
children. Factors which have a significant negative impact on the probability of 
private health coverage include foreign (non-English speaking) country of birth of 
the head of household, presence of smokers in the household, and having at least 
three dependent children. Gender is found to be a significant factor in the analysis 
of the single person households, with a female’s odds of being privately insured 
equal to 1.46 of a male’s odds, everything else being equal. The marginal effect of 
income on the probability of taking up private health coverage is calculated for 
each income quintile. It has been found that this effect is decreasing with the level 
of income. Re-evaluating the model, an estimate of income elasticity of demand for 
private health insurance is reported, equal to 0.12-0.14, depending on the model 
specification. This estimate suggests that demand for health insurance in Australia 
is more income-elastic than it is in the USA, which is to be expected, due to the 
availability of universal coverage in Australia.
7.5. C o n c l u sio n
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Statistical tests performed on the singles file did not allow the 
homoscedasticity hypothesis to be rejected. At the same time, heteroscedasticity 
was detected in the households data, which undermines the results of the probit 
analysis. Heteroscedasticity of logarithm of household medical expenditure has 
been confirmed by performing the quantile regression analysis. The quantile 
regression equations included income terms in log-quadratic form. The income 
elasticity of the conditional quantiles of log total household medical expenditure 
was estimated at the median income levels within the income quintiles. It has been 
established that income elasticity of the demand for medical care increases with 
income at each quantile of the conditional distribution of log medical expenditure 
studied in this chapter. Secondly, conditional demand for medical care is more 
elastic around the median of the distribution of medical expenditure, than at its 
tails. This is true within each income quintile studied. Estimates of income 
elasticity of demand for medical care have been obtained, ranging from the lowest 
0.13 (bottom income quintile, bottom decile of total medical expenditure), to the 
highest 0.48 (top income quintile, lowest quartile of the medical expenditure). 
Private health insurance used as an exogenous dummy is found to be a positive 
and significant contributor, with an estimated coefficient of about 0.30.
Section 7.3 of this chapter applies the probit model with heteroscedasticity 
to the households data, and finds that the estimates have been revised downwards. 
Section 7.4 proposes a model of a joint decision about private health coverage and 
positive medical expenditure, and estimates income elasticities of the demand for 
medical care, given that a positive amount is spent on it. Analysis of this section 
suggests that income is an important determinant of both decisions (PHI=1 and 
m>0), with the predicted probabilities of being insured and having positive medical 
expenditure increasing with income quintile. Income elasticity of demand for 
medical care was found to increase with income for both insured and uninsured. 
Insured households are found to have lower income elasticity of demand for 
medical care than uninsured households within the same income quintile 
(estimates between 0.20 and 0.45 for uninsured, and 0.16 and 0.40 for insured 
households, sorted in ascending order by income). The opposite is true for the 
single persons households (estimates between 0.13 and 0.28 for uninsured, and 
0.19 and 0.36 for insured households. This paradox requires additional
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investigation, but several immediate explanations arise. First, the reversal of the 
result can be caused by the heteroscedasticity of the households data, and poor 
performance of the model. Second, aggregation of income within the household 
might lead to the result. Income per capita should be employed to see whether the 
result is sustainable. Third, income elasticity could be estimated not at the median 
income within the quintile, but at a median level for the households of the same 
insurance status within the income quintile. More detailed analysis of this issue is 
left for future consideration.
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Ap p e n d ix
Figure 7. 1. Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve, Logit 
analysis, Households file
Area under ROC curve = 0.7735
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Figure 7. 2. Sensitivity vs. Specificity, Logit analysis, Households
file
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Figure 7. 3. Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve, Logit 
analysis, Singles file
Area under ROC curve = 0.7503
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Figure 7. 4. Sensitivity vs. Specificity, Logit analysis, Singles file
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Table 7.A. 1. Logit analysis: Households file
6420
1 0 6 3 . 5 6
0.0000
0 . 1 7 5 4
L o g i t  e s t i m a t e s  Number o f  obs
Wald c h i 2 ( 3 4 )  
Prob > c h i 2
Log l i k e l i h o o d  = - 3 6 5 9 . 3 7  Pseudo R2
1
duirt_hi | C o e f .
Robust  
St d.  E r r . z P> 1 z | [95% Conf. I n t e r v a l ]
i t i n c  | . 0 0 3 4 9 1 6 . 0 0 0 2 5 2 1 3 . 8 5 5 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 2 9 9 7 7 . 0 0 3 9 8 5 6
i t i n c 2  | - 1 . 2 2 e - 0 6 1 . 4 4 e - 0 7 - 8 . 4 6 1 0 . 0 0 0 - 1 . 5 0 e - 0 6 - 9 . 3 4 e - 0 7
i t i n c 3  j 1 . 1 3 e - 1 0 1 . 9 5 e - l l 5 . 7 7 2 0 . 0 0 0 7 . 4 4 e - l l 1 . 5 1 e - 1 0
owner | . 7 7 8 5 5 2 7 . 0 6 8 1 7 4 8 1 1 . 4 2 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 6 4 4 9 3 2 4 . 9 1 2 1 7 2 9
cobhead | - . 5 0 5 5 0 9 6 . 0 6 68 7 12 - 7 . 5 5 9 0 . 0 0 0 - . 6 3 6 5 7 4 8 - . 3 7 4 4 4 4 4
smokers | - . 4 4 1 4 6 6 5 . 0 64 5 1 4 6 - 6 . 8 4 3 0 . 0 0 0 - . 5 6 7 9 1 2 7 - . 3 1 5 0 2 0 3
f i t n e s s  | . 0 0 1 8 3 1 1 . 0 0 1 2 5 2 8 1 . 4 6 2 0 . 1 4 4 - . 0 0 0 6 2 4 3 . 0 0 4 2 8 6 5
totmed | . 0 1 3 4 4 3 9 . 0 0 19 7 6 6 . 8 0 4 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 9 5 7 1 . 0 1 7 3 1 6 9
s i n g l e  | . 0 7 2 9 4 3 2 . 1 0 8 5 3 0 8 0 . 6 7 2 0 . 5 0 2 - . 1 3 9 7 7 3 1 . 2 8 5 6 5 9 6
c oupl e j . 2 8 4 9 7 2 6 . 1 05 0 5 1 9 2 . 7 1 3 0 . 0 0 7 . 0 7 9 0 7 4 7 . 4 9 0 8 7 0 6
handi cap | - . 1 5 1 4 2 2 . 0 88 5 6 8 7 - 1 . 7 1 0 0 . 0 8 7 - . 3 2 5 0 1 3 6 . 0 2 2 1 6 9 5
p r i ve d uc  | . 3 8 6 7 6 8 8 . 1 1 1 30 4 3 3 . 4 7 5 0 . 0 0 1 . 1 6 8 6 1 6 3 . 6 0 4 9 2 1 2
st_nsw | . 2 5 9 5 0 2 8 . 1 3 7 8 4 8 9 1 . 8 8 3 0 . 0 6 0 - . 0 1 0 6 7 5 9 . 5 2 9 6 8 1 6
s t _ v i c  j . 2 0 1 2 9 3 8 . 1 41 0 7 9 1 1 . 4 2 7 0 . 1 5 4 - . 0 7 5 2 1 6 2 . 4 7 7 8 0 3 7
s t _ qn s  | . 0 4 6 4 4 9 9 . 1 4 8 6 6 4 5 0 . 3 1 2 0 . 7 5 5 - . 2 4 4 9 2 7 2 . 3 3 7 8 2 7
s t _ s a  j . 6 2 9 5 2 5 . 1 5 7 8 8 4 6 3 . 9 8 7 0 . 0 0 0 . 3 2 0 0 7 6 8 . 9 3 8 9 7 3 1
st_wa | . 4 1 5 2 9 2 6 . 1 5 9 67 3 3 2 . 6 0 1 0 . 0 0 9 . 1 0 2 3 3 8 7 . 7 2 8 2 4 6 5
s t _ t a s  | . 6 9 2 0 0 7 7 . 1 5 5 1 9 7 5 4 . 4 5 9 0 . 0 0 0 . 3 8 7 8 2 6 1 . 9 96 1 8 9 3
s t _ n t  j . 3 5 1 9 0 7 9 . 1 6 4 4 4 5 7 2 . 1 4 0 0 . 0 3 2 . 0 2 9 6 0 0 2 . 6 7 4 2 1 5 5
hdag2024 | 1 . 6 2 6 5 4 5 1 . 0 8 0 2 9 7 1 . 5 0 6 0 . 1 3 2 - . 4 9 0 7 9 8 7 3 . 7 4 3 8 8 8
hdag2529 | 1 . 6 1 1 7 1 7 1 . 0 7 6 1 1 7 1 . 4 9 8 0 . 1 3 4 - . 4 9 7 4 3 3 3 3 . 7 2 0 8 6 7
hdag3034 | 1 . 7 8 4 8 8 1 . 0 7 5 5 1 8 1 . 6 6 0 0 . 0 9 7 - . 3 2 3 0 9 6 4 3 . 8 9 2 8 5 7
hdag3539 | 1 . 9 9 6 0 2 9 1 . 0 7 6 0 6 6 1 . 8 5 5 0 . 0 6 4 - . 1 1 3 0 2 1 2 4 . 1 0 5 0 7 9
hdag4044 j 2 . 0 6 4 0 5 2 1 . 0 7 6 5 8 3 1 . 9 1 7 0 . 0 5 5 - . 0 4 6 0 1 2 4 4 . 1 7 4 1 1 7
hdag4549 | 2 . 0 5 5 1 6 7 1 . 0 7 7 3 8 4 1 . 9 0 8 0 . 0 5 6 - . 0 5 6 4 6 6 6 4 . 1 6 6 8 0 1
hdag5054 j 2 . 3 5 5 1 2 5 1 . 0 7 8 1 4 7 2 . 1 8 4 0 . 0 2 9 . 2 4 1 9 9 6 4 . 4 6 8 2 5 3
hdag5 559 | 2 . 4 2 9 4 7 6 1 . 0 7 9 7 0 1 2 . 2 5 0 0 . 0 2 4 . 3 1 3 3 0 1 2 4 . 5 4 5 6 5 1
hdag6064 j 2 . 7 3 8 6 5 5 1 . 0 7 8 6 2 . 5 3 9 0 . 0 1 1 . 6 2 4 6 3 7 2 4 . 8 5 2 6 7 3
hdag6569 | 2 . 7 6 0 1 7 1 . 0 7 8 8 5 6 2 . 5 5 8 0 . 0 1 1 . 6 4 5 6 5 4 . 8 7 4 6 8 9
hdag7074 j 2 . 4 8 9 5 5 1 1 . 0 7 9 0 9 5 2 . 3 0 7 0 . 0 2 1 . 3 7 4 5 6 4 4 4 . 6 0 4 5 3 8
hdag7579 | 2 . 1 6 1 7 5 9 1 . 0 8 2 0 7 1 . 9 9 8 0 . 0 4 6 . 0 4 0 9 3 9 8 4 . 2 8 2 5 7 8
hdag8084 j 2 . 3 3 9 3 8 6 1 . 0 9 0 0 3 6 2 . 1 4 6 0 . 0 3 2 . 2 0 2 9 5 4 4 4 . 4 7 5 8 1 8
hdag85 | 2 . 4 6 9 9 2 2 1 . 1 1 1 9 9 9 2 . 2 2 1 0 . 0 2 6 . 2 9 0 4 4 4 6 4 . 6 4 9 4
numdep2  j - . 0 3 0 2 8 3 4 . 1 0 8 4 8 2 9 - 0 . 2 7 9 0 . 7 8 0 - . 2 4 2 9 0 6 . 1 82 3 3 9 2
numdep3 | - . 3 9 7 4 2 2 9 . 1 2 0 5 3 8 7 - 3 . 2 9 7 0 . 0 0 1 - . 6 3 3 6 7 4 4 - . 1 6 1 1 7 1 5
_c ons - 4 . 6 9 8 6 5 3 1 . 0 8 5 5 7 4 - 4 . 3 2 8 0 . 0 0 0 - 6 . 8 2 6 3 3 8 - 2 . 5 7 0 9 6 8
L o g i t  e s t i m a t e s  Link t e s t  Number o f  obs = 6420
LR c h i 2 (2) = 1 5 5 8 . 0 0
Prob > c h i 2  = 0 . 0 0 0 0  
Log l i k e l i h o o d  = - 3 6 5 8 . 5 3 3 5  Pseudo R2 = 0 . 1 7 5 5
dum_hi I Coef .  S td .  E r r .  z P>|z| [95% Conf.  I n t e r v a l ]
_ h a t  I . 9 9 3 4 4 8 4  . 0 30 2 3 1 3  3 2 . 8 6 2  0 . 0 0 0  . 9 3 4 1 9 6 2  1 . 0 5 2 7 0 1
h a t s q  I - . 0 2 8 8 7 2 6  . 0 2 2 2 5 1 9  - 1 . 2 9 8  0 . 1 9 4  - . 0 7 2 4 8 5 7  . 0 1 4 7 4 0 4
_ cons  . 0 2 5 5 3 5 8  . 0 3 4 5 9 4 5  0 . 7 3 8  0 . 4 6 0  - . 0 4 2 2 6 8 1  . 0 9 3 3 3 9 6
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Table 7.A. 2. Logit analysis, Odds ratio: Households file
L o g i t  e s t i m a t e s
Log l i k e l i h o o d  = ■3659.37
Number o f  obs  
Wald c h i 2 ( 3 4 )  
Prob > c h i 2 
Pseudo R2
6420
1 0 6 3 . 5 6
0.0000
0 . 1 7 5 4
dum_hi Odds R a t i o
Robust  
S t d .  E r r . z NA
(h [95% Conf. I n t e r v a l ]
i t i n c 1 . 0 0 3 4 9 8 . 0 0 0 2 5 2 9 1 3 . 8 5 5 0.000 1 . 0 0 3 0 0 2 1 . 0 0 3 9 9 4
i t i n c 2 . 9 9 9 9 9 8 8 1 . 4 4 e - 0 7 - 8 . 4 6 1 0.000 . 9 9 9 9 9 8 5 . 9 9 9 9 9 9 1
i t i n c 3 1 1 . 9 5 e - l l 5 . 7 7 2 0.000 1 1
owner 2 . 1 7 8 3 1 7 . 1 4 8 5 0 6 4 1 1 . 4 2 0 0.000 1 . 9 0 5 8 5 8 2 . 4 8 9 7 2 7
cobhead . 6 0 3 1 9 8 1 . 0 4 0 3 3 6 6 - 7 . 5 5 9 0.000 . 5 2 9 1 0 1 6 . 6 8 7 6 7 1 2
smokers . 6 4 3 0 9 2 6 . 0 4 1 4 8 8 8 - 6 . 8 4 3 0.000 . 5 66 7 0 7 1 . 7 2 9 7 7 4 1
f i t n e s s 1 . 0 0 1 8 3 3 . 0 0 1 2 5 5 1 1 . 4 6 2 0 . 1 4 4 . 9 99 3 7 5 9 1 . 0 0 4 2 9 6
totmed 1 . 0 1 3 5 3 5 . 0 0 2 0 0 2 8 6 . 8 0 4 0.000 1 . 0 0 9 6 1 7 1 . 0 1 7 4 6 8
s i n g l e 1 . 0 7 5 6 6 9 . 1 1 6 7 4 3 2 0 . 6 7 2 0 . 5 0 2 . 8 6 9 5 5 5 5 1 . 3 3 0 6 3 9
coupl e 1 . 3 2 9 7 2 6 . 1 3 9 6 9 0 2 2 . 7 1 3 0 . 0 0 7 1 . 0 8 2 2 8 5 1 . 6 3 3 7 3 8
handi cap . 8 5 9 4 8 4 9 . 0 7 6 1 2 3 5 - 1 . 7 1 0 0 . 0 8 7 . 7 2 2 5 1 7 5 1 . 0 2 2 4 1 7
p r i ve d uc 1 . 4 7 2 2 1 6 . 1 6 3 8 6 4 3 . 4 7 5 0.001 1 . 1 8 3 6 6 6 1 . 8 3 1 1 0 8
st_nsw 1 . 2 9 6 2 8 5 . 1 7 8 6 9 1 5 1 . 8 8 3 0 . 0 6 0 . 9 8 9 3 8 0 8 1 . 6 9 8 3 9 1
s t _ v i c 1 . 2 2 2 9 8 4 . 1 7 2 5 3 7 5 1 . 4 2 7 0 . 1 5 4 . 9 27 5 4 2 9 1 . 6 1 2 5 2 9
s t_ qn s 1 . 0 4 7 5 4 6 . 1 5 5 7 3 2 9 0 . 3 1 2 0 . 7 5 5 . 7 8 2 7 6 1 5 1 . 4 0 1 8 9 8
s t _ s a 1 . 8 7 6 7 1 9 . 2 9 6 3 0 5 3 . 9 8 7 0.000 1 . 3 7 7 2 3 4 2 . 5 5 7 3 5 4
st_wa 1 . 5 1 4 8 1 4 . 2 4 1 8 7 5 3 2 . 6 0 1 0 . 0 0 9 1 . 1 0 7 7 5 9 2 . 0 7 1 4 4 5
s t _ t a s 1 . 9 9 7 7 2 2 . 3 1 0 0 4 1 6 4 . 4 5 9 0.000 1 . 4 7 3 7 7 4 2 . 7 0 7 9 4 3
s t _ n t 1 . 4 2 1 7 7 8 . 2 3 3 8 0 5 2 2 . 1 4 0 0 . 0 3 2 1 . 0 3 0 0 4 3 1 . 9 6 2 4 9 3
hdag2024 5 . 0 8 6 2 7 5 . 4 9 4 6 8 3 1 . 5 0 6 0 . 1 3 2 . 6 1 2 13 7 3 4 2 . 2 6 2
hdag2529 5 . 0 1 1 4 0 9 5 . 3 9 2 8 6 2 1 . 4 9 8 0 . 1 3 4 . 6 08 0 8 9 4 4 1 . 3 0 0 2
hdag3034 5 . 9 5 8 8 6 5 6 . 4 0 8 8 6 7 1 . 6 6 0 0 . 0 9 7 . 7 23 9 0 4 1 4 9 . 0 5 0 8
hdag3539 7 . 3 5 9 7 7 7 . 9 1 9 5 9 6 1 . 8 5 5 0 . 0 6 4 . 8 9 3 1 3 1 7 6 0 . 6 4 7 5 1
hdag4044 7 . 8 7 7 8 2 8 8 . 4 8 1 1 3 9 1 . 9 1 7 0 . 0 5 5 . 9 5 5 0 3 0 2 6 4 . 9 8 2 4 3
hdag4549 7 . 8 0 8 1 4 2 8 . 4 1 2 3 6 6 1 . 9 0 8 0 . 0 5 6 . 9 4 5 0 9 8 6 4 . 5 0 8 7 3
hdag5054 1 0 . 5 3 9 4 4 1 1 . 3 6 3 0 6 2 . 1 8 4 0 . 0 2 9 1 . 2 7 3 7 8 9 8 7 . 2 0 4 2 6
hdag5559 1 1 . 3 5 2 9 3 1 2 . 2 5 7 7 7 2 . 2 5 0 0 . 0 2 4 1 . 3 6 7 9 3 3 9 4 . 2 2 1 7 2
hdag6064 1 5 . 4 6 6 1 7 1 6 . 6 8 1 8 1 2 . 5 3 9 0.011 1 . 8 6 7 5 6 8 1 2 8 . 0 8 2 3
hdag6569 1 5 . 8 0 2 5 2 1 7 . 0 4 8 6 5 2 . 5 5 8 0.011 1 . 9 0 7 2 2 6 1 3 0 . 9 3 3 5
hdag7074 1 2 . 0 5 5 8 6 1 3 . 0 0 9 4 2 2 . 3 0 7 0 . 0 2 1 1 . 4 5 4 3 5 8 9 9 . 9 3 6 7 7
hdag7579 8 . 6 8 6 4 0 2 9 . 3 9 9 2 9 8 1 . 9 9 8 0 . 0 4 6 1 . 0 4 1 7 8 9 7 2 . 4 2 6 9
hdag8084 1 0 . 3 7 4 8 7 1 1 . 3 0 8 9 8 2 . 1 4 6 0 . 0 3 2 1 . 2 2 5 0 1 7 8 7 . 8 6 6 4 3
hdag85 1 1 . 8 2 1 5 3 1 3 . 1 4 5 5 2 2 . 2 2 1 0 . 0 2 6 1 . 3 3 7 0 2 2 1 0 4 . 5 2 2 2
numdep2 . 9 7 0 1 7 0 5 . 1 0 5 2 4 6 9 - 0 . 2 7 9 0 . 7 8 0 . 78 4 3 4 5 2 1 . 2 0 0 0 2 1
numdep3 . 6 7 2 0 4 9 7 . 0 8 1 0 0 8 - 3 . 2 9 7 0.001 . 5 3 0 6 3 8 5 . 8 5 1 1 4 6 1
Table 7.A. 3. Logit analysis: Singles file
L o g i t  e s t i m a t e s  
Log l i k e l i h o o d  = - 9 6 6 56727
Number of  obs = 
Wald c h i 2 (30)
Prob > c h i 2  = 
Pseudo R2 =
1761
2 4 1 . 5 1
0 . 0 0 0 0
0 . 1 4 5 9
1
dum_hi | C o e f .
Robust  
S t d.  E r r . z P> | z | [95% Conf. I n t e r v a l ]
i t i n e  | . 0 0 4 65 9 4 . 0 0 0 5 6 7 7 8 . 2 0 7 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 3 5 4 6 6 . 0 0 5 7 7 2 1
i t i n c 2  | - 1 . 6 1 e - 0 6 3 . 3 8 e - 0 7 - 4 . 7 5 2 0 . 0 0 0 - 2 . 2 7 e - 0 6 - 9 . 4 3 e - 0 7
i t i n c 3  j 1 . 3 5 e - 1 0 4 . 0 2 e - l l 3 . 3 6 0 0 . 0 0 1 5 . 6 3 e - l l 2 . 1 4 e - 1 0
owner | . 7 39 9 8 9 9 . 1 2 6 5 8 4 3 5 . 8 4 6 0 . 0 0 0 . 4 9 1 8 8 9 2 . 9 8 8 0 9 0 6
female | . 3 7 8 89 6 7 . 1 2 2 3 8 1 5 3 . 0 9 6 0 . 0 0 2 . 1 3 9 0 3 3 3 . 6 1 8 7 6 0 2
cobhead | - . 3 1 2 4 1 1 8 . 1 41 7 6 9 3 - 2 . 2 0 4 0 . 0 2 8 - . 5 9 0 2 7 4 5 - . 0 3 4 5 4 9 1
smokers | - . 0 1 5 3 3 3 6 . 1 3 8 5 3 5 - 0 . 1 1 1 0 . 9 1 2 - . 2 8 6 8 5 7 2 . 2 5 6 1 8 9 9
f i t n e s s  | - . 0 0 2 1 7 2 5 . 0 0 2 7 3 4 - 0 . 7 9 5 0 . 4 2 7 - . 0 0 7 5 3 1 . 0 03 1 8 6 1
totmed j . 01 6 87 2 3 . 0 0 5 0 7 2 4 3 . 3 2 6 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 6 9 3 0 6 . 0 2 6 8 1 3 9
h and ica p | - . 2 1 8 4 7 7 9 . 1 7 4 5 7 9 8 - 1 . 2 5 1 0 . 2 1 1 - . 5 6 0 6 4 8 1 . 1 2 3 6 9 2 2
s t_nsw | . 0 53 0 2 7 6 . 2 5 5 2 3 0 2 0 . 2 0 8 0 . 8 3 5 - . 4 4 7 2 1 4 8 . 5 5 3 2 6 9 6
s t _ v i c  | . 02 6 20 5 3 . 2 6 4 1 3 3 6 0 . 0 9 9 0 . 9 2 1 - . 4 9 1 4 8 6 9 . 5 4 3 8 9 7 6
s t _ q n s  | - . 0 7 4 6 0 3 1 . 2 7 7 3 6 1 2 - 0 . 2 6 9 0 . 7 8 8 - . 6 1 8 2 2 1 1 . 4 6 9 0 1 4 8
s t _ s a  | . 4 7 4 8 7 1 8 . 2 9 0 7 2 4 7 1 . 6 3 3 0 . 1 0 2 - . 0 9 4 9 3 8 1 1 . 0 4 4 6 8 2
s t_wa | . 0 66 2 75 1 . 3 0 9 1 6 4 8 0 . 2 1 4 0 . 8 3 0 - . 5 3 9 6 7 6 7 . 6 72 2 2 6 9
s t _ t a s  | . 5 70 2 69 1 . 2 7 9 6 7 5 6 2 . 0 3 9 0 . 0 4 1 . 0 2 2 1 1 4 9 1 . 1 1 8 4 2 3
s t _ n t  j . 3 78 1 88 7 . 3 1 6 8 8 8 4 1 . 1 9 3 0 . 2 3 3 - . 2 4 2 9 0 1 2 . 9 99 2 7 8 5
hdag2024 | . 8 24 3 33 5 1 . 0 9 3 2 6 4 0 . 7 5 4 0 . 4 5 1 - 1 . 3 1 8 4 2 5 2 . 9 6 7 0 9 2
hdag2529 j . 9 59 7 71 1 . 0 8 3 8 2 5 0 . 8 8 6 0 . 3 7 6 - 1 . 1 6 4 4 8 7 3 . 0 8 4 0 2 9
hdag3034 j . 6 8 29 2 11 1 . 0 8 0 8 9 7 0 . 6 3 2 0 . 5 2 8 - 1 . 4 3 5 5 9 9 2 . 8 0 1 4 4 1
hdag3539 | 1 . 3 5 7 1 2 3 1 . 0 8 0 7 2 8 1 . 2 5 6 0 . 2 0 9 - . 7 6 1 0 6 5 6 3 . 4 7 5 3 1 2
hdag4044 | 1 . 2 2 4 8 2 1 1 . 0 8 2 9 7 3 1 . 1 3 1 0 . 2 5 8 - . 8 9 7 7 6 7 2 3 . 3 4 7 4 0 9
hdag4549 j 1 . 6 9 5 9 8 7 1 . 0 8 4 6 4 1 . 5 6 4 0 . 1 1 8 - . 4 2 9 8 6 8 5 3 . 8 2 1 8 4 3
hdag5054 \ 1 . 5 9 3 2 8 6 1 . 0 8 0 9 5 8 1 . 4 7 4 0 . 1 4 0 - . 5 2 5 3 5 3 1 3 . 7 1 1 9 2 4
hdag5559 | 1 . 7 5 5 0 7 1 . 0 8 9 5 0 1 1 . 6 1 1 0 . 1 0 7 - . 3 8 0 3 1 2 7 3 . 8 9 0 4 5 4
hdag6064 j 2 . 0 3 8 8 5 1 . 0 7 8 2 1 3 1 . 8 9 1 0 . 0 5 9 - . 0 7 4 4 0 8 9 4 . 1 5 2 1 0 8
hdag6569 j 2 . 0 0 5 8 4 1 . 0 7 7 8 8 6 1 . 8 6 1 0 . 0 6 3 - . 1 0 6 7 7 8 3 4 . 1 1 8 4 5 9
hdag7074 | 1 . 7 8 8 2 2 3 1 . 0 7 7 3 0 2 1 . 6 6 0 0 . 0 9 7 - . 3 2 3 2 4 9 5 3 . 8 9 9 6 9 5
hdag7579 | 1 . 6 7 1 1 7 8 1 . 0 8 1 2 5 2 1 . 5 4 6 0 . 1 2 2 - . 4 4 8 0 3 7 3 . 7 9 0 3 9 2
hdag8084 | 2 . 0 6 0 7 6 9 1 . 0 8 5 9 8 1 . 8 9 8 0 . 0 5 8 - . 0 6 7 7 1 3 4 . 1 8 9 2 5 1
hdag85 | 2 . 1 7 8 8 0 6 1 . 1 1 0 7 9 4 1 . 9 6 1 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 0 1 6 9 0 2 4 . 3 5 5 9 2 2
_c on s  | - 4 . 5 0 3 1 5 8 1 . 0 9 9 8 2 7 - 4 . 0 9 4 0 . 0 0 0 - 6 . 6 5 8 7 7 9 - 2 . 3 4 7 5 3 8
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L o g i t  e s t i m a t e s  Number o f  obs = 1761
Wald c h i 2 (30)  = 2 4 1 . 5 1
Table 7.A. 4. Logit analysis, Odds ratio: Singles file
Log l i k e l i h o o d  = - 9 6 6 56727
Prob > 
Pseudo
c h i  2  = 
R2
0 . 0 0 0 0
0 . 1 4 5 9
dum_hi Odds R a t i o
Robust  
St d.  E r r . z P> 1 z | [95% Conf. I n t e r v a l ]
i t i n c 1 . 0 0 4 6 7 . 0 0 0 5 7 0 4 8 . 2 0 7 0 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 3 5 5 3 1 . 0 0 5 7 8 9
i t i n c 2 . 9 99 9 98 4 3 . 3 8 e - 0 7 - 4 . 7 5 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 9 9 9 9 9 7 7 . 9 9 9 9 9 9 1
i t i n c 3 1 4 . 0 2 e - l l 3 . 3 6 0 0 . 0 0 1 1 1
owner 2 . 0 9 5 9 1 4 . 2 6 5 3 0 9 9 5 . 8 4 6 0 . 0 0 0 1 . 6 3 5 4 0 3 2 . 6 8 6 1 0 1
female 1 . 4 6 0 6 7 2 . 1 78 7 5 9 3 3 . 0 9 6 0 . 0 0 2 1 . 1 4 9 1 6 2 1 . 8 5 6 6 2 5
cobhead . 7 31 6 8 0 2 . 1 0 3 7 2 9 8 - 2 . 2 0 4 0 . 0 2 8 . 5 5 4 1 7 5 1 . 9 6 6 0 4 0 9
smokers . 9 8 47 8 33 . 1 3 6 4 2 6 9 - 0 . 1 1 1 0 . 9 1 2 . 7 5 0 6 1 8 9 1 . 2 9 1 9 9 8
f i t n e s s . 9 9 7 8 2 9 9 . 0 0 2 7 2 8 1 - 0 . 7 9 5 0 . 4 2 7 . 9 92 4 9 7 3 1 . 0 0 3 1 9 1
totmed 1 . 0 1 7 0 1 5 . 0 0 5 1 5 8 7 3 . 3 2 6 0 . 0 0 1 1 . 0 0 6 9 5 5 1 . 0 2 7 1 7 7
handicap . 8 03 7 4 1 2 . 1 4 0 3 1 7 - 1 . 2 5 1 0 . 2 1 1 . 5 7 0 8 3 9 1 . 1 3 1 6 6 7
st_nsw 1 . 0 5 4 4 5 9 . 2 6 9 1 2 9 7 0 . 2 0 8 0 . 8 3 5 . 63 9 4 0 6 9 1 . 7 3 8 9 2 9
s t _ v i c 1 . 0 2 6 5 5 2 . 2 7 1 1 4 6 8 0 . 0 9 9 0 . 9 2 1 . 6 1 1 7 1 6 1 1 . 7 2 2 7 0 8
s t _ q n s . 9 2 8 1 1 1 7 . 2 5 7 4 2 2 2 - 0 . 2 6 9 0 . 7 8 8 . 5 3 8 9 0 2 2 1 . 5 9 8 4 1 9
s t _ s a 1 . 6 0 7 8 0 8 . 4 6 7 4 2 9 6 1 . 6 3 3 0 . 1 0 2 . 9 0 9 4 2 9 2 2 . 8 4 2 4 9 4
st_wa 1 . 0 6 8 5 2 1 . 3 3 0 3 4 8 9 0 . 2 1 4 0 . 8 3 0 . 5 8 2 9 3 6 7 1 . 9 5 8 5 9 4
s t _ t a s 1 . 7 6 8 7 4 3 . 4 9 4 6 7 4 3 2 . 0 3 9 0 . 0 4 1 1 . 0 2 2 3 6 1 3 . 0 6 0 0 2 5
s t _ n t 1 . 4 5 9 6 3 8 . 4 6 2 5 4 2 4 1 . 1 9 3 0 . 2 3 3 . 7 8 4 3 4 9 2 . 7 1 6 3 2 1
hdag2024 2 . 2 8 0 3 6 2 . 4 9 3 0 3 7 0 . 7 5 4 0 . 4 5 1 . 2 67 5 5 6 4 1 9 . 4 3 5 3 2
hdag2529 2 . 6 1 1 0 9 8 2 . 8 2 9 9 7 4 0 . 8 8 6 0 . 3 7 6 . 3 1 2 0 8 2 6 2 1 . 8 4 6 2 5
hdag3034 1 . 9 7 9 6 5 2 2 . 1 3 9 8 0 1 0 . 6 3 2 0 . 5 2 8 . 2 3 7 9 7 2 8 1 6 . 4 6 8 3 6
hdag3539 3 . 8 8 5 0 0 1 4 . 1 9 8 6 3 1 1 . 2 5 6 0 . 2 0 9 . 4 67 1 6 8 4 3 2 . 3 0 7 9 1
hdag4044 3 . 4 0 3 5 5 7 3 . 6 8 5 9 6 1 . 1 3 1 0 . 2 5 8 . 4 0 7 4 7 8 5 2 8 . 4 2 8 9 8
hdag4549 5 . 4 5 2 0 2 6 5 . 9 1 3 4 8 7 1 . 5 6 4 0 . 1 1 8 . 6 50 5 9 4 7 4 5 . 6 8 8 3 4
hdag5054 4 . 9 1 9 8 8 8 5 . 3 1 8 1 9 2 1 . 4 7 4 0 . 1 4 0 . 5 91 3 4 6 5 4 0 . 9 3 2 5
hdag5559 5 . 7 8 3 8 5 5 6 . 3 0 1 5 1 7 1 . 6 1 1 0 . 1 0 7 . 6 8 3 6 4 7 6 4 8 . 9 3 3 0 8
hdag6064 7 . 6 8 1 7 6 6 8 . 2 8 2 5 7 9 1 . 8 9 1 0 . 0 5 9 . 9 28 2 92 6 3 . 5 6 7 8 5
hdag6569 7 . 4 3 2 3 3 7 8 . 0 1 1 2 1 6 1 . 8 6 1 0 . 0 6 3 . 8 9 8 7 2 4 9 6 1 . 4 6 4 4 6
hdag7074 5 . 9 7 8 8 1 8 6 . 4 4 0 9 9 1 1 . 6 6 0 0 . 0 9 7 . 7 2 37 93 3 4 9 . 3 8 7 4
hdag7579 5 . 3 1 8 4 2 7 5 . 7 5 0 5 5 9 1 . 5 4 6 0 . 1 2 2 . 6 38 8 8 1 1 4 4 . 2 7 3 7 6
hdag8084 7 . 8 5 2 0 0 4 8 . 5 2 7 1 2 1 . 8 9 8 0 . 0 5 8 . 9 3 4 5 2 8 6 6 5 . 9 7 3 3 3
hdag85 8 . 8 3 5 7 5 9 . 8 1 4 6 9 6 1 . 9 6 1 0 . 0 5 0 1 . 0 0 1 6 9 2 7 7 . 9 3 8 6 3
L o g i t  e s t i m a t e s  Link  
Log l i k e l i h o o d  = - 9 6 6 .
t e s t
56332
Number of  obs = 
LR c h i 2 ( 2 )
Prob > c h i 2 = 
Pseudo R2 =
1761
3 3 0 . 2 1
0 . 0 0 0 0
0 . 1 4 5 9
dum_hi | C o e f . S t d.  E r r . z P> 1 z | [95% Conf. I n t e r v a l ]
h a t  | 9 9613 04 . 0 7 7 4 7 5 1 1 2 . 8 5 7 0 . 0 0 0 . 84 4 2 8 1 9 1 . 1 4 7 9 7 9
h a t s q  | 0 0404 31 . 0 4 5 4 9 2 5 - 0 . 0 8 9 0 . 9 2 9 - . 0 9 3 2 0 6 8 . 0 8 5 1 2 0 6
_ c on s  | 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 . 0 7 0 6 0 9 9 0 . 0 3 0 0 . 9 7 6 - . 1 3 6 2 8 1 8 . 1 4 0 5 0 4
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P r o b i t  e s t i m a t e s  Number of  obs = 6420
Wald c h i 2 (34)  = 1 1 9 4 . 9 0
Table 7.A. 5. Probit analysis: Households file
Log l i k e l i h o o d  = - 3 6 62 2946
Prob > 
Pseudo
c h i  2  = 
R2
0 . 0 0 0 0
0 . 1 7 4 7
1
dum_hi | C o e f .
Robust  
S t d.  E r r . z P> 1 z i [95% Conf. I n t e r v a l ]
i t i n c  | . 0 0 2 0 7 5 4 . 0 0 0 1 4 6 1 1 4 . 2 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 7 8 9 1 . 0 0 2 3 6 1 7
i t i n c 2  j - 7 . 1 8 e - 0 7 8 . 2 9 e - 0 8 - 8 . 6 5 9 0 . 0 0 0 - 8 . 8 1 e - 0 7 - 5 . 5 5 e - 0 7
i t i n c 3  | 6 . 6 2 e - l l l . l l e - 1 1 5 . 9 6 3 0 . 0 0 0 4 . 4 4 e - l l 8 . 8 0 e - l l
owner | . 4 73 9 82 4 . 0 4 0 7 8 9 5 1 1 . 6 2 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 3 9 4 0 3 6 4 . 5 53 9 2 8 3
cobhead | - . 2 9 5 5 2 4 9 . 0 3 9 6 5 9 3 - 7 . 4 5 2 0 . 0 0 0 - . 3 7 3 2 5 5 8 - . 2 1 7 7 9 4 1
smokers | - . 2 6 1 4 5 7 9 . 0 3 8 3 6 8 3 - 6 . 8 1 4 0 . 0 0 0 - . 3 3 6 6 5 8 5 - . 1 8 6 2 5 7 4
f i t n e s s  j . 0 01 1 4 8 4 . 0 0 0 7 2 0 1 1 . 5 9 5 0 . 1 1 1 - . 0 0 0 2 6 3 . 0 0 2 5 5 9 8
totmed j .0 07 6 83 . 0 0 1 0 7 9 8 7 . 1 1 6 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 5 5 6 6 7 . 0 09 7 9 9 3
s i n g l e  | . 0 46 6 0 2 5 . 0 6 4 5 6 9 4 0 . 7 2 2 0 . 4 7 0 - . 0 7 9 9 5 1 2 . 1 7 3 1 5 6 2
c ou pl e  | . 1 7 5 9 1 6 9 . 0 6 2 5 0 3 2 . 8 1 5 0 . 0 0 5 . 05 3 4 1 3 4 . 2 9 8 4 2 0 4
h and ica p | - . 0 9 1 9 5 5 1 . 0 5 3 4 3 8 2 - 1 . 7 2 1 0 . 0 8 5 - . 1 9 6 6 9 2 1 . 0 1 2 7 8 1 9
p r i v e d u c  | . 2 3 05 2 71 . 0 6 6 5 2 1 3 . 4 6 5 0 . 0 0 1 . 1 0 0 1 4 8 5 . 3 6 0 9 0 5 8
st _nsw j . 1 62 6 7 8 8 . 0 8 2 5 2 4 6 1 . 9 7 1 0 . 0 4 9 . 0 0 0 9 3 3 6 . 3 2 4 4 2 4 1
s t _ v i c  | .1 22 2 25 . 0 8 4 3 9 1 1 . 4 4 8 0 . 1 4 8 - . 0 4 3 1 7 8 4 . 2 8 7 6 2 8 4
s t _ q n s  j . 0 35 2 6 8 7 . 0 8 8 8 6 2 3 0 . 3 9 7 0 . 6 9 1 - . 1 3 8 8 9 8 1 . 2 0 9 4 3 5 6
s t _ s a  j . 3 80 7 4 9 4 . 0 9 4 5 4 1 7 4 . 0 2 7 0 . 0 0 0 . 1 9 5 4 5 1 1 . 5 6 6 0 4 7 7
s t_wa j . 2 4 9 7 8 3 5 . 0 9 5 4 7 9 8 2 . 6 1 6 0 . 0 0 9 . 0 6 2 6 4 6 5 . 4 3 6 9 2 0 6
s t _ t a s  j . 4 1 27 6 1 . 0 9 3 0 6 3 8 4 . 4 3 5 0 . 0 0 0 . 2 3 0 3 5 9 2 . 5 9 5 1 6 2 8
s t _ n t  j . 2 08 3 0 3 6 . 0 9 8 3 4 3 6 2 . 1 1 8 0 . 0 3 4 . 0 1 5 5 5 3 6 . 4 0 1 0 5 3 6
hdag2024 | . 7 03 7 5 3 6 . 4 9 9 4 3 4 5 1 . 4 0 9 0 . 1 5 9 - . 2 7 5 1 2 1 . 6 8 2 6 2 7
hdag2529 | . 6 99 7 6 7 7 . 4 9 6 4 9 7 3 1 . 4 0 9 0 . 1 5 9 - . 2 7 3 3 4 9 1 . 6 7 2 8 8 4
hdag3034 j . 7 9 6 7 4 9 6 . 4 9 5 9 1 8 9 1 . 6 0 7 0 . 1 0 8 - . 1 7 5 2 3 3 6 1 . 7 6 8 7 3 3
hdag3539 j . 9 2 0 2 5 0 8 . 4 9 6 3 2 5 5 1 . 8 5 4 0 . 0 6 4 - . 0 5 2 5 2 9 2 1 . 8 9 3 0 3 1
hdag4044 | . 9 6 2 94 9 3 . 4 9 6 7 3 5 5 1 . 9 3 9 0 . 0 5 3 - . 0 1 0 6 3 4 4 1 . 9 3 6 5 3 3
hdag4549 | . 9 50 7 2 4 9 . 4 9 7 3 5 4 9 1 . 9 1 2 0 . 0 5 6 - . 0 2 4 0 7 2 7 1 . 9 2 5 5 2 3
hdag5054 | 1 . 1 3 4 0 4 5 . 4 9 7 9 2 9 2 2 . 2 7 8 0 . 0 2 3 . 1 5 8 1 2 1 7 2 . 1 0 9 9 6 8
hdag5559 | 1 . 1 7 8 2 6 1 . 4 9 9 0 6 3 2 2 . 3 6 1 0 . 0 1 8 . 2 0 0 1 1 4 6 2 . 1 5 6 4 0 7
hdag6064 | 1 . 3 5 8 4 5 8 . 4 9 8 2 6 0 5 2 . 7 2 6 0 . 0 0 6 . 3 8 1 8 8 5 7 2 . 3 3 5 0 3 1
hdag6569 | 1 . 3 7 5 9 9 4 . 4 9 8 3 9 6 9 2 . 7 6 1 0 . 0 0 6 . 3 9 9 1 5 4 1 2 . 3 5 2 8 3 4
hdag7074 j 1 . 2 0 8 3 2 6 . 4 9 8 5 6 1 3 2 . 4 2 4 0 . 0 1 5 . 2 31 1 6 3 4 2 . 1 8 5 4 8 8
hdag7579 | 1 . 0 1 0 9 3 . 5 0 1 0 1 0 7 2 . 0 1 8 0 . 0 4 4 . 0 2 8 9 6 7 1 1 . 9 9 2 8 9 3
hdag8084 | 1 . 1 1 9 1 5 7 . 5 0 6 4 8 9 2 2 . 2 1 0 0 . 0 2 7 . 1 2 6 4 5 6 5 2 . 1 1 1 8 5 8
hdag85 j 1 . 1 9 1 8 4 . 5 2 2 8 2 7 6 2 . 2 8 0 0 . 0 2 3 . 1 6 7 1 1 6 2 2 . 2 1 6 5 6 3
numdep2  | - . 0 1 7 0 1 9 3 . 0 6 4 7 6 6 5 - 0 . 2 6 3 0 . 7 9 3 - . 1 4 3 9 5 9 2 . 1 0 9 9 2 0 7
numdep3 | - . 2 3 3 4 2 2 5 . 0 7 2 2 1 4 2 - 3 . 2 3 2 0 . 0 0 1 - . 3 7 4 9 5 9 7 - . 0 9 1 8 8 5 2
_ co ns  | - 2 . 5 4 4 3 2 1 . 5 0 2 9 8 5 9 - 5 . 0 5 8 0 . 0 0 0 - 3 . 5 3 0 1 5 5 - 1 . 5 5 8 4 8 6
Table 7.A. 6. Probit analysis, Marginal effects: Households file
P r o b i t  e s t i m a t e s
Log l i k e l i h o o d  = - 3 6 6 2 . 2 9 4 6
Number o f  obs = 6420  
Wald c h i 2 (34)  = 1 1 9 4 . 9 0  
Prob > c h i 2  = 0 . 0 0 0 0  
Pseudo R2 = 0 . 1 7 4 7
1
dum_hi | dF/dx
Robust  
S t d.  E r r . z P> 1 z | x - b a r [ 95% C . I .  ]
i t i n c  | . 0 0 0 82 4 . 0 0 0 0 5 8 1 4 . 2 1 0 . 0 0 0 6 7 1 . 4 0 4 . 0 00 7 1 . 0 0 0 9 3 8
i t i n c 2  | - 2 . 8 5 e - 0 7 3 . 2 9 e - 0 8 - 8 . 6 6 0 . 0 0 0 759603 - 3 . 5 e - 0 7 - 2 . 2 e - 0 7
i t i n c 3  | 2 . 6 3 e - l l 4 . 4 1 e - 1 2 5 . 9 6 0 . 0 0 0 1 . 5e+09 1 . 8 e - l l 3 . 5 e - l l
owner | . 1 8 8 1 8 5 5 . 0 1 6 1 8 2 3 1 1 . 6 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 6 8 5 5 1 4 . 1 5 6 4 6 9 . 2 1 9 9 0 2
cobhead | - . 1 1 7 3 3 2 4 . 0 1 5 7 3 9 2 - 7 . 4 5 0 . 0 0 0 . 2 7 0 7 1 7 - . 1 4 8 1 8 1 - . 0 8 6 4 8 4
smokers | - . 1 0 3 8 0 6 8 . 0 1 5 2 2 8 3 - 6 . 8 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 3 1 2 6 1 7 - . 1 3 3 6 5 4 - . 0 7 3 9 6
f i t n e s s  | . 0 0 0 4 5 5 9 . 0 0 0 2 8 5 9 1 . 5 9 0 . 1 1 1 5 . 9 1 5 0 8 - . 0 0 0 1 0 4 . 0 0 1 0 1 6
totmed j . 0 0 3 0 5 0 4 . 0 0 0 4 2 9 2 7 . 1 2 0 . 0 0 0 1 4 . 0 8 3 2 . 0 0 2 2 0 9 . 0 0 3 8 9 2
s i n g l e  | . 0 1 8 5 0 2 6 . 0 2 5 6 3 6 6 0 . 7 2 0 . 4 7 0 . 2 7 4 2 9 9 - . 0 3 1 7 4 4 . 0 6 8 74 9
c ou pl e  | . 0 6 9 8 4 4 4 . 0 2 4 8 1 6 4 2 . 8 1 0 . 0 0 5 . 3 2 3 0 5 3 . 0 2 1 2 0 5 . 1 18 4 84
h andi cap j - . 0 3 6 5 0 9 . 0 2 1 2 1 6 6 - 1 . 7 2 0 . 0 8 5 . 1 0 4 6 7 3 - . 0 7 8 0 9 3 . 0 0 5 0 7 5
p r i v e d u c  | . 0 91 5 2 6 3 . 0 2 6 4 1 2 6 3 . 4 7 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 9 2 2 1 2 . 0 3 9 7 5 9 . 1 4 3 2 9 4
st_nsw j . 0 6 4 5 8 8 5 . 0 3 2 7 6 5 5 1 . 9 7 0 . 0 4 9 . 2 5 8 4 1 1 . 0 0 0 3 6 9 . 1 2 8 8 0 8
s t _ v i c  | . 0 48 5 2 7 1 . 0 3 3 5 0 6 5 1 . 4 5 0 . 1 4 8 . 2 1 0 2 8 - . 0 1 7 1 4 4 . 1 1 41 9 9
s t _ q n s  | . 0 1 4 0 0 2 8 . 0 35 2 8 1 3 0 . 4 0 0 . 6 9 1 . 1 3 7 6 9 5 - . 0 5 5 1 4 7 . 0 8 3 15 3
s t _ s a  j . 1 5 1 1 6 9 1 . 0 3 7 5 3 5 2 4 . 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 8 8 9 4 1 . 0 7 7 6 0 2 . 2 2 47 3 7
s t_wa j . 0 9 9 1 7 1 7 . 0 3 7 9 0 8 1 2 . 6 2 0 . 0 0 9 . 0 8 3 8 0 1 . 02 4 8 7 3 . 1 7 34 7
s t _ t a s  j . 1 6 3 8 7 8 7 . 0 3 6 9 4 9 2 4 . 4 4 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 9 7 9 7 5 . 0 9 1 46 . 2 3 6 2 9 8
s t _ n t  | . 0 8 2 7 0 2 9 . 0 3 9 0 4 4 7 2 . 1 2 0 . 0 3 4 . 0 7 1 6 5 1 . 0 0 6 1 7 7 . 1 5 9 2 2 9
hdag2024 | . 2 79 4 1 1 6 . 1 9 8 2 4 3 8 1 . 4 1 0 . 1 5 9 . 0 4 7 0 4 - . 1 0 9 1 3 9 . 6 6 7 96 2
hdag2529 | . 2 77 8 2 9 1 . 1 9 7 0 7 7 8 1 . 4 1 0 . 1 5 9 . 0 9 3 4 5 8 - . 1 0 8 4 3 6 . 6 6 4 09 4
hdag3034 | . 3 1 6 3 3 3 9 . 1 9 6 8 4 0 6 1 . 6 1 0 . 1 0 8 . 1 3 8 1 6 2 - . 0 6 9 4 6 7 . 7 0 2 1 3 4
hdag3539 j . 3 65 3 6 7 6 . 1 9 6 9 9 3 1 1 . 8 5 0 . 0 6 4 . 1 3 5 2 0 2 - . 0 2 0 7 3 2 . 7 5 1 4 6 7
hdag4044 j . 3 8 2 3 2 0 2 . 1 9 7 1 5 3 1 1 . 9 4 0 . 0 5 3 . 1 1 6 6 6 7 - . 0 0 4 0 9 3 . 7 6 8 73 3
hdag4549 | . 3 7 7 4 6 6 8 . 1 9 7 3 9 9 4 1 . 9 1 0 . 0 5 6 . 0 8 5 2 0 2 - . 0 0 9 4 2 9 . 76 43 6 2
hdag5054 j . 4 5 0 2 5 0 5 . 1 9 7 6 1 3 7 2 . 2 8 0 . 0 2 3 . 0 6 3 2 4 . 06 2 9 3 5 . 8 3 7 5 6 6
hdag5559 | . 4 67 8 0 5 4 . 1 9 8 0 6 2 1 2 . 3 6 0 . 0 1 8 . 0 5 2 9 6 . 0 7 9 6 1 1 . 8 5 6
hdag6064 j . 5 39 3 4 9 4 . 1 9 7 7 2 8 5 2 . 7 3 0 . 0 0 6 . 0 6 1 2 1 5 . 1 5 1 8 0 9 . 9 2 6 89
hdag6569 j . 5 4 6 3 1 1 6 . 1 9 7 7 8 0 8 2 . 7 6 0 . 0 0 6 . 0 6 2 9 2 8 . 1 5 8 6 6 8 . 9 3 3 95 5
hdag7074 | . 4 79 7 4 2 1 . 1 9 7 8 5 8 4 2 . 4 2 0 . 0 1 5 . 0 6 4 33 . 0 9 1 9 4 7 . 8 6 7 5 3 8
hdag7579 | .4 01 3 7 . 1 9 8 8 4 5 6 2 . 0 2 0 . 0 4 4 . 0 4 0 6 5 4 . 0 1 1 6 4 . 79 11
hdag8084 | . 4 4 4 3 3 9 5 . 20 1 0 1 5 3 2 . 2 1 0 . 0 2 7 . 0 2 3 6 7 6 . 0 5 0 3 5 7 . 8 3 8 32 2
hdag85 | . 4 7 3 1 9 6 6 . 2 0 7 4 9 9 5 2 . 2 8 0 . 0 2 3 . 0 1 0 2 8 . 0 6 6 5 0 5 . 8 7 9 8 8 8
numdep2  | - . 0 0 6 7 5 7 2 . 02 5 7 1 4 3 - 0 . 2 6 0 . 7 9 3 . 1 6 4 6 4 2 - . 0 5 7 1 5 6 . 04 36 4 2
numdep3 j - . 0 9 2 6 7 5 8 . 0 2 8 6 7 3 - 3 . 2 3 0 . 0 0 1 . 1 0 7 9 4 4 - . 1 4 8 8 7 4 - . 0 3 6 4 7 8
_ c on s  j - 1 . 0 1 0 1 7 3 . 1 9 9 4 7 3 5 - 5 . 0 6 0 . 0 0 0 1 - 1 . 4 0 1 1 3 - . 6 1 9 2 1 2
o b s . P | 
p r e d .  P |
. 4 6 8 8 4 7 4
. 4 6 0 9 5 9 5 ( a t  x - b a r )
z and P>|z| a r e  t he  t e s t  o f  t he  u n d e rl y i n g c o e f f i c i e n t  b e in g 0
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Ma rg inal  e f f e c t s  from l o g i t
Table 7.A. 7. Logit analysis, Marginal effects: Households File
Log L i k e l i h o o d  = - 3 6 5 9 . 3 7
Number o f  obs  
c h i 2 ( 3 4 )
Prob > c h i 2 
Pseudo R2
6420  
= 1 0 6 7 . 7 0  
=  0.0000 
= 0 . 1 7 5 4
dum_hi | C o e f . S t d.  E r r . z P>|z| [95% Conf. I n t e r v a l ]
i t i n c  | . 0 00 8 6 7 1 . 0 0 0 0 6 2 5 1 3 . 8 7 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 7 4 4 5 . 0 0 0 9 8 9 6
i t i n c 2  | - 3 . 0 2 e - 0 7 3 . 5 6 e - 0 8 - 8 . 4 6 8 0 . 0 0 0 - 3 . 7 2 e - 0 7 - 2 . 3 2 e - 0 7
i t i n c 3  j 2 . 8 0 e - l l 4 . 8 4 e - 1 2 5 . 7 7 5 0 . 0 0 0 1 . 8 5 e - l l 3 . 7 4 e - l l
owner | . 1 9 3 3 3 3 7 . 0 1 69 01 3 1 1 . 4 3 9 0 . 0 0 0 . 1 6 0 2 0 7 7 . 2 26 4 5 9 6
cobhead | - . 1 2 5 5 3 0 4 . 0 1 6 5 9 1 5 - 7 . 5 6 6 0 . 0 0 0 - . 1 5 8 0 4 9 2 - . 0 9 3 0 1 1 6
smokers | - . 1 0 9 6 2 6 9 . 0 16 0 0 9 6 - 6 . 8 4 8 0 . 0 0 0 - . 1 4 1 0 0 5 2 - . 0 7 8 2 4 8 6
f i t n e s s  | . 0 0 0 4 5 4 7 . 0 00 3 1 1 1 1 . 4 6 1 0 . 1 4 4 - . 0 0 0 1 5 5 1 . 0 0 1 0 6 4 5
totmed j . 0 0 3 3 3 8 5 . 0 0 0 4 9 1 8 6 . 7 8 8 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 2 3 7 4 5 . 0 0 4 3 0 2 4
s i n g l e  | . 0 1 8 1 1 3 6 . 0 26 9 5 2 2 0 . 6 7 2 0 . 5 0 2 - . 0 3 4 7 1 1 8 . 0 7 0 9 3 9
c ou pl e  | . 0 7 0 7 6 5 7 . 0 2 6 08 9 2 . 7 1 2 0 . 0 0 7 . 0 1 9 6 3 2 1 . 1 2 1 89 9 3
h and ica p | - . 0 3 7 6 0 1 8 . 0 21 9 94 - 1 . 7 1 0 0 . 0 8 7 - . 0 8 0 7 0 9 3 . 0 0 5 5 0 5 7
p r i v e d u c  j . 0 9 6 0 4 4 1 . 0 27 6 4 2 6 3 . 4 7 5 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 4 1 8 6 5 7 . 1 5 0 2 2 2 6
s t_nsw j . 0 6 4 4 4 0 9 . 0 3 4 2 3 2 5 1 . 8 8 2 0 . 0 6 0 - . 0 0 2 6 5 3 6 . 1 3 1 5 3 5 4
s t _ v i c  | . 0 4 9 9 8 6 2 . 0 3 5 0 3 4 8 1 . 4 2 7 0 . 1 5 4 - . 0 1 8 6 8 0 7 . 1 18 6 5 3 1
s t _ q n s  | . 0 1 1 5 3 4 6 . 0 36 9 1 7 5 0 . 3 1 2 0 . 7 5 5 - . 0 6 0 8 2 2 3 . 0 8 3 8 9 1 5
s t _ s a  j . 1 5 6 3 2 6 4 . 0 3 9 2 0 5 1 3 . 9 8 7 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 7 9 4 8 5 9 . 2 3 3 1 6 7
s t_wa j . 1 03 1 2 7 3 . 0 3 9 6 5 0 7 2 . 6 0 1 0 . 0 0 9 . 0 2 5 4 1 3 4 . 1 8 0 8 4 1 2
s t _ t a s  j . 1 7 1 8 4 2 4 . 0 3 8 5 3 9 8 4 . 4 5 9 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 9 6 3 0 5 7 . 2 47 3 7 9 1
s t _ n t  j . 0 87 3 8 7 3 . 0 40 8 3 4 4 2 . 1 4 0 0 . 0 3 2 . 0 07 3 5 3 3 . 1 6 7 42 1 4
hdag2024 | . 4 0 3 9 1 0 8 . 2 6 8 1 2 1 6 1 . 5 0 6 0 . 1 3 2 - . 1 2 1 5 9 7 8 . 9 2 9 4 1 9 5
hdag2529 | . 4 0 0 2 2 8 7 . 2 6 7 0 8 4 5 1 . 4 9 9 0 . 1 3 4 - . 1 2 3 2 4 7 2 . 9 2 3 7 0 4 7
h dag3034 | . 4 4 3 22 9 3 . 2 6 6 91 8 3 1 . 6 6 1 0 . 0 9 7 - . 0 7 9 9 2 0 8 . 9 6 6 3 7 9 5
h dag3539 | . 4 9 5 6 6 2 7 . 2 6 7 03 4 3 1 . 8 5 6 0 . 0 6 3 - . 0 2 7 7 1 4 9 1 . 0 1 9 0 4
hdag4044 | . 5 1 2 5 5 4 6 . 2 67 1 5 7 6 1 . 9 1 9 0 . 0 5 5 - . 0 1 1 0 6 4 6 1 . 0 3 6 1 7 4
hdag4549 | . 5 1 0 3 4 8 2 . 2 6 7 3 5 5 7 1 . 9 0 9 0 . 0 5 6 - . 0 1 3 6 5 9 3 1 . 0 3 4 3 5 6
hdag5054 | . 5 8 4 8 3 5 . 26 7 5 1 6 2 2 . 1 8 6 0 . 0 2 9 . 0 6 0 5 1 3 1 . 1 0 9 1 5 7
hdag5559 j . 6 0 3 2 9 8 3 . 2 6 7 8 9 8 5 2 . 2 5 2 0 . 0 2 4 . 0 7 8 2 2 6 8 1 . 1 2 8 3 7
hdag6064 j . 6 8 0 0 7 5 . 2 6 7 5 9 1 8 2 . 5 4 1 0 . 0 1 1 . 1 5 5 6 0 4 8 1 . 2 0 4 5 4 5
hdag6569 | . 6 8 5 4 1 7 6 . 2 6 7 6 5 2 9 2 . 5 6 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 1 6 0 8 2 7 5 1 . 2 1 0 0 0 8
hdag7074 | . 6 1 8 2 1 6 4 . 2 6 7 7 3 7 5 2 . 3 0 9 0 . 0 2 1 . 0 9 3 4 6 0 6 1 . 1 4 2 9 7 2
hdag7579 | . 5 3 6 8 1 7 5 . 2 6 8 5 0 7 4 1 . 9 9 9 0 . 0 4 6 . 0 1 0 5 5 2 7 1 . 0 6 3 0 8 2
hdag8084 | . 5 8 0 9 2 6 7 . 2 70 4 7 4 6 2 . 1 4 8 0 . 0 3 2 . 0 5 0 8 0 6 3 1 . 1 1 1 0 4 7
hdag85 | . 6 1 3 3 4 2 . 2 7 5 9 2 0 7 2 . 2 2 3 0 . 0 2 6 . 0 7 2 5 4 7 4 1 . 1 5 4 1 3 7
numdep2  | - . 0 0 7 5 2 0 1 . 02 6 9 3 9 1 - 0 . 2 7 9 0 . 7 8 0 - . 0 6 0 3 1 9 7 . 0 4 5 2 7 9 5
numdep3 | - . 0 9 8 6 8 9 8 . 02 9 9 3 6 5 - 3 . 2 9 7 0 . 0 0 1 - . 1 5 7 3 6 4 3 - . 0 4 0 0 1 5 4
. icons | - 1 . 1 6 6 7 9 . 2 69 0 90 3 - 4 . 3 3 6 0 . 0 0 0 - 1 . 6 9 4 1 9 8 - . 6 3 9 3 8 3
Ma rg inal  e f f e c t s  e v a l u a t e d  a t
i t i n c i t i n c 2 i t i n c 3 owner cobhead smokers f i t n e s s
X 6 7 1 . 4 0 4 4 7 5 9 6 0 3 . 5 1 . 45e+09 . 6 8 5 5 1 4 . 2 7 0 7 1 6 5 . 3 1 2 6 1 6 8 5 . 9 1 5 0 7 9
totmed s i n g l e c ouple handicap pr iv ed u c st_nsw s t _ v i c
X 1 4 . 0 8 3 2 2 . 2 7 4 2 9 9 1 . 3 2 3 05 3 . 1 04 6 7 2 9 . 0 9 2 2 1 1 8 . 2 5 8 4 1 1 2 . 2 1 0 2 8 0 4
s t _q ns s t _ s a st_wa s t _ t a s s t _ n t hdag2024 hdag 2  529
X . 1 3 7 6 9 4 7 . 0 8 8 9 4 0 8 . 0 8 3 8 0 0 6 . 0 9 7 9 7 5 1 . 0 7 1 6 5 1 1 . 0 4 7 0 4 0 5 . 0 9 3 4 5 7 9
hdag3034 hdag3539 hdag4044 hdag4549 hdag5054 hdag5559 hdag6064
X . 1 3 8 1 6 2 . 1 3 5 2 0 2 5 . 1 1 6 6 6 6 7 . 0 85 2 0 2 5 . 0 6 3 2 3 9 9 . 0 5 2 9 5 9 5 . 0 6 1 2 1 5
hdag6569 hdag7074 hdag7579 hdag8084 hdag85 numdep2 numdep3
X . 0 62 9 2 8 3 . 0 6 4 3 3 0 2 . 0 4 0 6 5 4 2 . 0 2 3 6 7 6 . 0 1 0 2 8 0 4 . 1 6 4 6 4 1 7 . 1 0 7 9 4 3 9
X
_c on s
1
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Table 7.A. 8. Probit analysis: Singles file
P r o b i t  e s t i m a t e s
Log l i k e l i h o o d  = - 9 6 7 . 2 8 0 1 5
Number of  obs  
Wald c h i 2 (30)  
Prob > c h i 2 
Pseudo R2
1761
2 6 0 . 4 1
0.0000
0 . 1 4 5 3
Robust
dum_hi j C o e f . S td .  E r r . z P>|z| [95% Conf. I n t e r v a l ]
i t i n e  | . 0 0 2 7 1 5 5 . 00 033 8 . 2 2 9 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 2 0 6 8 7 . 0 0 33 6 23
i t i n c 2  j - 9 . 2 0 e - 0 7 1 . 9 7 e - 0 7 - 4 . 6 6 1 0 0 0 0 - 1 . 3 1 e - 0 6 - 5 . 3 3 e - 0 7
i t i n c 3  | 7 . 5 7 e - l l 2 . 3 4 e - l l 3 . 2 3 2 0 0 0 1 2 . 9 8 e - l l 1 . 2 2 e - 1 0
owner | . 4 5 0 4 3 5 4 . 0 7 4 2 7 4 1 6 . 0 6 4 0 0 0 0 . 3 0 4 8 6 0 8 . 5 9 6 0 1
female | . 2 2 25 6 53 . 0 7 1 7 6 1 6 3 . 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 . 0 8 1 9 1 5 2 . 3 6 3 2 1 5 5
cobhead j - . 1 6 9 8 8 7 8 . 0 8 1 7 9 4 2 - 2 . 0 7 7 0 038 - . 3 3 0 2 0 1 5 - . 0 0 9 5 7 4 2
smokers | - . 0 1 3 5 5 6 . 08 0 8 2 9 - 0 . 1 6 8 0 867 - . 1 7 1 9 7 7 9 . 1 4 4 8 6 5 9
f i t n e s s  | - . 0 0 1 3 0 5 2 . 0 0 1 6 4 6 9 - 0 . 7 9 2 0 428 - . 0 0 4 5 3 3 1 . 0 0 1 9 2 2 8
totmed j . 0 09 6 9 8 9 . 0 0 2 6 3 5 9 3 . 6 8 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 4 5 3 2 7 . 0 1 4 8 6 5 1
handi cap j - . 1 2 3 2 4 6 7 . 1 0 3 6 5 9 - 1 . 1 8 9 0 234 - . 3 2 6 4 1 4 5 . 0 7 9 9 2 1 2
st_nsw | . 0 4 3 6 6 8 8 . 1 55 1 2 8 3 0 . 2 8 2 0 778 - . 2 6 0 3 7 7 . 3 4 7 7 1 4 7
s t _ v i c  | . 0 2 8 4 3 1 9 . 1 5 9 8 0 6 7 0 . 1 7 8 0 859 - . 2 8 4 7 8 3 6 . 3 41 6 4 7 3
s t _ qn s  j - . 0 4 6 6 1 9 . 1 6 7 3 1 5 8 - 0 . 2 7 9 0 781 - . 3 7 4 5 5 1 9 . 2 8 1 3 1 3 9
s t _ s a  | . 2 8 2 7 0 8 7 . 1 7 5 2 2 3 4 1 . 6 1 3 0 107 - . 0 6 0 7 2 2 9 . 6 2 6 1 4 0 4
s t_wa | . 0 35 2 4 6 3 . 1 8 5 1 9 3 5 0 . 1 9 0 0 849 - . 3 2 7 7 2 6 3 . 3 9 8 2 1 8 9
s t _ t a s  j . 3 4 0 1 6 5 5 . 1 70 5 2 6 4 1 . 9 9 5 0 046 . 0 0 5 9 4 . 6 7 4 39 1
s t _ n t  | . 2 20 4 5 2 2 . 1 9 1 3 8 5 9 1 . 1 5 2 0 249 - . 1 5 4 6 5 7 3 . 5 9 5 5 6 1 7
hdag2024 j . 3 42 7 0 1 2 . 5 1 2 5 6 7 8 0 . 6 6 9 0 504 - . 6 6 1 9 1 3 3 1 . 3 4 7 3 1 6
hdag2529 j . 4 14 7 9 8 8 . 5 0 8 7 2 7 9 0 . 8 1 5 0 415 - . 5 8 2 2 8 9 7 1 . 4 1 1 8 8 7
hdag3034 | . 2 6 7 3 4 4 1 . 5 0 6 6 7 7 9 0 . 5 2 8 0 598 - . 7 2 5 7 2 6 4 1 . 2 6 0 4 1 5
hdag3539 | . 6 6 7 1 5 2 2 . 5 05 8 6 5 3 1 . 3 1 9 0 187 - . 3 2 4 3 2 5 5 1 . 6 5 8 6 3
hdag4044 [ . 5 7 3 78 1 3 . 5 0 6 8 8 2 2 1 . 1 3 2 0 258 - . 4 1 9 6 8 9 7 1 . 5 6 7 2 5 2
hdag4549 | . 8 5 1 6 6 3 8 . 5 08 7 4 6 3 1 . 6 7 4 0 094 - . 1 4 5 4 6 0 6 1 . 8 4 8 7 8 8
hdag5054 | . 7 8 9 8 4 0 4 . 5 0 6 1 0 5 2 1 . 5 6 1 0 119 - . 2 0 2 1 0 7 5 1 . 7 8 1 7 8 8
hdag5559 j . 8 8 5 6 8 9 1 . 5 1 0 4 2 6 1 . 7 3 5 0 083 - . 1 1 4 7 2 7 4 1 . 8 8 6 1 0 6
hdag6064 | 1 . 0 4 1 9 0 8 . 5 0 3 5 6 0 5 2 . 0 6 9 0 039 . 0 5 4 9 4 7 6 2 . 0 2 8 8 6 9
hdag6569 j 1 . 0 1 6 5 4 1 . 5 0 2 6 4 4 4 2 . 0 2 2 0 043 . 0 3 1 3 7 6 1 2 . 0 0 1 7 0 6
hdag7074 | . 8 9 0 7 8 6 6 . 5 0 2 4 2 9 6 1 . 7 7 3 0 076 - . 0 9 3 9 5 7 3 1 . 8 7 5 5 3
hdag7579 | . 8 1 64 7 5 . 5 0 4 9 9 2 9 1 . 6 1 7 0 106 - . 1 7 3 2 9 2 9 1 . 8 0 6 2 4 3
hdag8084 j 1 . 0 4 7 2 0 9 . 5 0 9 2 6 6 7 2 . 0 5 6 0 040 . 0 4 9 0 6 4 5 2 . 0 4 5 3 5 3
hdag85 | 1 . 1 1 1 0 3 5 . 52 8 6 8 6 3 2 . 1 0 2 0 036 . 0 7 4 8 2 8 7 2 . 1 4 7 2 4 1
_ c on s  I - 2 . 5 1 7 9 3 4 . 5 1 8 4 4 9 4 - 4 . 8 5 7 0 0 0 0 - 3 . 5 3 4 0 7 6 - 1 . 5 0 1 7 9 2
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P r o b i t  e s t i m a t e s  Number of  obs = 1761
Wald c h i 2 (30)  = 2 6 0 . 4 1  
Prob > c h i 2  = 0 . 0 0 0 0
Log l i k e l i h o o d  = - 9 6 7 . 2 8 0 1 5  Pseudo R2 = 0 . 1 4 5 3
Table 7.A. 9. Probit analysis, Marginal effects: Singles file
1
dum_hi | dF/dx
Robust  
S t d.  E r r . z P>|z| x - b a r [ 95% C . I .  ]
i t i n c  | . 0 0 0 9 7 0 5 . 0 0 0 1 1 6 8 8 . 2 3 0 . 0 0 0 3 7 4 . 7 2 5 . 0 0 0 7 4 2 . 0 0 1 1 9 9
i t i n c 2  j - 3 . 2 9 e - 0 7 7 . 0 1 e - 0 8 - 4 . 6 6 0 . 0 0 0 274553 - 4 . 7 e - 0 7 - 1 . 9 e - 0 7
i t i n c 3  | 2 . 7 1 e - l l 8 . 3 4 e - 1 2 3 .23 0 . 0 0 1 4 .  9e+08 l . l e - 1 1 4 . 3 e - l l
owner | . 1 6 0 9 8 2 6 . 0 2 6 5 0 0 5 6 . 0 6 0 . 0 0 0 . 57 7 51 3 . 1 0 9 0 4 3 . 2 1 2 9 2 3
female | . 0 79 5 43 3 . 0 2 5 6 0 2 4 3 . 1 0 0 . 0 0 2 . 55 7 07 . 0 2 9 3 6 4 . 1 2 9 7 2 3
cobhead | - . 0 6 0 7 1 6 8 . 0 2 9 1 6 6 1 - 2 . 0 8 0 . 0 3 8 . 2 46 4 51 - . 1 1 7 8 8 1 - . 0 0 3 5 5 2
smokers | - . 0 0 4 8 4 4 8 . 0 2 8 8 8 8 - 0 . 1 7 0 . 8 6 7 . 2 6 5 1 9 - . 0 6 1 4 6 4 . 0 5 1 7 7 5
f i t n e s s  | - . 0 0 0 4 6 6 5 . 0 0 0 5 8 8 8 - 0 . 7 9 0 . 4 2 8 2 . 5 1 9 4 6 - . 0 0 1 6 2 . 0 0 0 6 8 8
totmed | . 0 03 4 66 3 . 0 0 0 9 4 6 9 3 . 6 8 0 . 0 0 0 8 . 1 4 2 9 4 . 0 0 1 6 1 . 0 0 5 3 2 2
handi cap | - . 0 4 4 0 4 7 5 . 0 3 7 0 4 4 8 - 1 . 1 9 0 . 2 3 4 . 1 2 3 2 2 5 - . 1 1 6 6 5 4 . 0 2 8 5 5 9
s t_nsw j . 0 1 5 60 7 . 0 5 5 4 5 1 9 0 . 2 8 0 . 7 7 8 . 2 5 8 3 7 6 - . 0 9 3 0 7 7 . 1 2 4 2 9 1
s t _ v i c  | . 0 1 0 1 6 1 4 . 0 5 7 1 1 9 9 0 . 1 8 0 . 8 5 9 . 20 8 40 4 - . 1 0 1 7 9 2 . 1 2 2 1 1 4
s t _ q n s  | - . 0 1 6 6 6 1 3 . 0 5 9 7 9 1 3 - 0 . 2 8 0 . 7 8 1 . 1 39 1 25 - . 1 3 3 8 5 . 1 0 0 5 2 7
s t _ s a  | . 1 01 0 3 8 2 . 0 6 2 6 4 8 1 . 6 1 0 . 1 0 7 . 1 0 1 6 4 7 - . 0 2 1 7 5 . 2 2 3 8 2 6
st_wa j . 0 1 2 5 9 6 8 . 0 6 6 1 9 0 4 0 . 1 9 0 . 8 4 9 . 0 8 06 3 6 - . 1 1 7 1 3 4 . 1 4 2 3 2 8
s t _ t a s  | . 1 21 5 7 2 9 . 0 6 0 9 4 5 1 . 9 9 0 . 0 4 6 . 1 0 44 8 6 . 0 0 2 1 2 3 . 2 4 1 0 2 3
s t _ n t  j . 0 7 8 7 8 8 1 . 0 6 8 4 0 0 6 1 . 1 5 0 . 2 4 9 . 0 5 8 4 8 9 - . 0 5 5 2 7 5 . 2 1 2 8 5 1
hdag2024 | . 1 2 2 4 7 9 1 . 1 8 3 0 2 7 1 0 . 6 7 0 . 5 0 4 . 05 45 1 4 - . 2 3 6 2 4 7 . 4 8 1 2 0 6
hdag2529 | . 1 4 82 4 63 . 1 8 1 5 9 9 5 0 . 8 2 0 . 4 1 5 . 0 6 2 4 6 5 - . 2 0 7 6 8 2 . 5 0 4 1 7 5
hdag3034 | . 0 9 55 4 7 . 1 8 0 9 5 0 7 0 . 5 3 0 . 5 9 8 . 08 12 0 4 - . 2 5 9 1 1 . 4 5 0 2 0 4
hdag3539 | . 2 3 8 4 3 5 7 . 1 8 0 4 5 2 9 1 . 3 2 0 . 1 8 7 . 07 3 82 2 - . 1 1 5 2 4 5 . 5 9 2 1 1 7
hdag4044 j . 2 0 5 0 6 5 5 . 1 8 0 8 6 1 5 1 . 1 3 0 . 2 5 8 . 066 44 - . 1 4 9 4 1 7 . 5 5 9 5 4 8
hdag4549 j . 3 0 4 3 7 8 9 . 1 8 1 3 6 3 6 1 . 6 7 0 . 0 9 4 . 0 6 1 32 9 - . 0 5 1 0 8 7 . 6 5 9 8 4 5
hdag5054 | . 2 8 2 2 8 3 6 . 1 8 0 4 2 3 1 1 . 5 6 0 . 1 1 9 . 0 6 2 46 5 - . 0 7 1 3 3 9 . 6 3 5 9 0 6
hdag5559 | . 3 16 5 3 9 3 . 1 8 1 9 3 2 4 1 . 7 4 0 . 0 8 3 . 0 5 2 81 1 - . 0 4 0 0 4 2 . 6 7 3 12
hdag6064 | . 3 7 2 3 7 0 9 . 1 7 9 3 2 1 6 2 . 0 7 0 . 0 3 9 . 0 8 6 88 2 . 0 2 0 9 0 7 . 7 2 3 8 3 5
hdag6569 | . 3 6 3 3 0 4 9 . 1 7 9 0 1 1 9 2 . 0 2 0 . 0 4 3 . 09 71 0 4 . 0 1 2 4 4 8 . 7 1 4 1 6 2
hdag7074 | . 3 1 8 3 6 1 1 . 17 9 0 2 0 3 1 . 7 7 0 . 0 7 6 . 1 0 7 32 5 - . 0 3 2 5 1 2 . 66 9 2 3 4
hdag7579 | . 2 9 1 8 0 2 6 . 1 7 9 9 7 9 3 1 . 6 2 0 . 1 0 6 . 08 97 2 2 - . 0 6 0 9 5 . 6 4 4 5 5 6
hdag8084 | . 3 74 2 6 5 4 . 1 8 1 3 6 1 2 2 . 0 6 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 6 1 32 9 . 0 1 8 8 0 4 . 7 2 9 7 2 7
hdag85 j . 3 9 7 07 6 3 . 1 8 8 2 7 7 8 2 . 1 0 0 . 0 3 6 . 0 2 9 52 9 . 0 2 8 0 5 9 . 76 6 0 9 4
_ c on s  1 - . 8 9 9 8 9 2 5 . 1 8 3 0 5 4 1 - 4 . 8 6 0 . 0 0 0 1 - 1 . 2 5 8 6 7 - . 5 4 1 1 1 3
o bs .  P | . 3 4 2 4 1 9 1  
p r e d .  P I . 3 1 9 5 3 5 1  ( a t  x - b a r )
z and P > 1z| a r e  t he  t e s t  of  t he  u n d e rl y in g c o e f f i c i e n t  b ei ng 0
Table 7.A. 10. Logit analysis, Marginal effects: Singles file
Marginal e f fe c ts  from 
Log Likelihood = -966
lo g it
56727
Number of obs 
c h i2 (30)
Prob > chi2 
Pseudo R2
1761 
= 253.00  
= 0 . 0 0 0 0  
= 0.1459
dum_hi | Coef. Std. Err. z V N [95% Conf. Interval]
i tin c | .001003 .0001205 8.326 0 . 0 0 0 .0007669 .0012391
i t in c 2 - 3 . 46e-07 7 . 20e-08 -4 .798 0 . 0 0 0 - 4 . 87e-07 - 2 . 04e-07
itinc3 2 . 9 1 e - l l 8 . 60e-12 3.384 0 . 0 0 1 1 . 2 2 e - l l 4 . 5 9 e - l l
owner .1592909 .0271532 5.866 0 . 0 0 0 .1060715 .2125102
female .0815616 .026272 3.105 0 . 0 0 2 .0300695 .1330538
cobhead -.06725 .030378 -2 .214 0.027 -.1267897 -.0077103
smokers -.0033007 .0298205 - 0 . 1 1 1 0.912 -.0617479 .0551464
fitn ess -.0004676 .0005889 -0.794 0.427 -.0016218 .0006865
totmed .0036319 .0011024 3.295 0 . 0 0 1 .0014713 .0057926
handicap -.0470297 .0375805 -1.251 0 . 2 1 1 -.1206861 .0266266
st_nsw .0114148 .0549549 0.208 0.835 -.0962948 .1191244
st_vic .005641 .0568643 0.099 0.921 -.1058109 .1170929
st_qns -.0160591 .0596932 -0.269 0.788 -.1330557 .1009375
st_sa .1022213 .0626375 1.632 0.103 -.020546 .2249886
st_wa .0142664 .0665579 0.214 0.830 -.1161847 .1447176
st_tas .1227566 .060204 2.039 0.041 .0047589 .2407543
st_nt .0814092 .0682124 1.193 0.233 -.0522846 .215103
hdag2024 .1774467 .2347953 0.756 0.450 -.2827437 .6376371
hdag2529 .2066011 .2326106 0 . 8 8 8 0.374 -.2493073 .6625095
hdag3034 .1470062 .2321886 0.633 0.527 - .3080751 .6020875
hdag3539 .2921355 .2316779 1.261 0.207 -.1619448 .7462158
hdag4044 .263656 .2322629 1.135 0.256 -.191571 .718883
hdag4549 .3650797 .2322445 1.572 0.116 - .0901112 .8202706
hdag5054 .342972 .2314704 1.482 0.138 -.1107016 .7966456
hdag5559 .3777979 .2332412 1.620 0.105 -.0793463 .8349422
hdag6064 .4388845 .2304585 1.904 0.057 -.0128058 .8905747
hdag6569 .4317789 .2304362 1.874 0.061 -.0198678 .8834256
hdag7074 .3849344 .2304906 1.670 0.095 - .0668189 .8366876
hdag7579 .3597391 .2314245 1.554 0 . 1 2 0 - .0938446 .8133229
hdag8084 .4436028 .232128 1.911 0.056 - .0113596 .8985653
hdag85 .4690116 .2373763 1.976 0.048 .0037627 .9342606
_cons -.9693537 .2325106 -4.169 0 . 0 0 0 -1 .425066 -.5136413
Marginal e f fe c ts  evaluated at
it in c i t in c 2 itinc3 owner female cobhead smokers
X 374.7246 274553.2 4 . 86e+08 .5775128 .5570698 .2464509 .2651902
fitn ess totmed handicap st_nsw st_vic st_qns st_sa
x 2.519461 8.142936 .1232254 .2583759 .2084043 .1391255 .1016468
st_wa st_tas st_nt hdag2024 hdag2529 hdag3034 hdag3539
X .080636 .1044861 .0584895 .0545145 .0624645 .0812039 .0738217
hdag4044 hdag4549 hdag5054 hdag5559 hdag6064 hdag6569 hdag7074
x .0664395 .0613288 .0624645 .0528109 .0868825 .0971039 .1073254
hdag7 579 hdag8084 hdag85 _cons
X .0897217 .0613288 .0295287 1
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Table 7.A. 11. OLS regression for log total medical expenditure,
Households file
Regression with robust standard errors Number of obs = 
F ( 34, 5440) = 
Prob > F 
R-squared
5475 
22.91  
= 0.0000 
= 0.1202
Root MSE = 1.2123
1
logmed | Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err. t P> 111 [95% Conf. Interval]
loginc | -.392081 .1113219 -3 .522 0 . 0 0 0 - .6103164 -.1738455
loginc 2  | .0551026 .0098253 5.608 0 . 0 0 0 .0358411 .0743642
dum_hi | .3119546 .0368044 8.476 0 . 0 0 0 .2398032 .3841059
owner | .1648374 .0410004 4.020 0 . 0 0 0 .0844603 .2452146
cobhead | -.0135574 .038513 -0 .352 0.725 -.0890582 .0619434
female | .0555124 .0371076 1.496 0.135 -.0172334 .1282582
smokers | -.0163058 .0375275 -0 .435 0.664 -.0898747 .0572632
single | -.4082759 .0641584 -6 .364 0 . 0 0 0 - .534052 -.2824998
couple | -.1677129 .0578559 -2 .899 0.004 -.2811337 -.0542922
handicap j .2427126 .0506599 4.791 0 . 0 0 0 .1433988 .3420263
priveduc | .1339957 .0618961 2.165 0.030 .0126546 .2553369
st_nsw | .1665019 .0826296 2.015 0.044 .0045149 .328489
st_v ic  | .1078821 .0834144 1.293 0.196 -.0556435 .2714077
st_qns | .0701644 .0865786 0.810 0.418 -.0995643 .2398931
st_sa  | .0818937 .0941049 0.870 0.384 -.1025896 .2663769
st_wa | -.0204994 .0952972 -0 .215 0.830 -.2073201 .1663213
st_tas  | -.0265614 .0941565 -0 .282 0.778 -.2111458 .158023
st_nt j .0978934 .0978725 1 . 0 0 0 0.317 -.0939759 .2897627
hdag2024 j - .5739371 .3573766 -1 .606 0.108 -1.274538 .126664
hdag2529 | -.3031143 .3526275 -0 .860 0.390 -.9944053 .3881768
hdag3034 | -.3456698 .3520424 -0 .982 0.326 -1.035814 .3444741
hdag3539 | -.3411521 .3529926 -0 .966 0.334 -1.033159 .3508546
hdag4044 | -.2671506 .3530742 -0 .757 0.449 -.9593173 .4250161
hdag4549 | -.2200685 .3545161 -0 .621 0.535 -.9150619 .4749249
hdag5054 | -.1793664 .3550232 -0 .505 0.613 -.875354 .5166211
hdag5559 j - .3167841 .3558984 -0 .890 0.373 -1.014487 .3809192
hdag6064 j - .246886 .3545052 -0 .696 0.486 -.941858 .448086
hdag6569 j -.2649521 .3543832 -0 .748 0.455 -.9596849 .4297807
hdag7074 j - .2993431 .3546231 -0 .844 0.399 -.9945463 .3958602
hdag7579 | -.3075437 .3572107 -0 .861 0.389 -1.00782 .3927323
hdag8084 | - .3213375 .3678106 -0 .874 0.382 -1.042394 .3997185
hdag85 j -.2202864 .3794704 -0 .581 0.562 -.9642002 .5236274
numdep2  | .066955 .0584391 1.146 0.252 -.0476089 .181519
numdep3 | .020481 .0676129 0.303 0.762 -.1120674 .1530294
_cons 2.37721 .4880991 4.870 0 . 0 0 0 1.420341 3.33408
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Table 7.A. 12. Median regression, Households file
Median regression Number of obs = 5475
Raw sum of deviations 5673.753 (about 2.2202899)
Min sum of deviations 5239.727 Pseudo R2 = 0.0765
logmed Coef. Std. Err. t P> 111 [95% Conf. Interval]
loginc -.4263085 .1147299 -3 .716 0 . 0 0 0 - .6512249 -.201392
loginc 2 .0617604 .0104536 5.908 0 . 0 0 0 .0412673 .0822536
dum_hi .3074601 .0443963 6.925 0 . 0 0 0 .2204256 .3944946
owner .1328359 .0496721 2.674 0.008 .0354587 .2302131
cobhead -.0207525 .0465302 -0 .446 0.656 -.1119703 .0704652
female .094513 .0442139 2.138 0.033 .0078361 .1811899
smokers -.0006873 .0453041 -0.015 0.988 -.0895014 .0881268
single -.3593171 .0768969 -4 .673 0 . 0 0 0 - .5100658 -.2085684
couple -.1292749 .0722714 -1 .789 0.074 -.2709557 .0124059
handicap .2378848 .0631981 3.764 0 . 0 0 0 .1139912 .3617784
priveduc .172463 .0754487 2.286 0 . 0 2 2 .0245534 .3203725
st_nsw .0059673 .0974294 0.061 0.951 -.1850334 .196968
st_vic -.0170542 .0992519 -0 .172 0.864 -.2116276 .1775192
st_qns -.0702772 .1031676 -0 .681 0.496 -.272527 .1319727
st_sa .0971767 .1122527 0 . 8 6 6 0.387 -.1228836 .3172369
st_wa -.1142359 .1115783 -1 .024 0.306 -.332974 .1045022
st_tas -.1143664 .1109457 -1 .031 0.303 -.3318645 .1031316
st_nt -.0490593 .116733 -0 .420 0.674 -.2779027 .1797841
hdag2024 -.9606773 .4388322 -2 .189 0.029 -1.820964 -.1003907
hdag2529 -.6572596 .4340809 -1 .514 0.130 -1.508232 .1937126
hdag3034 -.7397136 .4330701 -1 .708 0.088 -1.588704 .1092771
hdag3 539 -.7117387 .4337994 -1.641 0 . 1 0 1 -1 .562159 .1386817
hdag4044 -.650421 .4344734 -1 .497 0.134 -1.502163 .2013206
hdag4549 -.5437374 .4353729 -1 .249 0 . 2 1 2 -1 .397242 .3097676
hdag5054 -.5598018 .4364436 -1.283 0 . 2 0 0 -1 .415406 .2958023
hdag5 559 -.5555399 .4382011 -1 .268 0.205 -1.414589 .3035096
hdag6064 -.7238027 .4372004 -1 .656 0.098 -1 .58089 .1332851
hdag6569 -.6585394 .4376017 -1 .505 0.132 -1.516414 .199335
hdag7074 -.7007805 .4375273 -1 .602 0.109 -1.558509 .1569481
hdag7579 -.7515048 .4412581 -1 .703 0.089 -1.616547 .1135376
hdag8084 -.635324 .4501985 -1 .411 0.158 -1.517893 .2472452
hdag85 -.6196134 .4772935 -1 .298 0.194 -1 .5553 .3160728
numdep2 .0799478 .0743439 1.075 0.282 -.0657959 .2256916
numdep3 .0697872 .0837824 0.833 0.405 -.0944599 .2340343
_cons 2.916748 .5529038 5-275 0 . 0 0 0 1.832835 4.000661
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Table 7.A. 13. 0.1 Quantile regression, Households file
1 Quantile regression Number of obs = 5475
Raw sum of deviations 2653.211 (about .26236427)
Min sum of deviations 2505.717 Pseudo R2 = 0.0556
logmed | Coef. Std. Err. t P> 111 [95% Conf. Interval]
loginc | -.3337523 .2055311 -1 .624 0.104 -.7366756 .069171
loginc 2  | .0454443 .0180167 2.522 0 . 0 1 2 .0101243 .0807643
dum_hi | .3069885 .06145 4.996 0 . 0 0 0 .186522 .4274551
owner | .128228 .0707115 1.813 0.070 -.0103949 .2668508
cobhead | .0359819 .0650156 0.553 0.580 -.0914747 .1634386
female | -.0573014 .0625476 -0 .916 0.360 -.1799197 .0653169
smokers j - .006111 .0638574 -0 .096 0.924 -.131297 .119075
single j - .7477307 .1085341 -6 .889 0 . 0 0 0 - .960501 -.5349604
couple | -.3988481 .0993797 -4.013 0 . 0 0 0 - .593672 -.2040242
handicap j .3196133 .0875249 3.652 0 . 0 0 0 .1480296 .4911971
priveduc | .1729334 .1051178 1.645 0 . 1 0 0 -.0331396 .3790063
st_nsw | .3249991 .1367533 2.377 0.018 .0569078 .5930903
st_vic  | .3259864 .1395979 2.335 0 . 0 2 0 .0523187 .5996541
st_qns | .2653304 .1438455 1.845 0.065 -.0166644 .5473252
st_sa j .1435684 .1562658 0.919 0.358 -.1627751 .449912
st_wa | -.0765176 .1562381 -0 .490 0.624 -.3828067 .2297715
st_tas  j .1078791 .1549877 0.696 0.486 -.1959588 .411717
st_nt j .3722312 .163896 2.271 0.023 .0509295 .693533
hdag2024 | -.4376137 .6145171 -0 .712 0.476 -1.642313 .7670857
hdag2529 | -.2788136 .6096719 -0 .457 0.647 -1.474014 .9163872
hdag3034 | -.2478998 .6091672 -0 .407 0.684 -1.442111 .9463116
hdag3539 | -.4493992 .6102123 -0 .736 0.461 -1.645659 .7468609
hdag4044 j - .2222676 .6101398 -0 .364 0.716 -1.418386 .9738504
hdag4549 | -.2017195 .6113115 -0 .330 0.741 -1.400135 .9966956
hdag5054 | -.190831 .6120577 -0 .312 0.755 -1.390709 1.009047
hdag5559 j - .3121694 .6125504 -0 .510 0.610 -1.513013 .8886745
hdag6064 j - .0639226 .6114754 -0 .105 0.917 -1.262659 1.134814
hdag6569 | -.0545862 .6122405 -0 .089 0.929 -1.254823 1.14565
hdag7074 | -.1904726 .611749 -0 .311 0.756 -1.389745 1.0088
hdag7579 | - . 0 2 1 1 2 2 .6170431 -0 .034 0.973 -1.230773 1.188529
hdag8084 | -.3697459 .627858 -0 .589 0.556 -1.600599 .8611069
hdag85 | .1246646 .6650661 0.187 0.851 -1.179131 1.42846
numdep2  | - .0499624 .1023495 -0 .488 0.625 -.2506084 .1506836
numdep3 | - .0859632 .118022 -0 .728 0.466 -.3173336 .1454072
_cons 1 .712681 .8688462 0-820 0.412 -.9906051 2.415967
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Table 7.A. 14. 0.25 Quantile regression, Households file
.25 Quantile regression Number of obs = 5475
Raw sum 
Min sum
of deviations  
of deviations
4811.867
4465.1
(about 1.2725656)
Pseudo R2 = 0.0721
logmed Coef. Std. Err. t P> |t| [95% Conf. Interval]
loginc -.4329617 .1881247 -2 .301 0 . 0 2 1 - .8017613 -.064162
loginc 2 .0635516 .0168527 3.771 0 . 0 0 0 .0305135 .0965897
dum_hi .3708998 .0650184 5.705 0 . 0 0 0 .2434377 .498362
owner .1960651 .072666 2.698 0.007 .0536107 .3385196
cobhead -.0560091 .0681856 -0.821 0.411 -.1896802 .077662
female .1104507 .0651276 1.696 0.090 -.0172254 .2381268
smokers -.0240376 .0666167 -0 .361 0.718 -.1546329 .1065577
single -.6644676 .1133895 -5 .860 0 . 0 0 0 - .8867564 -.4421788
couple -.31195 .1062191 -2 .937 0.003 -.520182 -.103718
handicap .2351207 .0914488 2.571 0 . 0 1 0 .0558444 .4143969
priveduc .2307795 .1110314 2.079 0.038 .0131136 .4484454
st_nsw .2293121 .1418407 1.617 0.106 -.0487525 .5073767
st_v ic .1334346 .1444844 0.924 0.356 -.1498127 .4166819
st_qns .0481573 .149975 0.321 0.748 -.2458536 .3421682
st_sa .1484196 .1633815 0.908 0.364 -.1718735 .4687127
st_wa -.0182725 .1624336 - 0 . 1 1 2 0.910 -.3367073 .3001624
st_tas -.0614559 .1616813 -0 .380 0.704 -.3784159 .255504
st_nt .0958834 .1712318 0.560 0.576 -.2397994 .4315662
hdag2024 -.5135691 .6017384 -0.853 0.393 -1.693217 .6660789
hdag2529 -.1249528 .5949372 - 0 . 2 1 0 0.834 -1.291268 1.041362
hdag3034 -.1386006 .5932497 -0 .234 0.815 -1.301607 1.024406
hdag3539 -.2366551 .5947486 -0 .398 0.691 -1 .4026 .92929
hdag4044 -.1353448 .5955994 -0 .227 0.820 -1.302958 1.032268
hdag4549 -.0353258 .5967537 -0 .059 0.953 -1.205202 1.13455
hdag5054 .008807 .598447 0.015 0.988 -1.164389 1.182002
hdag5559 -.1203561 .6007601 - 0 . 2 0 0 0.841 -1.298086 1.057374
hdag6064 -.0064316 .5991175 - 0 . 0 1 1 0.991 -1.180942 1.168078
hdag6569 .0818509 .5999179 0.136 0.891 -1.094228 1.25793
hdag7074 .1226016 .599239 0.205 0.838 -1.052147 1.29735
hdag7579 .0085751 .6049606 0.014 0.989 -1 .17739 1.19454
hdag8084 -.1322969 .618776 -0 .214 0.831 -1.345345 1.080752
hdag85 .1688016 .6607228 0.255 0.798 -1.126479 1.464083
numdep2 -.0065142 .1083841 -0 .060 0.952 -.2189905 .205962
numdep3 -.0772076 .1235305 -0 .625 0.532 -.3193768 .1649616
_cons 1.357403 .815196 1.665 0.096 -.2407073 2.955513
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.75 Quantile regression Number of obs = 5475
Raw sixm of deviations 4221.462 (about 3.048799)
Table 7.A. 15. 0.75 Quantile regression, Households file
Min sum of deviations 3912.985 Pseudo R2 = 0.0731
logmed Coef. Std. Err. t P> 111 [95% Conf. Interval]
loginc -.3438676 .090772 -3 .788 0 . 0 0 0 - .521817 -.1659182
loginc 2 .048309 .0085792 5.631 0 . 0 0 0 .0314903 .0651277
dum_hi .2757175 .0419724 6.569 0 . 0 0 0 .1934349 .3580001
owner .2032209 .04596 4.422 0 . 0 0 0 .113121 .2933208
cobhead .0224335 .0428753 0.523 0.601 -.0616192 .1064862
female .0375641 .0404675 0.928 0.353 -.0417685 .1168967
smokers -.0362892 .0417521 -0.869 0.385 -.11814 .0455617
single -.1673055 .0707618 -2.364 0.018 -.3060269 -.0285842
couple -.0088283 .0673187 -0 .131 0.896 -.1407999 .1231432
handicap .1916236 .0580983 3.298 0 . 0 0 1 .0777277 .3055194
priveduc .1153969 .0700552 1.647 0 . 1 0 0 - .0219393 .2527332
st_nsw .1257734 .0905229 1.389 0.165 -.0516877 .3032346
st_vic .0261801 .0920253 0.284 0.776 -.1542264 .2065866
st_qns .0173053 .0960637 0.180 0.857 -.1710181 .2056287
st_sa -.0139173 .104005 -0.134 0.894 -.2178088 .1899742
st_wa .0368034 .1032208 0.357 0.721 -.1655507 .2391574
st_tas .023021 .102894 0.224 0.823 -.1786924 .2247343
st_nt .1181435 .1075546 1.098 0.272 -.0927065 .3289935
hdag2024 -.543914 .3785459 -1.437 0.151 -1.286015 .1981874
hdag2529 -.2906133 .3737675 -0 .778 0.437 -1.023347 .4421206
hdag3034 -.439536 .3728713 -1.179 0.239 -1.170513 .2914409
hdag3539 -.3283019 .373579 -0 .879 0.380 -1.060666 .4040623
hdag4044 -.3214914 .3742042 -0.859 0.390 -1.055081 .4120985
hdag4549 -.2204321 .3754253 -0.587 0.557 -.9564159 .5155518
hdag5054 -.1240719 .3760904 -0 .330 0.741 -.8613595 .6132158
hdag5559 -.4805299 .37738 -1 .273 0.203 -1.220346 .2592859
hdag6064 -.4109598 .3764758 -1 .092 0.275 -1.149003 .3270833
hdag6569 -.4747326 .3767547 -1 .260 0.208 -1.213322 .2638573
hdag7074 -.4521132 .3770486 -1 .199 0.231 -1.191279 .2870529
hdag7579 -.5513286 .3803631 -1 .449 0.147 -1.296992 .1943353
hdag8084 -.5707608 .3894105 -1 .466 0.143 -1.334161 .1926396
hdag85 -.7510092 .4175645 -1 .799 0.072 -1.569603 .0675842
numdep2 .1899614 .0684744 2.774 0.006 .0557241 .3241986
numdep3 .0803231 .0765492 1.049 0.294 -.0697438 .2303901
_cons 3.178477 .4596462 6.915 0 . 0 0 0 2.277387 4.079567
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.9 Quantile regression Number of obs = 5475
Raw sum of deviations 2207.343 (about 3.6599655)
Table 7.A. 16. 0.9 Quantile regression, Households file
Min sum of deviations 2065.272 Pseudo R2 = 0.0644
logined Coef. Std. Err. t P> 111 [95% Conf. Interval]
loginc -.2636431 .1054977 -2 .499 0 . 0 1 2 - .4704608 -.0568254
loginc 2 .0402843 .0101875 3.954 0 . 0 0 0 .0203128 .0602558
dum_hi .2797089 .0526563 5.312 0 . 0 0 0 .1764816 .3829363
owner .0964214 .0561373 1.718 0.086 -.0136303 .2064731
cobhead .0315827 .0529681 0.596 0.551 -.072256 .1354215
female .1747681 .0510898 3.421 0 . 0 0 1 .0746117 .2749245
smokers -.0289087 .0516299 -0 .560 0.576 -.130124 .0723066
single -.2772413 .0889773 -3 .116 0 . 0 0 2 -.4516724 -.1028101
couple -.0901806 .0836556 -1 .078 0.281 -.2541791 .0738178
handicap .256344 .0724203 3.540 0 . 0 0 0 .1143712 .3983169
priveduc .0170447 .0860845 0.198 0.843 -.1517154 .1858047
st_nsw .1369302 .1130656 1 . 2 1 1 0.226 -.0847236 .358584
st_v ic .1268353 .1149116 1.104 0.270 -.0984373 .352108
st_qns .0666154 .1204466 0.553 0.580 -.1695082 .302739
st_sa -.0079184 .130526 -0 .061 0.952 -.2638015 .2479647
st_wa .0515043 .1286166 0.400 0.689 -.2006356 .3036442
st_ ta s -.0929934 .1283727 -0 .724 0.469 -.3446553 .1586685
st_nt .0753063 .1333059 0.565 0.572 -.1860266 .3366392
hdag2024 .0574571 .5042427 0.114 0.909 -.9310603 1.045975
hdag2529 .1361513 .4986102 0.273 0.785 -.8413242 1.113627
hdag3034 .118635 .4973276 0.239 0.811 -.856326 1.093596
hdag3539 .2374905 .4988439 0.476 0.634 -.7404431 1.215424
hdag4044 .2928087 .4987569 0.587 0.557 -.6849544 1.270572
hdag4549 .3633919 .5003797 0.726 0.468 -.6175524 1.344336
hdag5054 .3696771 .5005456 0.739 0.460 -.6115924 1.350947
hdag5559 .1664047 .5016643 0.332 0.740 -.817058 1.149867
hdag6064 .3730956 .5005663 0.745 0.456 - .6082146 1.354406
hdag6569 .0391251 .5009684 0.078 0.938 -.9429734 1.021224
hdag7074 .0262955 .5013833 0.052 0.958 -.9566163 1.009207
hdag7579 .0947624 .5050204 0.188 0.851 - .8952795 1.084804
hdag8084 .16324 .5164526 0.316 0.752 - .8492136 1.175694
hdag85 .0789579 .5461205 0.145 0.885 - .9916567 1.149573
numdep2 .1307615 .0847908 1.542 0.123 -.0354624 .2969854
numdep3 .0636224 .0950223 0.670 0.503 -.1226594 .2499041
_cons 3.053553 .5845987 5.223 0 . 0 0 0 1.907506 4.1996
Table 7.A. 17. Probit model with heteroscedasticity, Households file
Heteroscedastic probit model: Number of obs 
Zero outcomes 
Nonzero outcomes
6420
3410
3010
Log likelihood = -3660.802
Wald c h i2 (33) 
Prob > chi2
30022.91
0.0000
dum_hi j Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err. z P> 1 z | [95% Conf. Interval]
dum_hi
itin c  j .0017525 .0003235 5.417 0 . 0 0 0 .0011184 .0023866
i t i n c 2  j - 6 . 19e-07 1 . 18e-07 -5 .261 0 . 0 0 0 - 8 . 50e-07 - 3 . 89e-07
itinc3 | 5 . 8 3 e - l l 1 . 2 4 e - l l 4.695 0 . 0 0 0 3 . 3 9 e - l l 8 . 2 6 e - l l
owner | .3992638 .1100724 3.627 0.000 .1835259 .6150016
cobhead j -.2236254 .071625 -3 .122 0 . 0 0 2 -.3640078 -.083243
smokers | -.2081268 .0754607 -2 .758 0.006 -.3560272 -.0602265
fitn ess  | .0011976 .0007382 1.622 0.105 -.0002493 .0026445
totmed | .0066972 .002055 3.259 0 . 0 0 1 .0026695 .0107248
single j .0803072 .0781778 1.027 0.304 -.0729184 .2335329
couple | .1612349 .0517414 3.116 0 . 0 0 2 .0598236 .2626462
handicap | .0010004 .0343179 0.029 0.977 -.0662615 .0682623
priveduc | .1919094 .0679784 2.823 0.005 .0586742 .3251446
s t_nsw j .1088184 .0845602 1.287 0.198 -.0569166 .2745534
st_vic  j .0847686 .0904372 0.937 0.349 -.092485 .2620222
st_qns | -.0113142 .1162521 -0 .097 0.922 -.2391641 .2165357
st_sa  | .3000627 .0635714 4.720 0.000 .1754651 .4246602
st_wa | .2002472 .0761458 2.630 0.009 .0510041 .3494903
st_tas  | .2860555 .0652169 4.386 0.000 .1582327 .4138783
st_nt | .1740742 .0854787 2.036 0.042 .0065391 .3416093
hdag2024 j .9435329 . .
hdag2529 | .9094902 .2265596 4.014 0.000 .4654416 1.353539
hdag3034 j 1.006786 .1981626 5.081 0.000 .6183942 1.395177
hdag3539 | 1.112427 .1737588 6.402 0.000 .7718659 1.452988
hdag4044 j 1.141021 .1700843 6.709 0.000 .8076619 1.47438
hdag4549 | 1.129269 .1732849 6.517 0.000 .7896364 1.468901
hdag5054 | 1.231174 .1512041 8.142 0.000 .9348192 1.527528
hdag5559 j 1.335967 .1373467 9.727 0.000 1.066773 1.605162
hdag6064 j 1.437259 .1152297 12.473 0.000 1.211413 1.663105
hdag6569 j 1.501834 .0977566 15.363 0.000 1.310235 1.693433
hdag7074 | 1.384559 .1216683 11.380 0.000 1.146093 1.623024
hdag7579 | 1.460712 .0821271 17.786 0.000 1.299746 1.621678
hdag8084 | 1.204429 .2149372 5.604 0.000 .7831595 1.625698
hdag85 | 1.047446 .3662242 2.860 0.004 .3296602 1.765233
numdep2  | - .0119401 .0686279 -0 .174 0.862 -.1464484 .1225681
numdep3 | -.1830893 .1011879 -1 .809 0.070 -.381414 .0152354
_cons | -2.497149 • •
lnsigma2  |
single j .0737054 .104767 0.704 0.482 -.131634 .2790449
couple j .1349809 .1058967 1.275 0 . 2 0 2 - .0725727 .3425345
female | .1483513 .0611855 2.425 0.015 .0284299 .2682728
handicap | -.1133604 .0869951 -1 .303 0.193 -.2838678 .0571469
st_nsw j .1090585 .1211661 0.900 0.368 -.1284226 .3465396
st_v ic  j .1237913 .1228839 1.007 0.314 -.1170568 .3646393
st_qns | .2305559 .1342995 1.717 0.086 -.0326663 .4937781
st_sa  j - .1428775 .1327997 -1.076 0.282 -.4031602 .1174053
st_wa | -.0111845 .1359233 -0 .082 0.934 -.2775894 .2552204
st_tas  | -.0811531 .1316976 -0 .616 0.538 -.3392756 .1769694
st_nt | .0125511 .1451216 0.086 0.931 -.2718819 .2969842
hdag2024 | -.4746003 .157512 -3 .013 0.003 -.783318 -.1658825
hdag2529 | - .2246018 .2642236 -0 .850 0.395 -.7424707 .293267
hdag3034 | -.2247501 .2508297 -0.896 0.370 -.7163673 .266867
hdag3539 | -.2399404 .2520891 -0 .952 0.341 -.7340261 .2541452
hdag4044 | -.2535574 .2553944 -0.993 0.321 -.7541213 .2470065
hdag4549 | - .3539226 .2614417 -1.354 0.176 -.8663388 .1584937
hdag5054 j - .5533568 .2700594 -2.049 0.040 -1.082664 -.0240501
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hdag5559 | -.4463086 .2665758 -1 .674 0.094 -.9687876 .0761703
hdag6064 j -.712115 .2577069 -2 .763 0.006 -1.217211 -.2070188
hdag6569 | -.9865334 .2655515 -3 .715 0 . 0 0 0 -1 .507005 -.4660621
hdag7074 | - .6528835 .2871434 -2 .274 0.023 -1.215674 -.0900928
hdag7579 | -1.104158 .3544619 -3 .115 0 . 0 0 2 -1 .79889 -.409425
hdag8084 | -.2432227 .3852903 -0 .631 0.528 -.9983778 .5119324
hdag85 j .2159253 .5404782 0.400 0.690 -.8433926 1.275243
numdep2  | -.0083322 .1077647 -0 .077 0.938 -.2195471 .2028826
numdep3 | -.1978793 .1136623 -1 .741 0.082 -.4206533 .0248948
Wald test  of lnsigma2=0: c h i2 (27) = 92.28 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Table 7.A. 18. Bivariate probit model, Households file
Bivariate probit regression  
Log likelihood = -6020.2844
Number of obs 
Wald c h i2 (6 6 ) 
Prob > chi2
6420
1640.91
0.0000
Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err. z P > | z | [95% Conf. Interval]
dum_hi |
i t in c  | .0021267 .0001453 14.639 0 . 0 0 0 .0018419 .0024114
i t i n c 2  | - 7 . 14e-07 8 . 25e-08 -8 .653 0 . 0 0 0 - 8 . 76e-07 - 5 . 52e-07
itinc3 | 6 . 4 8 e - l l l . l l e - 1 1 5.821 0 . 0 0 0 4 . 3 0 e - l l 8 . 6 6 e - l l
owner | .4898946 .0403491 12.141 0 . 0 0 0 .4108118 .5689773
cobhead | -.2973364 .039464 -7 .534 0 . 0 0 0 - .3746845 -.2199882
smokers | -.2620227 .03814 -6 .870 0 . 0 0 0 - .3367758 -.1872696
fitn e ss  j .0012103 .0007003 1.728 0.084 -.0001623 .0025829
single | .0121126 .0640329 0.189 0.850 -.1133895 .1376147
couple | .1626578 .0621323 2.618 0.009 .0408808 .2844347
handicap | -.0640092 .0525316 -1 .218 0.223 -.1669693 .0389509
priveduc j .2530745 .0660707 3.830 0 . 0 0 0 .1235782 .3825708
st_nsw | .1923721 .0823294 2.337 0.019 .0310094 .3537348
st_v ic  | .1404384 .0843072 1 . 6 6 6 0.096 -.0248007 .3056776
st_qns | .063545 .0885956 0.717 0.473 -.1100993 .2371892
st_sa  | .3959895 .0944105 4.194 0 . 0 0 0 .2109483 .5810307
st_wa j .2713301 .0952878 2.847 0.004 .0845694 .4580907
st_tas  j .418223 .0928591 4.504 0 . 0 0 0 .2362225 .6002234
st_nt j .2225787 .097725 2.278 0.023 .0310411 .4141162
hdag2024 | .6907564 .4991254 1.384 0.166 -.2875115 1.669024
hdag2529 | .6887012 .4961102 1.388 0.165 -.283657 1.661059
hdag3034 j .7909948 .4955101 1.596 0 . 1 1 0 - .1801872 1.762177
hdag3539 | .9222187 .495888 1.860 0.063 -.049704 1.894141
hdag4044 | .977515 .4963728 1.969 0.049 .0046422 1.950388
hdag4549 j .9647508 .4969144 1.941 0.052 -.0091835 1.938685
hdag5054 | 1.166136 .4975016 2.344 0.019 .1910505 2.141221
hdag5559 | 1.194079 .4986818 2.394 0.017 .2166802 2.171477
hdag6064 j 1.373342 .4978233 2.759 0.006 .3976265 2.349058
hdag6569 | 1.386651 .4980882 2.784 0.005 .4104166 2.362886
hdag7074 | 1.2143 .4981718 2.438 0.015 .2379011 2.190699
hdag7579 | 1.020319 .5006783 2.038 0.042 .0390075 2.00163
hdag8084 | 1.136212 .5058847 2.246 0.025 .1446965 2.127728
hdag85 | 1.204272 .5216604 2.309 0 . 0 2 1 .1818365 2.226708
numdep2  | .0007006 .0642925 0 . 0 1 1 0.991 -.1253104 .1267115
numdep3 | - .2208737 .0717986 -3 .076 0 . 0 0 2 -.3615963 -.0801511
_cons | -2 .50579 .5026448 -4 .985 0 . 0 0 0 -3 .490955 -1.520624
dum_med |
itin c  | .0011717 .0002174 5.388 0 . 0 0 0 .0007455 .0015979
i t i n c 2  | - 5 . 30e-07 1 . 67e-07 -3 .165 0 . 0 0 2 - 8 . 58e-07 - 2 . 02e-07
itinc3 | 7 . 3 7 e - l l 3 . 2 8 e - l l 2.249 0.025 9 . 47e-12 1 . 38e-10
owner | .2343535 .0458842 5.108 0 . 0 0 0 .1444221 .3242848
cobhead j - .193423 .0455328 -4 .248 0 . 0 0 0 - .2826656 -.1041805
smokers | - .121127 .0444757 -2 .723 0.006 -.2082979 -.0339562
fitn e ss  j .0001368 .0009391 0.146 0.884 -.0017038 .0019775
single | - .487854 .0711181 -6 .860 0 . 0 0 0 - .627243 -.348465
couple | .0373908 .0741408 0.504 0.614 -.1079226 .1827041
handicap | .0523368 .0681294 0.768 0.442 -.0811943 .1858679
priveduc | .1830274 .0947412 1.932 0.053 -.002662 .3687168
st_nsw | -.0696628 .099676 -0 .699 0.485 -.2650242 .1256985
st_v ic  | .0303037 .1018994 0.297 0.766 -.1694154 .2300229
st_qns j .475556 .1137315 4.181 0 . 0 0 0 .2526463 .6984657
st_sa  | .1177069 .1154899 1.019 0.308 -.1086491 .3440629
st_wa | .3562707 .1234763 2.885 0.004 .1142616 .5982799
st_tas  | -.1002415 .1112549 -0 .901 0.368 -.3182971 .1178141
st_nt j - .0914151 .1172665 -0 .780 0.436 -.3212532 .1384231
hdag2024 | .6540676 .2444398 2.676 0.007 .1749745 1.133161
hdag2529 | .6401505 .2396792 2.671 0.008 .1703879 1.109913
hdag3034 | .7346149 .2390338 3.073 0 . 0 0 2 .2661172 1.203112
hdag3539 | .8162905 .2407662 3.390 0 . 0 0 1 .3443975 1.288184
hdag4044 | .9491289 .2429757 3.906 0 . 0 0 0 .4729053 1.425352
hdag4549 | .8873046 .2438025 3.639 0 . 0 0 0 .4094605 1.365149
hdag5054 | 1.27594 .2502423
hdag5559 | 1.066291 .2496373
hdag6064 | 1.207319 .2477491
hdag6569 | 1.123838 .2457846
hdag7074 | 1.14286 .2457792
hdag7579 | 1.24884 .2515469
hdag8084 | 1.136114 .2626577
hdag85 | 1.01451 .2954614
numdep2  | .1927554 .0821073
rrumdep3 | .1012549 .0885166
_cons | -.3280405 .2616739
/athrho | .2596168 .0287168
rho I .2539371 .026865
.099 0 .. 0 0 0 .7854746 1.766406
.271 0 .. 0 0 0 .5770104 1.555571
.873 0 .. 0 0 0 .7217392 1.692898
.572 0 .. 0 0 0 .6421091 1.605567
.650 0 .. 0 0 0 .6611418 1.624578
.965 0 .. 0 0 0 .7558173 1.741863
.325 0 .. 0 0 0 .6213141 1.650913
.434 0 .. 0 0 1 .4354163 1.593604
.348 0 . 019 .031828 .3536827
.144 0 . 253 -.0722345 .2747443
.254 0 .. 2 1 0 - .8409118 .1848308
.041 0 .. 0 0 0 .2033329 .3159007
.2005763 .3057956
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
2
1
1
9
Wald test  of rho=0: ch i2 (1) = 81.7323 Pr > chi2 = 0.0000
Table 7.A. 19. Bivariate probit model, Singles file
Bivariate probit regression  
Log likelihood = -1900.256
Number of obs 
Wald c h i2 (58) 
Prob > chi2
1761
406.94
0.0000
1
Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err. z P> 1 z | [95% Conf. Interval]
dum_hi
it in c  | .0028225 .0003264 8.647 0 . 0 0 0 .0021827 .0034622
i t i n c 2  j - 9 . 31e-07 1 . 94e-07 -4 .802 0 . 0 0 0 - 1 . 31e-06 - 5 . 51e-07
itinc3 j 7 . 5 1 e - l l 2 . 3 0 e - l l 3.262 0 . 0 0 1 3 . 0 0 e - l l 1 . 2 0 e - 1 0
owner | .4473328 .0732711 6.105 0 . 0 0 0 .303724 .5909415
cobhead | - .169 .0819401 -2 .062 0.039 -.3295996 -.0084005
female | .2383263 .0714517 3.335 0 . 0 0 1 .0982835 .3783692
smokers j -.0233116 .0805791 -0 .289 0.772 -.1812437 .1346206
fitn e ss  | -.0010782 .0016574 -0 .651 0.515 -.0043266 .0021702
handicap | -.0901801 .1027932 -0 .877 0.380 -.2916511 .111291
st_nsw | .0805359 .153934 0.523 0.601 -.2211693 .382241
st_v ic  | .0394025 .1595189 0.247 0.805 -.2732488 .3520539
st_qns | -.0251267 .1660964 -0 .151 0.880 -.3506696 .3004163
st_sa  j .2914392 .1747053 1 . 6 6 8 0.095 -.0509769 .6338552
st_wa j .0596006 .18445 0.323 0.747 -.3019148 .421116
st_tas  | .3523696 .1701638 2.071 0.038 .0188546 .6858846
st_nt j .2178212 .191669 1.136 0.256 -.1578431 .5934855
hdag2024 | .3204103 .5067793 0.632 0.527 -.672859 1.31368
hdag2529 | .3967387 .5030775 0.789 0.430 -.5892752 1.382753
hdag3034 | .2787555 .5003619 0.557 0.577 -.7019359 1.259447
hdag3539 | .6716521 .4994019 1.345 0.179 -.3071576 1.650462
hdag4044 j .578934 .5012493 1.155 0.248 -.4034965 1.561365
hdag4549 | .890313 .5013113 1.776 0.076 -.0922391 1.872865
hdag5054 | .7894986 .5005194 1.577 0.115 -.1915015 1.770499
hdag5559 | .8917227 .503916 1.770 0.077 -.0959345 1.87938
hdag6064 | 1.055835 .497624 2 . 1 2 2 0.034 .0805104 2.031161
hdag6569 j 1.031162 .4963877 2.077 0.038 .0582599 2.004064
hdag7074 | .9015746 .496117 1.817 0.069 -.0707968 1.873946
hdag7579 | .8211277 .4986149 1.647 0 . 1 0 0 - .1561395 1.798395
hdag8084 | 1.068775 .5025394 2.127 0.033 .083816 2.053734
hdag85 | 1.144649 .5212691 2.196 0.028 .1229804 2.166318
_cons j -2.510497 .5121753 -4 .902 0 . 0 0 0 -3.514342 -1.506652
dum_med
it in c  | .0014881 .0004996 2.979 0.003 .0005089 .0024673
i t i n c 2  j - 8 . 37e-07 5 . 19e-07 -1 .613 0.107 - 1 . 85e-06 1 . 80e-07
itinc3 | 1 . 58e-10 1 . 1 2 e - 1 0 1.404 0.160 - 6 . 2 5 e - l l 3 . 78e-10
owner | .0615312 .0746123 0.825 0.410 -.0847063 .2077687
cobhead | -.1224388 .0765167 -1 .600 0 . 1 1 0 - .2724088 .0275312
female | .4228471 .0708977 5.964 0 . 0 0 0 .2838902 .561804
smokers j - .1539616 .0782641 -1 .967 0.049 -.3073564 -.0005668
fitn ess  j .0131522 .0060242 2.183 0.029 .0013449 .0249594
handicap | .0519256 .1075053 0.483 0.629 -.1587809 .2626321
st_nsw | -.1459256 .169711 -0 .860 0.390 -.4785531 .1867019
st_v ic  | -.1151749 .1727084 -0 .667 0.505 -.4536771 .2233273
st_qns | .3596924 .1864392 1.929 0.054 -.0057218 .7251065
st_sa  | .0187766 .1887754 0.099 0.921 -.3512164 .3887696
st_wa | .5098272 .2037667 2.502 0 . 0 1 2 .1104517 .9092026
st_tas  | -.1614645 .1874907 -0 .861 0.389 -.5289395 .2060104
st_nt | -.1663566 .2036764 -0 .817 0.414 -.565555 .2328418
hdag2024 j .6246093 .3159206 1.977 0.048 .0054162 1.243802
hdag2529 | .7041443 .3150313 2.235 0.025 .0866943 1.321594
hdag3034 j .8437301 .3100984 2.721 0.007 .2359485 1.451512
hdag3539 j .9950031 .3125366 3.184 0 . 0 0 1 .3824426 1.607564
hdag4044 | 1.048778 .3154234 3.325 0 . 0 0 1 .4305596 1.666997
hdag4549 j 1.008791 .3173351 3.179 0 . 0 0 1 .3868259 1.630757
hdag5054 | 1.213161 .3189228 3.804 0 . 0 0 0 .588084 1.838238
hdag5559 | 1.312754 .3192181 4.112 0 . 0 0 0 .6870981 1.93841
hdag6064 j 1.410977 .3141284 4.492 0 . 0 0 0 .7952962 2.026657
hdag6569 j 1.116657 .3079924 3.626 0 . 0 0 0 .5130035 1.720311
hdag7074 | 1.081124 .3086198 3.503 0 . 0 0 0 .4762404 1.686008
hdag7579 | 1.304725 .3114713 4.189 0 . 0 0 0 .6942522 1.915197
hdag8084 | 1.200736 .3227785 3.720 0 . 0 0 0 .5681014 1.83337
hdag85 | 1.101244 .3569039 3.086 0 . 0 0 2 .4017255 1.800763
_cons | -1.029247 .3415606 -3 .013 0.003 -1.698693 -.3598007
/athrho | .2913708 .0477118 6.107 0 . 0 0 0 .1978574 .3848841
rho | .283396 .0438799 .1953153 .3669415
Wald te s t  of rho=0: chi2(1) = 37.2942 Pr > chi2 = 0.0000
282
Table 7.A. 20. OLS model of log total medical expenditure, PHI=0,
Households file
Regression with robust standard errors Number of obs = 2685
F ( 33, 2651) = 7.88
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.0893
Root MSE = 1.2211
1
logmed | Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err. t P> 111 [95% Conf. Interval]
loginc | -.4308203 .1673384 -2 .575 0 0 1 0 - .7589473 -.1026932
loginc 2  | .0612423 .0153868 3.980 0 0 0 0 .031071 .0914137
owner | .1662285 .0540812 3 .074 0 0 0 2 .0601829 .2722742
cobhead | -.0217506 .0531472 -0 .409 0 682 -.1259647 .0824635
female j .0003402 .05222 0.007 0 995 -.1020559 .1027363
smokers | -.0171342 .0518641 -0 .330 0 741 -.1188324 .0845641
single | -.3278497 .088285 -3 .714 0 0 0 0 - .5009641 -.1547353
couple | -.1584622 .0870451 -1 .820 0 069 -.3291453 .0122209
handicap | .2512414 .0692693 3.627 0 0 0 0 .115414 .3870688
priveduc | .1979618 .1059181 1.869 0 062 -.0097286 .4056522
st_nsw | .188104 .1199085 1.569 0 117 -.0470196 .4232277
st_vic  j .1266381 .1221287 1.037 0 300 -.112839 .3661152
st_qns j .0012048 .1237327 0 . 0 1 0 0 992 -.2414177 .2438272
st_sa  | .0266502 .142043 0.188 0 851 -.2518762 .3051765
st_wa j - .1108181 .1379565 -0 .803 0 422 -.3813314 .1596952
st_tas  | .0974555 .1410784 0.691 0 490 -.1791794 .3740904
st_nt | .1174722 .1450119 0.810 0 418 -.1668757 .40182
hdag2024 j - .51289 .3641403 -1 .408 0 159 -1.226918 .2011378
hdag2529 j - .2586396 .3592044 -0 .720 0 472 -.9629888 .4457095
hdag3034 | -.319059 .3573591 -0 .893 0 372 -1 .01979 .3816719
hdag3539 | -.23443 .3607504 -0 .650 0 516 -.9418107 .4729507
hdag4044 | -.1559658 .3594499 -0 .434 0 664 -.8607964 .5488647
hdag4549 | - .2230631 .3661879 -0 .609 0 542 -.941106 .4949798
hdag5054 | -.1837268 .368297 -0 .499 0 618 -.9059053 .5384517
hdag5559 | - .2816182 .3641585 -0 .773 0 439 -.9956817 .4324453
hdag6064 | - .3073394 .3623966 -0 .848 0 396 -1 .017948 .4032694
hdag6569 | - .3652924 .3620736 -1 .009 0 313 -1.075268 .344683
hdag7074 | -.2783163 .3621426 -0 .769 0 442 -.988427 .4317943
hdag7579 | -.3122763 .3635128 -0 .859 0 390 -1.025074 .4005211
hdag8084 | - .3821274 .3797747 -1 .006 0 314 -1.126812 .3625572
hdag85 | -.3534371 .3926 -0 .900 0 368 -1 .12327 .4163962
numdep2  | .0093305 .0873445 0.107 0 915 -.1619397 .1806007
numdep3 | - .0998902 .0964686 -1 .035 0 301 -.2890516 .0892711
_cons 1 2.379212 .6071625 3 .919 0 0 0 0 1.188652 3.569772
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Table 7.A. 21. OLS model of log total medical expenditure, PHI=1,
Households file
Regression with robust standard errors Number of obs 
F ( 32, 2757) 
Prob > F 
R-squared 
Root MSE
2790 
8 . 1 2  
= 0 . 0 0 0 0  
= 0.0855  
= 1.2034
1
logmed | Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
loginc | -.3737706 .1444847 -2 .587 0 . 0 1 0 - .6570797 -.0904614
loginc 2  | .0524442 .0125876 4.166 0 . 0 0 0 .0277621 .0771264
owner | .1374164 .0657801 2.089 0.037 .0084332 .2663996
cobhead | -.0079591 .0565317 -0.141 0 . 8 8 8 - .1188079 .1028897
female | .1195749 .0534444 2.237 0.025 .0147798 .2243701
smokers | - .0191705 .0547046 -0 .350 0.726 -.1264367 .0880957
single j -.5085135 .0957663 -5 .310 0 . 0 0 0 - .6962944 -.3207326
couple j - .1936236 .0783211 -2 .472 0.013 -.3471976 -.0400497
handicap | .2390767 .0752646 3.176 0 . 0 0 2 .0914961 .3866574
priveduc | .0765199 .0770218 0.993 0.321 -.0745064 .2275461
st_nsw | .1521736 .1138312 1.337 0.181 -.0710294 .3753766
st_v ic  | .0878241 .1148408 0.765 0.444 -.1373586 .3130069
st_qns | .1581696 .1222838 1.293 0.196 -.0816075 .3979468
st_sa  j .1386643 .1259386 1 . 1 0 1 0.271 -.1082792 .3856079
st_wa j .0774332 .1313453 0.590 0.556 -.180112 .3349783
st_tas  j - .0942872 .1268762 -0 .743 0.457 -.3430693 .1544949
st_nt j .0887407 .1325879 0.669 0.503 -.171241 .3487223
hdag2024 | -.4567822 .2531367 -1 .804 0.071 -.953139 .0395745
hdag2529 | -.1420792 .2196011 -0 .647 0.518 -.5726784 .2885201
hdag3034 | - .1523691 .2172465 -0 .701 0.483 -.5783513 .2736131
hdag3539 j - .2302491 .2161207 -1 .065 0.287 -.6540238 .1935256
hdag4044 j - .1550287 .2178624 -0 .712 0.477 -.5822186 .2721613
hdag4549 | - .0062579 .2163073 -0 .029 0.977 -.4303985 .4178828
hdag5054 j .0345684 .2158877 0.160 0.873 -.3887495 .4578863
hdag5559 j - .1256417 .2248292 -0 .559 0.576 -.5664924 .315209
hdag6064 | .0149049 .2168358 0.069 0.945 -.4102721 .4400819
hdag6569 | .0407491 .2148854 0.190 0.850 -.3806035 .4621017
hdag7074 | - .09524 .2159502 -0 .441 0.659 -.5186805 .3282005
hdag7579 | -.0482078 .2372442 -0 .203 0.839 -.513402 .4169864
hdag8084 | 
hdag85 j
(dropped)
.2903488 .3350992 0 . 8 6 6 0.386 -.366722 .9474197
numdep2  | .1229253 .07935 1.549 0 . 1 2 1 -.0326661 .2785167
numdep3 | .1774312 .0944452 1.879 0.060 -.0077592 .3626216
_cons | 2.497976 .4913453 5.084 0 . 0 0 0 1.534534 3.461418
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Table 7.A. 22. OLS model of log total medical expenditure, PHI=0, Singles
file
Regression with robust standard errors Number of obs 
F ( 28, 744) 
Prob > F 
R-squared 
Root MSE
773 
2.06  
= 0 . 0 0 1 1  
= 0.0680  
= 1.2395
1
logined | Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err t P> 11 1 [95% Conf. Interval]
loginc 1 - .334362 .1952136 -1.713 0.087 -.7175969 .048873
loginc 2  | .0463395 .0219445 2 . 1 1 2 0.035 .003259 .08942
owner | - .0131262 .1000297 -0 .131 0.896 - .2095004 .1832479
cobhead | -.0200943 .1054965 -0 .190 0.849 - .2272006 .187012
female | -.014424 .1028726 -0 .140 0.889 -.216379 .1875311
smokers | -.0251065 .105361 -0 .238 0.812 - .2319468 .1817338
handicap | .3141567 .1158752 2.711 0.007 .0866754 .5416381
st_nsw 1 .0415068 .2164076 0.192 0.848 - .3833355 .4663491
st_v ic  1 - .2788412 .224136 -1 .244 0.214 -.7188554 .161173
st_qns I -.4231917 .2304474 -1 .836 0.067 -.8755962 .0292129
st_sa  1 - .4337829 .2570767 -1 .687 0.092 -.9384649 .0708991
st_wa I -.5622073 .2492031 -2 .256 0.024 -1.051432 -.0729823
st_tas  1 - .0409268 .2693804 -0.152 0.879 -.5697631 .4879094
st_nt 1 - .1647213 .2768671 -0 .595 0.552 -.708255 .3788124
hdag2024 j - .6959431 .4646234 -1 .498 0.135 -1.608072 .2161859
hdag2529 j -.4057824 .4586008 -0.885 0.377 -1.306088 .4945231
hdag3034 j -.3554459 .4507744 -0 .789 0.431 -1.240387 .5294953
hdag3539 j -.3481626 .4642217 -0 .750 0.453 -1.259503 .5631778
hdag4044 | -.4679199 .4607728 -1 .016 0.310 -1.37249 .4366498
hdag4549 j .0203994 .4813952 0.042 0.966 -.9246552 .9654541
hdag5054 j - .591189 .4764471 -1 .241 0.215 -1.52653 .3441517
hdag5559 | -.7344958 .443804 -1 .655 0.098 -1.605753 .1367613
hdag6064 | -.5793272 .4416667 -1 .312 0.190 -1.446389 .2877342
hdag6569 | -.5228017 .443218 -1 .180 0.239 -1.392909 .3473051
hdag7074 j - .3914781 .4403128 -0 .889 0.374 -1.255881 .4729253
hdag7579 | - .3784488 .4396424 -0 .861 0.390 -1.241536 .4846385
hdag8084 j -.439639 .4549499 -0 .966 0.334 -1.332777 .4534992
hdag85 | -  .4899384 .4873925 -1 .005 0.315 -1.446767 .4668899
_cons j 2.538822 .6634473 3.827 0 . 0 0 0 1.23637 3.841273
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Table 7.A. 23. OLS model of log total medical expenditure, PHI=1, Singles
file
Regression with robust standard errors Number of obs 
F( 27, 483) 
Prob > F 
R-squared 
Root MSE
511 
1.77  
= 0.0107  
= 0.0801  
= 1.3128
1
logmed | Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err t P> 111 [95% Conf. Interval]
loginc | - .3544954 .198434 -1 .786 0.075 -.7443959 .0354051
loginc 2  | .0536166 .0232583 2.305 0 . 0 2 2 .0079166 .0993166
owner | .2186084 .1534591 1.425 0.155 -.0829215 .5201384
cobhead | .0603701 .1529916 0.395 0.693 -.2402412 .3609814
female j .2611752 .1321977 1.976 0.049 .0014216 .5209287
smokers | -.2091026 .1578226 -1 .325 0.186 -.5192063 . 1 0 1 0 0 1
handicap | .6627729 .2050714 3.232 0 . 0 0 1 .2598306 1.065715
st_nsw j .51398 .3082356 1.667 0.096 -.0916684 1.119628
st_v ic  | .416127 .3144805 1.323 0.186 -.2017919 1.034046
st_qns j .1181759 .3342884 0.354 0.724 -.5386633 .7750151
st_sa  | .3946142 .3375115 1.169 0.243 -.268558 1.057786
st_wa j .1432357 .3940806 0.363 0.716 -.6310883 .9175598
st_tas  j .1722002 .3280938 0.525 0.600 -.4724671 .8168676
st_nt j .4269031 .3434761 1.243 0.215 -.2479888 1.101795
hdag2024 | (dropped)
hdag2529 | .1488463 .4372756 0.340 0.734 -.710351 1.008044
hdag3034 | .1389095 .4254705 0.326 0.744 -.6970921 .9749112
hdag3539 | -.2029731 .3744937 -0 .542 0.588 -.9388111 .532865
hdag4044 | .1843186 .3976442 0.464 0.643 -.5970075 .9656448
hdag4549 j .2989102 .4030582 0.742 0.459 -.4930538 1.090874
hdag5054 j .336854 .3721107 0.905 0.366 -.3943018 1.06801
hdag5559 | .2923961 .464756 0.629 0.530 -.6207972 1.205589
hdag6064 | .2768421 .3835133 0.722 0.471 -.4767184 1.030402
hdag6569 | .2620343 .383733 0.683 0.495 -.4919578 1.016027
hdag7074 j .1235787 .3916213 0.316 0.752 -.6459131 .8930705
hdag7579 j .0506999 .393213 0.129 0.897 -.7219195 .8233193
hdag8084 | -.2696171 .4399874 -0 .613 0.540 -1.134143 .5949086
hdag85 | .4076249 .493369 0.826 0.409 - .5617899 1.37704
_cons 1.225029 .6228095 1.967 0.050 .0012783 2.44878
C h a p t e r  8. C o n c l u s io n
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Understanding the mechanisms behind the demand for medical care, and 
their links with the availability of health insurance, is a challenging task which 
has attracted significant attention from economists around the globe. A good model 
has to recognise that health is a valuable asset, that medical care can improve 
health, and that insurance plays an important role in mitigating the financial risks 
due to the illness accompanied by high medical expenditure. Imperfect information, 
moral hazard and adverse selection are all present in the health insurance market. 
Regulators intervening in this market need to understand the likely effects of the 
policies, and the goal of economists is to develop models suitable for policy 
evaluation. In this thesis, an attempt was made to add to the economic 
understanding of the relationship between the consumption of medical care and 
health insurance, with application to current Australian developments.
The Australian health care system is located in the middle of the spectrum 
of systems existing in the developed countries. It is characterised by an extensive 
government involvement in health care provision and finance through the 
universal tax-funded health insurance scheme. At the same time, medical 
practitioners provide their service on a fee-for-service basis. Private health 
insurance complements public coverage for a range of services, and is an important 
part of the health care finance. Chapter 2 of the thesis provides a concise review of 
the historical facts related to the public debate about the architecture of the 
Australian health insurance systems. It covers the major steps in the development 
of the national insurance scheme, including the early Commonwealth actions in 
health care, the failed Earle Page Plan I, the Kinnear Report, the amendment to 
the Constitution in 1946, introduction of the voluntary health insurance known as 
the Earle Page Scheme II, and the National Health Act of 1953. The Australian 
Medical Association played an important role in shaping public policies and 
attitudes towards the principles of health care provision, and was vehemently 
opposed to the public subscription of medical practitioners. A heated political 
debate in the late-sixties, known as the Voluntarism versus Compulsion debate,
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was eventually resolved with the introduction of Medibank in 1975, followed by the 
creation of Medicare in 1984. Since then, private health insurance coverage was 
continuously falling, hitting a low in 1998-99, when a set of government initiatives 
was introduced to assist the struggling sector. Chapter 2 studies some major 
features of the private health insurance regulatory environment, including 
community rating and mandatory contributions to the reinsurance pool, and 
supplies evidence for deterioration of the risk characteristics of the privately 
insured. Examining the results of the Industry Commission Inquiry conducted in 
1996-97, the fall of private health insurance coverage is not at all surprising. The 
crowding-out effect of public health insurance on the private system has received 
its due attention in the literature, and the Australian phenomenon falls into the 
same category.
Since the recent policy change in private health insurance regulations, 
including introduction of the Lifetime Health Cover and measures aimed at 
elimination of uncertain residual out-of-pocket expenditure for the privately 
insured, combined with tax penalties for high-income earners who fail to purchase 
private hospital coverage, a reversal in the membership trend has occurred. 
According to the Private Health Insurance Administration Council, private 
hospital coverage reached 46% by the end of the third quarter of 2000, a drastic 
fourteen percentage points increase since the first quarter of the same year. A 
sharp increase in the amount of benefits above the Schedule Fee, which health 
funds gained the legal power to offer, has also occurred since the introduction of 
“no gap” and “known gap” policies. The industry-level data was not available for 
this research, thus the impact of the recent government policies on the demand for 
medical care could not be econometrically quantified. Even so, the theory of 
demand for medical care suggests that expanding the scope of insurance, or 
effectively reducing the consumer’s copayments for certain services, leads to an 
increase in demand for those services. This effect, known as moral hazard, has 
been considered in great detail in Chapter 3.
Chapter 3 provides a survey of the health economics literature, with a 
particular emphasis on theoretical models of the demand for medical care and 
insurance. It covers the Grossman model of demand for health and its
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deterministic and stochastic extensions. A lot of attention is devoted to the 
problems of moral hazard in the health insurance market, and an associated 
welfare loss. Studies of health insurance price elasticity of the demand for medical 
care are also covered in this chapter. Other issues include the crowding-out effect 
of public insurance on private schemes, inequality in health, and measures of 
health. This chapter concludes that there is a void in the current literature, related 
to the dynamic stochastic model of demand for health capable of incorporating 
health insurance. This thesis has been aimed at filling this void by proposing an 
original theoretical model of such a kind.
The model of Chapter 4, developed independently from Isaac Ehrlich’s 
(2000) model, incorporates health-improving activities which influence survival 
probabilities. It uses dynamic optimality conditions for the shadow prices of wealth, 
mortality rate, and the probability of life extension, to establish the optimal choice 
of medical care. It is shown that under the assumptions of the model, a lower price 
of medical care, a lower interest rate, a higher wage rate and a lower subjective 
discount rate all lead to a higher optimal consumption of medical care and to a 
higher expected lifespan, which is an endogenous variable in the model. An 
important distinction of the proposed model from Ehrlich’s variant is that leisure is 
included in the utility function. A set of conditions linking optimal consumption 
and leisure choices was derived. It has been shown that if investment in medical 
care just offsets the increase in hazard rate, consumption is growing, as long as the 
interest rate outweighs the sum of the psychological and physiological discount 
rates - an analogue to Euler’s equation in this case. Later in the thesis (Chapter 6), 
empirical evidence was found to support the broad definition of medical services as 
health-enhancing activities. Medical expenditure and contributions for fitness and 
sports are found to be close in distribution.
Chapter 5 is a core theoretical chapter of the thesis. It uses a stochastic 
optimisation technique and Ito’s stochastic differentiation lemma as its major 
analytical tool. The consumer derives instantaneous utility from the stream of 
consumption and health-adjusted leisure. Labour is paid an efficiency wage 
dependent on the health status. Health is assumed to be measured by a continuous 
index which follows a Wiener process. The rate of change in health is comprised of
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the investment in health through the purchase of medical care, and the health 
depreciation rate. The wealth accumulation equation also follows a Wiener 
specification, and its disturbance is allowed to be correlated with the health error 
term. The chapter first considers a self-insured consumer, for whom optimality 
conditions of the interior solution for consumption, leisure and medical care are 
obtained. Optimal evolutions of the marginal value of health and wealth allow for 
the optimal evolution of the medical care to be solved, which appears to follows a 
similar Wiener specification. Comparison with the no-uncertainty case produces 
the familiar Euler’s equation, in which the shadow price of wealth depends only on 
the interest rate and subjective discount rate. The marginal value of health is 
shown to depend on the subjective discount rate, health capital depreciation rate, 
the price of medical care, wage rate, and the shape of the medical care 
transformation schedule. It is shown that uncertainty changes the marginal 
evaluation of both health and wealth, adding variances of the shock components 
adjusted by the parameters of risk aversion to the discount factors.
As another example, the case of logarithmic utility function was considered, 
which allowed to derive a simple interior solution for optimal consumption, leisure 
(labour supply) and demand for medical care. In this simplest specification, the 
income elasticity of the demand for medical care is constant. In the more general 
case, this is not necessarily true - a model prediction which is supported in the 
consequent empirical analysis of Chapter 7.
In the remainder of Chapter 5, a model of health insurance with constant 
coinsurance rate is introduced. Two alternative specifications are considered. In 
the first specification, it is shown that if the premium is set up under the 
assumption of invariance of the pre-insurance distribution of medical expenditure, 
the insurance contract is not sustainable, because the distribution of medical 
expenditure changes after the introduction of insurance. Marginal evaluation of 
health changes, and the additional term in the optimal value of health represents a 
moral hazard effect (increase in the demand for medical care). The second contract 
presented in Chapter 5 models insurance as a two-stage decision. First, the 
household chooses the optimal coinsurance rate, and after the uncertainty of the 
health status is resolved, a decision about the consumption of medical care is made,
with the coinsurance rate taken as given. Optimality conditions are derived and 
discussed.
A theoretical relationship between the coinsurance rate elasticity of the 
demand for medical care and the coinsurance elasticities of health and wealth is 
derived in Chapter 5. It is shown that if an increase in coinsurance rate leads to a 
lower level of health, and there is no income effect (due to the appropriate 
adjustment in premium), then the direction of change in the demand for medical 
care depends on the degree of the relative risk aversion with respect to health. If 
the consumer exhibits high relative risk aversion with respect to health (greater 
than one), it is theoretically possible that an increase in the coinsurance rate (i.e. 
an increase in the consumer’s out-of-pocket expenditure) may lead to a higher 
demand for medical care. Hence, the degree of risk aversion towards health is an 
important parameter in this model. Estimation of this parameter from real data is 
left for further research.
Chapter 5 also derives expressions for coinsurance rate elasticities of 
consumption and leisure. It is shown that changes in consumption due to the 
increase in coinsurance rate are driven by the income effect, and that the overall 
effect of change in the coinsurance rate on leisure (and labour supply) is 
ambiguous. Assumptions made in derivation of these results are constant relative 
risk aversion with respect to health and wealth, and constant elasticity of the 
health-adjustment factor in the utility function, equal to the elasticity of the 
medical care transformation function.
To fully test the theoretical model developed in Chapter 5, an extensive 
panel dataset is needed, containing time series for consumption, labour supply, 
medical expenditure and price of medical care, along with a rich set of demographic 
and health characteristics. Unfortunately, this level of data was not available at 
the time of the analysis. The data which satisfied part of the requirements for 
model applicability was obtained from the 1993-94 Household Expenditure Survey, 
Australia, conducted by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. The major problem 
with these data includes lack of information on the type of coverage (single vs. 
family, or hospital vs. ancillary or both). This made it necessary to restrict the 
analysis to those households for whom the insurance type could be derived
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unambiguously in respect of single/family classification. The level of the coverage 
(e.g. hospital, ancillary, or both) still could not be resolved from the data. The 
benefits of using this dataset include detailed income and expenditure data, 
including health and fitness expenditure, and a rich set of demographic variables.
Chapter 6 presents a detailed description of the dataset used to test some of 
the findings of the theoretical chapters. Optimality conditions derived in Chapter 5 
suggest that the optimal interior solution for medical care is a function of the 
marginal value of health, the marginal value of wealth, the price of medical care, 
the shape of the health investment schedule, and the coinsurance rate. The 
marginal value of health is not directly measurable, even so proxy variables can be 
used, including age, gender, family composition, socio-economic status, 
geographical location and type of residence, cultural background, apparent attitude 
toward risk (smoking), and medical condition, to approximate an unobservable 
value of individual health. Empirical evidence of the links between those variables 
and medical expenditure can also be expected. On the same grounds, the optimality 
condition for choosing a coinsurance rate suggests that the interior coinsurance 
rate is an implicit function of the marginal values of health and wealth. Hence, a 
decision to purchase private health insurance coverage can be linked to the 
explanatory factors which serve as proxies for the marginal value of health 
(wealth).
Chapter 6 concludes that income is the major determinant of the PHI 
decision, influencing both the decision to insure, and the decision of how much 
coverage to purchase. Expenditure on private health insurance increases with 
income, and so does total health care expenditure. Households in the upper income 
quintile are found to contribute twice as much in health insurance premiums than 
the insured in the lowest quintile. A similar effect was established for such factors 
as socio-economic disadvantage status, employment and occupation status of the 
head of household, all of which are directly linked to income. In the insured 
households, the incidence of unemployment is one third of that in the households 
without private health coverage. A managerial and professional occupation of the 
head of household is positively linked to the likelihood of having private coverage. 
Private ownership or purchasing of an occupied dwelling is also found to be a
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Other important determinants of the private health insurance decision 
include age, gender, and family composition. Insured households are found to be 
“older” on average than uninsured. Couples with or without children are much 
more likely to have some type of PHI coverage than singles. Single parent families 
in the dataset are predominantly uninsured. An interesting link appears to exist 
between private education for children and the private health insurance choice. 
Whether this link is explained by some common factor, for example a relatively 
higher weight attached to the private good in the household’s utility function, is a 
subject for further analysis. One of the seemingly puzzling results is the lack of 
significance of health status and a handicap in explaining the health insurance 
decision. However, this result has been established in previous studies based on 
Australian data, and is consistent with the safety-net role played by Medicare in 
the provision for people with health conditions and handicaps.
Residence in South Australia and Tasmania was linked to an increase in the 
probability of being insured, while residence in Queensland yields some lower odds 
for PHI. An overseas, non-English speaking country of birth of the head of 
household is found to reduce the chances of PHI. Smoking has been found to be 
associated with a lower incidence of PHI, and can be considered a candidate for a 
proxy for risk aversion on the households, but not on the singles level, where the 
significance of its effect disappears. Some curious results concerning females 
smoking suggest that, for females, smoking seems to be separable from their 
decision to purchase private health insurance. Smoking females are as likely to be 
insured as non-smoking females, while for males, the insurance rate of smokers is 
much lower than that of non-smokers. Additional research and perhaps an 
alternative dataset with more observations on smokers is needed to accept or reject 
this hypothesis. Among some other curious by-products of the analysis is the 
positive link between the consumption of wine and incidence of PHI coverage, the 
validity of which also has to be tested on a larger dataset.
Chapter 6 contains an analysis of detailed medical expenditure items for 
both insured and uninsured households and concludes that, at any income level, 
persons with PHI spend more on general practitioners and specialists. Opticians
significant factor in favour of the PHI decision.
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fees as a a percentage of the total medical bill are higher for uninsured than for 
insured. Uninsured persons in the highest income quintiles incur higher hospital 
charges than insured, all of which can be anticipated, knowing the scope of services 
covered by private health insurance. On average, simple comparative statistics 
analysis performed on the data shows that insured households spend more on 
medical care than uninsured households. A health condition leads to higher 
medical spending for the uninsured, while no significant difference is observed 
within the insured group. Health-improving activities measured by total 
expenditure on fitness and sports-related activities are found to have a smaller 
explanatory power in the PHI decision. Interestingly enough, fitness expenditure of 
the (younger) single persons in the top income quintile is inversely related to the 
amount of PHI contribution, which suggests that younger healthier people may 
choose to substitute exercise for more extensive health coverage. This renders 
empirical support for the assumptions of the model in Chapter 4: it seems 
reasonable to assume that an individual can rationally choose to invest in health 
by purchasing fitness services, perceiving this as improving his or her survival 
chances. Gender differential has been found in both medical and fitness 
expenditure: on average, insured females spend more (less) on medical care 
(fitness) than insured males.
Tests for lognormality of income, medical, and fitness expenditure reported 
in Chapter 6 suggest that, although statistical tests reject the lognormality 
hypothesis, departures from lognormality are reasonably modest, and the model 
assumptions of Chapter 5 seem to be justified by the data. Fitness and medical 
expenditure have been fitted against the lognormal density, and estimates of mean 
and variance have been found to be very close. This gives more empirical support 
for a wider concept of medical care as an investment into health capital formation 
used in Chapter 4.
Chapter 7 continues the analysis started in Chapter 6 by proposing several 
empirical models based on the theory developed in Chapter 5. The first-order 
conditions determining the optimal coinsurance rate and medical expenditure lay 
the foundation for the binary choice model of private health insurance choice. 
Univariate logit and probit models of health insurance choice fitted to the
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households and singles data separately allow us to identify correctly between 71 
and 72 percent of the cases. Predictions of both logit and probit models are quite 
similar. Factors positively contributing to the probability of having PHI include 
income, ownership of dwelling, expected medical expenditure, older age of the head 
of household, couple-only composition of household, residence in South Australia, 
Western Australia, Tasmania and Northern Territory, and private education for 
children. Negative factors include foreign (non-English speaking) country of birth 
of the head of household, smoking, and more than two dependent children in the 
family. In the singles file, gender is found to be a significant factor, with a female’s 
odds of being privately insured equal to 1.46 of a male’s odds, ceteris paribus. For 
each income quintile, the marginal effect of income on the probability of PHI=1 has 
been evaluated and found to decrease with the level of income. Changing the model 
to include logarithmic, rather than level, terms in income, income elasticity of 
demand for private health insurance has been estimated at 0.12-0.14, depending on 
the logit or probit specification. The result is comparable to other estimates based 
on the Australian data, and is higher than income elasticity of demand for health 
insurance estimated from the US data. It is also intuitive because of the 
availability of the universal coverage in Australia, which effectively makes private 
health insurance a supplement rather than alternative to the basic system.
Several problems arise during the estimation. The main one is 
heteroscedasticity detected in the households data. Quantile regression analysis 
confirmed the problem of heteroscedasticity in the logarithm of total household 
medical expenditure data. Estimated at the median income levels within the 
household income quintiles, the income elasticity of the demand for medical care 
has been found to increase with income at each quantile of the conditional 
distribution of log medical expenditure. At the same time, conditional demand for 
medical care was found to be more elastic around the median of the distribution of 
medical expenditure, rather than at its tails, within each income quintile. 
Estimated income elasticity of demand for medical care ranges from 0.13 for the 
bottom income quintile, bottom decile of total medical expenditure, to 0.48 for the 
top income quintile, lowest quartile of the medical expenditure. Private health 
insurance has been identified as a positive and significant contributor to total 
medical expenditure, with an estimated coefficient of about 0.30. The assumption of
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its orthogonality with the error terms has been relaxed later in the chapter.
The probit model corrected for heteroscedasticity has been fitted to the 
households data, leading to some downward revision in the estimates. Finally, a 
model of a joint decision concerning private health insurance choice and a decision 
to incur positive medical expenditure, has been estimated. Income elasticities of 
the demand for medical care were calculated at the second stage of the model, 
based on the observations with positive medical expenditure. This model identifies 
income as an important determinant of both decisions (PHI=1 and m>0), with the 
predicted marginal probabilities of having private health insurance coverage and 
positive medical expenditure increasing by income quintile. For both insured and 
not, income elasticity of demand for medical care has been estimated to increase 
with income.
Estimated income elasticity of demand for medical care has been found to be 
between 0.20 and 0.45 for uninsured households, and 0.16 and 0.40 for insured 
households, increasing with income in both cases. It appears that the demand of 
insured households is less elastic than the demand of uninsured households. The 
result for singles is opposite: uninsured single persons have estimated income 
elasticity of demand for medical care between 0.13 and 0.28, compared with 0.19 
and 0.36 for insured. In both cases, income elasticity of demand is increasing with 
income quintile. This disparity of results requires additional investigation.
Summarising this chapter and the thesis as a whole, income has been found 
to be a major determinant of private health insurance choice in Australia, as well 
as a determinant of the decision to spend on medical services. The income elasticity 
of demand for medical care has been estimated to increase with the level of income. 
Policies which target income (e.g. a Medicare Levy Surcharge on high income 
earners without private health insurance), can be expected to be effective in 
stimulating the private health insurance decision. The effect of “known gap” and 
“no gap” policies is more difficult to predict based on the available data. The 
aggregate effect will depend on the age and income distribution of the insured 
population, and their varying income and price elasticities. A finer level of data is 
needed to quantify the change in demand based on the proposed model.
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